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This research explores the impact of formal mechanisms for public participation on 
policies regulating the provision of municipal solid waste management (MSWM) in 
two emerging economies: Brazil and India. It argues that although public participation 
is often interpreted as a means of enabling citizens to exert influence over government 
policies, for the benefit of society as a whole, it is in fact powerful interest groups that 
dominate the official participatory processes. Thus, in certain cases, rather than 
enhancing the political involvement of ordinary citizens, the mechanisms established 
to encourage public participation favour dominant economic and political forces. 
This research, therefore, provides a critical analysis of the concept of public 
participation from a theoretical interest group perspective: it identifies the main 
participants in these political processes, and analyses not only how and why these 
channels of public participation are implemented, but also who benefits from their 
political mechanisms. 
The comparative analysis of these countries is especially useful in the current context 
since they are both subject to immense pressure from the global market to promote 
economic growth, yet their ability to deal with the increasing tide of waste generated 
as a result, and their institutional capacity to regulate market practices, remain for the 
most part inadequate. Although each country has quite distinct formal decision-
making processes and spaces of public participation, the research reveals remarkably 
similar policy outcomes in the MSWM sector – that is, powerful interest groups wield 
significant influence in both countries, albeit in specific ways. This investigation of 
the influence of interest groups on decision-making, therefore, furthers our 
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understanding of how public participation works in these emerging economies, and to 






Esta pesquisa explora o impacto dos mecanismos formais de participação pública nas 
políticas de regulação da prestação de gestão de resíduos sólido municipal em duas 
economias emergentes: Brasil e Índia. 
A pesquisa argumenta que, embora a participação pública seja interpretada como um 
meio de permitir que o cidadão possa exercer influência sobre políticas do governo, 
em prol da sociedade como um todo, mecanismos, tais como consultas públicas, 
acabam sendo dominados por grupos de interesse econômico. Portanto, em 
determinadas circunstâncias, ao invés de reforçar a participação política do cidadão, 
esses mecanismos participativos acabam por favorecer interesses econômicos. 
Esta pesquisa fornece uma análise crítica do conceito de participação pública pela 
perspectiva teórica dos grupo de interesse, a fim de identificar os principais 
participantes nestes processos políticos. A pesquisa analisa, não apenas como e 
porque os canais de participação pública são implementados, mas também quem se 
beneficia desses mecanismos políticos. 
A análise comparativa desses países é especialmente útil no contexto atual, já que 
ambos estão sob forte pressão de crescimento econômico de seus mercados internos, 
enquanto sua capacidade de lidar com a crescente geração de resíduos sólidos urbanos 
e sua capacidade institucional de regular as práticas de mercado permanece, em 
grande parte, inadequadas. Embora esses países apresentem processos de tomada de 
decisão e espaços de participação pública distintos, a análise comparativa mostra 
resultados bastante semelhantes. Portanto, a investigação da influência de grupos de 
interesse na tomada de decisões contribui para promover nossa compreensão de como 
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a participação pública opera nessas economias emergentes e, em que medida, afetam 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The context and objective of the research  
This research explores the impact of formal mechanisms for public participation on 
policies regulating the provision of municipal solid waste management (MSWM) in 
two emerging economies: Brazil and India. The study of these countries is especially 
useful in the current context since they are both subject to immense pressure from the 
global market to promote economic growth, while their ability to deal with the 
increasing tide of waste that results from this economic doctrine of elevated 
production and consumption, and their institutional capacity to regulate the practices 
of the market, remain for the most part inadequate.  
In addition, these countries represent two examples of liberal democracy in the Global 
South: India is the first- and Brazil the fourth-largest democracy in the world, in terms 
of the size of their electorate. Yet, despite the fact that they have very different 
official mechanisms for public participation in their decision-making processes, these 
two democracies are rarely compared. This thesis, however, undertakes a comparative 
analysis of the policies of the solid waste management sector in India and Brazil, and 
shows that, in spite of the formal differences in organisational structures, the policy 
outcomes are remarkably similar – that is, powerful interest groups wield significant 
influence in both countries, albeit in very specific ways. Thus, although their 
decision-making processes – and their spaces of public participation – are not in any 
way similar, these very specificities appear to engender comparable results.  
The fact that these similar outcomes are the result of formally contrasting decision-
making proceedings helps to further our understanding of how public participation 




take advantage of these democratic channels. Arguably, this could not be clearly 
perceived without a comparative analysis, since the procedures themselves appear 
natural to the political contexts in which they are embedded. This research, therefore, 
investigates not only how the activities of corporate interest groups influence 
government decisions, but also how this affects the quality of democracy and 
socioeconomic development in these countries. 
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the study of how channels of public 
participation are established as a means of encouraging ordinary citizens to directly 
engage in political decisions that affect their lives. Proponents of public participation 
(‘popular sovereignty’) argue that it has the potential to both empower citizens, 
allowing them to express their views, and promote inclusiveness, giving marginalised 
groups a voice in the political arena (Pateman, 1970; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; 
Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). However, contrary to this stated objective, it appears 
that in certain circumstances, rather than enhancing the political involvement of the 
ordinary citizen, the mechanisms put in place to encourage public participation favour 
powerful economic and political interests instead. Not only that, but the obvious 
disparity in power among the participants in these processes threatens to impact the 
functioning of the democracies in which they operate.  
In such cases, powerful pressure groups, most specifically those representing 
corporate interests, use these participatory processes to exert a disproportionate 
influence over government decision-making – and this continues throughout the 
policymaking process. These economic and political elites can deploy vast financial 
resources, strategic lobbying techniques and unrivalled access to instruments that 




they ensure that government policies privilege their interests. They are able to exploit 
the discourse of ‘popular sovereignty’ that underpins these spaces of public 
participation to legitimise their economic and political power. 
This study, therefore, offers some important contributions to the literature on public 
participation. One of the key questions that emerges from a survey of the literature 
(Golden, 1998; Jordan and Maloney, 2007: 17) – who participates in these political 
processes and for what reasons – has remained for the most part unaddressed. This 
research specifically interrogates this issue, exploring the influential role interest 
groups play in these political processes: it analyses not only how and why these 
channels of public participation are implemented, but also who benefits from their 
political mechanisms. 
Although there are many competing definitions of the term ‘interest group’, this study 
defines such groups as non-state organisations seeking to influence public policies on 
the provision of public goods (Berry, 1977; Baroni et al., 2014: 4). It investigates the 
activity of interest groups in the arena of government decision-making, and argues 
that although public participation is often interpreted as a means of enabling citizens 
to take advantage of political openings to exert influence over government policies, it 
is in fact the most powerful interest groups that dominate official participatory 
processes such as public consultations. Its analysis of public participation thus 
contributes to an understanding of the real forces influencing government policy, 
particularly as these mechanisms establish how and to what extent individuals and 
groups can participate in policy formulation, as well as legitimising the agreements 




In order to critique the theories of public participation and explore the impact of 
interest group activity, the research (as mentioned above) analyses two case studies of 
public policies relating to the distribution of a ‘collective good’ – in this case, solid 
waste management. According to Jeffrey Berry (1977: 8), the term ‘collective good’ 
means that the benefits of a public policy must be ‘shared by all people, independent 
of their membership or support of a given group’. Solid waste management clearly 
matters to debates on democratic consolidation in emerging economies, as citizen 
interest and involvement in the issue varies greatly according to electoral cycles and 
local conditions. Although solid waste management is a matter that profoundly 
impacts the everyday conditions of the citizenry – it is fundamentally related to the 
daily processes of production and consumption, and the environmental quality of life 
of the population – few people appear to engage with the political processes that 
encompass it. As the welfare of the population is the responsibility of the state, a 
number of scholars (Laird, 1993, for example) claim that policies involving social and 
economic issues, particularly the delivery of essential public services, deserve public 
scrutiny, as ordinary citizens have a stake in the outcome and therefore have 
important contributions to make in the way these services are provided. 
However, some researchers (Olson, 1971; Golden, 1998) argue, as does this thesis, 
that it is not citizens but corporate interest groups that carry the most weight in 
government decision-making processes. These corporate groups have neither the 
welfare of the population nor the aim of addressing social inequality as their 
objective; their goal is profit, as their survival depends primarily on competing 
successfully in the market and satisfying their shareholders. For example, the survey 
carried out by Eric Gutierrez et al. (2003) on business sector participation in the 




concerns fail to meet the needs of the poorer segments of the population – a failure 
that is evident in the lack of transparent practices, community mobilisation or 
affordable tariffs that reflect the socioeconomic conditions of the communities they 
are meant to serve. The authors attribute this to ineffectual government rules, low 
levels of community engagement, the absence of enforcement of citizens’ rights and 
deficient market mechanisms. This study, however, develops the argument further by 
showing that it is also partly due to the domination by corporate interest groups of the 
arenas for public consultation that help shape the provision of such public goods as 
solid waste management services. In a context where government institutions have 
insufficient regulatory capacity, a political decision-making process that is dominated 
by corporate groups tends to be biased towards market interests, and as a 
consequence, its policy outcomes often end up adversely affecting the quality of 
public services.  
Comparative analysis 
In the previous research that I undertook in 2010 for my Masters degree, I analysed 
the formulation of Brazil’s national policy on solid waste. My research looked at the 
challenges inherent in implementing this policy across such a vast country, with its 
diverse geographies, climates, populations and cultures, and unequal socioeconomic 
conditions. As a result, when I began my doctoral research, my initial aim was to 
explore how another developing country, facing similar challenges, dealt with the 
same problem. The choice of India was due to the fact that although well over a 
decade has passed since its Solid Waste (Management & Handling) Rules were 
published in 2000, few of its towns have fully implemented the national guidelines, 




analysis of Brazil and India presents two contrasting cases that provide a good 
opportunity to understand how the experience of one country might contribute to 
debates on the implementation of a similar policy in the other. During the fieldwork in 
India, which investigated the implementation of waste policies, it was clear that – in 
comparison to Brazil – participatory debates on policy formulation were almost non-
existent. This motivated me to investigate why, when the policy decision-making 
process varies so greatly between these two emerging economies, the extent of the 
influence of powerful interest groups over policymaking is markedly similar, despite 
their differing roles in these processes. The specific characteristics of policymaking, 
which are crucial to our understanding of how democracy works in these countries, 
cannot be captured and measured without a thorough investigation of the democratic 
structures in which they are embedded. 
In 2014, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, launched his ‘Clean India 
Mission’,1 calling on the whole population to participate in a national effort to clear 
the country of waste. According to the programme’s official documents (QCI, 2016: 
7), the active participation of citizens and the private sector is regarded as crucial to 
its success. This followed the failure of the existing Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) 
Rules 2000, published after minimal public consultation, to contribute to improving 
the provision of solid waste management services in the country, as witnessed by the 
fact that few cities have implemented the guidelines in their totality (LS, 2008: 3). 
Meanwhile, in Brazil, the National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS) was enacted in 
2010, after twenty years of intense participatory debates and congressional 
                                                
1 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA) (in Hindi) 




proceedings. Thereafter, the procedures for implementing the recycling system 
throughout the whole country were discussed, resulting in a series of sectoral 
agreements between the responsible government agency and the most powerful of the 
interest groups involved in the debates.  
In both Brazil and India public participation is described as an important pillar of 
municipal waste management services. In the case of the Brazilian legislative 
framework (Law 12,305/2010, Art.6, X), public participation is conceived of as 
‘social control’; that is, there are a series of mechanisms that guarantee public 
participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of waste policies. In 
India, in the recently amended MSW Rules 2016, Article 6b establishes that the 
ministry in charge must establish ‘consultation with stakeholders’ when formulating 
national and state policies (MoEFCC, 2016). Although the term ‘stakeholders’ is not 
defined, the document mentions some of the players involved in the process: 
government agencies, urban local bodies (ULBs), private sector and business 
associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), residents’ welfare associations 
(RWAs), waste pickers and individual residents. In the case of the rule-making 
processes, Frank Laird (1993: 352) explains that the government employs this term 
instructively to announce to the general public that the invitation to participate is 
extended to all ‘people who care about the issue’. 
However, these two countries have distinct decision-making proceedings. Brazil is a 
presidential democracy, and the Brazilian PNRS is a national law that was enacted in 
Congress by the country’s legislature. India, meanwhile, is a parliamentary 
democracy, and its series of waste rules were established by ministerial decree and 




government. These policy frameworks – the law and the regulations – were both 
decided on at federal level and follow a democratic process (Carey and Shugart, 1998: 
12; Golden, 1998); however, they affect how the public participate in the decision-
making process in different ways. This research investigates the role of interest 
groups in these two, disparate democratic decision-making processes. 
Democracy theories generally focus on the legislative decision-making process, the 
actors involved and the outcomes. The Brazilian case exemplifies this: in its 
legislative process, the formal democratic characteristics of the decision-making 
process are guaranteed as the decisions are formulated by elected parliamentary 
representatives. However, few authors have paid attention to the example of the rule-
making process (Golden, 1998: 246), such as that exemplified by the Indian Waste 
Rules. Regulatory agencies are part of the executive branch of government, and 
therefore those taking the decisions are unelected civil servants. To ensure that 
decisions are not made according to a purely technocratic procedure, and to guarantee 
the legitimacy of the democratic system, this sort of executive process needs a level of 
democratic scrutiny, usually a period of public notice or a public consultation 
(Furlong and Kerwin, 2004: 354). Interestingly, however, Marissa Golden (1998: 
255), exploring similar rule-making processes in the US, discovered a complete 
absence of participation by ordinary citizens. Golden (1998: 252) claims that, in the 
US case, decision-making processes formally designed to encourage public 
participation are in fact dominated by corporate interest groups. What the present 
research reveals is that powerful interest groups are equally predominant in the 





MSWM, democracy and development 
These problems are most evident in decisions concerning the provision of public 
services. The management of municipal solid waste – the provision of urban waste 
collection services, the treatment and disposal of the collected waste, and the public 
and private institutions involved – has a significant impact in emerging economies 
(UN-Habitat, 2010: 6). Over the last decades, Brazil and India have faced a mounting 
increase in the generation of waste, a result of the fact that rapid economic growth and 
urbanisation have led to the spread of new patterns of consumption among their 
burgeoning populations (ABRELPE, 2014; Annepu, 2013). Inadequate waste 
management produces harmful social and environmental consequences at both the 
local level (degrading the quality of life and exposing the population to pollution and 
disease) and the global (climate change) (UN-Habitat, 2010: 14).  
However, the often-overlooked factor in the debate on the politics of waste 
management in emerging economies is the amount of influence interest groups have 
on government decisions. Emerging economies such as Brazil and India, despite 
enjoying high levels of economic growth, still have persistent domestic problems 
linked to inequality and underdevelopment. On the one hand, there is fierce 
competition for contracts for the provision of waste management services. This basic 
public service consumes a large part of municipal budgets, which, in the majority of 
cities, are funded by federal financial transfers. The provision of efficient waste 
management services in large cities demands infrastructure, technology and capital 
investment; hence, a few large corporate groups tend to dominate the contracts. On 
the other hand, waste management in developing countries faces serious constraints in 
terms of inefficiency, the patchy coverage of public services and the marginalisation 




stresses, due to the budget limitations of local authorities and their inability to provide 
public services to the entire population, the poorer regions of the cities, such as the 
peripheral areas and the slums, receive less attention and are generally left without 
basic services. Another significant sign of underdevelopment in these countries is the 
large number of the poorer members of the population who still make their living 
collecting waste from the streets and dumpsites to sell in the informal market in 
recyclables (Scheinberg et al., 2011). These ‘waste pickers’ comprise a singular 
interest group in this political process: it is only in the spaces set aside for public 
participation that their political organisations are able to argue for their labour rights, 
yet they are forced to compete in these spaces with far more powerful political and 
economic interests. 
In relation to this, it is important to note that some academics (O’Donnell, 1996; 
Jayal, 2001) have called attention to what they term the ‘uneven’ democratic systems 
in countries such as Brazil and India, with their persistent particularisms, deficient 
institutionalisation and highly inequitable socioeconomic conditions. These 
characteristics are apparent in the solid waste management sector, which often 
presents a picture of public and private players colluding over irregularities in the 
contracts for service provision, which are clearly linked to the financing of electoral 
campaigns (Janaagraha, 2012). 
This study of waste reforms in Brazil and India, therefore, provides a fresh 
perspective on how the political activities of interest groups, particularly corporate 
interest groups, influence the provision of this public good to the population, defining 
those who have access to these services and those who are in charge of their 




imagine democracy without the participation of associations or organisations of 
individuals, stating that the activity of such interest groups is intrinsic to the liberal 
democratic process. However, in his research into why democracies in the Global 
South have struggled to tackle poverty alleviation, Ashutosh Varshney (1999: 32) 
claims that market-oriented economic reforms are instituted from above by national 
and international economic elites, never from below. In this context, the statement by 
Harold Lasswell (1936) that the decision-making process defines ‘who gets what, 
when and how’, thus determining who participates in the process and enjoys the 
benefits of its social policies, and who is excluded, takes on added importance. 
1.2 The research question 
The main question this thesis explores is: how does interest group participation in the 
decision-making process shape solid waste policies in Brazil and India, what forms 
does it take and why? 
In order to answer this question, the study investigates how public participation is 
conceived of in these countries’ policies; how interest group activities have shaped 
their policy formulation; their main participatory spaces of state-interest group 
interactions; and the influential groups involved in policy decisions on waste 
management in each country. The research, therefore, analyses the impact on 
government institutions and political procedures when interest groups are included in 
government policymaking. 
1.3 The main contributions of the research 
The central argument of this thesis is that, despite the varying approaches to 




consistently prevent more democratic and accountable forms of solid waste 
management from emerging. Furthermore, while changes can be noted in both Brazil 
and India during recent years, aimed at including waste pickers in the decision-
making process, the active promotion of policies targeted at the wider public good 
remains distinctly limited, and is subordinated to the interests of more powerful 
groups.  
In the course of determining the validity of this argument, this research makes two 
contributions to the field of policy analysis. Firstly, it brings together two distinct 
lines of thought that have emerged from the study of democracy: theories of public 
participation and pressure group theories. Although they are usually treated in the 
literature as distinct, each with its specific theoretical approach, they overlap in this 
thesis, since both are crucial to an understanding of the forces operating in the 
decision-making processes of a democratic state. Thus, this research provides a 
critical analysis of the concept of public participation from a theoretical interest group 
perspective, in order to identify the main participants in these political processes.  
Secondly, the research provides a unique opportunity to compare how interest groups 
participate in two distinct democratic proceedings: policymaking by the legislative 
branch of government (in Brazil) and rule-making by government decree (in India). 
To this end, the study investigates the influence of interest groups on decision-making 
in the same policy sector in each of these different procedural contexts. It thus 
contributes to an understanding of how these groups operate in each type of political 
process, and to what extent they affect the quality of democracy in these countries. 
Beyond solid waste management, there are clear similarities to be drawn with other 




contributes to a wider understanding of the behaviour of democratic states and their 
relationship to decision-making in crucial issues that affect the environment. 
1.4 The limitations of the research 
The research uses as a case study the municipal solid waste management sector, 
which has its own specific characteristics. Businesses and corporate concerns, as well 
as public administrators, play a distinctive role in the political processes of this sector, 
and the policy debates involve a plethora of technical discussions on environmental 
licensing, public tenders, MSWM methods and cost-benefit analyses. Running in 
parallel to these debates, especially in developing countries, are the activist operations 
of social movements and NGOs, who champion the rights of informal groups of 
workers such as waste pickers. Added to this, the two chosen countries have large, 
diverse populations and complex regional characteristics, in terms of governance, 
demography and history. For all of the above reasons, therefore, this research limited 
its analysis to the policy context of national reforms in the management of solid 
waste. 
1.5 Research timeframe 
The timeframe of this research begins in the mid-1990s, which coincidently marks the 
beginning of the current tranche of waste reforms in Brazil and India, and extends to 
the most recent significant events to happen before the end of the research process: 
the signing of the Sectoral Agreement on Packaging in Brazil in late 2015 and the 
publication of the Swachh Bharat Survekshan (the first evaluation of the 
implementation of the Clean India Mission) in early 2016. The significance of these 




mentioning that the historical analysis also includes events that took place before this 
timeframe, due to their influence on the way solid waste management is currently 
understood and practiced in both countries. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) discusses two distinct theoretical strands that have 
emerged from the literature on democracy: theories of public participation and interest 
group theories. In its reflection on the implications of these theories for developing 
countries, the chapter’s first section explores how the literature analyses public 
participation, addressing the concepts of power, citizenship and political spaces of 
participation. This section also discusses the role of the state, the capacity of the 
individual (voter) to influence public policies through the channels of political 
representation, and the role of political parties in policy decisions. The second section 
explores a number of distinct pressure group theories – group theory, pluralism, elite 
group theory, neo-pluralism and corporatism – in order to understand how different 
scholars in the field apply these concepts to an explanation of the forces shaping 
government decisions. The third section discusses the challenge of applying these 
theories to emerging economies, exploring the debates of Guillermo O’Donnell 
(1996) and Gopal Jayal (2001) about the characteristics of democracy in these 
countries, which are marked by issues relating to inequality, political patron-client 
relationships and the rise of social movements. 
Chapter 3 then outlines the design of the research, detailing its methodology, which is 
based on the triangulation of three qualitative methods (document analysis, interviews 
and observation). The chapter also discusses the choices made during the research in 




The comparative analysis of the two case studies (in Brazil and India) is divided 
between four empirical chapters: Chapter 4 on how the institutional systems of 
municipal solid waste management are organised in these countries; Chapter 5 on 
how public participation is perceived in law; Chapter 6 on institutional spaces of 
participation; and Chapter 7 on the key interest groups involved in these political 
processes. In this way, Chapter 4 first contextualises and provides background 
knowledge of the evolution of the issue in each country, while the subsequent 
chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) develop the analytical engagement with the empirical 
research, exploring how interest groups and public participation influence the legal 
frameworks, the participatory spaces in which the state and interest groups are able to 
interact, and the main interest groups involved in these political processes. 
In order to analyse the same sectoral policy in both countries, Chapter 4 begins with a 
detailed comparative analysis on the current waste management situation in Brazil 
and India, discussing their key socioeconomic characteristics and infrastructural 
constraints. Section 4.2 reviews how waste was treated in the past in these two 
countries, analysing the early practices of waste management, the introduction of the 
service as a public health issue, and more recently, its development as a result of 
international agreements on the environment. This historical overview aims to shed 
light on the origins of many of the policies and practices now in place in these 
countries in order to further the understanding of how interest groups have become 
involved in their political structures. The third section discusses the key institutional 
mechanisms (legislative frameworks and government bodies) established for the 
provision of this public service in Brazil and India. Overall, the chapter provides the 




informal channels through which interest groups operate, and reflecting on why they 
take the forms they do in each country. 
Chapter 5 investigates the formulation of national policy in Brazil and India from the 
perspective of interest group engagement in the political process. These two case 
studies show how decision-making in the same policy sector (at least from the late 
1980s on) varies, revealing two different political realms: more technocratic in India, 
with decisions taken by a group of ‘technical experts’ within the government; more 
participatory in Brazil, the result of an extensive consultation process. This chapter 
analyses how these two different models of public participation emerged, and their 
consequences, in terms of both solid waste management policy and the inclusion or 
exclusion of certain actors in its provision. The Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA), 
mentioned above, represents a shift in this historical process in India, as this 
nationwide campaign has public participation at its heart; nevertheless, the citizens do 
not decide its policies. More recently, due to the pressure of its implementation 
deadline, interest groups have been invited to discuss viable solutions to the problems 
of implementing it across the country. 
The thesis then turns to address the way the participatory and technocratic models 
accommodate divergent economic and political interests in the political process. 
Chapter 6 explores four institutional forms of state-interest group interaction in these 
two political realms, employing the concept of participatory spaces proposed by John 
Gaventa (2005). In Brazil, the 4th National Conference on the Environment and the 
Sectoral Agreements on Reverse Logistics are two nationwide institutional 
participatory spaces, designed to encourage interest groups to discuss, negotiate and 




India, meanwhile, the judiciary has become an institutional space of contestation, as 
well as a significant actor, shaping the country’s waste reforms over the last two 
decades. Finally, the last section of this chapter investigates accusations – which 
surfaced frequently in the interviews in both countries – of corruption, collusion and 
other abuses, which help distort the political process of waste reform and have a 
negative impact on the provision of public services and the relationship between 
public and private interests.  
Chapter 7 looks at the main groups involved in solid waste management in each 
country. It investigates the specific ways in which their competing interests operate in 
these divergent democratic systems, and analyses their capacity to shape 
policymaking. In Brazil, representative associations of the waste management 
industry, other corporate interests and local governments have exerted their influence 
on the decision-making process through their command of capital and of the services 
of legal and industry experts. In India, the decisions taken by consultants working 
within central government fail to reflect the reality of the problems of nation-wide 
implementation. This gap between policy and implementation has opened up a space 
for a diversity of informal practices at the local level; however, the actors involved do 
not have a voice in the political decisions taken at the national level. In addition to all 
these competing domestic interests, emerging economies represent a huge market for 
the global corporations operating in this sector. Transnational private sector concerns 
involved in waste management, global industries from other sectors, specialised 
chambers of commerce, international research centres and NGOs have all actively 
participated, providing information, promoting their interests and influencing the 
domestic debates in both countries. In the midst of this competitive market, 




recognition of their rights. The different levels of participation achieved by this 
singular interest group in the decision-making processes of Brazil and India is the 
result of the different trajectories taken by their social movements. This section 
explores the differing capacity of these various interest groups to participate in 
decision-making in both political realms, and how their activities have shaped these 
countries’ waste policies.  
Finally, the last chapter summarises the main points of the research, which explores 
interest group activities in Brazil and India, providing a critical analysis of the 
theories of interest groups and public participation, and reflecting on the impact of the 
disproportionate power and influence of corporate interest groups on democracy and 
development in these countries. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis primarily focuses on the participation of interest groups in government 
decisions; it argues that pressure groups, not citizens, dominate the politics of the 
provision of public services (specifically waste management), affecting how the 
forces of democracy and development operate in emerging economies. This chapter 
sets out to explore the literature of political participation in preparation for an analysis 
of how the actors involved are organised and how their activity shapes policymaking 
in the MSWM sector. 
Most studies in the field of participatory democracy focus on the roles and relative 
influence of the ordinary citizen and government institutions, although they pay 
recognition to the fact that the political processes in which these actors participate are 
also influenced by other powerful forces and manipulative discourses. In general, 
however, the literature of public participation either places the ordinary citizen, 
characterised as an agent of transformation, at the centre of the political process, 
empowered to shape political decisions and improve the quality of governance and 
the provision of public services (Brodie et al., 2009; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007), or 
it argues that political and economic elites take advantage of the political discourse of 
public participation and use it to advance their own particular interests (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001). However, although this literature sometimes mentions the 
participation of interest groups, it fails to recognise that political processes and 
participatory debates are quite often dominated by such pressure groups.  
The analysis of interest group participation differs from that of the political 




differences. The proponents of participatory and direct democracy argue, for the most 
part, that individuals are empowered to change government decisions, while studies of 
pressure groups focus on the necessity for individuals to act collectively to advance 
their common interests (Olson, 1971). Interest group theories, therefore, emphasise 
that pressure groups rather than individuals are the key agents influencing policy 
decisions. Although these theories offer distinct explanations of the decision-making 
process, they are equally crucial to an understanding of the forces impacting political 
processes. However, the general assumption of both that political participation 
influences government decisions raises some important questions: who participates in 
these political processes, to what end and for whose benefit, and what sort of 
influence do they have on the decisions of governments?  
In order to clarify the debate on the relative influence of ordinary citizens and interest 
groups, the literature review is divided into three main sections. It begins by exploring 
the literature of public participation, which analyses the main channels of democratic 
interaction between the state and society, as well as the decision-making process and 
its principal actors. The first section looks at the concept of public participation (how 
the public is involved in policymaking) and the meaning of these participatory 
processes for policy decisions. The lack of a clear definition of the terms ‘citizens’ 
and ‘interest groups’ is evident in the fact that, in many cases, participatory spaces in 
a particular sector are often designed or promoted in the name of the ‘public’ – that is, 
in the name of the ordinary citizen or the community – but are dominated by powerful 
groups with specific interests. The second section investigates how different schools 
of thought in interest group studies understand the role of such groups and the 
strategies they use to influence government decisions. The third section then 




emerging economies such as Brazil and India, that are subject to both internal and 
external pressures to advance the development of their markets while continuing to 
face problems associated with chronic underdevelopment. 
The chapter’s main contribution lies in bringing these two theories together to enable 
a discussion of the implications of this debate for emerging economies. In the 
following empirical chapters, these theories will be revisited to explore, firstly, how 
decision-making operates in the waste management sector in Brazil and India. This 
entails investigating how the distinct structure of the decision-making proceedings in 
each country affects the relationship between the state and interest groups, and how 
the activities of interest groups shape policy outcomes in this sector. Secondly, these 
theories will be applied to an analysis of why these political processes take their 
specific forms, exploring the institutional spaces for political participation and the 
informal practices in the MSWM sector in these countries, which are characterised by 
weak institutionalisation and particularism. Finally, the research will use its 
theoretical underpinning to look at the main groups involved in these political 
processes, investigating their activities and their capacity to influence government 
decisions. By taking into account these three dimensions – the laws, the institutional 
spaces of political action and the key actors involved – this research aims to compare 
how these interests not only shape policy in the waste management sector, but also 
democratic practices in these countries. 
2.2 Why study public participation? 
Political participation is understood as the personal engagement of citizens in 
activities intended to influence government decisions. Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari 




people play a direct role in governance and the policy decisions that affect their lives. 
Among the most common participatory activities are public hearings and the direct 
engagement of citizens in public institutions or local organisations established to 
improve the provision of services to communities (Brodie et al., 2009: 16). This 
section explores how scholars understand the capacity of the ordinary citizen to 
influence government decisions, the role of democratic institutions and the definition 
of the people involved in these political processes. 
The idea that citizens are empowered to take the lead in influencing and, if necessary, 
changing government decisions that directly impact their lives, and the assumption 
that bringing the state closer to citizens improves transparency, accountability and 
social justice, hold great appeal for academics, politicians, social movements and 
investors. Scholars studying this area (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Gaventa, 2004, 
Hickey and Mohan, 2004, Cornwall and Coelho, 2007) have explored the potential for 
citizen participation in government reforms and developmental planning in order to 
discover whether the voices of the poor and those lacking representation are included 
in the planning process, whether this engagement strengthens the responsiveness and 
accountability of the government and the institutions involved in policymaking, and 
whether it improves the quality and equality of public service provision. Participatory 
democratic debate is meant to provide an opportunity for different actors to discuss 
and criticise policy proposals both before and after the decision-making process 
(Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008: 482). Despite the fact that proponents argue that 
participation and open deliberation is central to the democratic process, sceptics 
express concern over the legitimacy of the authority of those directly involved in such 
deliberations (Dryzek, 2009: 1380). For example, John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer 




to represent certain social groups, and how these organisations are held accountable. 
Critics further argue that the participatory process is time-consuming and, even worse, 
that some deliberative processes are a mere formality that governments carry out to 
meet official requirements for public consultation (Dryzek, 2009: 1398). 
As public participation is promoted as a way of engaging citizens in decision-making, 
the first question that arises is: exactly how does the ordinary citizen participate in 
government decisions and to what extent are they able to affect the political process 
and improve governance and the provision of public services? In order to analyse the 
capacity of citizens and groups to influence decision-making, we need to explore the 
main channels of state-citizen interaction and the role of state and non-state actors in 
these processes. It is essential to first analyse the capacity of the ordinary citizen to 
influence government decisions. 
Democratic systems provide three main channels of state-society interaction in 
decision-making: namely, representative, participatory and deliberative systems. 
These provide different levels of interaction and opportunities for individuals and 
groups to influence decision-making. Basically, in the representative model, citizens 
elect representatives to govern and take decisions on their behalf, whereas in the 
participatory and deliberative models, the political process is open to any citizen to 
become directly involved in the decision-making. In the participatory system, citizens 
and groups are informed and consulted during the decision-making process; while in 
the deliberative system, citizens interact with each other, debating the choices and 
then voting on the decisions (Dryzek, 2009). There are other models of democratic 
decision-making, such as referenda, which involve a nation-wide decision-making 




major subject of public interest (Sartori, 1987: 111). However, this model is beyond 
of the scope of this research, which is focused on policy decision-making in a 
particular sector. The following subsections analyse these processes in more depth. 
Representative democracy 
When speaking of democracy, the first actors that come to mind are citizens, political 
parties and elected representatives. The key aspect that differentiates democratic from 
non-democratic regimes is the possibility they offer citizens to elect the members of 
their government, while the electoral process itself provides a mechanism for popular 
control of these elected officials once they are in power by holding them to account in 
the next election (Przeworski et al., 1993: 4). Citizens, therefore, elect representatives 
to formulate policies, while the implementation of these decisions is delegated to 
appointed officials in charge of the functions of government; the ordinary citizen, in 
practice, does not have any influence on policymaking. Adam Przeworski et al. (1999: 
3) explain that the structure of representative democracy is based on the fact that 
those who govern are chosen during elections and their official mandates are 
conditioned by periodic elections; although citizens have the right to give their 
opinions and disagree with official decisions, they are not legally entitled to instruct 
the government. The elected representatives define citizens’ social duties and 
responsibilities, and all members of society are obliged to follow these rules. 
Representation in politics means acting on behalf the electorate in the public interest 
(Dahl, 1989: 209); however, it is often not clear whether these elected officials 
represent the people who elected them or their own political parties. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1985) and Adam Przeworski et al. (1999) are sceptical about the 




represented? The democratic system does not represent the individual but the majority 
of the electorate, or it employs some variant of this method. This leads to the problem 
of the ‘tyranny of the majority’, which is especially prevalent in countries such as 
India, where society is marked by cultural and social cleavages, and majority rule 
significantly disadvantages minority groups who are marginalised by ethnicity, caste 
or religious differences (Nayyar, 2001: 363). Schumpeter (1985) also claims that 
representative democracy is reduced to a competition between political parties; 
democracy in fact only exists during elections. Political parties are theoretically 
separate from both state and society, and their role is to provide the link between the 
two, but Schumpeter (2010: 251) claims that, rather than a means for participatory 
action, they are the mechanisms by which political elites legitimise their power in 
society: ‘a party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the 
competitive struggle for political power’.  
During elections themselves, images, beliefs and identities are forged by competing 
claims to power in the attempt to impose particular visions of society on the mass of 
citizens (Przeworski, 1985: 99). Such differing views are not spontaneous; they are 
products of the conflicts and confrontations between divergent interests. Political 
parties take advantage of these differences to create specific identities in order to 
promote their campaigns amongst the electorate (Przeworski, 1985: 101). Przeworski 
et al. (1999: 29) explain that candidates focus everything on winning elections; once 
they assume public office, however, their own private interests, which often differ 
from those of the electorate, come to the fore. Even if a political representative 
genuinely wants to serve the public, their actions in office will be conditioned by the 




Thus, the representative model is an indirect system, where citizens do not make 
policies but, rather, vote for candidates who propose the policies they believe will 
render them electable to public office. Przeworski (1985: 14) stresses, therefore, that 
citizens delegate policy decisions to representatives, and these representatives are 
individuals who have their own particular, narrow interests. 
Participatory and deliberative democracy 
The arguments between advocates of indirect and direct democracy lie in the origin of 
modern democratic theory (Pateman, 1970: 17). In the nineteenth century, Jeremy 
Bentham and James Mill argued that representative democracy, with universal 
suffrage and the election of accountable representatives, protects citizens’ interests 
from government excesses, while Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill 
contended that the direct participation of citizens is crucial to maintaining the 
democratic polity. In contrast to theorists of representative democracy, who study 
political parties, electoral processes and conflicts among the electorate, 
participationists explore different forms of popular participation in policymaking – 
particularly the direct engagement of individuals and groups with governance – and 
the many channels of non-electoral decision-making.  
Social scientists have endeavoured to discover different ways of deepening 
democracy in order to bring citizens closer to the governmental decision-making 
process. Carole Pateman (2012: 10) explains that political participation is concerned 
with ‘democratising democracy’, bringing the social and political realms closer to the 
ordinary citizen – in other words, changing the way in which citizens are engaged in 
government decisions that affect their lives. Despite the fact that proponents of 




Sartori (1987: 114) questions the premise of ‘participatory democracy’, claiming that 
the term ‘participation’ means ‘taking part in person’; in his view, self-government is 
only possible for small-scale group democracy. Sartori (1987: 111) and Dahl (1989: 
12) advise us to bear in mind the scale of modern nation-states when considering the 
roots of the term ‘democracy’, which lie in the ancient Greek polis (a small city-state, 
governed by the collective decisions of the community) and the pre-industrial cities of 
the modern enlightenment theorists. Due to the fact that participation means active 
personal engagement in decision-making and governance, Sartori (1987) claims that 
political debates necessarily involve only small groups of participants in making 
collective decisions that may affect large parts of the population. In his view, 
participatory democracy should not replace electoral, representative democracy, since 
decisions are only made by those who have the opportunity to participate, and this can 
lead to elitism.  
In line with Sartori’s critique, and despite some successful cases of participatory 
democracy that are analysed below, Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009: 212) agree that 
participatory democracy works only in small-scale communities such as workplaces, 
trade union branches, neighbourhood assemblies and community service programmes, 
where interaction and communication between the participants is feasible; its 
application to complex issues in large-scale societies and national participatory 
processes raises concerns. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2010: 163) criticise, for 
instance, the social bias of participatory processes. These authors explain that, in 
general, participatory processes benefit the wealthiest groups in a society, who, due to 
their economic status, have access to education, knowledge and communication skills. 
These groups possess the political resources that enable their involvement in decision-




decisions as they lack the economic and political resources needed to partake in the 
political process. 
Theories of participatory development emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to 
mainstream, centralised planning; they advocated the incorporation of local, often 
marginalised people in the decision-making process of development projects and 
programmes (Pateman, 2012: 7). This process of decentralisation (initiated in the 
1990s with the publication of Agenda 21, a UN ‘action plan’ for sustainable 
development) focused on local governance, with the aim of bringing government 
closer to the citizen, and placed the idea of citizen participation at the centre of the 
political debate. Subsequently, however, academics such as Cooke and Khotari (2001) 
began to view the concept of participatory development with a certain degree of 
cynicism. A trenchant critique emerged, focused on the professionalisation of these 
mainstream processes and their manipulation by the numberless NGOs and donor 
agencies seeking to profit from the pro-poor discourses advocating the empowerment 
of local peoples and communities. As a consequence, John Gaventa (2007: 1) 
comments that ‘participation’ is now part of the daily jargon of bureaucrats, 
politicians, decision-makers, activists, NGOs, donor agencies and academics, and is 
routinely employed by the mass media, politicians and government programmes. 
However, despite these – often justified – criticisms, participatory processes have 
sometimes achieved significant changes in governance, giving a voice to actors who 
would otherwise be excluded from society. James Holston (2009: 245) claim that 
contemporary urbanisation, especially in the large metropolises of the Global South, 
has exacerbated the inequalities between the city centres, which are well-served by 




infrastructure and services. Impoverished residents living on the outskirts of cities are 
forced to organise amongst themselves in order to confront the ‘entrenched systems of 
inequalities’ that maintain their social exclusion and contest their right to live in the 
city (Holston, 2009: 257). Holston’s research in the Brazilian city of São Paulo 
describes alternative forms of public participation, where the leaders of poor 
communities have organised grassroots mobilisations of residents’ associations, and 
in the process, gained a greater knowledge of their rights. These mobilisations have in 
some cases succeeded in changing the decision-making practices of government 
institutions and forced the state to improve public services. Holston highlights the fact 
that this ‘insurgent citizenship’ differs in form from the labour and social class 
struggles that emerged in Europeans cities in the twentieth century. Nowadays, 
residents living in precarious and illegal spaces mobilise around issues such as the 
right to housing, basic infrastructure and security (Holston, 2009: 247).  
In their survey of participatory governance in São Paulo, Peter Houtzager and Adrian 
Lavalle (2009) show that the majority of the claims of the urban poor are presented to 
the state by leaders of civil organisations. These individuals and their forms of direct 
participation in governance and decision-making do not constitute an alternative to 
the conventional representative party system; instead, they act as new mediators in the 
relationship between the state and particular unrepresented social groups. However, 
the ‘mediators’ involved in this form of participatory system possess neither a clear 
structure of accountability nor any criteria by which to measure their legitimacy 
(Houtzager and Lavalle, 2009: 26). Although these empirical cases show a certain 
level of successful engagement in politics by the urban poor, such examples of 
popular mobilisation cannot be generalised to all policy areas. The argument this 




of public services, corporate interests prevail. Nevertheless, as Pateman (2012: 10) 
points out, participation is a learning process that requires structural changes, as it 
demands different levels of interaction between citizens and political authority.  
Ellie Brodie et al. (2009: 14) separate public or political participation from other 
associational activities such as social and individual participation. ‘Public 
participation’ means the direct engagement of the individual in political decision-
making through activities such as citizens’ panels; public consultations; consensus 
conferences; deliberative mapping; deliberative polling; deliberative meetings of 
citizens; electronic processes; participatory appraisal; and participatory strategic 
planning (Brodie et al., 2009: 15). ‘Social participation’, on the other hand, describes 
individuals’ engagement in collective activities as part of their daily lives (for 
example, belonging to a community group or volunteering), while ‘individual 
participation’ comprises the daily routines in which individuals, through their actions 
and choices, express their principles and worldviews (for example, participating in 
campaigns for sustainable consumption or choosing green products). Social and 
individual participation do not have a political impact on government decisions. 
Participationists call the sphere of interaction between the state and society 
‘participatory spaces’ (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007: 1). Gaventa (2005: 11) defines the 
term ‘space’ in this context as ‘opportunities, moments and channels where citizens 
can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which 
affect their lives and interests’. Chapters 6 of this thesis analyse key examples of both 
institutional and informal participatory spaces in the reform of waste management in 
Brazil and India (such as nation-wide consultation meetings, sectoral agreements and 




involved in these political processes. The chapter investigates the power relations 
present in these processes, the potential for these spaces and the activities they 
encompass to influence political processes, and their impact on the outcome of 
reforms. These spaces are not impartial; rather, they are socially constructed and 
controlled, and they shape the structure and discourse of power. In general, whoever 
proposes a participatory space does so in pursuit of their own objectives. Gaventa 
(2005: 12) divides participatory spaces into three main forms: closed, invited and 
claimed.  
•  ‘Invited spaces’ are institutional spaces promoted by government bodies and other 
institutions to encourage citizens to participate in or deliberate on different stages of 
the policy-making process. Chapter 6 returns to this issue in section 6.2 when it 
debates the 4th National Conference on the Environment (CNMA). 
•  ‘Closed spaces’ are exclusive to elite groups of decision-makers and do not involve 
procedures for public engagement or consultation. Bureaucrats, elected officials and 
invited experts are in charge of the decision-making. The majority of social norms 
are formulated on a daily basis by a myriad of government bodies, without public 
scrutiny – if every government action necessitated a public consultation, it would be 
impossible to govern. However, certain policy reforms demand public consultation, 
although access to this is often controlled, with the inclusion of some specialist 
groups and exclusion of others (section 5.2 discusses this form of process in the 
context of the formulation of the Indian Waste Rules). 
•  ‘Claimed’ or ‘created spaces’ are the result of popular mobilisations against 




spaces are created outside of the institutional arena, when people join together to 
discuss their common concerns and mobilise for a common purpose. 
Gaventa (2005: 12) explains that all these spaces are dynamic, changing their 
configurations over time according to their members’ interests. Invited spaces can be 
implemented to legitimise closed-door decision-making processes, while grassroots 
mobilisations can become institutionalised and incorporated into the political 
discussions or government proceedings. 
However, the main question is, who participates in these forums and political 
processes? In discussions about public participation and democracy, the term ‘the 
public’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘the people’, ‘citizens’, and more 
recently, ‘stakeholders’. Although the concept is often taken for granted by those 
studying social science or working in the field, it is important to clarify exactly who 
‘the public’ involved in these processes is. 
The origin of the term ‘the people’ lies in the ancient Greek word, demos, from 
demokratia, which means ‘the rule of the people’ (Dahl, 1998: 11; Sartori, 1987: 21). 
The demos were the people of the polis (Sartori, 1987: 25). Sartori (1987: 21) 
explains that the definition of ‘the people’ may vary, and can mean the entire 
population, the majority of the electorate or the poorer members of the population. In 
terms of representative processes, ‘the public’ refers to the electorate of citizens, as 
defined by universal suffrage, but it does not include everybody – it generally 
excludes, for instance, children, those with severe mental disabilities, prisoners and 
transient inhabitants. George Frederickson (1991: 396) suggests that the term ‘the 
public’ can assume different meanings according to the question posed and the 




theories and public choice analysis, the public is conceived of as consumers, while 
from the perspective of service provision, it comprises clients. 
The term ‘stakeholder’ also appears in discussions about public participation. This is a 
recent expression largely employed in the management sector, particularly in the 
sphere of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (corporate self-evaluation whose 
purpose is to provide information for the market). It encompasses the totality of actors 
affected by the activities of a business concern, or when applied to the public sector, 
by public policy and services. In many cases, ‘stakeholders’ are confused with 
‘interest groups’, because some authors describe stakeholders as all the ‘interested’ 
individuals, both organised and unorganised, affected by the organisation or the 
service. The scope of this term seems too loose to define the actors participating in 
decision-making, involving as it does not only legislators, but also the providers and 
users of public services – a whole universe of populations potentially affected by the 
provision of public services, as well as the lack of it. Most of these actors have little 
influence on or interest in participating in decision-making. Nevertheless, the term 
stakeholder has been widely employed in several official documents – for example, in 
the Indian Manual on Municipal Solid Waste Management (MoUD, 2014b) and the 
Solid Waste Management (MSW) Rules, 2016 (MoEFCC, 2016), which designate 
public consultation. Thus, it appears that all of the above terms have become too 
nebulous to use in an analytical study. It seems appropriate, instead, to find a more 
precise definition of the groups of individuals involved in policy-making. 
Brodie et al. (2009: 21), in their research into the processes of participation in 
community development in the UK, present a survey of the actors engaged in public 




of some community group organisations, bureaucrats and activists, there is hardly any 
mention of interest groups. ‘Interested’, unorganised individuals are not interest 
groups. The unorganised ordinary citizen hardly ever has the power to change 
decisions unless they join forces to engage politically in the institutional process. 
Nowadays, there are generally open microphones in public consultations for 
individuals to voice their opinions. For example, the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) – proceedings that are implemented to measure the effects of a 
large urban project – have specific rules mandating the consultation of affected 
communities during the planning application stage. In addition, due to the advances of 
the internet, almost every official body now has a link on their webpage to enable 
some sort of interaction with the public, and an increasing number of public 
consultations are carried out online. While attending a public hearing in the legislative 
assembly of the state of São Paulo as part of my fieldwork, for example, I noted that 
individuals were able to voice their concerns and make suggestions to the local 
councillors in periodic public assemblies concerning the introduction of bills. There 
was an interesting moment in one of these consultations when a man came to the 
microphone to express a somewhat confused claim – I had previously noticed him in 
other public hearings – and the convener of the debate called him by his name and 
kindly asked him to be concise, giving the impression that he was known to speak in 
every session. However, this type of participation has little, if any, influence on the 
decision-making process. 
In contrast to political engagement in the public arena of debates, the advent of the 
internet, social media and other technologies appears to have encouraged many 
individuals to take isolated actions against government decisions. There are also very 




imposition of certain policies. Such individual actions are beyond the scope of this 
research, since they do not help us discover the identity of the key actors influencing 
government decisions. Mancur Olson (1997: 1) differentiates self-interested 
individuals from interest groups, explaining that such individuals do not engage in 
common concerns; in fact, he suggests that private, individual interests can be more 
effectively achieved without collective action (Olson, 1997: 7). Unorganised citizens, 
however, have little chance to partake in policymaking unless they organise with 
other individuals to advance their common interests in the public arena. 
The fact is that the participation of citizens in politics decreases considerably when it 
comes to the electoral process. John Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy (2009: 208) 
suggest that one of the many reasons explaining this apathy is a lack of interest in or 
knowledge about politics and public affairs, coupled with the assumption that political 
processes are manipulated by political and economic elites, which means that many 
citizens have little faith in the success of individual efforts to change political 
outcomes. Those who do participate usually have a specific interest in a particular 
policy area. Thus, the participatory processes are legitimised by relatively small 
groups of participants – ‘small’ here does not mean a few people, but a smaller 
number than the whole society.  
Deliberative democracy is a category of public participation where the participants 
come together to reflect on, debate and exchange their views about a political matter 
before expressing their decision (Pateman, 2012: 8). Sartori (1987: 112) emphasises 
that such debate aims to improve the quality of decisions. The concept of deliberative 
democracy, therefore, describes the direct deliberation of decision-making by non-




model differs from the legislative processes and partisan systems of representative 
democracy, where elected officials are entitled to represent the interests of the 
majority of the population. Public hearings, forums and deliberative polling are some 
of the institutional spaces of deliberative decision-making. In general, these work best 
at the local level, where the number of participants is measurable. Innovative 
examples of successful deliberative schemes involving communities have been 
reported by a number of academics (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008: 489, Pateman, 
2012: 12, Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, Spiller and Liao, 2006); these include 
participatory budgets in the city of Porto Alegre and the Health Council in Brazil, and 
the role of the panshayat (assemblies of elders) in the Indian state of Kerala, which 
has created new opportunities for public participation in town planning. There are 
many examples of citizen-based forums and institutional spaces with a certain level of 
deliberative practices, designed to accommodate a mix of public and private actors. 
Some of these will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7 in the discussion on the 4th 
CNMA (section 6.2), the sectoral agreements on reverse logistics in Brazil (section 
6.3) and the provision of public services in India (section 7.3). 
The democratic models discussed above illustrate a variety of channels through which 
individuals and groups can interact with each other and with government officials, 
and exercise some level of participation in public affairs. 
Public participation, interest groups and the policy cycle 
This subsection analyses how public participation is understood within government 
policy proceedings. Forums for public participation such as public hearings can be 
implemented in specific stages of the decision-making process, and the involvement 




and legislation of the specific country. Thomas Birkland (2011: 241) divides these 
actors into two categories: official and unofficial. The officials, who are obliged to 
participate, comprise both elected representatives and members of the bureaucracy, 
including members of the legislative (senators, deputies), the executive (the personnel 
of ministries, agencies, government bodies and the state or municipal secretariat) and 
the judiciary (magistrates and public prosecutors). Despite lacking legal powers or 
duties, the unofficial actors in the proceedings (individual citizens, interest groups, 
think tanks, lawyers and the mass media, among others) have the right to express their 
interests and concerns. Thomas Dye (1998: 26) explains that the study of ‘how 
policies are made’ takes into account the fact that policymaking is a political process, 
divided into a series of consecutive stages. The number and the nomenclatures of 
these stages vary according to different theorists. Dye divides the process into six 
stages – problem identification, agenda-setting, formulation, legitimation, 
implementation and evaluation – with different actors involved in each stage. The 
stage of problem identification, policy formulation and legitimation tends to be open 
to numerous actors (including ordinary citizens and interest groups), but, in practice, 
only those with a particular interest in the sector involved usually attend. During the 
decision-making and implementation processes, generally only official actors have 
the authority to debate the issue and vote on it. However, even during this stage, 
interest groups are often engaged in lobbying the decision-makers to adopt certain 
policies. 
The definition of public policy varies according to the theorist who proposes it. The 
following are just two examples. Probably the most comprehensive definition is the 
well-known one proposed by Dye (1998: 1), who describes public policy simply as 




that the government is the primary actor, since it has the authority to legislate on 
behalf of society, drawing up public policies that order or ban certain behaviours; 
coordinating the bureaucracy; allocating goods and resources; and establishing taxes 
and sanctions (Dye, 1998: 2). In addition to such actions, Dye also emphasises that 
even the inaction of government can be considered as policy. However, this definition 
seems somewhat simplistic; Michael Howlett at al. (2009: 5), for example, contend 
that it is so broad that it encompasses everything that involves the government, from 
the ordering of office supplies to the purchase of nuclear weapons. In addition, it is 
based on the idea that all government choices and actions are deliberate and target-
oriented, while, in reality, many are contradictory, while others may produce 
unexpected outcomes. 
William Jenkins expands Dye’s definition by proposing a more thorough and nuanced 
description of public policies, describing them as: 
[A] set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or groups 
concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a 
specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the 
power of those actors to achieve. (William Jenkins, 1978: 15) 
Howlett at al. (2009: 6) claim that, in addition to the fact that policies are often made 
through a process that includes a selection of the decisions resulting from the 
interaction between official agencies and other actors, Jenkins’ definition also takes 
into account the limits to a government’s capacity to implement these policies. 
Policymaking is thus defined as a process of actions that the state adopts, in 




Howlett et al. (2009: 4) explain, public policy is conceptualised as a ‘techno-political’ 
exercise. The technical part aims to identify the best options available to address the 
problems; meanwhile, the political sphere takes into account the union of the different 
actors involved in the political process, as different groups might disagree on the 
formulation of the problem and the solutions proposed. In contrast to this picture of a 
rational process, based on problem-solving and susceptive analysis, Charles Lindblom 
(1959) suggests that much government planning comes down to ‘muddling through’. 
In other words, instead of a scientific analysis of the alternatives, with a risk analysis 
and a thorough calculation of the possible outcomes, policies are in fact the result of 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom, 1959: 519). Rather than take the risk of 
implementing carefully planned improvements that might produce radical changes, 
bureaucrats in general opt for small, incremental steps, following accepted practices. 
Therefore, public participation can be implemented as part of this political process, 
but what is the basis for this public engagement in government decisions? 
Democracy and liberalism 
In order to understand how (and why) individuals and groups are involved in policy 
decision-making, we need to also understand how democracy works and the role of 
the democratic state in the political process.  
As discussed above, democracy is a political regime in which the majority of the 
population select their representatives to govern the country and make decisions on 
their behalf (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 80; Beetham, 1997: 79). It is based on the 
‘rule of law’, meaning that those with political power cannot impose authoritarian 
measures and their power is limited by the same laws that apply to any other citizen. 




government, Robert Dahl (1989) introduces the concept of ‘polyarchy’, suggesting a 
minimal procedure by which to define and separate democracy from other political 
regimes. According to Dahl (1989: 221), a polyarchy is a polity where elected 
officials are chosen in fair, competitive and periodic elections and entrusted to govern 
under the constitutional law; almost all adult citizens have the right to vote for their 
representatives and to be elected to public office, and they also have the right to 
information, freedom of expression and the autonomy to form political parties, 
associations and interest groups. As such, voting equality, participation, enlightened 
understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion are essential preconditions for the 
democratic process (Dahl 1989: 108). David Beetham (1997: 42) further defines 
democracy as the institutional separation of powers into the executive, legislative and 
judiciary; the separation between the public and private realms, where the private 
realm (civil society, the market, individuals) is autonomous from that of the state; the 
power of a representative parliament; and the pluralism of ideas. These tenets mean 
that political institutions are delimited by a constitution, which protects the individual 
from arbitrary state power and ensures no ruler or group can usurp the central power 
of the state. In addition to these basic attributes, there are other components that vary 
among the different forms of democracy, such as the government’s federal 
arrangements, the number of parties involved in the electoral process, and the checks 
and balances between the branches of government (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 83). 
The democratic system thus provides a series of structural arrangements whereby 
individual citizens and groups of citizens are allowed to participate in government 
decisions. These differences are essential to explore how the characteristics of each 





Liberal democracy is also based on a set of fundamental individual rights, such as 
freedom of association, press and religion, which are usually included in a written 
constitution.2 One of the fundamental features that differentiates the democratic 
system from other political regimes is freedom of association (Tocqueville, 1835). 
Bobbio et al. (1998: 687) explain that part of the challenge of separating the concept 
of liberalism from that of democracy, however, is the fact that liberalism is what 
distinguishes democracy from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Only democracy 
allows pressure groups to disagree with centrally made decisions. Whereas non-
democratic regimes also have groups that form within the military or the party 
bureaucracy, these are generally informal groups seeking to gain political power, and 
their autonomy is limited (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). By contrast, in the 
democratic system, the law guarantees freedom of association and allows the formal 
activity of civil society, whereby interest groups can seek to influence decision-
making. Thus, liberalism provides democracies with the legal mechanisms that enable 
individuals to come together to defend their common interests in the public arena.  
However, political liberalism and economic liberalism are two different concepts. 
Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg (2001) divide the idea of liberty into two forms 
of individual autonomy: the private and the political. The right of the individual to 
participate in government decisions is different from their freedom to compete in the 
market, although these authors claim that these rights complement each other in a 
democratic system (Habermas and Rehg, 2001: 780). They explain that private 
autonomy is guaranteed by the impersonal rule of law, and differs from civic 
                                                
2 For example, the fundamental rights of citizens are set out in Article 5 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 




autonomy, where the individual is empowered to determine their own laws in 
participatory and deliberative political systems. In modern democracies, the classical 
idea of the ‘rule of law’ is manifested in the concept of ‘human rights’ and is attached 
to the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, which legitimises the political process (Habermas 
and Rehg, 2001: 767). However, Deepak Nayyar (2001) has a different perspective. 
He claims that liberalism is often misunderstood: the liberal orthodoxy is that 
democratic principles protect the political freedom of individuals, while market 
principles protect their economic freedom, and together these guarantee that people 
can pursue their interests in the political arena. The problem is that democracy is 
based on the political equality of adult suffrage, while the market is based on the 
unequal distribution of income and property. Markets exclude people who do not 
produce, consume or sell their labour, especially the poor; without purchasing power, 
people cannot buy the goods and services offered in the market (Nayyar, 2001: 363). 
Therefore, there is a contradiction between the principle of inclusive political 
participation and the exclusion of the poor from economic markets, which reinforces 
inequality. This has significant implications for the application of democratic models 
of participation in developing countries (as discussed later in section 2.4). 
Although, Dahl (1998: 45) provides some significant justifications for the preference 
of democracy over other regimes, such as the protection of individuals against the 
arbitrary cruelty of an autocrat, the freedom of individuals to pursue their own 
fundamental interests and the promotion of human development, he attests that 
democracy is not a synonym for development, nor a promise of future solutions. 
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl (1991: 76) claim that there is a temptation to 
imagine that the democratic system will resolve all the irregularities in society; in 




more efficient administrative systems. They demystify four common assumptions 
about this type of regime (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 85). Firstly, democracy does not 
mean more open economies; instead, some democratic countries have implemented 
protectionist policies and austerity measures in a bid to promote economic 
development, mainly in periods of political and economic transition. Secondly, their 
economies are not more efficient than non-democratic regimes – in older and long-
enduring democracies, political and economic institutions work together, reinforcing 
each other, but ‘uneven democracies’ still need to deal with the problems of 
inequality and particularism (the concept of ‘uneven democracies’ is discussed later in 
section 2.4). Thirdly, democracies can be more difficult to administer and their 
decision-making processes slower than in autocratic regimes, since they are obliged to 
consult more actors before reaching a decision. Also, not only can the amount of 
bargaining widen the opportunities for corruption in the decision-making process, but 
the level of disagreement can be higher as the losers in political disputes have the 
right to complain. Finally, democracies can be more unstable and less orderly, since 
freedom of expression allows oppositional forces and social movements to protest 
government decisions (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 85). Recently, non-democratic 
countries, such as China and Singapore, have demonstrated steady economic growth, 
while a large number of newly democratised countries in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia still suffer from problems of underdevelopment, including poverty and high 
levels of inequality. In addition to all these limitations, the electoral process appears 
to have neither improved politics nor changed politicians’ conduct; in fact, the 
opposite can be true: corrupt politicians are quite often re-elected.  
Liberalism and democracy, however, guarantee individuals the right of association – 




state becomes the space in which these claims are contested and negotiated. It is, 
therefore, necessary to analyse the role of the democratic state as the mediator of 
different interests in society. Niraja Jayal (2001: 44) claims that only the state can 
create the conditions for citizens and groups to exercise democratic participation by 
respecting differences and mediating between disputes; nevertheless, due to the state’s 
inherent authoritarian tendencies, a strong civil society is the only guarantee against 
the centralisation of power. 
According to Dahl (1998: 41), the state is often treated as if it were a unitary system, 
with government institutions establishing the norms of social conduct and their 
enforcement. The famous notion of Thomas Hobbes (1651: 125) that the state is a 
superior entity, with the coercive power to enforce impersonal rules which all citizens 
are compelled to obey, is a generally accepted formulation. The state does indeed 
possess the power to enforce the law in its territory – in the most extreme cases, 
employing the police or military; however, it is important to differentiate between the 
authority of the state and the use of force. Dahl (1989: 244) explains that the authority 
of the democratic state is based on the legitimacy of the law, and Bobbio et al. (1998: 
675) add that this legitimacy lies in the consensus of a significant part of the 
population, which means the state is generally capable of ensuring compliance to the 
rules without recourse to force. The idea of public participation as a mechanism for 
the legitimation of government interests is explored in the case of the Indian SBA 
(section 5.2) and the Sectoral Agreements in Brazil (section 6.3). 
The authority of the state is generally based in its bureaucracy, where the actions of 
the government are coordinated (Weber, 1947). The state itself is organised as a set of 




with it. The state, then, is not a unitary system; rather, it comprises a myriad of 
government institutions, organised to provide services, which sometimes work in 
contradiction to one another. Institutions are commonly described in social science as 
‘the rules of the game’, which means that they regulate behaviours and impose 
structures on human relationships (North, 1993: 2). Some government institutions are 
highly formalised, with a constitution, laws, regulations, and dedicated buildings and 
officials, while others have informally accepted values and rituals (O’Donnell, 1996: 
3). The study of institutions also has to take into account the hierarchy of laws and 
public bodies operating in the governance of a nation. Douglass North (1993:1) states 
that institutions determine the incentives that induce the choices and behaviours of 
individuals and organisations affecting its economy and the lives of its citizens.  
The majority of political conflicts and different interests are negotiated in this public 
realm. Thus, the state is both the supreme entity that regulates the practices of 
individuals or groups and the public sphere where these actors negotiate policy 
alternatives. The institutional approach to the study of the decision-making process 
attributes the outcomes of policy decisions exclusively to government institutions, 
with institutional arrangements determining the behaviour of individuals and groups 
in society. However, although government institutions dictate the rules of the game, 
there are other forces influencing government decisions. As Peter Dicken (2011: 178) 
emphasises, every country has a particular set of structures and practices determining 
how its society and economy operate. An understanding of the role of the state in the 
organisation of society and the economy, therefore, is fundamental to an analysis of 





Orthodox theories of the role of the state 
In order to understand the forces influencing interest groups’ relationships with and 
impact on government decisions, this subsection explores two opposing orthodox 
theories of the state: Marxism and market liberalism. The analysis of the role of the 
state in liberal democracies takes two main ideological positions: on the one hand, 
neoliberals aim to narrow the power of the public realm to render it as minimal as 
possible, retaining only its remit to promote economic growth and regulate and 
protect property rights against state interference or collective interests; on the other 
hand, proponents of social democracy advocate an extensive role for the state, in 
terms of regulation, taxation and progressive policies that address inequalities by 
providing basic services, income security and social programmes for universal 
education and healthcare (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 77).  
Liberalism’s main tenet is protection of the individual’s freedom to pursue their 
particular interests (Howlett et al., 2009: 55), and this reasoning establishes practices 
and beliefs that help promote the capitalist mode of production, which Beetham 
(1997: 42) defines as a market-oriented organisation of society based on production 
and exchange. According to Przeworski (1985: 11), the market economy is a system 
grounded in competition and the free exchange of products and services, where 
property rights are guaranteed by law. Market liberals believe that the role of the 
government should be reduced in favour of market mechanisms; they advocate both 
economic freedom and freedom for the individual to make rational choices. Dicken 
(2011: 177) explains that, in the now-pervasive neoliberal model, the system is 
dominated by the concept of ‘individualism’ and the maximisation of ‘short-term 
business profitability’. Apart from producing measures that promote these outcomes, 




produce ‘bad’ results, and only the market produces ‘good’ results (Dryzek and 
Dunleavy, 2009: 33). Neoliberalism advocates economic freedom, unhindered by the 
coercive power of the state (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009: 100). 
In contrast, Karl Marx provided a theory of capitalism and the evolution of society, 
according to which, capitalist society is divided into two main social classes, the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 2005: 98). A small number of 
property owners, the bourgeoisie, hold property rights and own the means of 
production. They employ the proletariat, who own nothing but their labour power 
(Marx and Engels, 2005), their employment guaranteed only by their capacity to 
generate profits for the capitalist owners. Mancur Olson (1971: 103) explains that 
these classes are divided by antagonistic economic interests and, in this relationship, 
the members of each group have opposing collective interests. According to John 
Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy (2009: 92), the state-society relationship can be 
analysed in three different ways: as an instrument of the ruling class, the arbiter of the 
conflict between the classes, or the maintainer of the capitalist system’s stability. 
From a Marxist viewpoint, the welfare state can mitigate the harmful consequences of 
capitalism, but even ‘social policies of redistribution do not represent [the] political 
influence of ordinary people, merely stabilising society in the interests of the elite’ 
(Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009: 77, 97). 
Przeworski (1985: 77) disagrees with the Marxist theory that the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism generates social instability; in fact, he claims the opposite – 
democracy perpetuates capitalism, since the systems of production and ‘exploitation 
can be maintained with the consent of the exploited’. The democratic institutions of 




Since, in capitalist societies, politics is reduced to material interests, interest groups 
participate in politics in order to realise their specific material needs (Przeworski, 
1985: 134). In his view, democracy provides opportunities for any group to satisfy 
their material needs, and the future of the system (and the realisation of the various 
interests within it) depends on decisions on the allocation of resources. The survival 
of the economic system and capitalist society, however, relies primarily on the 
profitability of business and the accumulation of capital: without investment, the 
economy cannot support itself, consumption decreases and living standards decline. 
The state, therefore, needs to provide the means to maintain and expand investments. 
As Lindblom (in Howlett et al., 2009: 57) explains, due to ‘the reliance of states in 
capitalist societies on business revenues for the overall levels of social well-being’, 
business concerns have unparalleled capacity to influence decision-makers. 
In a democratic state, civil society occupies an intermediate position between the state 
and society. The public realm is separated from the private sector, and it determines 
how society and the market operate. However, social scientists appear ambivalent 
about the relationship between the democratic polity and the market economy: some 
theorists argue that market forces harm the democratic process, while others claim 
they benefit democratic institutions. Beetham (1997: 76) states that this disagreement 
depends on how theorists conceptualise the role of the market economy and civil 
society in the political process. If the market is conceived of as exclusive of civil 
society, theorists tend to treat the economic domain as self-interested, pursuing only 
the maximisation of profits, while theorists who include the market as part of civil 
society understand the polity in a broader sense, perceiving civil society as a space of 
democratic manifestation. The former separate this conflict into three main forces: the 




an intermediary sphere between the state and the individual, operating autonomously 
and independently, and counterbalancing the authority of the state (Beetham, 1997: 
76). As such, civil society becomes an arena of intense political contestation. 
Authority and power 
Dahl explains that, in order to have ‘effective participation’, all citizens must have 
equal opportunity to discuss and raise concerns about the government’s political 
agenda: 
Throughout the process of making bidding decisions, citizens ought to have 
an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their 
preferences as to the final outcomes. They must have adequate and equal 
opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another. (Dahl, 1989: 109) 
However, the study of politics is the study of the exercise of power and how power 
shapes these political processes. Within this sphere of political competition between 
conflicting interests, some actors are more powerful than others. The concept of 
power is central to understanding the capacity of actors to influence policy decisions 
and the decision-making processes, as well as the relationships between interest 
groups. Power favours the development of some groups and restricts others. Michel 
Foucault (1991) defines ‘power’ as action that influences others’ behaviour. As 
Bobbio et al. (1998: 940) explain, power is thus part of every social relationship in 
which the behaviour of individual/group A (government body, political party, interest 
group) impacts the behaviour of individual/group B. Therefore, power implies a 




demands an A who exerts power and an opposing B who is affected by this action. 
Hence, according to Foucault (1991), power is a relationship rather than the 
imposition of force or violence; it comes from below, from the individual’s 
acceptance of their social position. As Mark Kelly (2013: 65) explains, ‘power comes 
from occupying a position in a complex social network that endows a person with 
power’. The power of the state lies in its institutions (its laws and values), rather than 
the use of force. 
In the context of public participation, Gaventa (2005: 15) describes three 
conceptualisations of power: the ‘visible power’ involved in decision-making, the 
‘hidden power’ that sets the political agenda, and the ‘invisible power’ shaping 
meanings and values within the participatory processes. Political power is visible 
when it is impersonally defined through legislation, institutions and the procedures of 
policymaking. Some groups and institutions are able to exert influence over the 
determination of who participates in policy decision-making and who is excluded, as 
well as the agenda. Some actors also shape the beliefs and values of those 
participating – Gaventa (2005: 15) explains that ‘processes of socialisation, culture 
and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, 
acceptable and safe’. Therefore, far from being politically neutral, participatory 
processes are permeated by power relations. 
The study of interest groups also involves an understanding of the different ways that 
power is conceptualised. For example, ‘elite theory’ is the study of the structures of 
power and wealth in terms of the relationship between those at the top of the pyramid 




power is dispersed among a variety of groups, preventing its concentration. These 
ideas will be studied in detail in section 2.3.  
However, the main question here is: what is the power of the ordinary citizen to 
influence policy decisions, and are citizens competent to decide on policies? 
Experts, science and decision-making 
Before addressing interest group theories, it is important to highlight the position of 
certain influential individuals in participatory forums and other government 
proceedings. Among all the actors involved in decision-making, public policy experts 
hold a distinctive position in government decisions as they offer technical solutions to 
social problems. They comprise academics, researchers, politicians, members of 
associations, lawyers, leaders of social movements and NGOs, chief executive 
officers of corporations (CEOs), directors of government bodies – in sum, they are the 
leading specialists in their fields. They play an opinion-forming role in government 
committees and think tanks, and participate in public debates and academic forums, 
producing and managing information, and influencing public opinion (Dahl, 1989: 
335). These experts occupy an ambiguous position, as individuals and as members of 
interest groups; some may appear as individuals but, in fact, represent specific groups 
and promote ideologies that benefit particular group interests.  
The debate on the role of experts in decision-making is crucial to this research. Their 
importance in politics is based on the power of knowledge and science, which Daniel 
Kleinman (2000: 11) divides into three spheres: structures, resources and discourses. 
Structural power defines the boundaries of action in a particular issue, and provides 




values and behaviour. The majority of the events that I attended on the policies of 
solid waste management in the course of my fieldwork, including public hearings, 
business fairs and academic discussions, were populated by experts. Atul Kohli 
(1993: 683) calls attention to the 1990s and the beginnings of neoliberalism in India, 
when, in the name of efficiency and pragmatism, technocratic decisions were 
conducted by public policy specialists behind closed doors, without any vestige of 
popular control. This is still a current feature of Indian politics: decisions on the 
Indian waste reforms (discussed in Chapter 5 and 6), for example, were taken by a 
few bureaucrats and some invited experts, with little space for public consultation. 
Harry Eckstein (cited in Maloney et al., 1994: 22) claims that some restricted 
consultations are not necessarily undemocratic since certain technical issues demand 
professional expertise and few people have the interest or knowledge to take such 
decisions. However, this means there is a risk that important issues become 
‘depoliticised’ and controlled by a small number of interest groups with access to 
government officials.  
Dahl (1989: 338) contends that because a knowledge gap separates the political elite 
from the ordinary citizen, the role of the expert is to render knowledge accessible to 
citizens and to clarify issues to help them decide the best way to advance the public 
interest. William McDonough and Michael Braungart (2002: 12), however, argue that 
although it is almost universally recognised that decisions on environmental issues, 
for example, should be discussed democratically, complex issues cannot rely on 
democratic consultation alone, as the layperson does not have the necessary specialist 
knowledge. Proponents of the essential role of expertise claim that in post-industrial 
societies technical knowledge is key to decision-making. J. K. Galbraith (cited in 




experts play a decisive role: politicians are obliged to choose between rational policy 
alternatives, and these choices must be supported by technical arguments. The 
legitimacy of the decision-making process is thus guaranteed by technical expertise 
and scientific rationality. The authority of science, according to this argument, always 
underpins political authority (Bocking, 2004: 3).  
However, the predominant role of experts raises concerns when their authority is 
translated into political power (Bocking, 2004: 21). Scientific authority is based on its 
‘credibility’, which Steven Epstein (2000: 16) defines as the capacity to aggregate the 
support of a sufficient number of people to back a claim. Dahl (1998: 72), however, 
argues that government decisions are not scientific experiments, where solutions are 
based on empirical evidence; rather, they involve negotiating the uncertainties and 
conflicts in society, and demand ethical judgements, based on principles such as 
justice, equity and morality. Sheila Jasanoff (2003) states that there are two key 
problems in science: the first is fallibility and the second is a ‘pro-business bias.’ She 
explains that all predictive techniques, designed to minimise uncertainty and risk, and 
promote good management, suffer from ‘overconfidence in the accuracy and 
completeness of the picture they produce’ (Jasanoff, 2003: 239). These methods tend 
to provide false confidence in the security – that is, the comprehensive coverage of all 
potential risks – provided by expert analysis. Experts downplay scenarios ‘outside 
their field of vision’. Jasanoff (2003: 223) gives several examples of the failure of 
scientific control – including climate change and the disasters of Chernobyl, in the 
former USSR, and Bhopal, in India – that clearly expose human pretensions to 
technological domination. As these instances show, scientific knowledge is in fact 




The second problem concerns the accountability and impartiality of experts, and the 
integrity of their research. Scientific and technical knowledge, when used in the 
service of politics, becomes a sociopolitical issue. The idea of the authority of science 
raises the question of the relationship between expert knowledge, power and 
democratic decision-making, particularly as political elites are willing to manipulate 
information to reinforce their power (Dahl, 1989: 338). David Kleinman (2000: 11) 
shows how the authority vested in scientific knowledge can be used to impose 
dominant discourses that shape values and opinions, giving those who hold this 
expertise a sort of ‘cultural authority’. This authority is based on the assumption that 
scientists’ findings are impartial and exempt from political influence (Kleinman, 
2000: 4). Science has indeed been responsible for significant developments that have 
helped solve social problems and further an understanding of the world we live in, but 
there is a danger that science is regarded as value-neutral and free of bias, particularly 
when scientific knowledge is used to support political decisions (Bocking, 2004: 17).  
Richard Sclove (1995) claims that, in democratic systems, citizens should have the 
option to influence decisions that affect their lives, but reliance on technocratic 
decision-making creates conflicting private interests in the political process. Jasanoff 
(2003) adds that even in political processes involving consensus and deliberative 
forums, designed to include both citizens and experts, the expert realm excludes 
laypersons from the review and critique of its evidence, as they do not possess enough 
expert knowledge. In addition, some participatory processes are implemented too late 
in the policy cycle, after the major decisions have already been taken. This was the 
experience of the 4th CNMA in Brazil (section 6.2), where, despite the engagement of 
the population across the country, it was not clear whether the outcome of these 




As an academic, however, I am aware that I am also a specialist. Although my 
capacity to influence policies is limited as I am not formally engaged with any group 
or active in any political process, my text presents my interpretation of these political 
processes and debates, bringing the voices of certain actors to the fore. When I 
present a paper in conferences or academic journals, for example, I am part of a group 
of academics that is, in turn, part of a wider body of intellectual experts. If I 
participate in conferences organised by international organisations involved in the 
waste management sector, my work contributes to these organisations. If my paper is 
included in a panel focused on developing countries, it contributes to the 
reinforcement of the ideology of a North-South divide. Therefore, as a researcher 
working as part of the scientific community, I have some sort of influence on the 
production of the information that affects the political realm – the object of my 
critique. 
Experts, therefore, cannot be impartial; they play a distinctive role in forums for 
public participation, guiding debates and influencing the values of the participants. 
The reason for holding an open debate is to give a plurality of actors the opportunity 
to raise their ideas or concerns in a public arena; however, some elite groups, by 
virtue of their claim to expertise, are able to take a leading position in these debates 
and thus their organisations possess significant influence over policy-making. 
Although there are examples of successful participatory processes where excluded 
social groups have gained some sort of access to the decision-making process, and of 
participatory forums that have fostered interaction and the exchange of knowledge 
between government bodies and interest groups across different levels of governance, 




access to government resources. These political processes are legitimised by their 
dominant participants. 
2.3 Interest group theory 
The previous section focused on public participation, questioning the role of the 
ordinary citizen in these political processes. This section explores the influence of 
pressure groups on government decisions from the perspective of interest group 
theory. Despite the extensive literature on public participation, there has been less 
focus on the role of interest groups within these political decision-making processes. 
Public participation involves a series of activities and spaces where the public 
(individuals and groups) can engage in government decisions. This section, therefore, 
explores how different schools of thoughts interpret the role of the state and that of 
interest groups in government decisions. Although the public is sometimes able to 
participate in certain processes, such as public hearings, at specific moments of 
decision-making, interest groups are able to exert a major influence on the entire 
political process. In addition to public hearings and participatory forums, Scott 
Furlong and Cornelius Kerwin (2004: 363) describe a number of methods of interest-
group participation, such as submitting written documents (research, analysis or 
proposals) to government bodies; forming coalitions with other groups to support or 
halt bills; holding informal face-to-face meetings with government officials both 
before and after consultations; and filing petitions in the courts to prevent the 
implementation of government decisions. Even in technocratic decision-making 
processes, which are generally closed to the public, experts and members of interest 
groups participate in the government committees that invariably define whether and 




A few authors have explored participation from the perspective of interest groups. 
William Maloney et al. (1994) investigate the role of interest groups in consultations 
in the UK, discussing the unequal capacity privileged groups have to influence the 
political process, as well as analysing their strategies. Pablo Spiller and Sanny Lao 
(2006) explore the way interest groups purchase influence, lobby the legislative and 
executive branches of government, and promote lawsuits through the judiciary. 
Meanwhile, Marissa Golden (1998) and Scott Furlong (1997) look specifically at the 
role of interest groups in federal policymaking in the US. Golden (1998) explains that 
the US Congress has delegated the design of certain policies to the executive. This 
transfer of rule-making powers from elected representatives to unelected bureaucrats 
should involve public oversight to ensure the protection of the democratic process; 
instead, Congress has legitimated interest-group participation in the decision-making, 
and as a result, the process is dominated by big business, and the voices of ordinary 
citizens are virtually absent. Golden’s analysis contributes to an understanding of the 
activity of interest groups in the drawing up of the Indian MSW Rules – the result of 
an executive decree. The main question the majority of these scholars pose is: who 
participates in government decisions and what influence do they wield? The activities 
of interest groups in decision-making must be defined in terms of the mechanisms 
they use and the actions they take in order to influence government decisions.  
Few academics have focused on the role of interest groups in Brazil and India. 
Amongst those who do, some give cultural explanations for their political influence in 
these countries. Andréa Gozetto and Clive Thomas (2014: 3), for example, provide an 
historical, sociopolitical context for interest group activities in Brazil. They attribute 
the system of interest groups that operates in the country to its particular political 




Portuguese hierarchical family tradition); a strong presidential system; and the 
evolution of the economy and the expansion of democratic pluralism after 1988 
(Gozetto and Thomas, 2014: 3). They argue that Brazilian politics up to the present 
day has always been linked to the distribution of power between political elites and 
powerful interest groups. In the case of India, S. A. Palekar (2014) and Sandeep 
Gulabsingh (2015) explain that although business groups are also the most organised 
and powerful groups in the country’s politics, groups representing racial, linguistic, 
religious and regional claims also exert a strong influence on government decisions. 
Legislators have a close relationship with religious sectors, and the ‘caste lobby’ 
(from the dominant down to the minority and so-called ‘backward’ castes) has an 
increasingly strong influence on politics. Thus, Indian political institutions and its 
socioeconomic development are shaped by interest group participation in decision-
making (Palekar, 2014: 339). 
Although religious and other social groups may seek to participate in politics, the 
most influential group (in the case of public service provision) is the special-interest 
group of business and commercial organisations. Associations of industries, chambers 
of commerce, law firms and lobbyists are the most organised and powerful groups 
influencing the governmental agenda (Olson, 1971: 141). In addition to the methods 
mentioned above, Thomas Dye (1998: 35) explains that interest groups are involved 
in a variety of other interactions with decision-makers and civil servants, such as 
providing information and research; helping draft legislation; contributing to 
campaigns and financing government programmes, political parties and officials; 
cementing relationships between politicians and businessmen by providing dinners, 




‘revolving door’); pursuing lawsuits to stop or change legislation; and instigating 
grassroots mobilisation to support their interests. 
Jordan and Maloney (2007: 2) even claim that interest groups are more representative 
of citizens’ preferences than political parties. Although this literature focuses on 
pressure groups, it is important to bear in mind that political parties are also, in a 
sense, interest groups. Andrew McFarland (1987: 12) contends that the study of 
interest groups and political parties varies according to the particular theoretical 
position adopted by the social scientist. On the one hand, Bobbio et al (1998: 564) 
state that political parties and pressure groups represent specific interests in society; 
they both participate in politics and mediate the interaction between the state and 
society. However, the democratic party system has its own mechanisms through 
which it participates in electoral competition, and elected representatives are directly 
in charge of policy decision-making and public administration. Although pressure 
groups do not participate directly in elections, and their members do not have 
institutional decision-making powers, they can influence political decisions. Pressure 
groups act independently of partisan associations and exert significant control over 
political parties: while political parties are at the centre of the decision-making 
process, pressure groups seek, either through incentives or coercive actions, to ensure 
that their interests are guaranteed (Bobbio et al., 1998: 564). Although deemed illegal 
in some democratic systems, interest groups frequently finance the electoral 
campaigns of political parties, recruit members to take official positions and 
determine policy alternatives by lobbying politicians. The ‘lobby’ is literally a 
corridor in the office buildings and hotels where parliamentarians routinely work and 
live (Bobbio et al., 1998: 563), and the term ‘lobbying’ is used to describe the 




government officials in the attempt to convince them to facilitate policies that 
promote their client’s interests. Spiller and Liao (2006: 5) describe lobbying as ‘the 
transferring of resources’ (money, contacts and information) to government officials 
in order to affect their decisions. Although these practices are part of politics, there is 
a common feeling that lobbying is an undemocratic, even dirty practice, usually 
conducted behind closed doors.  
On the other hand, Grant Jordan and William Maloney (1994: 1) claim that 
associations of individuals are intrinsic to the democratic system, and their 
participation represents a valuable contribution to public policy. These authors argue 
that they provide opportunities for individuals to interact with, learn from and make 
pluralist contributions to the decision-making process. However, the term ‘interest 
group’ lacks precision (Jordan et al., 2004: 207), as many scholars have a different 
conceptualisation of its definition. Interest groups are usually differentiated from 
government institutions, and include business organisations, non-government and 
trade associations, but exclude social movements and public interest groups. Jeffrey 
Berry (1977: 7) defines a public interest group as ‘one that seeks a collective good, 
the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership 
of activists of the organisation’. According to this definition, interest groups are 
organised groups which seek to influence policies for the good of their members 
(Jordan et al., 2004); this definition by default excludes unorganised and latent 
groups. Laura Baroni et al. (2014) explain that differentiations of classification or 
definition in the literature are driven by different research focuses, with the two main 
distinctions based on behaviour and organisation. The first approach observes the 
groups’ activities in relation to their influence on policy outcomes, while the latter 




mobilise their membership. Taking a behavioural approach, Jordan et al. (2004: 28) 
also suggest a differentiation between ‘pressure participants’, organisations in a 
potential position to influence public policies, and ‘policy participants’, ‘organisations 
not primarily dedicated to political activity’. They suggest that corporate groups can 
be labelled either as ‘interest groups’, when they combine in trade associations and 
are not directly engaged in changing policy, or as ‘pressure participants’, when the 
company attempts to intervene in the political process (Jordan et al., 2004: 208). 
However, interest groups theories provide different perspectives on the capacity of 
influence of these groups. These theories have evolved into four main analytical 
models: group theory, pluralism, elite group theory and neo-pluralism. These are 
further (roughly) divided into two main schools of thought: one more pluralist, which 
sees the existence of such groups as essential to diluting the centralisation of state 
power, and the other more elitist, which believes that power is concentrated in a 
minority of dominant groups. In addition to these key theories, this literature also 
explores the theory of corporatism, which evolved in Europe in parallel with the 
discussion of interest groups. 
Initially, interest group theory emerged from the study of the American political 
system, but it has since been applied to many other political contexts across the world. 
For example, authors such as Jayal (2001), Nayyar (2001), Alston et al. (2016) and 
Gozetto and Thomas (2014), among others, employ these theories to explain the 
decision-making processes in Brazil and India. The following section is an overview 




2.3.1 Group theory 
Group theory has its origins in a work by Arthur Bentley (1908), The Process of 
Government, which discusses the dominant role of interest groups in politics; his 
theories gained prominence in the 1950s with David Truman’s (1951) The 
Government Process. According to these authors, politics can be reduced to the 
struggle between different groups of people, each pursuing their own economic 
interests. Groups, rather than individuals, are the key forces behind political and 
economic developments in society; Truman (1951: 246) claims that isolated 
individuals acting independently are rare in politics. In this context, the term ‘group’ 
means ‘a number of individuals with a common interest’ (Olson, 1971: 8): group 
members share common behaviours and act together to achieve their mutual goals.  
Raymond Castell and Arthur Bentley (cited in Olson, 1997: 9) both assert that ‘every 
group has an interest’. According to Olson (1971: 120), the discourse of ‘individual 
interests’ versus ‘the national interest’ is a sham. Society and politics are the result of 
many conflicting pressures, and political debate is used to openly discuss problems 
and thus reach a consensual solution. Olson (1971: 10) gives an example of an 
industrial sector that wishes to change a tariff system: in order to change policy or to 
obtain government assistance, interest groups in this sector will organise themselves 
as a pressure group to lobby for the change. If their action faces resistance, they will 
invest resources in influencing public opinion and negotiating agreements with 
competing groups. John Commons (cited in Olson, 1971: 116), writing in the 1950s, 
claims that pressure groups based on economic interests are more influential in the US 
than the legislature, which is based on geographical representation. He believes such 
groups represent freedom of voluntary association, and are the most vital organisation 




Bentley (cited in Olson, 1971: 119) states that the term ‘pressure’ (as in ‘pressure 
groups’) refers to influence on policy-making, where the government is the space of 
accommodation for many competing interests. Even self-interested economic groups 
are important for the political process, precisely because they have antagonistic 
interests which balance those of other competing powers. The government, in fact, is 
created by interest groups; it is the space of interaction for these interests, and its 
political institutions are put in place to support them. In addition, William Maloney et 
al. (1994: 21) claim that government officials cultivate relationships with pressure 
groups as their bills rely on engaging such interests, and a policy that does not receive 
the attention of society will hardly ever be enacted in law. Interest groups, therefore, 
work through the government, and their particular interests have meaning when they 
are interpreted and referenced to other pressures as part of the governmental process 
(Bentley, 1908: 271). Although sometimes there is a risk that the government works 
as the tool of certain private interests (Bentley, 1908: 270), Olson (1971: 124) 
explains that both Bentley and Truman interpret pressure group activity in 
government affairs as generally beneficial for society as it helps balance the 
multiplicity of interests involved in a public issue. 
Opponents of this view claim that the activity of interest groups in the decision-
making process is costly in terms of time and the complexity of consultations. Bobbio 
et al. (1998: 564) emphasise that it could be even more expensive in terms of the 
acquisition of information and knowledge, and the resistance of opposing groups left 
out of consultations. However, as pressure groups play a dominant role in policy-
making, their activities should at least be better regulated and more transparent. 
Bobbio et al. (1998: 570), therefore, claim that a democracy requires mechanisms in 





The term ‘pluralism’ here refers to the inclusion of diverse ideas and views within the 
political process. Dahl (1989: 291) explains that the concept of ‘polyarchy’ recognises 
that the political process is the result of conflicts between a multitude of groups and 
organisations working independently of the state and of one another. In this case, 
decision-making is not a ‘black box’, limited to politicians and bureaucrats (Dryzek 
and Dunleavy, 2009: 253). Pluralists believe that power-sharing between various 
groups disperses the central authority of the state, as the policy outcome is a result of 
the action of multiple centres of power. Thus, the competition between conflicting 
interests produces fair and balanced decisions. According to this view, the 
government is an autonomous entity, negotiating with these interest groups.  
Pluralism developed in American social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s as an 
explanation of the emergence of civil rights movements (Black Power groups, anti-
Vietnam War campaigners and environmentalists) in the political arena (Parsons, 
1995: 253). However, in the 1970s, theorists also started to recognise that policy-
making is primarily influenced by powerful business interests. According to 
McFarland (1987: 138), the concept of pluralism evolved out of a combination of 
Dahl’s work on power, Truman’s and Bentley’s group theory and Lindbolm’s 
incrementalism. The theoretical framework is built on the premise that policymaking 
is an incremental process, in which the government and its agencies are autonomous 
entities and its decision-makers are influenced by a variety of organisations seeking to 
advance their independent interests. The amalgamation of these conflicts leads to a 




For example, in the case of the waste policies analysed in this research, the pluralist 
model would describe the difference between the Brazilian and the Indian decision-
making processes as simply a result of the former government incorporating more 
actors into the political process than the latter. This being the case, it would appear 
that the federations of industries, mayors, labour unions and NGOs involved in the 
solid waste management sector, all lobbying for their specific interests, would 
encounter a more pluralist political system in Brazil than in India, where the system is 
deemed more technocratic. Thus, research in this area would no doubt conclude that 
the pluralist model generates more representative and balanced policies. However, 
this analysis would be simplistic, failing to take into account the disparity of power 
between these groups. Other theories discussed below address this theme. 
Pluralist theory has been widely criticised, mainly due to the fact that it assumes that 
all claims are equally well organised and actively represented in the policymaking 
process. It lacks a clear explanation of the unequal power relations involved in 
politics, failing to recognise that some groups are more organised, more economically 
and politically powerful, and more capable of influencing policy decisions than others 
(Howlett et al., 2009: 40). Critics of the theory also claim that the role of the 
government is vague. Howlett et al. (2009: 39) criticise Dahl’s (1976) assumption that 
the government can be conceptualised not as an ‘entity’ but as an ‘arena’, where 
interest groups compete and bargain, ignoring the fact that government authorities 
also have private interests and special relationships with specific pressure groups. 
In The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1971: 127) argues against the pluralistic 
assumption that the counterbalance of the political actions of different pressure groups 




criticism on a distinction between the size of groups. Olson (1971: 21) contends that 
their organisational capacity is disproportionate: small groups, which he defines as 
‘privileged’ and ‘intermediate’ groups, are more efficient in promoting the common 
interests of their members, while large groups, which he calls ‘latent groups’ (such as 
ordinary citizens) are generally unorganised and inactive. The centripetal force of 
smaller groups strengthens the voluntary actions of their members, because they are 
closer to the issue, while members of larger groups lack this cohesive power, as their 
members are dispersed and free to advance their individual interests (Olson, 1971: 
50). The power of such groups in the political arena is uneven.  
This logic helps us to understand the actions of ordinary citizens and interest groups 
in participatory processes. For example, business associations are very efficient when 
promoting their demands in debates, while large groups of unorganised consumers or 
residents find it difficult to organise their claims in this manner – although, in some 
cases, a community affected by a specific problem is motivated to organise their 
demands effectively in order to press for government action. Olson (1971: 128) 
suggests that privileged groups generally defeat large groups, contradicting the 
democratic principle of the rule of the majority. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the 
organisational capacity and actions of some specific interest groups in the waste 
management sector in Brazil and India, specifically business associations (section 7.2) 
and the social movements of waste pickers (section 7.5). Section 6.3 also discusses 
the Sectoral Agreement of Reverse Logistics in Brazil, which is a deliberative forum 
designed to implement waste recycling across the country. After years of intense 
negotiations, the proposal put forward by a cohesive group of industrialists was 
accepted over the proposals of other influential groups; meanwhile, those who are the 




(Brazilian householders) had little representation. This exemplifies Olson’s (1971: 
132) critique of pluralist theory, which he claims does not work for latent groups as, 
although they have potential power, they lack organisation and coordination. 
2.3.3 Elite theory 
In contrast to the pluralists’ optimism, elite group theorists claim that only a minority, 
oligarchic group, representative of the concentration of political power, controls the 
state and society. These theorists reject the idea that democracy is the ‘government of 
the people, by the people’; democracy, they believe, is the result of the actions of the 
economic and governing elites who have access to decision-making. Research by 
Wrights Mills (cited in McFarland, 2010: 3) in the 1950s showed that the power elite 
in the US comprises an allied group of large corporations, military officers and 
members of Congress, and this group controls the country’s finances, federal 
government and means of force. Elite theorists contend that the ordinary citizen does 
not have the necessary knowledge or access to information to shape policymaking, 
and the elite are therefore generally able to influence their opinions, rather than the 
other way around (Dye, 1998: 18).  
Elite theorists also divide society into two classes: the ruling elite (owners of 
economic and political power) and the masses (ordinary citizens, excluded from the 
decision-making processes). The difference between this division of social classes to 
that of Marxist theory is the fact that, in Marx, the proletariat struggles to change this 
situation, and through these struggles arrives at the conclusion that the only solution is 
revolutionary systemic change. The masses in elite theory, by contrast, are powerless, 
under the control of the elite; in fact, the democratic model legitimises the power of 




use their assets, such as control of the means of communication and technical 
knowledge, to manipulate public opinion. Elite power is, therefore, based on the 
construction of social beliefs, values and behaviours, and control over the access to 
decision-making. It aims to restrain its opponents’ capacity for mobilisation and 
prevent any consideration of alternatives to elite goals (Parsons, 1995: 253). For 
example, Dye (2001: 16) explains that the institutional structure of society will 
determine which issues are placed on the government agenda, and which will escape 
notice. He claims that ‘non-decisions’ are also part of the structure of power that 
limits public concerns and mobilisation. Sartori (1987: 16) gives the example of the 
structural concentration of economic power in the US: wealthy organisations, such as 
industrialists and their business associations, financial institutions (investment banks 
and insurance companies), large media groups and corporate lawyers, decide on the 
issues to be considered by government – issues that impact the whole society. Some 
issues will never receive government attention, because they are deemed to be 
‘private’ concerns.  
According to elite theory, therefore, the state becomes the elite’s instrument and it is 
used to serve their interests (Domhoff, 1978a: 15 cited in Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009: 75). Schumpeter (2003: 269) criticises the political process, which only serves 
to legitimise elite power. He defines the democratic method as a competition for 
leadership, where everyone is theoretically free to compete but, in practice, it is the 
political elites who compete for the popular vote. In this way, elections are reduced to 
a form of market competition, where rival elites (through their political parties) 
propose programmes, and citizens only participate in policymaking insofar as they 




Although it is easy to identify the power of elites to influence political debates, 
participatory forums can provide opportunities for some underprivileged social groups 
to raise their voices and promote their claims in the political arena. Despite these 
theorists’ pessimism about elite dominance in politics, I observed during my 
fieldwork many civil servants, both in Brazil and India, who were committed to 
improving the quality of public services, as well as participatory forums which 
cemented relationships and improved the exchange of information between the 
authorities, social groups and local communities. Therefore, although elite dominance 
is a reality, its theorists do not pay enough attention to movements at the base of the 
pyramid; public participation has in fact provided an opening to some of these groups 
to change policies and challenge the status quo. 
2.3.4 Neo-pluralism 
Some scholars working in the pluralist tradition have incorporated the critiques and 
contributions of other theories, such as multiple-elite, social movements and coalition 
network theories, to formulate a neo-pluralist theory (McFarland, 2010: 8). This new 
theory explicitly recognises that policymaking is not neutral and, in reality, favours 
business and economic groups. In addition, the fact that a multitude of diverse groups 
are involved in policymaking does not necessarily entail more just or representative 
decision-making (McFarland, 2007: 46) since some important interests are not 
represented. Some groups are more powerful than others, and this disparity has a 
decisive influence on policy outcomes (Howlett et al., 2009: 39).  
Business groups always exert the most powerful influence in liberal democracies. 
Lindbom (1977 cited in Howlett et al., 2009: 39) explains that policymaking is 




governments rely on positive economic results for the tax revenues needed to advance 
their programmes. Furthermore, economic growth and employment rely on financial 
investment. For these reasons, big business and financial concerns are able to exert 
pressure on the state to pursue their interests. However, the intersection of theories of 
social movements, advocacy coalition and political process with neo-pluralist theory 
has contributed to its further development. 
Social movements theory 
The study of social movements differs from that of interest groups and political 
parties; nevertheless, some social movements develop into interest groups and, as 
such, participate in policymaking. A social movement is defined as the mobilisation 
of individuals and groups – many of them without formal political affiliations – in 
order to achieve a particular political outcome (Birkland, 2011: 136). Sidney Tarrow 
(1998: 5) argues that such collective action differs from the politics of democratic 
representation, markets or lobby groups as it allows the disadvantaged to access the 
institutional system; a social movement is often the only alternative open to people 
struggling against unacceptable conditions to engage in the political realm (Tarrow, 
1998: 4). They gain the strength (often through alliances with prominent citizens) to 
challenge elites, other interest groups and official institutions. In general, they 
mobilise around an issue of high visibility; when the target is achieved, the movement 
loses energy (Birkland, 2011: 137). 
In contrast to political parties and interest groups, the organisers of social movements 
lack financial resources, organisational structure or access to the state (Tarrow, 1998: 
6). Instead, they employ a wide repertoire of activities that challenge the political 




construct common identities and mobilising ideologies (Tarrow, 1998: 3). The 
engagement of people who self-identify with these collective struggles empowers the 
movement and enables it to take action. Some leaders of social movements become 
skilled in combining extra-parliamentary action with institutional participation. 
Indeed, some successful movements become well-structured organisations, their 
leaders are co-opted by the political system, and they turn to lobbying and bargaining 
with other interest groups and politicians (Tarrow, 1998: 6).  
In the case of solid waste management, the social movement of waste pickers has 
emerged as a remarkable worldwide phenomenon. Poor people working informally in 
this sector have organised together to fight for employment rights and improved 
working conditions, challenging government institutions and large corporations; some 
of these movements have gone on to develop into labour unions or cooperatives. 
Section 7.5 discusses the achievements of such social movements in Brazil and India. 
In addition, section 6.5 describes other, less-structured protests by residents of areas 
affected by dumpsites and incineration plants.  
Dominant networks 
Neo-pluralists also emphasise the role of ‘advocacy coalitions’, which establish 
alliances between interest groups within the policy network (McFarland, 2007: 58). 
These networks facilitate coalitions of lobbyists and the exchange of information 
between government agencies and interest groups (McFarland, 2007: 56). Some of 
these networks will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, which look at the decision-




John Wallis (2015) proposes an alternative model, which interprets the relationship 
among different organisations and the state as based on the dynamics of dominant 
networks. Dominant networks are the result of coalitions between powerful elite 
organisations, which enable them to enforce their interests in the political system. 
Wallis claims that this theory challenges the Hobbesian notion of the power of the 
state: in his famous work, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (1651) conceptualised the state 
as a supreme institution with the coercive powers to enforce its impersonal rules. 
However, Wallis (2015: 3) claims that society cannot be organised through violence; 
rather, it relies on incentives and agreements. The government’s capacity for 
coordination ensures the creation of a system of rules that are credible and 
enforceable, due to the economic benefits of coalitions (Wallis, 2015: 69). Dominant 
networks minimise the use of force, since the peaceful extraction of rents and other 
economic benefits accommodates the interests of both the networks and society.  
Governments ‘publicly signify agreements’ with these powerful networks in the 
interests of social consensus (Wallis, 2015: 7). Thus, these networks do not formally 
hold power; instead, power is organised impersonally through their relationship with 
the state (Wallis, 2015: 43). The ‘essential and defining characteristic of government 
is not the ability to use violence to enforce rules, but the ability to coordinate forces 
within society in such a way that rules and rule enforcement are credible’ (Wallis, 
2015: 4). Rather than using coercion, the state employs its capacity to organise and 
enforce coordination between these powerful organisations. Chapter 6 returns to this 
model when discussing the 4th CNMA and the Sectoral Agreements on Reverse 
Logistics in Brazil in sections 6.2 and 6.3. These participatory forums and deliberative 
processes provide institutional spaces in which some powerful groups form coalitions, 




who act with the endorsement of the government, are legitimised by the participatory 
process, consolidating their interests. 
However, one criticism of this version of the neo-pluralist theory is the lack of 
recognition of the influence of international organisations. Globalisation has increased 
the interdependence of domestic and international actors and nation-states. Dryzek 
and Dunleavy (2009: 309) argue that the analyses of the state put forward by 
globalisation theory and environmentalism changes the way the classic theories of 
democracy (such as pluralism, elite theory and Marxism) address domestic issues. 
These theories tend to explore political systems within a national frame, while 
globalisation theory places domestic political forces and institutions within a larger 
international context. The most important actors in this context are the multinational 
corporations involved in the global production network (the offshoring of production, 
trade and consumption) and international organisations supporting global systems of 
information and investment (Dicken, 2011: 430). Global elites, represented by 
chambers of commerce, multinational corporations, international investors and 
charities, among others, coordinate actions with national and local elites to reinforce 
their mutual interests. NGOs and social movements have also created international 
alliances in order to exchange information, and increase membership and cooperation 
on a global scale. Section 7.4 discusses the role of international organisations in 
shaping policymaking and the market in Brazil and India. Many of the participatory 
processes in these countries that are related to environmental issues have been 





In contrast to the models analysed above, which focused on the North American 
liberal democratic regime, the theory of corporatism evolved to explain the activity of 
interest groups in social democratic regimes in Europe and Latin America. Dicken 
(2011: 177) explains that, in a corporate state, the government plays a central role in 
the organisation of society and the economy, supporting business networks and 
industrial strategies. Public policy is, therefore, the result of institutional interaction 
between the state and interest groups (Howlett et al., 2009: 42). In Brazil, for 
example, this model is a product of a political culture of ‘tripartism’, where the 
economy is organised according to a contract between the state, business interests and 
labour unions. Wayne Parsons (1995: 258) explains that corporate states operate in 
the capitalist mode, but they seek to control economic interests; promoting 
cooperation between the different actors in order to avoid the negative consequences 
of conflicts and competition, and prevent or manage economic crises.  
Schmitter (1974: 86), however, argues that the term ‘corporatism’ can have pejorative 
connotations, as it is often associated with clientelism, where the government is 
primarily interested in bargaining over public policies with powerful economic 
interests. In some cases, these practices are labelled ‘participatory processes’, 
‘collaborative planning’ or ‘permanent consultation’, due to the interaction of these 
actors in decision-making processes. 
Gozetto and Thomas (2014: 96) explain that corporatist theory shares some 
similarities with pluralism, since both models are based on the growing formalisation 
of associations of interest groups as part of the political process, and the fact that their 




also play an important role in this system, as does the exchange of information during 
negotiations, leading to the diminished importance of territorial and partisan 
representation in policy-making. However, these models have distinct understandings 
of the institutional organisation of the state. While pluralism is based on the 
autonomous competition and interaction between interest groups, in the corporate 
system, this competition is organised and incentivised by the state, and operates 
interdependently with it. In the pluralist model, the policy outcome is the balance of 
the intersection of the forces involved; in the corporate model, it is the result of 
complementary interaction between the state and interest groups. Corporatism 
proposes a distinct structure of power, whereby institutional arrangements exert 
influence by advancing specific public policies, sectoral areas and interest groups. 
The state, therefore, plays a prominent role in organising, regulating and stimulating 
the association of interest groups within the policymaking process. 
Although other models have made significant contributions to the understanding of 
the way interest groups participate in government decisions, the corporatist model 
offers a better explanation of the political processes of waste management reform in 
Brazil and India. In these countries, interest groups rely on central government’s 
regulatory measures and transfer of resources. Without government initiatives and 
incentives, local government and the markets cannot evolve or overcome the system’s 
dysfunctional irregularities. However, it is worth noting that the state does not act 
independently – its activities are a result of interest group pressure. The policies are, 
in essence, written documents that regulate the needs of some of the interest groups 
involved. As such, the participatory process, which engages decision-makers and 
practitioners in negotiations, provides an opportunity for the exchange of information 




countries such as Brazil and India play a central role in the organisation of sectoral 
policies. State intervention is crucial for the sustainable functioning of the market 
economy, and both the government and interest groups legitimise their activities 
through participatory processes. 
2.4 Interest groups’ participation in decision-making in emerging economies 
The participation of interest groups helps us understand how the democratic state in 
these countries defines the solutions to social problems. As mentioned above, 
although many scholars have employed interest group theories to investigate the 
behaviour of interest groups in other political contexts, it is important to bear in mind 
that some of these theories emerged in the American and European political contexts. 
Given this, what can the Brazilian and the Indian contexts contribute to this debate, 
and what do they tell us about the nature of democracy? Despite their rapid economic 
growth during the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, these emerging 
economies still have fragile democratic and economic institutions. According to 
Anders Åslund (2013: 10), their financial systems are weak, with reasonably high 
inflation and government debt, and there are serious problems of governance, such as 
a weak rule of law and oversized government institutions. In addition, their 
policymakers still maintain ‘oligarchical practices’ – they concentrate more on their 
own benefits than on the economy as a whole – leading to a poor business 
environment and widespread allegations of corruption. These are structural problems 
that demand decades of reforms. Advanced economies faced several crises before 
their political and economic systems matured; emerging economies, by contrast, are 




Guillermo O'Donnell (1996) proposes using new, alternative concepts to describe 
such countries. In his view, many of the democracies of emerging economies should 
be classified as ‘uneven’, when compared with the long-enduring democracies of the 
Global North. Democracy in Brazil and India has, in fact, a relatively long history and 
quite a high level of institutionalisation, but informal rules and particularism are 
pervasive (O’Donnell, 1996: 6). Particularism means that patronage and nepotism 
flourish in the gaps between formal rules and the behaviours of political elites, 
leading to clientelism. High levels of socioeconomic inequality are closely related to 
informal institutionalisation and particularism. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the 
model of comparative politics to avoid the illusion of consolidation, since informal 
particularities in these countries undermine their capacity to ensure that all citizens 
are equally entitled to participate in decisions that affect their lives; business interests 
have far greater representation than underprivileged groups in these democracies. Atul 
Kholi (1993: 671) points out that the new middle-class elites in developing countries 
promote their own market-oriented political agenda, distancing themselves from the 
poor, and this aggravates inequality.  
Non-participation and social exclusion 
The decisions relating to the provision of waste management services touch on 
several dimensions of exclusion. Policies and institutional arrangements are crucial to 
mitigating inequalities and mediating economic and social development in industrial 
and commercial sectors, and in the governance of local economies. Policies and 
political processes define the political and economic inclusion/exclusion of those 
involved in the waste management sector, as well as its labour market and the 




service to all of the population under their jurisdiction. This sort of basic service has a 
major impact on the poorest populations, who are most exposed to pollution and the 
risk of disease; it also provides a means of subsistence, dignity and security for those 
working in this sector. 
In his research about the relationship between democracy and poverty alleviation, 
Ashutosh Varshney (1999) argues that when political and economic reforms come 
from above, they are intended to attract private investment (national and foreign) and 
satisfy the bureaucracy; while poverty is a secondary issue. Varshney (1999: 3) claims 
that policies are formulated primarily according to elite interests. The concept of 
social exclusion is thus crucial to understanding the structural inequalities of 
developing countries. This is evident in the issue of solid waste management. One of 
the key characteristics of this sector in developing countries is the presence of a large 
number of waste pickers working in the informal market. Section 7.5 discusses the 
organisation and political actions of this social group in Brazil and India.  
However, as Olson (1971: 166) emphasises, unorganised groups do not have a voice 
in the political process because they cannot afford to lobby or partake in 
policymaking. This is the case for some of the larger unorganised groups in society, 
such as migrants, waste pickers and residents of poor communities, whose common 
interests are clear, but whose capacity for organisation is limited. According to Olson 
(1971: 165), in many cases, any common gains that disadvantaged groups might 
acquire by engaging in policy decisions do not cover the high individual costs (loss of 
working hours and the cost of transport and food) of participating in politics. 
Unequal development policies undermine the capacity of excluded groups to 




social exclusion as the denial of the right to well-being and enjoyment of social and 
economic benefits, which consequently deprives individuals and groups of the 
opportunity to compete politically and economically in defence of their interests. 
Exclusionary practices are also regulated by state institutions, the market and society. 
The process of exclusion is, therefore, the result of social and economic structural 
forces that reproduce and accentuate exclusion over time.  
Gerry Rodgers et al. (1995: 3) explain that social exclusion can be analysed as a 
situation or as a process. When exclusion is persistent or permanent it resembles 
poverty, and this deprivation means that the individual cannot secure access to 
sufficient food, housing or services, further undermining their capacity to participate 
in society (Townsend, cited in Rodgers et al., 1995: 6). Room (cited in Rodgers et al., 
1995: 2) says that ‘when citizens are unable to secure their social rights, they will tend 
to suffer processes of generalised and persisting disadvantage and their social and 
occupational participation will be undermined’. Nayyar (2001: 367) lists the different 
forms that such exclusion can take, including exclusion from the labour market, 
ownership of land and security. Exclusion from the labour market leads to rising 
unemployment and the search for precarious jobs (low-skilled, ill-paid and without 
security); even within the labour market, there are different levels of exclusion: 
Rodgers et al. (1995: 44) explain that there are the ‘good’ jobs (secure, with 
acceptable working conditions), which are restricted to certain social groups, and 
‘bad’ ones, characterised by the concentration of poverty, where cultural values 
replicate processes of discrimination based on social identity, be it caste, race, gender, 
ethnicity, religion or geographical origin. When the poor are excluded from the 




their only recourse (Rodgers et al., 1995: 46). Chapter 7 returns to this issue in its 
discussion of waste pickers. 
In the majority of households, especially poorer ones, a daily wage is the only family 
income. Unemployment and precarious jobs affect livelihoods and exclude people 
from consumer society and access to basic essentials. The unequal distribution of 
public goods and services, such as sanitation, water and electricity, degrades the 
environment of low-income localities, exposing people to violence, insecurity and 
frequent displacement. Lack of these basic services compromises children’s 
development in terms of health, security and education, affecting their future as 
citizens, and in the worst cases, leading to child labour. 
Some scholars claim that these are not problems of the market, but of the state. 
However, the state cannot address these problems if their actions are dictated by 
business interests. The question that arises, then, is how does the participation of 
interest groups in government decisions impact democracy and development in these 
countries? How can participatory processes address the problems of inequality and 
exclusion when government and pro-business interest groups are only interested in 
economic development? 
Brazil and India 
Recognition of socioeconomic inequalities and political exclusion are crucial to an 
analysis of democracy and development in emerging economies such as Brazil and 
India. India’s economic growth has increased rapidly over recent years, mainly in the 
technology and telecommunication sectors; however, this development has not been 




definitions of democracy (for example, Dahl’s definition mentioned above in section 
2.2) and procedural analysis do not fit Indian democracy. She suggests that while 
some scholars argue that India is the largest democracy in the world, based on 
numbers of voters, they fail to mention that the inequalities that result from caste 
hierarchies, the dominance of landlords and gender disparities, among other issues, 
prevent the effective exercise of the franchise (Jayal, 2001: 3). Legal and political 
equality do not ensure that poorer citizens overcome the social and economic 
inequalities that undermine their capacity to influence decisions that affect their lives. 
The fact that, in this culturally diverse, hierarchical and still predominantly agrarian 
society, many lack access to appropriate information and the power to decide their 
own affairs, raises concerns about its democratic principles. Although Indian 
democracy has given the poor a voice in the electoral process, the concentration of 
power privileges the coalition of political and economic elites (Jayal, 2001: 42). In 
addition, laws in favour of the majority undermine religious and ethnic minorities, 
and other underprivileged social groups. Jayal (2001: 44) explains that the ideology of 
Hindutva, establishing the hegemony of Hinduism, ignores the claims of Muslims and 
other minorities, and compromises the project of a more egalitarian society. Indian 
democracy represents a space for political mobilisation, and political parties have 
taken advantage of ethnic identities in an attempt to expand the inclusion of 
marginalised groups in politics. But although certain policies have tried to 
compensate for historical distortions caused by the caste system by guaranteeing 
quotas in education and public sector employment for ‘scheduled castes’ and 
‘scheduled tribes’, politicians have instead used these policies to reinforce caste 




Brazil also has its own complicated history of class, race and regional inequalities. 
Recently, the country has experienced one of the worst economic and political crises 
in its history, leading to the impeachment of the president and exposing the fragility 
of its democratic system. Although there are positive figures for the reduction of 
poverty and inequality,3 the country has a disappointing development index, despite 
the optimistic forecasts of the early 2000s, and its economy is still recovering from 
two consecutive years of negative economic growth rates.4 However, taking into 
account these constraints, a recent study carried out by Alston et al. (2016) provides a 
different perspective on the trajectory of Brazil’s development. These researchers 
explain that the country is experiencing a period of critical transition, and instead of a 
short-term analysis based on economic indices, they propose a framework that 
involves in-depth analysis based on ‘windows of opportunity’, beliefs, leadership and 
dominant networks. In this framework, the consolidation of institutions plays a central 
role in the country’s long-term, sustainable development. These authors claim that 
although politicians and voters matter, it is the dominant networks that constrain and 
shape belief in society and its formal institutions (Alston et al., 2016: 3 and 171).  
The concept of dominant networks is crucial to shedding light on how the elites and 
the state operate in the political realm. Dominant networks are coalitions of elites 
(national and international business sectors, industrialists and banks, the bureaucracy, 
trade unions and agribusiness), who have the political power to influence or change 
the formal rules (Alston et al., 2016: 25). These authors explore the behaviour of such 
                                                
3 The World Bank’s poverty index shows a significant reduction from 24.7% of the population in 2001 to 7.4% in 
2014 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=BR&view=chart). 





dominant networks during ‘windows of opportunity’ – moments that initiate a process 
of institutional transformation. Their analysis covers the key sequential periods of 
Brazilian development over the last fifty years (the military regime, the period of 
democratisation, and the mandates of Presidents Cardoso, Lula and Dilma). They 
show that dominant networks have had a significant impact during these periods, 
defining the values and institutions that promote and accommodate processes of 
change (Alston et al., 2016: 19 and 24). This transition has led to dramatic changes in 
Brazilian society, and its current sustainable development is the result of a shared 
belief in ‘fiscally sound social inclusion’ among these elite groups, the population and 
the government. This belief guides the institutional choices and policy alternatives 
chosen to achieve the desired outcomes of the dominant networks, since decision-
making relies on the bargaining power of these organisations and the ‘side payments 
that they make among the networks’ (Alston et al., 2016: 25). The concept of 
dominant networks helps us to interpret how the dynamics between elite groups and 
the state operates, especially in the Brazilian case. 
2.5 Chapter summary 
The main conclusion this chapter draws is that interest groups and their policy experts 
(scientists, lawyers, industry spokespersons) have a far greater capacity to exert 
influence on policymakers than does the unorganised individual. Government 
decisions are not impartial participatory spaces, and certain sectoral niches tend to be 
dominated by pressure groups and their coalitions. This characteristic will be 
perceived throughout the following chapters which discuss the legislation, the 




decisions, and the main interest groups operating in the waste management policy 
sector. 
The chapter has shown that although democracy theories treat citizen participation 
and pressure group influence on government decisions as separate concerns, these 
concepts often overlap in the debate on the forces involved in the political decision-
making process. However, very few researchers have taken the further step of 
analysing these theories together. In his article on democratic participation in 
technical policy decisions, Frank Laird (1993: 356) points out the divergences 
between theories of citizen participation and interest group theories, emphasising that 
while the former stress individual political empowerment and the educational benefits 
of political engagement, the latter advocate group representation, where the benefits 
are seen in terms of pluralist competition and policy outcomes. Thus, both are needed 
to create a full picture of political participation. 
Although interest groups employ a variety of strategies to influence and potentially 
control policymakers (Dye, 1998; 35), legislation establishes the official limits of 
their engagement in the political discussions. The following chapters show how 
public participation provides not only the institutional space for collective action in 
politics, but also a way for the government to legitimise agreed policies. The analysis 
of the political influence of public participation versus that of interest groups, 
therefore, contributes to a better understanding of the rationale behind the democratic 
decision-making process, the forces operating in this process and the public 
legitimation of the final decisions. 
The first section of this chapter explored the main democratic channels open to 




operate in the democratic state. Public participation, theoretically, gives citizens the 
opportunity to exercise their political rights – for example, Holston’s (2009) research 
on ‘insurgent citizenship’ provides evidence of how public participation has provided 
disenfranchised groups with alternative ways of claiming their civil rights, while 
Varshney (1999: 4) states that political mobilisation and voting power enable the poor 
to exercise their political will and influence the government agenda. However, this 
section has noted how some scholars (Sartori, 1987; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009) 
have questioned the participationist idealisation of the politically active and engaged 
individual, capable of changing the political system. Gaventa (2005) warns that 
‘public participation’ is also a political discourse, and as such, it is important to 
recognise that arguments for participation often validate specific political interests. 
Mancur Olson’s (1971) study of collective action shows that interest groups, rather 
than unorganised individual or voters, have a greater chance of influencing 
government decisions. The second section of the chapter, therefore, discussed the 
different perspectives taken by interest group theories, and showed how all of these 
theories contribute to a reflection on the role of interest groups in decision-making. 
However, in developing countries, it appears that the corporate state plays a 
significant role in directing the activities of such groups towards stimulating specific 
sectoral niches of development (Dicken, 2011). Thus, business interest groups have a 
prominent position in the state’s corporatist strategy, establishing coalitions and 
interdependent relationships with the state. This section showed how some scholars 
(McFarland, 2007; Wallis, 2015) have attempted to explain the activities of and 
connections between interest groups and government agencies using the concept of 
dominant networks or coalitions. These networks attempt to control the exchange of 




most beneficial to their members. Applying these concepts to the countries under 
review, Pranab Bardhan (1998) claims that the presence of dominant coalitions are an 
obstacle to India’s economic growth; in contrast, Alston et al. (2016) state that 
dominant networks have helped to maintain the stability of Brazilian democracy in 
periods of political and economic transition, safeguarding the interests of political and 
economic elites. 
The third section of the chapter revealed how theories designed to explain political 
phenomena in so-called ‘uneven democracies’, such as India and Brazil, must address 
pervasive levels of particularism, deficient institutionalisation and social, economic 
and regional inequalities (O’Donnell, 1996; Jayal, 2001). In the case of the provision 
of public services, the more affluent groups in society demand resources from and 
actions by the state that will foster their own economic development (Hague and 
Harrop, 2010). Major decisions are influenced by these economic interests, which 
tend to exacerbate the uneven socioeconomic conditions suffered by the majority of 
the population (Nayyar, 2001). Liberalism (as in ‘liberal democracy’) is famously 
based on the principle of freedom for all citizens to pursue their aspirations, but as 
this section showed, a fundamental question is whether the policies analysed in this 
research assist all the people of Brazil and India, including the most disadvantaged 
social groups, or in fact primarily benefit business interests. In essence, how does 
democracy operate in these emerging economies? 
The next chapter describes the way this research has been designed to enable an 
analysis of the relative influence of these groups in Brazil and India in the context of 
the urgent problem of delivering basic waste management services on a national scale. 
 Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter introduces the design of this research and discusses the key 
methodological choices underlying the research process. In light of the research 
question (see section 3.2, below), the investigation focuses on the influence interest 
groups have on government policy-making in the waste management sector, 
conducting a comparative analysis of their activities in two countries (India and 
Brazil). The research, therefore, is designed to reveal the extent to which powerful 
interest groups, in particular corporate groups, participate in government decisions, 
what forms this participation takes and why they exert such influence. This chapter 
argues that interest group participation in policy decisions is embedded in the 
structural relationship between public and private actors in these countries. This being 
the case, it is necessary to gain a direct understanding of the way these processes 
unfold, and how they regulate the politics in the sector, from the participants 
involved. This has involved a triangulation of qualitative methods to enable the 
investigation into how policies addressing a particular issue that concerns the interests 
of certain powerful interest groups are agreed on at a national level. 
The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first debates the research question 
and gives an overview of the analysis; the second provides a justification for 
employing a comparative analysis; the third elucidates the research design and 
provides a thorough explanation of the research process, the fieldwork, and the 
validity and reliability of the data; and the fourth part (the chapter overview) discusses 





3.2 Research question and analysis overview 
Research question 
The question this research sets out to answer is: how does interest group participation 
in political decision-making shape solid waste management policies in Brazil and 
India, what forms does it take, and why? 
The question emerged from my desire to understand the capacity of a country to 
implement national policies to resolve the increasingly urgent issue of waste 
management, focusing on emerging economies such as Brazil, and the role citizens 
play in these government decisions. My first hypothesis, before embarking on the 
fieldwork, was based on a belief that governments in these countries lack the 
necessary institutional capacity to deal with their waste management problem; this 
was related to the quality of the policies produced and the capacity of local 
government to implement policies agreed at a central level. During the research for 
my Masters degree, I studied the decision-making process of the National Policy on 
Solid Waste (PNRS) in Brazil, and I was motivated to explore in greater depth how 
the country as a whole puts that legislation into practice, and whether the ordinary 
citizen is involved in this political process. For this reason, when I began my doctoral 
research, I travelled to the field to test this hypothesis, comparing the implementation 
of waste management policies in Brazil with those in India, a similar emerging 
economy.  
Waste management was a current topic of debate around that time (2011), as the 
Brazilian government had recently enacted its waste policy, and the implementation 
of the Indian Waste (MSW) Rules, after more than a decade on the statute books, was 




start by asking interviewees about their knowledge of the national policy and their 
personal participation (or the participation of their organisation) in the political 
process. I perceived that political decision-making in the two countries was quite 
different. In Brazil, the political process was the result of rounds of interest group 
consultation, followed by large, participatory, deliberative processes (the 4th National 
Conference on the Environment (CNMA) and the Sectoral Agreements, reviewed in 
sections 6.2 and 6.3, respectively), where the majority of interviewees seemed 
engaged in the political discussions. In contrast, the Indian MSW Rules were 
formulated by a close-knit group of experts, with very limited mechanisms for public 
consultation, and promulgated by ministerial decree. One of the interviewees in India, 
who had participated in one of the advisory committees in charge of policy 
formulation, thought my questions strange: “The ministry invites whomever they 
want and they do not need to give an account of that.’ This perspective, confirmed 
later when perusing policy documents (for example, the Indian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1986: Articles 23, 25 and 26) and discussing the issue with other 
informants, was quite different from decision-making in the same sectoral policy area 
in Brazil.  
After an extensive investigation of these differences, my explorations led to the 
question of whether public participation in these different political processes has any 
influence either on decision-making or policy outcomes. However, the idea of public 
participation conceals something more significant: it is only one proceeding in the 
midst of many during the policy-making process. I took the opportunity to 
reformulate the research question (see above). This research, therefore, investigates 
the relationships and conflicts between various interest groups (including those with 




the organisation of power within a sector (such as waste management) that has a 
profound impact on society.  
Analysis overview 
This study bases its investigation on a structuralist approach, and uses this theoretical 
framework to define the research issue and research practices, which comprise a 
comparative analysis. As Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2010: 31) explain, groups 
seeking to protect and further their interests – and maintain their sociopolitical power 
– are crucial elements in a political structure that is formed by a diversity of actors, 
including interest groups, political and economic elites, politicians and government 
bodies. Structuralists explain the individuals and groups’ practices as a reflection of 
macro-structures (the state, networks, organisations), where the political outcomes are 
the result of their interdependent interactions (Landman, 2000: 33). Therefore, the 
behaviour of individuals and groups must be analysed in a wider social, political and 
economic context, and also viewed as part of a historical process. As Todd Landman 
(2000: 292) states, ‘individuals are embedded in relational structures that shape 
human identities, interests, and interaction’. The analysis of this political 
configuration from a structuralist position differs from that of other theoretical 
approaches. Institutional theories, for example, argue that politics and government 
policies, and the political consequences of individual attitudes and choices, are shaped 
by the formal arrangements of government institutions. Meanwhile, behavioural and 
rational choice approaches ground their explanations in the individual, assuming that 
individual actions are the result of rational reasoning, whereby individuals always 
seek to maximise their achievements (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 25). By contrast, 




structuralists focus on a macro-social explanation, in which the individual or the 
internal members of organisations are of secondary importance. In this approach, 
individual values, attitudes and behaviours are products of the structural realm, which 
is determined by social relations, political and economic interests, and historical 
forces. 
Thomas Dye (1998: 4) defines policy analysis as the study of the actions of 
government and ‘the causes and consequences of these actions’. The study of interest 
group participation is embedded within these political processes; it seeks to 
understand the strategic forces that motivate government activities and determine 
policy outcomes. This research argues that the influence of interest groups on 
government decisions determines all aspects of government regulation. In the case of 
waste management, government policies include decisions as to which service 
providers will deliver the services; how they will be paid; the financial resources 
available to them; the technologies they will be allowed to implement; the level of 
environmental standards required for their operation; the type and quality of services 
the population will receive and how they will pay for those services; and the legality 
of other (often informal) groups providing similar services. All these features are the 
result of negotiations between decision-makers and interest groups, and their 
decisions have a significant impact on a society’s development. 
The analysis proceeds by means of a case study. Giampietro Gobo (2010) defines this 
as the examination of a phenomenon in a physical, social and cultural context, 
delimited by a period of time. In order to answer the research question, the research 
explores the decision-making processes in the same policy area in two different 




waste management in these countries, therefore, is used as a case study to investigate 
how interest group participation shapes these processes.  
3.3 Comparative analysis 
The study of interest group participation in decision-making broadens our 
understanding of how policies are formulated and why they appear to follow 
particular characteristic paths. However, this begs the question of whether this 
phenomenon is defined by its specific political context or whether it also applies to 
other (democratic) contexts. In this case, comparing decision-making in emerging 
economies may help researchers to identify the main internal and external forces that 
influence political decisions and the relationship of these forces with the democratic 
institutions that affect economic development and either address or perpetuate 
inequalities in these countries. The research aims to understand whether democracy 
creates favourable conditions for development. The comparison of the same 
phenomenon in two different political contexts may shed light on their singular 
characteristics – as well as revealing similar features – that affect the political 
processes. In addition, a comparative analysis that aims to understand the nature of 
democracy in these countries may help predict the patterns of decision-making and 
development in other countries. As Hague and Harrop (2010: 48) emphasise, 
countries’ development paths are not independent of one other as they are embedded 
in a globalisation process, in which governments learn, copy from and interact with 
each other. They are, therefore, open to the influence of external factors, such as the 
activities of transnational organisations, international agreements and global 




It is worth noting that the focus of the comparative analysis is not on the country’s 
performance in the management of solid waste, but on the influence of actors that 
affect the decisions that regulate this sector. It is an exercise in the interpretation of 
ideas participants hold about politics (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 38). In contrast to the 
positivist approach of hard science, where knowledge is based on the observation of 
natural phenomena, social phenomena are investigated by analysing opinions, 
experiences and identities, as knowledge in this field is both socially and individually 
mediated and constructed (Trent and Cho, 2014: 639). Although Chapter 4 provides 
an overview of the solid waste management situation and its historical evolution in 
Brazil and India, this information provides the basis for a wider understanding of the 
extent to which interest group participation influences, and even guides, the policy 
decisions and socioeconomic development of these countries. Thus, the theoretical 
goal is to establish the role of interest groups in government decisions and how this 
influence affects the solution of issues of public concern in emerging economies. 
The question arises of why these specific countries are critical to this analysis, and 
how it can avoid selection bias – the intentional choice of case studies – which could 
compromise the credibility of the research (Landman, 2000: 36). This problem affects 
mainly small-N comparative analysis, albeit the selection of countries is key for the 
comparative analysis, while the randomness of large-N studies dilutes this problem 
(Landman, 2000: 36). From the start, the aim of this research was to compare the 
problems facing emerging economies in the Global South. The cases of Brazil and 
India are salient here, since these economies are under pressure to sustain economic 
growth, yet features of underdevelopment, such as poverty and the unequal 
distribution of basic infrastructure, still persist. Other large emerging economies, such 




has a presidential system, enacted a General Law on the Prevention and 
Comprehensive Management of Waste in 2003; South Africa, a parliamentary 
democracy, launched its Waste Act in 2008. However, Brazil and India offer some 
revelatory or unusual cases for analysis. In addition to the historical, cultural and 
socioeconomic differences separating these countries, the Brazilian waste reform is a 
national law enacted under a presidential system, while the Indian MSW Rules were 
promulgated by ministerial decree under a parliamentary system. These pieces of 
legislation, therefore, were formulated using different political procedures. As a 
result, this research offers a unique opportunity to investigate the extent to which 
interest groups have influenced these distinct political processes, and how these 
processes have affected democracy and development in these emerging economies. 
The examples of other emerging economies, such as Turkey and Russia, were 
discarded from the outset: in addition to the problem of language, their democratic 
systems are questionable and they have recently been destabilised by autocratic 
measures, which would add an unwanted degree of complexity to the research.  
The idea of exploring the influence of interest group participation in government 
decisions using a comparative perspective is a novel one. Other researchers have 
employed different methods to explore the role of such actors in government 
decision-making processes. For example, Scott Furlong (1997: 331) email survey of 
organisations that lobby US government agencies presents a sample of interest groups 
and their activities. The author was interested in their methods and the effectiveness 
of their activities, which included lobbying, mobilising members of grassroots 
organisations, litigation and financial contributions. Scott Furlong and Cornelius 
Kerwin (2004: 361) repeated the research process a decade later in order to analyse 




increase in the diversity of these groups’ strategies, including the use of online 
communication, to influence government decision-makers. In the case of the US, for 
example, Marissa Golden (1998) explores the influence of interest groups, selecting 
eleven regulations at random in three different government agencies. Her research 
was based on written comments received from the public and those made available by 
government bodies in order to discover the characteristics of the participants and the 
influence of interest groups on the outcome of these rules. Golden’s findings show 
that, although policies were designed to promote public participation in decision-
making, at least in the areas of her investigation, the participatory processes were 
dominated by business interests.  
In Brazil, Andréa Oliveira (2004: 54) has carried out a series of interviews with 
lobbyists to create a profile of the profession and its activities in the country. 
Meanwhile, Andréa Gozetto and Thomas Clive (2014) have applied a neo-
institutional analytical approach to explore interest group influence on Brazil’s 
Biosafety Law (2005), which regulates the genetically modified foods (GMF) market. 
They expose the dynamics between two major conflicting groups involved in the 
decision-making process: those pressing for minimal regulation (corporate groups, 
agribusiness and industrialists) and those advocating stricter rules (the Ministry of the 
Environment and other government bodies, consumer protection organisations and 
environmentalists). In the end, the coalition for minimal regulation won the political 
battle, but the producers were required to add a GMF label to their products (Gozetto 
and Thomas, 2014: 22). 
In relation to the specific issue of public participation in Brazil and India, many 




governance in the state of Kerala, both successful examples of public participatory 
programmes (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, Heller, 2001). It is also worth mentioning 
the work of Alexandre Barbosa et al. (2014) on labour markets in Brazil and India; 
Sonia Dias (2009) and the work carried out by the NGO, Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), on the conditions of waste 
pickers in both countries; and the comparative analysis carried out by Jérémie Cavé 
(2012) of municipal solid waste management in two cities in these countries: Vitória, 
the capital of Espírito Santo, Brazil, and Coimbatore in the state of Tamil Nadu, India. 
However, there is little statistical data on these political processes in their totality, 
encompassing the complexity of factors involved, that would enable the formulation 
of a theoretical explanation of public participation in these two political contexts. 
There are several statistical studies correlating, for example, the impact of political 
corruption on other indices such as the level of democracy or quality of governance. 
Organisations, such as the Swedish research centre, the Quality of Governance 
Institute (QOG),5 Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index)6 and the 
World Bank (Control of Corruption Index), provide useful tools with which to 
measure and compare the impact of these irregularities on governance. However, 
these statistics are based on secondary data and do not detail how and why these 
irregularities occur. Also, there are no specific indicators with which to measure 
public participation and the impact of these relationships on policy formulation and 
implementation. Even the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), one of the 
main government-led research centres in Brazil with responsibility for supporting 
                                                
5 The Quality of Governance Institute (QoG): http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datavisualizationtool 




government planning and activity, which has a dedicated research group evaluating 
the impact of national conferences in Brazil (explored in section 6.2), does not yet 
have specific indices to measure such political processes. 
Global indices are valuable tools for large-N comparative analysis. However, 
comparing different political regimes through global indices and statistical data has its 
challenges. Michael Coppedge et al. (2011: 247) claim that although democracy is 
probably the most debated concept in social sciences, there is no single, universally 
accepted model of how to compare different regimes. Despite their value for decision-
makers and academics, the authors claim that global indices are inadequate for 
comparing the quality of and relationship between the operational features of 
democracies (Coppedge et al., 2011: 252). All indices have their strengths and 
weaknesses. They give researchers a crude sense of major attributes and overall 
characteristics, but they suffer from serious problems of ‘conceptualisation and 
measurement’ intrinsic to ‘the highly abstract and contested nature of democracy’ 
(Coppedge et al., 2011: 258). Instead, these authors suggest that researchers should 
take into account historical, multidimensional, disaggregated and transparent 
approaches.  
In a small-N comparative design involving two countries, however, qualitative 
methods can be used to produce an in-depth investigation into the characteristics of a 
common political phenomenon. Such methods can draw on a historical framework in 
order to reflect on the origin of some characteristic aspects of the practices of the 
government and other actors in the political process under investigation (see section 




3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Data collection and methods of analysis 
In order to answer the question as to the degree of power interest groups wield over 
waste management policy in Brazil and India (see section 3.2), the research has been 
designed to identify the main participants in the political decision-making process, the 
spaces of state-interest group interaction and the policy outcomes. This should 
advance its aim to discover the nexus between interest group participation and 
government decisions in these countries.  
In its investigation of the data generated by the political processes of waste 
management policy creation and implementation, the research employs a combination 
of three qualitative research methods: interviews, non-participatory observation and 
document analysis. The combination of multiple perspectives and methods of data 
collection allows for crosschecking the findings from different angles, helping 
increase the study’s reliability and credibility (Halperin and Health, 2012: 283; 
Saldaña, 2014: 604). The triangulation of these data sources and methods, therefore, 
enhances the research procedure’s objectivity. This is crucial because, as Gobo (2010: 
38) explains, ethnography is a ‘highly subjective method’, being very sensitive to the 
researcher’s perspective and preconceptions. Eliot Eisner (1992: 10) defines the 
pursuit of research objectivity as seeking to explore accurately all the perspectives 
and theoretical arguments concerning the data, in order to neutralise the risk of 
subjectivity. Although he claims that complete objectivity is impossible, he proposes 
that by employing methods that minimise personal judgment, the researcher can 
interpret the facts and build his or her argument with a degree of confidence that it is, 




used in this research should help reduce bias and enhance the credibility of its 
findings (Bowen, 2009: 28). 
The next subsection provides a brief explanation of the three methods of data 
collection (document analysis, interviews and observation) and how they were 
triangulated to answer the research question, followed by a thorough explanation of 
the employment of these methods in the research process in the field. 
Documentary evidence 
The primary source of information concerning the actions of governments and 
individuals, as well as the operation of organisations, is the documentation produced 
by public and private bodies involved in the political process. Paul Atkinson and 
Amanda Coffey (2010: 83) argue that textual documents can provide the information 
needed to understand how people and their organisations work, and how practices and 
knowledge are communicated among their members and with other organisations. 
The textual information analysed in this study comprises a series of government 
official records, such as laws, transcripts of parliamentary debates, registers of 
attendance at meetings, reports and statistics produced by government bodies 
involved in the waste management sector; it also includes non-governmental 
documents, such as conference programmes, institutional reports and digital 
documents. In addition, this investigation takes into account the work of other 
researchers, such as articles in academic journals, public reports and newspaper 
articles, which often present alternative views of the same political phenomenon 




The research also explores some secondary data based on descriptions of important 
participatory events that happened outside of the fieldwork period, such as the Indian 
cycle of ‘national consultation programmes’. Document analysis is not only about 
texts, but also images, and must take into account the increasing role of the internet in 
government communication. Section 5.2 explores the Clean India Mission, which 
extensively employs social media to spread the government’s campaign.  
All such documents are crucial to gaining an understanding of the decisions and 
practices of government institutions (Coffey, 2013: 367). However, as Paul Atkinson 
and Amanda Coffey (2010: 83) also state, they do not tell the whole history or daily 
reality of these institutions. Coffey (2013: 368) claims that documents generally do 
not mention the context in which they were produced and consumed. They present ‘a 
version of the reality’, since they are the result of social construction and are produced 
with a particular purpose, employing specific narrative conventions (Coffey, 2013: 
368). Therefore, the classification of a document demands careful attention to its 
function and ‘authorship’ (who wrote the document and with what intentions) and 
‘readership’ (the public who will consume it) (Coffey, 2013: 379).  
In the case of the analysis of interest group participation, the written documents need 
to be complemented by other, potentially contradictory, oral and observational 
narratives. Also, as Glenn Bowen (2009: 30) explains, documents provide support for 
interviews by raising questions that need to be clarified with the interviewees, or help 
confirm information gathered from practitioners and observations in the field. Written 
documents were crucial to this research for the preparation of the interviews and 






The interviews seek to develop a thorough description of the political processes in 
each country, based on the multiple perspectives of practitioners in the field, and to 
learn from their experiences how these processes have unfolded (Weiss, 1995: 9). The 
semi-structured interview approach was chosen to capture the interviewees’ 
viewpoints in their own words and to explore their experience in depth. The format of 
the conversation was based on open questions – a way of discovering their 
perspectives and opinions, producing a thick description of their experiences. Kathryn 
Roulston (2013: 398) stresses that the interview comprises a social co-construction of 
meanings by the researcher and the researched. However, Michael Huberman and 
Matthew Miles (2002) also warn that the validity of the interviews relies on the 
accurate description and interpretation of the research participant’s words. Given this, 
it is worth noting that in both the countries under analysis, but particularly in the 
‘cross-cultural dialogues’ I conducted with my Indian subjects, I had to remain aware 
of my potential influence on the interview process itself and in the translation and 
analysis of the interview data (Roulston, 2013: 309).  
The structure of the interviews followed a schedule composed of three main topics, 
backed up with some supplementary information from the literature (the following 
subsection provides a detailed description of the interview process). The informants 
were chosen using snowball sampling, whereby the researcher finds potential 
interviewees according to specific criteria, and they then suggest other pertinent 
informants (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 246). The criteria of the sampling frame were 
based on recruiting government and non-governmental actors involved in the specific 
policy area of waste management who could provide a variety of contrasting 




was to understand how the participation of these actors has shaped waste policies and 
practices in both countries. Although snowballing meant that my initial interviewees 
led me to other potential participants, and so on, it is important to highlight that the 
interviews also attempted to include a wide variety of voices involved in the political 
process, and the sources of information come from different perspectives, many of 
without any connection to the other interviewees.  
Non-participatory observation 
As Amir Marvasti (2013: 355) explains, ethnography means the observation and 
documentation of people’s behaviour in the field. It allows the researcher to collect 
information by directly observing people, places and situations, observing the 
manifestations and variations of a particular setting.  
Gobo (2010: 26) differentiates non-participatory and participatory observation, 
explaining that in the former, the object of study is observed without the researcher’s 
interference, while in the participatory method, the researcher directly interacts with 
his or her subjects and their situation, in order to learn about their daily routines and 
understand their perceptions and behaviours. In the case of the non-participatory 
observation method, the researcher aims to detach him or herself so as not to 
influence the observed situation. However, as the interpretation of the observation 
passes through the researcher’s subjective filters (Marvasti, 2013: 355), the analysis 
of the subject will always be mediated by the observer’s analytical position. 
In addition to the textual records, and the narratives and opinions of the interviewees, 
this research observed the behaviours and practices of its subjects, and their day-to-




tell the whole history of interest group participation, and direct observation is 
employed to perceive and confirm some aspects of the process as it takes place in 
particular settings. As Marvasti (2013: 360) says, observation also provides the social 
context and the ambience of particular events, which can support other data collected 
in the field. In this research, the observation took place in a wide array of settings, 
including workplaces, organisational settings (observing relationships and channels of 
communication) and participatory events. In a broader sense, it also compares 
observations in different cities in Brazil and India, and in these countries as a whole. 
For example, in this last case, it was interesting to perceive the difference between the 
symmetrical policy implementation of Brazil, where the same policy is applied to all 
the regions, and the asymmetrical policy implementation of India, where each state 
has the legislative power to adapt the central guidelines according to its own 
characteristics, generating a regional diversity of methods, as discussed in section 7.3.  
3.4.2 Detailed description of the fieldwork research activity  
Fieldwork in India and Brazil 
The majority of the primary data for this research was collected during four field trips, 
two in India and two in Brazil. These were carried out in: 
• March 2013 – Pilot research of two weeks in Delhi, India 
• September to December 2013 – Fieldwork in Brazil 
• February and April 2014 – Fieldwork in India 
• September 2014 – Fieldwork of two weeks in São Paulo, Brazil 
The pilot research in Delhi provided my first contact with India. I stayed on 




Studies in Science Policy (CSSP). These contacts opened up opportunities to meet 
some of the activists and other academics involved in the fields of waste management 
and public policy. Through these contacts I visited key sites, such as Jantar Mantar, an 
official space dedicated to public contestation and social mobilisation in New Delhi, 
and Dilshad Gardens, a housing colony in northeast Delhi, where a large number of 
inhabitants are involved in waste picking and recycling.  
I also attended the ‘Khwahishein Awareness Campaign for Waste-Pickers’ workshop 
in Delhi, where I became more conscious of the waste pickers’ political claims. In 
addition, I visited research organisations, such as the Centre for Science and 
Environment (CSE), and the archives at the National Institute of Urban Affairs 
(NIUA) and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML). 
The following subsections describe the way these three primary data sources are used 
in this research, including their limitations.  
Official documents  
This area of the research comprised the review of twenty-nine official documents, 
published at the federal level, on the issue of solid waste management in both Brazil 
and India. Tables 1 and 2 show a sample of these government documents. These were 
analysed in order to verify their contents, establish the government bodies and other 
actors involved in their formulation, and build a panorama of and timeline for the two 
political processes. Some of these documents also provided the information that 
enabled me to formulate the questions for the interviews and to verify the information 





Table 1: Sample of the legislation and task-force reports on MSW in India 
Year Documents selected Data analysed 
2016 
Solid Waste Management Rules Policy content 
Plastic Waste Management Rules EPR and the inclusion of waste pickers in the policy content 
e-Waste Management Rules EPR and the inclusion of waste pickers in the policy content 
Swachh Survekshan  First results after the implementation of the SBA  
2014 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan Programme content 
Report of the Task Force on Waste to 
Energy Planning Commission 
Evaluation of Waste Rules policy 
implementation 
2013 Draft MSW (M&H) Rules 2013 - withdrawn Policy content 
2011 
E-Waste (Management & Handling) 
Rules 
EPR and the inclusion of waste 
pickers in the policy content 
Plastic Waste (Management & Handling) 
Rules 
EPR and the inclusion of waste 
pickers in the policy content 
2010 
Report of the Committee to Evolve Road 
Map on Management of Waste in India, 
MOEF 
Evaluation of Waste Rules policy 
implementation 
2009 Position paper on SWM, Ministry of Finance 
Investment and financial 
mechanisms for SWM reforms 
2008 
National Urban Sanitation Policy (NUSP) Policy content 
National Action Plan for Climate Change Policy content 
The CAG audit on Municipal Solid 
Waste in India 
Evaluation of Waste Rules policy 
implementation 
2006 National Environment Policy Policy content 
2005 
Inter-ministerial Task Force on Integrated 
Plant and Nutrient Management using 
City Compost, 2005 
Policy content 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JnNURM) 
Investment and financial 
mechanisms for SWM reforms 




1998 Bio-medical Waste (Management & Handling) Rules Policy content 
1992 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) 
Recognises the third tier in the 
Indian federal structure and sets 
the legislative powers and 
responsibilities of urban local 
bodies 
1950 Constitution of India Union, state and concurrent lists  
Source: Author’s illustration 
Table 2: Sample of the legislation and official reports on SWM in Brazil 
Year Documents selected Data analysed 
2015 Solid Waste Management Diagnostic (SNIS)  
Evaluation of policy 
implementation 
2011 Sanitation Atlas (IBGE) Evaluation of policy implementation 
2010 
Decree 7,404 ruling (national policy on 
solid waste) Policy content 
National policy on solid waste, Law 
12,305/2010 Policy content 
2007 
National policy on sanitation, Law 
11,445 Policy content 
Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) Investment and financial mechanisms for SWM reforms 
1988 Federal Constitution 
Policy content on the 
environment, public participation 
and public service provision 
1981 Environmental Policy, Law 6,938 Policy content on the environment and public service provision 
Source: Author’s illustration. All these documents are referenced when cited in the 
thesis.  
 
All these documents are in the public domain. The Indian parliamentary debates are 




available in Hansard in the library of SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), 
University of London. In addition to these official documents, I also investigated the 
statistics published by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) and the National 
Sample Survey of India (NSSO) in India, and the information contained in the 
National Information System for Solid Waste Management (SINIR) and the National 
Survey of Basic Sanitation (PNSB) at the Brazilian Institute of Geography (IBGE). 
As well as documents at the federal level, I perused other sources at different levels of 
governance in both countries, such as the policies on solid waste in some Brazilian 
states and official documents published by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
(AMC) and other government bodies in India, to verify information gathered 
elsewhere.  
In addition, private organisations, such as the Brazilian Association of Public 
Cleansing (ABRELPE) and the Business Commitment for Recycling (CEMPRE) in 
Brazil, and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) 
and the National Solid Waste Association of India (NSWAI), provided reports and 
statistics. I also consulted reports of international organisations, such as the 
International Solid Waste Management (ISWA); the German organisation, 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PwC); and the United Nations Development Report Programme (UNDEP). 
Academic journals and reports of international NGOs, such as Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and the Global Anti-Incinerator 
Alliance (GAIA), also provided valuable perspectives on the issue. These 
organisations have provided extensive reports, with comprehensive data analyses of 
the condition of solid waste management in India and Brazil, from quite divergent 




Daily newspapers in India, such as the Hindustani Times and the Times of India, and 
clippings from Brazilian newspapers available in the legislative assembly of the state 
of São Paulo, proved a significant resource of historical data about the 
implementation of waste management policies. 
The interview process: the sample 
In total, seventy-six (one-to-one) interviews were carried out in Brazil, of which 
twelve were conducted during the 4th CNMA, and fifty-one were held in India. The 
number of Brazilians interviewed is larger due to the opportunity I had to talk to 
participants at the 4th CNMA. The conference offered a unique scenario: I was able, at 
a single event, to conduct interviews with a broad range of participants from across 
the country, representing a wide-ranging sample of interest groups involved in the 
debate. Section 6.2 provides a sample of the delegates at the conference. I attended 
the conference armed with the names of several people I wanted to interview, as I 
knew I would be able meet them in person without the need to arrange a meeting in 
advance. While there, I was also able to approach other people randomly in the 
corridors to talk about their role in the conference. In addition, I conducted some 
other discussions via teleconference (Skype) and email after the fieldwork period to 
clarify some of the findings. Although these techniques may provide quick and easy 
access to specific informants, they are less personal and exploratory than face-to-face 
interviews and mainly useful to confirm specific information. The sample, therefore, 
covers a variety of actors involved in the political process of solid waste management 
policy.  
Table 3 shows the sample of the interviewees in both countries, with the percentage of 




• Government – members of the legislature and executive government bodies at three 
levels, including ministries, environmental agencies, local authorities and civil 
servants; 
• Private sector – private companies ranging from large corporations and international 
organisations operating in the country, banks, law firms and consultants to small 
businesses and professional associations; 
• Civil society – community associations, residents’ associations, activists, labour 
unions and NGOs;  
• Research community – academics, research centres and think-tank organisations; 
• Waste picker’s organisations – cooperatives, NGOs and other labour organisations, 
and independent informal waste pickers. 
Table 3: Sampling frame of informants 
 
Brazil India 
 Informants % Informants % 
Government 28 37 15 30 
Private sector 16 21 10 20 
Civil society 9 12 8 16 
Research 
community 7 9 3 6 
Waste pickers’ 
organisations 16 21 14 28 
Total 76 100 51 100 
Resource: Author’s illustration 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix provide a complete list of this sample, with the names of 




Some of these informants could be classified across categories in this sample. For 
example, some law firms work for the private sector, but during the research in 
Bangalore, the SWM Roundtable was led by a law firm engaged to defend the public 
interest in the issue of waste collection in the city. Equally, some activists could also 
be classified as either academic researchers or as members of civil society or the 
informal sector, due to their level of engagement during the period of the interview. 
Some waste pickers alternate their work, sometimes working as part of a cooperative 
and sometimes informally. The term NGO is also a changeable categorisation: some 
provide several different types of service, without any clear definition of their activity 
or level of institutionalisation. In this area, some NGOs are activist organisations, 
engaged in the support of waste pickers, which are either formed by waste pickers 
themselves as they try to establish a political constituency or become involved 
through advocating for other issues, such as the improvement of service provision in 
particular local communities; others, meanwhile, work with the government as 
research centres or think tanks. 
While researching in India, with the support of SWaCH (India’s first wholly owned 
cooperative of self-employed waste pickers) in the city of Pune and the AMC in 
Ahmedabad, or visiting cooperatives in Brazil, such as COOPVILA or COOPERE, I 
had the chance to talk to many waste pickers working in different communities, on the 
streets and in other sorts of organisation. These encounters are not part of the sample 
of interviewees and I classify them as observations. Although these observations 
helped me to clarify some aspects of the research, they do not follow the research 




The major limitation of this sample is the lack of ordinary citizens’ voices. The reason 
for this is that the research was designed to interview practitioners in the policy area 
of waste management, and all those I had the chance to talk to, even informally, were 
engaged in some sort of organisation involved in that political process. 
The interview process: preparation, interviews, data organisation 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respondents’ 
workplaces. The following subsections give a detailed explanation of the process: the 
preparation, the content of the discussions and the organisation of the data after the 
interview.  
Interview preparation  
The pilot research I conducted in Delhi provided information about key organisations 
and potential informants. After that trip, I contacted some academics studying in the 
area who gave me valuable information about potential interviewees, and their contact 
details. I repeated the same process in Brazil, creating an agenda for the interviews. 
Some weeks before the fieldwork, I started arranging meetings with my potential 
informants. While I was contacting them via email or telephone, I undertook 
extensive research (on the internet, in official documents and the literature) to prepare 
specific questions for the various interviewees, including questions concerning key 
information that would help to clarify their role in the decision-making process. For 
instance, before interviewing the director of Veolia in India, I undertook a preliminary 
survey of the company’s activities to discover the challenges it met when it was 




As mentioned above, my perception of the problems of waste management changed 
during the research. I decided to adapt my first research question after the fieldwork 
in Brazil. Thereafter, I used only some of the questions I had formulated before my 
fieldwork relating to the interviewee’s participation in the political process. 
Conducting the interviews 
The interview questions were intended to help elucidate the characteristics of the 
waste sector in each country and the engagement of different actors in the political 
process that regulates the sector, from the perspective of the interviewee. All the 
interviews followed a relatively similar sequence: 
•  Introduction – The conversation began with an explanation of the purpose of the 
research, the format of the interview and its confidentiality. I explained the ethics 
form before asking for the interviewee’s written consent to my recording the 
interview or taking notes. 
•  Warm-up – This comprised a brief conversation about my personal experience in 
both countries. 
•  The main body of the interview – The discussion was divided into four main topics 
(see Table 4, below). The first questions were intended to explore the interviewee’s 
or their organisation’s activity in the sector, in order to capture different perspectives 
about the structure of the waste management system in the country. The second part 
was related to their knowledge of national policy and the decision-making process. 
The questions were related to the interviewee’s or their organisation’s participation 
in the reform of waste management, as well as their opinions on the issue. The third 




previous research about the interviewee, prior to the meeting, to clarify some 
specific aspects found in the literature. 
Table 4: Interview guide, with the main themes for discussion 
Theme Notes about the question 
Interviewee’s 
characterisation 
Could you describe your/your organisation’s activity in waste 
management? 
Interviewees received different questions according to their 
position in the waste management system. For instance, in the 
case of government officials, the questions explored their role in 
the administration and their communication with other 
organisations and official bodies at other levels of government. 
Waste pickers were questioned about their daily activities, their 
level of political organisation and their engagement with other 
actors (e.g. cooperatives, politicians and middlemen). 
Political 
participation 
Do you know the official waste policy? What is your 




What are the constraints that local governments face in achieving 
the targets set by central government? What are the main factors 
that contribute to the success or failure of the implementation of 
waste policies? What could be done to solve the problems? 
Specific 
questions 
For example, in the case of a business association, the questions 
were intended to capture the activities of the organisation, their 
position in relation to the political process, their strategy and their 
coalitions with other organisations. 
Source: Author’s illustration 
• The interviews varied in length, and the sequence and depth of their questions, 
according to the different circumstances, and it is more appropriate to describe their 
contexts in the body of the thesis. For example, the interview with the official in the 
Ministry of Cities in Brazil took around ten minutes as the interviewee appeared 
busy, distracted and uncomfortable with the interview, while the interview with the 
official in the Ministry of Science and Technology was relatively prolonged (more 




• Closure – After the questions, I asked if there was anything the interviewee would 
like to add or if they had any questions. Some became very interested in the 
comparative analysis and wanted more information about the waste management in 
the other country, thus extending the conversation. The interview often finished with 
an indication of other potential informants for further interviews. 
After the interview 
Some interviews were recorded, with the interviewee’s permission, and were 
transcribed later. Although recording facilitates conversation, allowing for a more 
fluid discussion, on many occasions the conversation became more natural after the 
recorder was turned off – an aspect reported by other researchers (Rapley, 2004). 
After each interview, the transcriptions or the notes from the conversation were 
analysed and the main points coded to facilitate the organisation of the topics. After 
the first round of interviews, questions began to emerge that challenged my initial 
hypothesis and the assumptions I formed before the fieldwork while examining the 
official documents and the literature. After a few rounds of interviews, the 
information started to suggest specific questions, such as: ‘How are policies 
formulated and how does society participate in these processes?’ ‘What are the main 
forms of interaction between the state and society?’ ‘Who are the main actors 
operating in this sector and what are their roles in the political process?’ During the 
transcription, some respondents’ opinions and key words were coded according to 
these questions. Johnny Saldaña (2014: 584) explains that this process of 
categorisation emerges from rereading and revaluating the data, as the researcher 




more evident. Thus, a preliminary organisation of the data evolved out of its initial 
categorisation, as discussed later in this section. 
One of the challenges encountered in this research is related to the issue of language. 
The range of practitioners in this sector encompassed actors operating at a global 
level, politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of government, as well as illiterate waste 
pickers. On the hand, in India, each state I visited has its own official language;7 in 
general, only the top ranks in government bodies and companies speak English. My 
communication with non-English speakers in India – for example, waste pickers and 
members of grassroots movements – was mediated by interpreters, mainly from 
NGOs such as SWaCH, SEWA and AIKMM. On the other hand, my knowledge of 
Portuguese, my first language, facilitated the fieldwork in Brazil and gave me access 
to interviewees across the entire territory. The language limitation was a key factor in 
the research design: to overcome this barrier and achieve a more balanced sample of 
interviewees, the research explored the institutional policy framework, where the 
majority of official documents and institutional interviewees communicate using 
English in India and Portuguese in Brazil. 
Observation 
About forty-one organisations involved in solid waste management and its 
governance were surveyed in Brazil, and thirty-nine in India (Appendix, Tables 1 and 
2, provide a complete list of organisations visited). In addition to these, the 
observations included visits to public and private facilities (landfills, transfer stations, 
                                                
7 For example, in Delhi the majority of people speak Hindi; in Mumbai and Pune most inhabitants 
speak Marathi; in Ahmedabad, Gujarati is the official language; and the inhabitants of Bangalore speak 




dumpsites, cooperatives of waste pickers) and public events, such as conferences, 
business fairs, and community and street events. Table 5 provides an overview of the 
main events attended. For example, in São Paulo, I attended two public hearings in 
the legislative assembly of the state of São Paulo, and seminars and business fairs. 
These events gave me the opportunity talk to participants and arrange interviews. 
Table 5: Events attended in Brazil 
Date Event Place Participants 
8-










18/11/2013 Public hearings in São Paulo São Paulo 
Open to all 
citizens 
1-





25/10/2013 Waste and Citizenship Forum Brasilia Waste pickers, politicians 
23/10/2013 4
th National Conference on the 
Environment Brasilia 
Practitioners of all 
sectors 
Source: Author’s illustration 
Table 6: Events attended in India 
Date Event Place Participants 
26/2/2014 Safe Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste Mumbai Local government officials, experts 
10/2/2014 ‘Exploring Pathways to Sustainability’ symposium Delhi 
Academics, 
activists 
16/3/2013 Khwahishein Awareness Campaign for Waste-Pickers Delhi 
NGOs, activists, 
academics 
10/3/2013 Jantar Mantar Delhi Social movements, NGOs, activists 




These events contributed to the process of snowballing used to find potential 
interviewees. For example, when I arrived in Delhi for my fieldwork, I was invited by 
Dr Kaveri Gill (we had previously engaged in email correspondence) to attend the 
‘Exploring Pathways to Sustainability’ symposium at the JNU. During this two-day 
event, I was made aware of the current debates on the challenges of solid waste 
management in India, and I met several academics, with whom I was able to arrange 
subsequent meetings. Later, in the conference on ‘The Safe Disposal of Municipal 
Solid Waste’, held at the SNDT Women’s University in Mumbai, I met municipal 
officers from several Indian cities, and I was invited by the representative of the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) to visit the city. 
Cities visited in India and Brazil 
Figs. 1 and 2 in the Appendix show two maps highlighting the cities visited in Brazil 
and India. As mentioned before, this research does not intend to make direct 
comparisons between solid waste management performances in different cities and 
countries. The cities visited during the fieldwork are not comparable, and they were 
not chosen as means of comparison. Prior to the fieldwork, I established contacts and 
organised my research specifically in the cities of São Paulo and Brasilia in Brazil, 
and Delhi, Mumbai and Pune in India, due to the concentration of government bodies, 
private organisations and events related to the waste management sector in these 
cities. Pune was particularly important to this research because of its progressive 
model of governance: one of the most important and enduring organisations of waste 





In addition to the above cities, I visited Sorocaba, Maceió and Penedo in Brazil and 
Ahmedabad and Bangalore in India. The decision to extend my research to these other 
cities was a result of the snowballing process and the way visits unfolded according to 
the availability of and access to key informants. It is essential to note that the samples 
are not the cities per se, but the policies and the actors involved in the political 
process.  
This research compares government-interest group relationships and the outcome of 
these national political processes in these countries. For example, when I was in 
Brazil, the city of Sorocaba was suffering a waste crisis due to a poorly drafted public 
tender, and the interviewee in the state of São Paulo environmental agency (CETESB) 
arranged an interview with members of staff in Sorocaba’s municipal waste 
department. I visited the cities of Maceió and Penedo in the northeast as it was 
convenient to travel to that region; I decided to take the opportunity this offered to 
extend my research into an investigation of how Brazil’s national policy on waste 
management was implemented far from the central axis of São Paulo, Brasilia and 
Rio de Janeiro.  
In India, when I attended an event in Mumbai, organised by the NSWAI, I met 
representatives of several local governments and I received an invitation to travel to 
Ahmedabad. The municipal corporation there provided a series of contacts with actors 
involved in waste management. In the case of Bangalore, I arranged a meeting, 
through my university department, with the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and 
Democracy, a think tank involved in the promotion of citizen participation in local 
governance in the city. Bangalore was also important due to the activities of protest 




led to the formulation of the Waste Rules 2000, the withdrawal of the Waste Bill 
2013, and the contestation of the National Consultation Programme, discussed in 
sections 5.2 and 6.4. 
Data analysis 
All the interviews and the written documents provided a range of competing and 
contrasting perspectives on the same topic. During the analysis, in order to reduce the 
data, I organised the material into five main categories based on the research question. 
This categorisation was the result of my reflection on the data, striving to make sense 
of the similarities in and differences between the same process in Brazil and India. 
The categories are as follows: 
•  the main organisations operating in the sector; 
•  how citizens participate in government decisions; 
•  the forms this participation take; 
•  the shape the political process takes; 
•  and how the policies are formulated.  
Key information from the textual documents, and the transcriptions of and notes from 
the interviews and observations, were organised according to this categorisation in an 
extensive and time-consuming process (Saldaña, 2014). During the process of 
reviewing the documents, interviewing respondents, listening to the recordings of the 
interviews, and reading and re-reading notes of the data, some predominant themes 
began to emerge. As research is an on-going process, in which the researcher is both 
investigating and producing knowledge, some of the interviews and discussions with 




some doubts (Rapley, 2004: 26). Some of these ideas were shared and tested with 
other audiences to discover whether the findings corresponded to the observations in a 
cyclical process of analysis (Marvasti, 2013: 364). As Allen Trent and Jeasik Cho 
(2014: 643) explain, the interpretation of data is a repetitive process, going back and 
forth between the data analysed and new interpretations. After revising the data many 
times, these categories finally crystallised into five main analytical themes:  
•  the solid waste management system and legislative framework in each country; 
•  the historical process that preceded this;  
•  the format of the decision-making in each country; 
•  the spaces of state-interest group interaction; 
•  and the main groups involved in the sector and their influence on decision-making. 
The interpretation of the data led to a reflection on these themes and the division of 
the sections explored in the findings. Nevertheless, it was not entirely clear at that 
stage that some interest groups dominate the decision-making of these political 
processes, and it needed further critical reflection to draw this final conclusion. This 
information was then reorganised into these themes that evolved into the organisation 
of the findings into chapters. 
The validation of these conclusions is the result of crosschecking these findings 
against different sources of data and methods (Halperin and Health, 2012: 281). The 
validity of findings is tested by whether credible conclusions can be drawn from the 
data set (Halperin and Health, 2012: 282). As Saldaña (2014: 604) suggests, the 
credibility of the research emerges from the methods of collection; a thorough 
description of the research process and the method of data analysis; the presentation 




testimonies, showing the diversity of sources and data collected. According to 
Huberman and Miles (2002: 42), validity concerns not a specific method, but the way 
conclusions are drawn from the accounts and the data by employing a method of 
analysis that fits the specific circumstances and purposes of the research.  
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described the research methods employed in the thesis. It has 
explained the main decisions taken during the research process, clarified the choices 
that led to the formulation of the research question – the result of reflection on aspects 
of the political process that were not evident at the beginning of the study, and 
considered some of the key challenges inherent in the comparison of the same 
political process in two different countries and in my critical role as a researcher in 
the field.  
A comparative analysis can offer an invaluable contribution to the understanding of 
these political phenomena: as this research argues, the political processes of decision-
making in these countries are a result of the evolution of the practices in the sector, 
and so the dominance of certain groups are not necessarily perceived unless compared 
with other political contexts. As this chapter has discussed, comparative studies based 
on small-N analysis are essentially grounded in case selection. The methodology, 
therefore, was used to provide the means for a careful consideration of the choice of 
Brazil and India as the contexts for the research. The comparison of interest group 
participation in these two emerging economies helps explain how such activities, 
while inherent to the workings of a democratic system, vary from one political 
context to another. The chapter also considered other research approaches that seek to 




although a number of different statistical tools and indices could be used to explore 
and compare political processes in different countries, the literature review has shown 
that Brazil and India have their own political particularities which demand a thick 
investigation of the characteristics of these political phenomena in the field. 
The research uses a structuralist approach to investigate the activities of the groups 
involved in solid waste management in these countries and their influence on 
government decisions. As Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2010: 31) state, 
structuralists do not focus on particular individuals or groups as isolated agents of 
change; they understand that actions and behaviours are influenced by macro-
structural configurations, and it is these that determine the results of public policy. 
Thus, this research collects information directly from the actors and organisations 
involved in order to construct a narrative that explains how the interconnection of 
these forces influences policy outcomes, because, as Landman (2000: 292) suggests, 
their actions and interests are embedded in a wider political context.  
The chapter explained how the triangulation of qualitative methods is compatible with 
the structuralist approach: the explanation of the political phenomena is based on 
information collected from groups of people involved in the political process 
(Landman, 2000: 43), which is then triangulated with the examination of political 
documents and observations of the behaviour and activities of these groups (in 
industry events, conferences and workplaces), as well as the political environment in 
which they operate. This triangulation also aims to minimise the subjectivity of the 
researcher (Eisner, 1992). In this case, I also critically reflected on the perspective and 
preconceptions of my own personal judgments and my position as a researcher 




This was followed by a thorough explanation of the collection, coding and 
interpretation of the data yielded by these methods (interviews, document analysis 
and observation), and a reflection on the limitations of these techniques. Section 3.4.2, 
for example, provided a detailed description of the research process, including all the 
documents analysed and their sources; the interview sample and the preparation and 
conduct of the interview process; and the organisational support received in the 
different cities visited during the fieldwork. 
The subsequent chapters (4 to 7) present the research findings, using this research 
design to explore the extent to which government decisions in emerging economies 
are influenced by interest group participation. They explore the structures of the two 
democratic societies under review, revealing the historical roots of their political 
processes and government institutions, and examine the structure of their decision-
making processes and state-interest group interactions, the institutional spaces that 
determine individuals’ and groups’ political activities, and the interconnections 
between the leading groups involved in shaping the political process. 
 Chapter 4 MSWM Systems in Brazil and India 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the problems of municipal solid waste 
management (MSWM) in Brazil and India, comparing the current situation in these 
countries, the origins and historical evolution of their practices, and the relationship 
between the public and private actors involved. The chapter argues that the 
characteristics of the public-private relationship in these countries are the result of 
historical circumstances and the way in which the provision of public services 
evolved and were structured over time. More recently, due to both the prominence of 
debates on the global environmental crisis and the expansion of the international 
market, new actors have emerged who have begun to exert a powerful influence over 
domestic decision-making in Brazil and India, in ways that extend to all levels of 
governance. 
The chapter establishes clear distinctions between the challenges of waste 
management implementation, its institutional arrangements and the characteristics of 
the service provision in place in each country. Each of these features have a 
significant but differential impact, according to the country, on the interaction 
between the state and (national and international) interest groups in this sector. The 
analysis of these characteristics helps to elucidate the origins of some of the current 
practices and the scope of the problem in each country, and the extent to which they 
are comparable in terms of their public-private relationships. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first compares the demographic 
characteristics of Brazil and India, and their waste management systems, in order to 
understand the problems of policy implementation. This section provides a snapshot 
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of municipal waste management in these countries, illustrating how this public service 
is organised. The second section considers historical factors that might explain some 
of the current practices and characteristics of waste management in each country, and 
the involvement of certain actors in its provision. The historical analysis looks at the 
early debates on the issue of waste management in Brazil and India, as well as the 
drivers – external (international agreements and market forces) and internal 
(constitutions, political practices and environmental accidents) – behind the evolution 
of their policies. Finally, the third section investigates their institutional frameworks – 
that is, the content of the waste management policies and the structure of the federal 
and government bodies mandated to provide these services to the entire population. 
This knowledge underpins the analysis of the interest groups involved in the policy 
decisions and provision of MSWM services that is developed over the course of the 
subsequent chapters.  
4.2 Comparative description of the waste refining systems in Brazil and India 
This first subsection begins by comparing some contrasting features of Brazilian and 
Indian societies. Despite the fact that these countries have been commonly classified 
as ‘emerging economies’ over the last decades, since the term BRIC8 gained global 
media attention, this generalisation hides certain striking and complex differences, in 
terms of socioeconomic characteristics, that appear in almost all the measures studied. 
Tables 7 and 8 show comparative features of demography and solid waste 
management performances in both countries. In Brazil, close to 200 million people 
                                                
8 The term ‘BRIC’ was launched in 2001 by Jim O’Neil, chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, to 
describe the group of new emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
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speak the same language and the majority practice the same religion (IBGE, 2015). In 
India, with a population six times larger, its 1.22 billion people speak several 
languages, and there is a great diversity of cultures and beliefs. These numbers on 
their own could already partly explain the differences in each governments’ provision 
of public services, but before we address the solid waste management issue, we need 
to highlight significant structural features that affect the capacity of these two 
countries to deal with the same problem. 
Table 7: Demographic data comparing Brazil and India 
 Brazil India 
Population – IBGE (2016) 202,033,670 1,267,401,849 
Urban population – IBGE (2014) 85.34% 32.37% 
GDP per capita (USD) -  
World Bank, 2014 11,384.40 1,851,50 
Overall GDP (million USD) – 
IBGE, 2013 2,243,854 1,937,797 
IDH – UNDEP, 2014 0.76 0.61 
GNI per capita (PPP $) 15,590 5,630 
Population living below  
income poverty line (%) – 
World Bank, 2014 
8.9 21.9 
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24) – 
World Indicators, 2005 98 81 
Illiteracy 9.4% (Census 2010) 26% (Census 2011) 
Total number of illiterate adults – 
UNESCO, 2013 13 million 262.9 million 
Source: IBGE (2015), Census (2011), the World Bank (2016), UNDEP (2016) 
India, which is classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income economy, is 
on the verge of becoming the third largest economy in the world, with an annual 
growth rate of 7.5%; meanwhile, Brazil, classified as an upper-middle-income 
MSWM Systems in Brazil and India 
145 
 
economy, is facing one of the worst political and economic crises of recent years. It is 
suffering its deepest recession in the last twenty-five years and showing economic 
growth of 0.2% in the first trimester of 2015 (IBGE, 2015). The survey on emerging 
consumer markets carried out by Credit Suisse (2015: 62) in 2015 shows two 
contrasting domestic consumption scenarios. Brazil’s economic growth, on the one 
hand, is in steady decline, as it faces relatively high inflation, fiscal austerity and 
unemployment during a period of high political tension, leading to macroeconomic 
uncertainty. On the other hand, India has experienced economic optimism, due to the 
election of a new government after thirty years of rule by a single majority party 
(Credit Suisse, 2015: 66). The survey shows high levels of expectations on the part of 
Indian respondents in terms of improvement in their personal finances and future 
household income, especially as the income of the average urban household grew 
about 12% in 2014, following two years of stagnation (Credit Suisse, 2015: 7). The 
reverse is true in Brazil: there is a marked decline of optimism among the middle 
classes. These findings confirm the perceptions of respondents interviewed during the 
fieldwork for this research.  
Consumer confidence has a strong impact on the generation of solid waste, due to its 
direct link to consumption (GWMO, 2015: 40). However, in Brazil, social welfare 
programmes, such as Bolsa Família, Fome Zero and Minha Casa Minha Vida,9 have 
been successful in alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities over the last decades. 
Illiteracy in Brazil currently affects less than 2% of the youth population (World 
Bank, 2014) and 9.4% of the overall population, according to the 2010 Census (IPEA, 
                                                
9 Translated into English, these programmes are the ‘Family Allowance Programme’, ‘My Home, My Life’ and 
‘Zero Hunger’, respectively. They are bold social programmes providing low-income families with subsidised 
goods and services. 
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2013: 59). In addition, in 2014, Brazil’s gross national income (GNI) per capita was 
almost three times India’s, and the percentage of the population living below the 
poverty line in India (21.9%) was more than double that of Brazil (8.9%). These 
demographic and economic figures show the complexities involved in analysing the 
contrast between two countries with the same economic classification. 
In terms of urban infrastructure, the difference is also clear to visitors to Brazilian and 
Indian cities: 99.5% of Brazilians has access to electricity; in India, this coverage is 
only 78.7%, and some large cities face shortages of electricity during certain hours. 
Meanwhile, according to the 2014 National Survey on Basic Sanitation (SNIS, 2014), 
despite the fact that 82.5% of Brazilians have access to piped water in their homes, 
51.4% still do not have sewage and drainage systems – that is, around 35 million 
Brazilians are without water and almost 100 million without sewerage (Table 8). In 
India, according to the 2011 census, the situation is even more acute, as 63.6% of 
households do not have latrines and 53.6% are not connected to a drainage system. 
Table 8: Comparative figures on solid waste management (Brazil and India) 
 Brazil India 
Improved sanitation facilities, urban 
(% of urban population with access) 82.80 (2015) 39.60 (2015) 
Solid waste generated tons per year 
(TPY) 61.1 million (2013)* 
54.75 million (urban) 
(2010)** 
Waste per capita per day 0.85 to 1.61kg (2012)**** 
0.2kg to 0.6kg 
(2013)** 
Amount of waste improperly 
disposed of 41.7% (2015)***** 91% (2010)*** 
Sources: World Bank (2015); *SNIS (2015: 54); **MoUD (2013: 2); ***Annepu 
(2012: 24); ****GWMO (2015: 55); *****ABRELPE (2015: 31) 
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Despite the fact that India has a population much larger than that of Brazil, both these 
countries generate comparable amounts of waste per year. The waste generation per 
capita in Brazil is higher than in India: while the average Brazilian generated between 
0.85 to 1.61Kg of waste a day in 2012 (ABRELPE, cited in GMWO, 2015: 55), the 
India urban waste generation per capita ranges between 0.2kg in small towns to 0.6kg 
in metropolises (GoI, 2014a: 3). This difference is probably a result of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita and the Western lifestyle of Brazilians, which is 
based on the consumption of industrialised, packaged products, which generate more 
dry waste. The diet of the Indian population, meanwhile, has up to recently been 
primarily based on unprocessed food, generating more organic waste. Nevertheless, 
these patterns are changing fast, and it is estimated that each Indian will be generating 
about 1.032kg of waste by 2030 (Kaushal et al., 2012: 1475). In addition, the Indian 
urban population is increasing rapidly due to industrialisation and the consequent 
migration from the villages to the cities. Today, only 32.37% of Indians (377 million) 
live in urban centres – compared with the 85.34%10 of city-dwelling Brazilians 
(IBGE, 2015) – but it is anticipated that by 2050 half of all Indians will be urban 
dwellers (GoI, 2014b: 3).  
Municipal solid waste management (MSWM) in Brazil and India 
In Brazil, the door-to-door collection of household waste in cities is a basic public 
service provided by most municipal authorities. Although this service is not yet 
universal, according to the Brazilian National Information System on Sanitation 
                                                
10 The definition of rural and urban areas in Brazil is controversial. However, the official data published by the 
IBGE, based on the Municipal Law of 1996, considers as ‘urban’ those areas situated within cities (municipal 
bodies) and villages (district bodies), as well as isolated urban areas. It considers as ‘rural’, those areas lying 
outside the city limits, including rural settlements. According to a decree published in 1938 by the government of 
President Getúlio Vargas, the definition of the city limits is established by the city’s mayor (Tubino, 2013).  
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(SNIS, 2015: 36), it covers 96.6% of urban households. However, this coverage varies 
considerably, from 100% in some cities in the centre-west to 47.1% in the north 
(SNIS, 2015: 36). This means that 2.9 million inhabitants (1.7%) do not receive this 
service (SNIS, 2015: 22) and some 20,000 tonnes of waste a day goes uncollected 
(ABRELPE, 2013: 29). The major problem, however, is the final disposal, since most 
of the urban waste collected (80.4%) is destined for landfill sites, and 41.1% of this is 
inappropriately disposed of (SNIS, 2015: 122). In the survey carried out by the 
Ministry of Cities (SNIS, 2015: 123), 1.233 municipalities admitted to sending their 
solid waste to dumpsites and uncontrolled landfills. Officially, the country has 1,196 
dumpsites, 652 uncontrolled landfills and 702 sanitary landfills11 (SNIS, 2015: 103), 
but these figures do not take into account clandestine and undeclared dumpsites, 
showing the enormous challenge the National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS) faces. 
Another problem is low rates of recycling. Despite the fact that 32.5% of Brazilian 
cities have declared some sort of recycling collection policy (SNIS, 2015: 55), official 
data shows that only 1.4% of all waste collected is recycled (SNIS, 2015: 75). It is 
likely that the recycling rates are higher, but as the majority of all waste is recycled by 
the informal sector, official sources do not take this into account. 
A key challenge for the economic maintenance of solid waste management services in 
Brazil is the fact that only 39.5% of municipalities charge public fees to cover the 
costs (SNIS, 2015: 93); in general (88% of the cases), the cost is included in the 
                                                
11 There are three types of waste disposal on the ground: sanitary landfills, uncontrolled landfills and open 
dumpsites. The sanitary landfill is the most acceptable, where waste is confined and covered in layers, with 
monitoring and treatment of leachate and gas emissions under specific operational standards (Annepu, 2012: 46); 
the uncontrolled type of landfill does not have any of these treatments; and the open dumpsite, the worst method of 
disposal, is where the waste is randomly dumped and left exposed on open ground, with severe environmental and 
social impacts. 
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Urban Building and Land Tax (IPTU), and only 2.8% of municipalities have a 
specific waste fee. According to the SNIS (2015: 1), the cost per capita per year 
ranges between USD 19.11 (R$ 71.91) in small cities to USD 44.44 (R$ 167,20) in 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two largest. Taking these two metropolises out of 
the equation, the municipalities expend, on average, USD 24.72 (R$ 93.00) on waste 
services for each inhabitant per year, which means that they each pay about USD 2.06 
per month for the municipality to manage the waste they generate. However, this 
means that some 4% of the municipal budget, plus the income collected from the 
residents, covers only half a percent of these costs (SNIS, 2015: 99).  
In small towns, the municipalities’ financial situation is even worse, since, in 
exchange for votes, some mayors do not charge the population, leaving the 
municipality totally dependent on federal grants.12 Gilmar Rodrigues (2007) shows 
that, on average, the Brazilian municipalities collect only 15% of their total revenues, 
while the rest (85%) is passed down by state and federal governments (Caderno do 
Ceas, 1997: 3 cited in Rodrigues, 2007: 276). Also, 75% of municipalities collect less 
than 10% of their municipal budgets, and 90% of those with less than ten thousand 
inhabitants are completely dependent on compulsory governmental transfers (Samuels 
cited in Souza, 1998 cited in Rodrigues, 2007: 296). In total, Brazilian municipalities 
spend almost USD 4.28 billion (R$ 16.1 billion) per year on waste management 
services (staff, lorries, maintenance, inputs, outsourcing and other remunerations) 
(SNIS, 2015: 100). As a result, the waste fee is always subject to controversy. For 
example, in order to improve and increase the transparency of waste management 
                                                
12 Valmir Lessa, Penedo City Hall engineer, interviewed at his office, Brazil, 23 December 2013. 
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services, São Paulo – the major business and financial hub of Latin America – 
introduced the Domestic Solid Waste Tax (TRSD) in 2002. However, after a huge 
political battle in the city council and the courts, the tax was revoked in 2005 (Soares, 
2005). Nowadays, part of the IPTU is used to cover the costs of municipal solid waste 
management. Section 6.5 explains the case of the ‘Cartel of Contractors’ and São 
Paulo City Hall in the 1990s in depth. 
Sanitation and solid waste management falls short in Brazil, but in India, the 
deficiencies are even more acute. The country’s positive economic figures do not 
reflect the reality of waste management. A report published by MoUD (2013: 8) 
claims that the provision of primary collection by local governments is insignificant, 
and part of the waste simply remains on the streets or outside dustbins in residential 
areas. Official figures show that 70% of the 127,486 tonnes of municipal solid waste 
generated per day is collected in urban centres, but only 12.45% is treated (MoUD, 
2014: 5). Annually, more than 81% of all urban solid waste collected is improperly 
disposed of in dumpsites (GoI, 2014b: 5). According to the Ministry of Urban 
Development (MoUD, 2013: 3), India had only fifty-nine landfills in operation in 
2013. Despite that fact that some cities have achieved high levels of household 
collection, such as Chandigarth (96.2%) and Surat (90.3%), and others, such as 
Rajkot, Surat and Ahmedabad, have implemented Integrated Sustainable Waste 
Management (ISWM) 13  projects in public-private partnerships (PPPs), few 
municipalities provide the primary service of doorstep waste collection (Janaagraha, 
2012: 7). This type of project is examined further in section 7.3, p. 315. The majority 
                                                
13 The concept of ISWM, proposed by the Dutch NGO, Waste, in the 1980s, aims to integrate the three dimensions 
– economic, social and environmental – into the MSWM system to promote sustainable development. Nowadays, 
this concept is accepted worldwide as a standard of good practice. 
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of the population, even in the metropolises, do not pay the land property tax; instead, 
they directly pay informal waste pickers (operating as individuals or organisations) or 
their resident welfare associations, which are responsible for the organisation of waste 
collection in their areas.  
Usually, urban waste collection is divided into two parts. The primary collection, in 
general, is carried out by waste pickers (Fig. 1) and delivered to specific collecting 
points (called dhalao in Delhi), located on roadsides in residential areas (Fig. 2), 
where the waste is segregated. Then, the secondary collection, carried out by the 
municipality or private contractors, transports the waste to transfer stations (Fig. 3), or 
directly to municipal facilities outside the cities. In some cases, the primary and 
secondary collections are not synchronised, which means that piles of waste are stored 
at collecting points in the streets for days, awaiting transport (MoUD, 2013: 8). In 
addition, as Rajendra Kaushal et al. (2012: 1481) explain, in poor areas, where the 
population is unable to pay for these services, waste is thrown onto the roads, dumped 
on river banks or burned in empty lots (Fig. 4), creating serious health risks and 
environmental hazards. However, this is not a problem for poorer areas alone: there 
are several unauthorised settlements in the middle of the cities, some of them very 
wealthy, which do not pay land property tax, and as result, their inhabitants do not 
have access to public services such as water and electricity. Figs. 1, 2 and 4 are 
common scenes that can be observed daily across New Delhi. On specific days, the 
garbage men come to door-to-door to collect some of the household waste; invariably, 
however, the remaining waste is burned in the open. Fig. 4 shows a bonfire of waste 
from the previous day’s religious celebrations at a temple in the Shivalik colony in 
South Delhi. Sections 7.3 and 7.5 discusses the role of some of the players involved in 
the collection of waste in Indian cities in greater depth.  
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Urban local bodies, therefore, face financial constraints in providing and improving 
waste management services. According to the report, Advisory on Improving 
Municipal Solid Waste Management Services (MoUD, 2013: 22), the majority of local 
authorities spend between 5% and 40% of their budget on MSWM, but in some cases, 
these costs can range from 10% in metropolises to 70% in smaller towns. From this 
amount, 60-70% covers street sweeping, 20-30% pays for transport, and only 5% is 
spent on final disposal (MoUD, 2013: 9). The survey carried out by the consultancy 
UNDEP (2016),14 shows that India has ten dumpsites15 in the list of the fifty largest 
dumpsites in the world; Brazil has one, the Estrutural dumpsite in Brasilia.16 The 
description above, however, contrasts with the recent Swachh Bharat Survekshan, 
published by the MoUD in February 2016, showing the ranking of the seventy-three 
cleanest Indian cities (discussed in section 5.2 on the ‘Clean India Mission’). 
 
 
                                                
14 The D-Waste website provides a map with general information about these dumpsites: http://www.atlas.d-
waste.com 
15 Okhla, Ghazipur and Bhalaswa in Delhi; Bruhat in Bangalore; Deonar in Mumbai; Dhapa in Kolkata, West 
Bengal; Perungundi and Kodungaiyur in Chennai; Pirana in Ahmedabad; Moti Jheel in Lucknow. 
16 Jardim Gramacho was closed down in 2014. 




Figure 1: Primary collection carried out by waste pickers in New Delhi, India 
(Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Figure 2: Secondary collection in Delhi, India (Source: Author’s photo) 









Figure 4: Waste burned on an empty lot in Delhi (Source: Author’s photo) 
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Thus, a review of solid waste management in emerging economies reveals two 
contrasting realities: on the one hand, major infrastructure projects, involving 
enormous financial investment, and on the other, the informal work of waste pickers. 
An obvious feature of underdevelopment in both countries is the significant number 
of people making some sort of a living from sorting through waste. Indeed, the 
recycling systems in Brazil and India rely heavily on the work of this informal army 
of waste pickers (Sharholy et al., 2008: 467). They can be seen working on the streets 
of the city every day, rolling sacks of waste and transporting recyclables in pushcarts, 
and they are responsible for processing almost all recycled material. In India, 
according to Ranjith Annepu (2012: 49), recycling rates can reach 56% in large 
metropolises, which is high even for the most advanced systems in high-income 
economies. These countries also have high rates of recycling of specific kinds of 
materials: India is the highest plastic recycler (47%) in the world (BRF, 2015) and 
Brazil has the highest rate of aluminium recycling (almost 98%), due to the collection 
of beverage cans by its low-income population. The cheap labour in India and its 
proximity to China, the largest importer of plastic scrap in the world, have a 
significant impact on the Indian recycling sector (GWMO, 2015: 85).  
The waste pickers manually sort materials in subhuman conditions, without protective 
equipment, labour rights, job security or benefits of any kind (Gill, 2010: 5). Some 
more organised groups own trucks, but most of them transport materials in irregular 
conditions. Generally, they are unskilled workers and rural migrants who cannot find 
a formal job in the city (Snel, 1997: 32); many do not have official identification 
papers. Lacking other alternatives, they scrape a living from the waste they collect, 
working day and night in unsafe conditions in streets and on dumpsites (Freitas and 
Fonseca, 2011: 18). Although prevalent in both India and Brazil, this specific interest 
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group receives very different treatment by these countries’ legislatures – their 
capacity for political participation in government decisions is detailed in section 7.5. 
Job informality, therefore, plays a significant role in this sector. The survey by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Kapsos and Bourmpoula, 2013), based on 
household surveys in emerging economies, shows the distribution of employment 
divided between five economic classes (Table 9, below). In Brazil, the majority of 
employees are concentrated in the middle classes (about 80%), while in India, 93.5% 
of jobs are taken by the poorer classes. 
Table 9: Main characteristics of the labour force, encompassing waste pickers 
 Brazil India 
Labour force participation rate, total  
(% of total population ages 15-64)  75 56.50 
Unemployment, total  
(% of total labour force)  6.80 (2014) 3.60 (2010) 
Vulnerable employment, total  
(% of total employment)   23.10 (2013) 80.80 (2010) 
Sources: Suisse (2015), the World Bank (2016)  
 
























2008 3.2 3.5 13.4 48.8 31.1 
India 
2009 29.3 37 27.2 6.1 0.4 
Source: Adapted from Kapsos and Bourmpoula (2013: 29)  




These figures are reflected in these countries’ societies. Banerjee and Duflo (cited in 
Kapsos and Bourmpoula, 2013: 5) explain that middle-class families live in healthier 
conditions than the poor since they have better access to healthcare, education and 
urban infrastructure. The developing middle classes are still poor, but above the 
poverty line, and they are part of an emerging consumer class able to purchase 
nonessential goods and services and access higher levels of education (Kapsos and 
Bourmpoula, 2013: 7). In addition, according to the Indian Ministry of Labour and 
Employment labour bureau (2014: 5), 90% of jobs in India are informal, comprising 
50% of the national product.  
However, in contrast to the social condition of waste pickers, the waste management 
market in these emerging countries has become extremely profitable, with heavy 
investments in infrastructure and technology. Advanced sanitary landfills are 
emerging, which use state-of-the-art methods to capture methane gases for generating 
energy. For example, the city authorities in São Paulo raised approximately USD18 
million (R$ 75.7 million) through three carbon-credit auctions in 2007, 2008 and 
2012, the result of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects that capture 
methane gas from two disused public landfill sites. Meanwhile, in 2014, Rio de 
Janeiro’s local government closed the ‘Gramacho Garden’, the largest dumpsite in 
Latin America, displacing the waste pickers in order to implement the same process. 
According to the Indian government (GoI, 2014: 6 and 35) and MoUD (2014: 280), 
there are eight waste-to-energy (WtE) plants in operation and five new projects under 
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construction.17 WtE is now the focus of major contractors in these two countries. The 
last incinerator plant was closed down in São Paulo in 2002, but now, more than a 
decade later, new incinerator plants are under approval after the launch of the 
Brazilian National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS).18 Despite protests by residents, 
environmentalists and social movements, new incinerators such as the one in Barueri, 
near São Paulo city, are going through the licencing process. Washington Novaes 
(2013) argues that this is an inevitable process, since there are other ongoing projects 
near important urban centres across the country. Local governments are subject to 
strong pressure by major contractors, who are also the main funders of their electoral 
campaigns. The players operating in this sector in Brazil and India, therefore, have 
conflicting interests and very different capacities to influence government decisions. 
Section summary  
The section above shows that Brazil seems to present better performance figures than 
India in terms of coverage per capita and levels of waste collected, processed and 
properly disposed of. The salient point so far is the fact that the first stage of 
municipal waste management, door-to-door collection, is almost solved in Brazil, 
while, in India, service provision is very deficient in the majority of its cities and 
towns. One of the main priorities of the Brazilian PNRS is a resolution to the problem 
of the many dumpsites and unregulated landfills in the country. Meanwhile, in India, 
environmentally sound waste disposal is still limited to just a few cities. However, 
some significant demographic and economic differences contribute to these divergent 
                                                
17 In operation: two in Andhra Pradesh, three in Delhi, one in Kerala and two in Maharashtra; new projects: 
Timarpur-Okhla and Ghazipur in Delhi, Bangalore, Pune and Hyderabad. 
18 The incinerator plant, Vergueiro, was closed in São Paulo in 2002, due to outdated technology and complaints 
from the neighbourhood population. 
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statistics. Certainly, population size and other cultural and socioeconomic diversities 
impact the differential capacities of the Brazilian and Indian governments to provide 
such public services. It is interesting to note, however, that although their 
demographic characteristics are so diverse, both countries have produced comparable 
measures to address the problem. They also have significantly parallel historical 
trajectories and legislative frameworks in the sector, and have faced similar 
limitations when it comes to implementing these proposed solutions at a local level. 
One key obstacle in both countries is the fact that the majority of local authorities face 
severe constraints when it comes to providing public services for their citizens and 
achieving the targets established by central government. Large metropolises face 
gigantic challenges in universalising waste management services, while the majority 
of medium-sized and small towns do not possess the necessary equipment or qualified 
staff. According to Benito Muiños Juncal, former director of the Department of 
Territorial Planning in Bahia, Brazil, for example, of the state’s 417 municipalities, 
only forty have resident engineers, and few of these have environmental management 
skills.19 However, as will be discussed more fully later in the chapter, the struggles of 
local governance are quite different in the Brazilian and Indian federal contexts. 
Historically, the municipalities have always been recognised as important players in 
the Brazilian federal system, and this has meant that the centralised power of the state 
is weaker.20 The dynamics of the central-local relationship was crucial to keeping the 
territory united from the early times of the monarchy to the nineteenth century. Later, 
as Marta Arretche (2012: 25) explains, the 1988 Constitution combined the policy-
                                                
19 Interviewed via telephone on 29 November 2014. 
20 Even during the military regime, the mayors, as well as the deputies and city councillors, were elected. 
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making power of its central elites with the limited political autonomy of its local 
elites. Meanwhile, the central-local state relationship was crucial to maintaining the 
Union of India during independence in 1947. Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh (2011: 
62) explain that the bargain between a strong central government and regional elites 
(the colonial princely states) was critical to ensuring political stability, shaping the 
federation and accommodating its diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic and 
cultural demands. The Indian Constitution of 1950 established the discrete powers of 
the Union and the states, while the third tier was recognised later in 1992, with the 
73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts. Nevertheless, until today, scholars 
have argued that local governments in India struggle to handle their public affairs. 
Before discussing the legislative framework (below), it is worth giving a brief 
overview of the early days of the solid waste management issue in Brazil and India, 
and its evolution over recent decades. Although this study limits its analysis to events 
after the late-1980s, when the political processes and the design of the current policies 
began in these two countries, the characteristics of the current approach to waste 
management betrays the inheritance of some of those early practices. 
4.3 Historical evolution of MSWM legislation in Brazil and India 
Research carried out by Marielle Snel (1997) before the publication of the first Indian 
Waste Rules gives us some interesting insights into the early stages of waste 
management in India. She explains that, in the late nineteenth century, during the 
colonial period, there was little literature, apart from John Wallace (1893) and E. 
Ernest Freeman (1899), on sanitation in India; the issue did not interest the British 
administration until the Royal Sanitary Commission in 1873 drew attention to the fact 
that diseases such as cholera were killing some sixty nine out of every thousand 
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British soldiers annually (Snel, 1997: 39). Around the same time, a public awareness 
campaign, focused on water supply and waste, was launched after plague reappeared 
in 1868. From that moment, the government took a technocratic approach, based on 
the commission’s analysis, which provided instructions on how to manage solid waste 
from an expert point of view. The idea took hold that civilian surgeons or ‘executive 
officers of health’, modelled on the British Medical Office of Health, should take 
charge of sanitation (Snel, 1997: 41). To some extent, these characteristics have 
remained part of the Indian administration: for example, for a long period, health 
officers continued to collect the waste and throw it onto designated sites, inside or 
outside the cities, unaware of the environmental implications. Vaishali Nandan,21 
senior technical expert at Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
explains that even today, solid waste continuous to be treated as a street-cleansing 
issue, under the responsibility of the health section of the urban departments in the 
large majority of urban local areas (ULBs). Prashant Pandya,22 deputy director of 
MSWM of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), points out that 
Ahmedabad is today one of the very few cities in India with a specific department for 
solid waste management.23  
Rose George (2008) argues that Mahatma Gandhi was one of the few politicians of 
his time who discussed the oppressive practices of waste picking and cleaning latrines 
by Dalits (the ‘untouchable’ caste), advocating that each citizen take care of their own 
waste. Joshua Goldestein (2012: 338) explains that, during this period, the 
implementation of public services was always discriminatory, favouring ‘foreign 
                                                
21 Interview recorded (41’40”) in the headquarters of the GIZ in New Delhi on 9 April 2014. 
22 Interviewed at the AMC headquarters in Ahmedabad on 6 March 2014. 
23 The Manual on MSWM (MoUD, 2014: 60) suggests that health officers in MSWM should gradually be replaced 
by environmental or public health engineers. 
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enclaves and local elites’ and ignoring the ordinary native population. Thus, the 
inequity of colonial programmes, always justified by lack of funds and the difficulty 
of adopting health practices, served to aggravate prejudice. Goldestein (2012: 339) 
states that the ‘inability’ of native population to modernise was a common theme 
amongst colonialists and nationalist sanitary ideologues.  
The first policy, the Waste Nuisance Act 1911, enacted after the All India Sanitary 
Conference in Mumbai in 1911, established that municipal solid waste management 
was an obligatory responsibility of local civic authorities (Snel, 1997: 42). Yet, before 
independence, another law on environmental pollution, the Waste Act 1932 (Snel, 
1997: 28 and 38) was enacted. Post-independence, Snel (1997: 24) explains that, due 
to vertiginous population growth, the government gave more attention to large-scale 
economic projects, ignoring environmental legislation; it was only after a series of 
environmental disasters in the 1970s that the Indian government published the first 
environmental legislation: the Water Act 1974, Air Act 1981 and Environmental 
Protection Act 1986. In the 1980s, sanitation and solid waste management in India 
was linked to World Bank assistance programmes, such as the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade programme in 1981-90. 
Until recently, the solid waste generated by the Indian population was mainly organic, 
and nature ensured its decomposition (Goldstein, 2012: 329). The environment was 
able to absorb the small quantities of waste that were generated, and the common 
practice in rural areas was to dump it in the open, on compost heaps or in rivers. In 
the 1990s, however, due to increasing amounts of processed, packaged and disposable 
products, packaging started to litter the roadsides. 
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In Brazil, meanwhile, according to Marco Roza (2006: 77), official documents from 
the early eighteenth century show that the population was responsible for their own 
household waste. Ariovaldo Caodagilo and Roney Cytrynowicz (2012: 32) also state 
that, around this time, the first official documents of the São Paulo administration 
make it clear that the population should deliver the waste left after festivities to 
specific sites outside the city limits. As Gisele Machado (2011: 8) explains, domestic 
waste used to be stored in barrels inside residences and transported by slaves to be 
dumped in the rivers, wetlands and beaches of Rio de Janeiro. Around 1839, 
documents show that the street cleaning was carried out by black and mulatto 
prisoners (Roza, 2006: 78) – Miziara (cited in Caodagilo and Cytrynowicz, 2012: 32) 
explains that waste handling was associated with punishment. In 1850, after a number 
of epidemics, the Rio de Janeiro city authorities established that urban waste should 
be collected from the central urban areas, removed from the view of the bourgeoisie 
and sent to the Sapucaia landfill site on the outskirts of the city, close to the poorest 
neighbourhoods (Machado, 2011: 8). By 1869, São Paulo, which had reached some 
thirty thousand inhabitants, signed the first contract for urban cleansing with a private 
company. Meanwhile, the Municipal Posture Code ruled that the city authorities were 
responsible for the collection and final disposal of urban waste (Caodagilo and 
Cytrynowicz, 2012: 22), and about two decades later, in 1892, the process of door-to-
door collection began in Rio de Janeiro (Caodaglio and Cytrynowicz, 2012: 46).  
The ideal of cleansing public spaces, not only physically but also morally, was present 
in the hygiene reforms and the political discourse that accompanied the proclamation 
of the republic in 1889 (Coimbra, 2006). Moral degradation and poverty were 
characterised as an intertwined ‘epidemic’ by the scientific Brazilian elites, who 
claimed they had no place in a hygienic, modern, civilised city. For example, in order 
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to solve the problem of recurrent yellow fever outbreaks, and influenced by the newly 
implemented urban renewal of Paris,24 the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Pereira Passos, 
enacted health reforms based on opening up large avenues, flattening the hills and 
enforcing sanitary measures (Machado, 2011: 8). In the mid-1960s, waste 
management in São Paulo city was privatised. According to João Gianesi Neto, vice 
president of the Brazilian Association of Solid Waste and Public Cleaning (ABLP), 
the first university faculty of sanitary engineering was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 
1966, and many of its graduates participated in the country’s sanitation projects.25 
In India, however, it was not until 2015 that Dr. Bindeshwar Pathak, who has 
campaigned for sanitary reforms and championed the cause of the Dalits since the 
1970s, proposed the creation of the Sulabh International University of Sanitation, the 
first university in India to be dedicated to research on sanitation. However, Pathak 
(cited in George, 2008) claims that, even until recently, few politicians wanted to be 
associated with issues such as sanitation, sewage and waste pickers. Nevertheless, 
influenced by his visions, the L N Mithila University, in the state of Bihar, included 
the subject on its curriculum in 2015 (TOI, 2015). 
The historical characteristics and debates mentioned above have influenced the 
performance of solid waste management in these two countries, and some have 
continued to be part of the practices in both countries up to today. 
 
                                                
24 A massive urban renewal programme was carried out in Paris by Baron Georges-Eugene Haussmann between 
1853-1870, during the reign of Louis Napoleon III. 
25 Interviewed at the ABLP offices in São Paulo on 10 October 2013. 
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Contemporary evolution of environmental legislation and MSWM processes in 
Brazil and India 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, and made clear by the previous 
subsection, solid waste management in these two countries was historically driven by 
public health concerns. From the 1970s and 1980s, when the need for environmental 
protection began to gain global traction following a series of major environmental 
disasters, which resulted in the first international meetings on the environment, the 
governments of Brazil and India started to take (almost coincidently) measures to 
address sanitation and waste management in their territories. 
Fig. 5 (below) shows a summary of the historical process, with the main recent 
environmental policies: the left vertical timeline shows a number of key facts and 
agreements taken at a global level; the other vertical timeline shows the policies 
linked to the issue of solid waste in the Indian context (left) and the Brazilian (right). 




Figure 5: Summary of the historical progress of environmental agreements at a 
global level and of legislation related to solid waste management in India and 
Brazil (Source: Author’s illustration) 




The era of international environmental policies began with the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Redclift, 1996). Thereafter, in the 1980s, 
the first legislation and governmental institutions dedicated to environmental 
protection emerged almost simultaneously in Brazil and India. The India-Stockholm 
Committee was born from the Conference and became the advisory group structuring 
the Indian government’s actions on the environment (Snel, 1997: 25). Following this, 
in 1980, the Department of the Environment was created and the first environmental 
policy, the Air Act, was enacted in 1981. In the same year, the National Environment 
Policy Act (Law 6,938/1981) was enacted in Brazil, establishing the National 
Environment System (SISNAMA), which set up the decentralised structures of 
environmental governance. Then, in 1985, the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment 
(MMA) and the Indian Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MoEF) were 
created, respectively (the latter replacing the existing Department of the 
Environment). Both central governments were thus empowered to enforce 
environmental protection.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that these two historical developments were 
completely separate; the two countries do not share any common interests in the 
subject or any working relationships. The main link is the evolution of the 
international environmental debate, legislation and jurisprudence, and the market for 
sustainable development (Sands, 2003: 26), as well as pressure by the UN to organise 
national structures to incorporate these international responses to environmental 
protection. Therefore, both countries were not acting proactively; reacting to 
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environmental incidents, they followed the legal framework available in the 
international arena.  
The Indian Environmental (Protection) Act (EPA) was enacted in 1986, two years 
after a number of major environmental accidents, such as those at the Mathura oil 
refinery in Uttar Pradesh, the Thal-Vaishet fertiliser plant near Mumbai and of course 
the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal (Snel, 1997: 241). Meanwhile, just two years 
later, in 1988, the Brazilian Constitution was enacted, with a specific chapter, Article 
225, dedicated to the environment. In 1989, India enacted the Hazardous Waste 
(Management and Handling) Rules. Then, driven by activists’ actions after the Surat 
plague, the MoEF published the Bio-medical and Municipal Solid Waste (Handling & 
Management) Rules in 1998 and 2000, respectively. In Brazil, also in 1989, Bill 354 
on healthcare waste was proposed in the Brazilian parliament, signalling the start of 
the process of formulating a national waste policy. Dumping waste in the open 
became an environmental crime in Brazil in 1981, with the Law of Environmental 
Crimes (Law 9,605: Art.34, § 2nd, V), which establishes penalties for pollution and 
damage to the environment. However, as the national waste policy was evolving too 
slowly, some Brazilian states began to enact their own waste legislation during the 
1990s (Abramovay et al., 2013: 47). This process is examined further in section 5.3.  
A global wave of decentralisation during the mid-1980s and 1990s paralleled the 
evolution of environmental governance. The Brazilian Constitution, drawn up in 1988 
after a period of centralised military rule (1964-1985), was influenced by this trend, 
and accorded local governments significant autonomy. According to the Constitution, 
the municipalities are responsible for the provision of basic public services. In 1993, 
the Indian government launched two significant decentralising reform acts: the 73rd 
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and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAA), giving new constitutional status to 
rural and urban local bodies, and stipulating (among other responsibilities) (Ruet and 
Lama-Rewal, 2009: 18, Singh, 2007: 4) the provision of public services (Article 
243W: 12th Schedule, 6). Thereafter, the issue of solid waste management became 
part of the global agenda, emphasised in the UN resolution, Agenda 21, which was 
launched during the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro, also known as Rio92. This 
document provides guidelines for sustainable development at national and local 
levels, and provides ground-breaking principles for environmental legislation, such as 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle (principle 16) and the ‘precautionary approach’ (principle 
15), and emphasising that successful sustainable development at a global level relies 
on local participation in decision-making and environmental management (principles 
10, 20, 21 and 22) (UNCED, 1992). These principles were integrated into the 
environmental legislative framework of both India and Brazil. For example, based on 
these international policies, Brazil enacted the City Statute in 2001 and the Master 
Plans and Agenda 21 in 2002. 
Both countries’ governments also launched national financial programmes to improve 
infrastructure, including sanitation and waste management in their strategies. The 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) is a significant urban 
modernisation scheme, launched by the Indian government in 2005, with estimated 
investments of USD 14.7 billion (Rs. 1,00,000 Crore) for a period of seven years and 
direct investment of USD 9.7 billion (Rs. 66,000 Crore) from central government 
(MoUD, 2014: 21). The project aims to improve urban infrastructure and basic 
services, with solid waste management as one of its priority themes. Meanwhile, in 
2007, the Brazilian government launched the second phase of its Growth Acceleration 
Programme (PAC), a strategic USD 872.3 billion (R$ 1.59 trillion) urban 
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infrastructure improvement programme, in which sanitation and solid waste 
management are regarded as essential elements. Following this process, Brazil 
launched its National Policy on Sanitation (Law 11,445) in 2007, and in 2008, India 
launched its National Urban Sanitation Policy (NUSP). 
Climate change topped the new global agenda, and has become one of the central 
priorities in international negotiations over the last two decades. In 1988, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established, and in 1992, the 
issue was discussed in the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) at Rio92. In 1997, both India and Brazil signed the Kyoto 
Protocol. These treaties and international instruments pressured countries to reduce 
their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, taking into account the fact that waste disposal 
has a major impact on climate change, mainly due to the large amount of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) and methane gases (CH4) released from dumpsites. On the brink of the 
Conference of the Parties (Cop15) in 2009, India launched the National Action Plan 
on Climate Change in 2008, and in 2009, Brazil launched its National Policy on 
Climate Change (Law 12.187) to manifest their commitment to Copenhagen. For 
example, the Brazilian National Plan (PNMC, 2008) and the National Policy on 
Climate Change (Law 12.187/2009) established voluntary reduction targets of GHG 
emissions of between 36.1% and 38.9% until 2020 (ICLEI, 2012: 12). 
The last decades have seen intense debates on solid waste management, strongly 
influenced by international organisations – the deficiencies of waste management in 
developing countries represents a promising market for the industrialised world: the 
majority of Brazil’s 5,569 municipalities, for example, need solid waste solutions. In 
2010, the Brazilian PNRS (Law 11.305) was enacted; around the same time several 
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existing Indian Waste Rules were reviewed. 26  Nowadays, these waste policies 
comprise concepts such as integrated solid waste management, a waste treatment and 
disposal hierarchy, and some sort of ‘extended producer responsibility’ (EPR) plan. 
With regard to the latter, the Indian EPR was introduced in the Plastic Waste (M&H) 
Rules 2011, while the PNRS proposed an alternative sectoral agreement on reverse 
logistics in Brazil, which is explored in section 6.3. 
Recently, in 2012, at Rio+20 UNCED, the subject was debated at the ‘Zero Waste 
Strategies and Actions towards Sustainable Cities’, one of five hundred fringe events 
at the conference. Among topics such as waste management, sustainable cities, green 
economics and poverty eradication, the Brazilian PNRS took a central position in the 
debate (UN, 2012). 
Last, but not least, waste reforms in both countries set extremely tight targets for 
implementation: Prime Minister Narendra Modi has expressed the aim of 
implementing waste reforms throughout India by 2019; while the Brazilian 
Parliament is discussing the extension of its deadline to close all the country’s 
dumpsites by 2021. 
These two foregoing sections have described the current situation of solid waste 
management in Brazil and India, and provided a historical background to the 
structuring of these practices. Ground-breaking documents, agreed as part of a global 
consensus and published alongside international conferences, have been crucial to 
promoting the political and economic agendas of these emerging economies; they 
                                                
26 The Hazardous, Bio-medical and Plastic Waste Rules were revised in 2010 and 2011. See Table 1 (section 3.4.2) 
for a compendium of all the main official documents on SWM published by the Indian government. 
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have had a significant influence on policy decision-making, contributing to changes in 
attitudes and practices concerning environmental issues and the provision of public 
services. In addition to the environmental legislation and the scientific and 
technological developments in waste management, the active participation of 
academics, activists, the business sector, the mass media and social movements has 
also pressured these governments into developing their practices. The following 
section discusses the recent waste reforms in Brazil and India. 
4.4 Service provision of municipal solid waste management in Brazil and India 
The following subsections describe the democratic institutions and federal 
arrangements for the implementation of waste management policies in India and 
Brazil, respectively. 
4.4.1 Policy framework on MSWM in India 
The waste reforms in India began after an outbreak of plague in the city of Surat in 
Gujarat in 1994. According to Snel (1997: 23), eighty-three people died and another 
5,905 were affected by the spread of the waterborne disease after flooding aggravated 
the problem of uncollected waste. In 1996, Almitra Patel submitted a public interest 
claim (PIL) to the Supreme Court against the Union of India and all its states 
(discussed more fully in section 6.4, p. 261). This PIL forced the MoEF to form a 
committee to study the problem and finalise the waste rules (GoI, 2014a: 6). In 2000, 
the MoEF codified the Municipal Solid Waste (Management & Handling) Rules, 
establishing that all cities and towns should enforce their implementation (MoEF, 
2000). The MSW Rules 2000 were accompanied by a detailed Manual on Solid Waste 
Management, prepared by the Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering 
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Organisation (CPHEEO), under the oversight of the Ministry of Urban Development 
(MoUD), with a comprehensive set of mandatory guidelines for the implementation 
of the Rules in every ULB in the country (MoUD, 2000). According to the Rules’ 
Schedule I (MoEF, 2000: 5), the deadline for implementation was set as December 
2003. However, in 2003, the majority of the cities had not even started the process, a 
fact that was confirmed again in 2011. In 2013, after more than a decade, a report by 
the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB, 2013: 5) identified that hardly any city in 
the country was able to provide door-to-door collections to all their residents, and that 
the majority of the waste, once collected, was dumped in the open. 
India has separate sets of guidelines for different types of waste (municipal solid, bio-
medical, hazardous, plastic and e-waste). Subba Rao, director of the Ministry of 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC),27 explains that the Indian 
Waste Rules are not acts, but subordinate legislation, under the Environmental 
(Protection) Act (EPA 1986).28 Such legislation29 comprises rules formulated by 
government departments entrusted with the legislative power to draw up regulations 
on specific matters. As John Carey and Matthew Shugart (1998: 13) explain, the 
subordinate legislation does not have the same status as a law; rather, these rules are 
executive decrees, establishing guidelines for the formulation of state policy across 
the country. According to the EPA 1986, Articles 23, 25 and 26, the MoEFCC is the 
government body vested with the legislative power to draw up rules to protect and 
improve the environment.30 Although solid waste management is part of public health 
                                                
27 In 2014, the MoUF was renamed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate (MoEFCC). 
28 Interviewed at the MoEFCC headquarters in New Delhi, 9 April 2014. 
29 Parliament of India. Available online:  
http://www.mpa.nic.in/mpa/Manual/Manual_English/Chapter/chapter-11.htm 
30 EPA 1986. Available online at: http://envfor.nic.in/legis/env/env1.html 
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and sanitation, as specified in the State List II (item 6) of the Constitution of India, the 
regional states’ legislatures have exclusive powers to legislate on any of the matters 
enumerated in List II under their jurisdictions. However, according to the Janaagraha 
Report (2012: 5), many states have not yet enacted any waste policies, strategies or 
plans,31 despite the fact that (as mentioned earlier) the 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Acts (CAA), enacted in 1992, give constitutional recognition to rural 
administrations and ULBs, specifying their powers and responsibilities, including the 
provision of waste management services as a primary responsibility (GoI, 2014a). 
Table 11 gives a brief overview of the policy framework and the institutional structure 
of the main bodies responsible for the implementation of the MSW Rules in India. In 
the Indian federal structure, at central level, the MoEFCC has the power to set the 
legal framework and the MoUD provides financial support and coordinates policy 
implementation across the country. The state governments are responsible for 
preparing state and municipal policies and plans, enforcing the provision of policies in 
the cities and providing guidance and financial support for ULBs. The ULBs are 
responsible for the provision of public services to citizens at the local level. At city 
level, solid waste management service provision is the responsibility of the MoUD; in 
the majority of cases, this falls under a health department, and in a very few cases, a 
specific MSWM department (DEA, 2009: 1). Monitoring this implementation is the 
responsibility of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB): the ULBs monitor the 
local situation and report to the State Pollution Control Board (SPCB), which then 
                                                
31 MoUD (2014: 23) shows the example of the Karnataka State Policy on Integrated Waste Management, one of 
the few state policies enacted in the fifteen years since the MSW Rules. 
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reports to the CPCB. The MoEFCC is also responsible for monitoring the activities of 
the CPCB, SPCB and pollution control committees (MoUD, 2014, 32). 
Table 11: Policy framework and executive bodies responsible for the 





Constitution of India and 73rd and 
74th AAC 
Environmental Protection Act, 
1986 
National Urban Sanitation Policy, 
2008 
Waste M&H Rules 
Ministry of the Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change 
Ministry of Urban 
Development 
Central Pollution Control 
State State policy 
Ministry of Urban 
Development and State 
Pollution Control 
Municipal Local policy Urban local body 
Source: Author’s illustration 
Even government officials, however, criticise this complex bureaucratic structure, 
which inevitably leads to a lack of coordination between the different ministries and 
departments; added to which, the hierarchical culture in the bureaucracy prevents any 
cohesion between the efforts of civil servants from different departments. A civil 
servant (who requested anonymity) claims that: 
There are always parallel things being done at separate venues with 
separate agendas. The primary focus is the same, but operating at different 
times. There is no connection within the ministries and this characteristic 
can be extended to the industry and the NGOs too. 
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In 2015, in order to alleviate the financial constraints of the ULBs, the Indian 
government launched the Jawharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JnNURM) (mentioned earlier). This is a large national investment programme of 
USD 22 billion (Rs. 145,816 crores) to improve urban infrastructure and public 
service delivery (MoUD, 2014a: 21). It covers sixty-five selected cities (58% of the 
Indian population) over seven years, with waste managements as one of the 
requirements. There are other central government financial schemes to assist the sub-
national governments. For example, the 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) for the 
improvement of infrastructure for urban water supply, sewerage and sanitation aimed 
to achieve 100% household coverage of solid waste management services, funded by 
investment of USD 334 million (Rs. 2,212 crores).32 In all these schemes the national 
government aims to attract private investment through public-private partnerships to 
increase financial capacity and build infrastructure, making Indian cities more 
attractive to investors in order to sustain economic growth. Despite improvements in 
the more developed cities and metropolises, some critics (Kundu and Samanta, 2011: 
63, Sivaramakrishna, 2009) argue that JnNURM has failed to address the problems of 
the urban poor, privileging instead capital and real-estate investment. 
Due to the unsustainable sanitary conditions in the country, in the first year of his 
mandate, Prime Minister Modi launched the ‘Clean India Mission’ (SBA),33 as one of 
the priorities of his government. The plan covers 4,041 statutory towns – urban 
centres with a local body such as a municipality, corporation or municipal committee 
(MoUD, 2014a). The MoUD is in charge of implementing measures to eliminate 
                                                
32 The Indian government has also allocated financial support to ULBs through the 12th Financial Commission 
grants – USD 368 million (Rs. 25 billion) to improve SWM – and the 13th Financial Commission grants – USD 12 
billion (Rs. 87,519 crores) for training and capacity building (MoUD, 2014: 32). 
33 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in Hindi. 
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defecation in public and construct household, community and public toilets; promote 
public awareness campaigns to change sanitary behaviour; and improve the capacity 
of ULBs to provide waste management services and eradicate waste ‘scavenging’ 
(MoUD, 2014a: 5) within five years. The SBA is both a programme and a 
communications campaign, published by the MoUD. As part of this new national 
strategy, the Municipal Solid Waste Rules were amended in April 2016. 
Apart from the committee of experts in the ministry responsible for the Waste Rules, 
the Indian Parliament has also nominated the Standing Committee on Urban 
Development, comprising representatives of the Lok Sabah (House of Commons) and 
Rajya Sabah (House of Lords), to assist the politicians with information and oversee 
the actions of the executive on behalf of the Parliament and all citizens.34 In addition 
to the MoEFCC and the MoUD, other government bodies have published a series of 
reports on the issue of solid waste management. Table 1 (section 3.4.2) provides a list 
of the main rules and reports published by the government. Also, institutions such as 
the Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering Organisation (CPHHEO), 
the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), the National Institute of Urban Affairs 
(NIUA) and the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), 
among others, contain highly qualified experts, who provide the government with 
information. In addition, the National Urban Information System (NUIS),35 within the 
MoUD, has a town-level urban database, which provides information to agencies 
concerned with urban infrastructure planning across the country. This operates on two 
platforms: the Urban Spatial Information System (USIS) and the National Urban Data 
                                                
34 For other standing committees on solid waste, see the 186th Report on MSW (M&H) Rules 2000 (Rajya Sabha) 
and the 38th Report on MSW (Lok Sabha) of the Standing Committee on Urban Development, 2009.  
35 National Urban Information System, available on [http://moud.gov.in/nuis]. Its access is not open to the general 
public, restricted under the Rights to Information Act (RTI). 
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Bank and Indicators (NUDB&I). Despite the deficient monitoring of municipal solid 
waste management, all these documents show that there is an extensive literature 
inside government itself about the issue in India. 
4.4.2 Policy framework on MSWM in Brazil 
The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 has an exclusive chapter dedicated to the 
environment (Article 225). The legislation establishes that subjects of national interest 
such as sanitation must be treated as federal law, and that the municipalities are 
responsible for the delivery of public services (Art.30, V). According to Arnaldo 
Jardim and José Valverde (2012: 671), the history of the National Policy on Solid 
Waste (PNRS) begins in 1989, one year after the enactment of the Constitution, when 
the draft of Policy Bill 354 on healthcare waste was submitted to the Senate, then in 
August 2010, after more than twenty years of proceedings, the PNRS (Law 12,305) 
was finally sanctioned by the National Congress. Thereafter, just four months later, it 
was made law via Decree 7,404 in December of the same year, receiving emergency 
treatment by the executive. Section 5.3 explores this internal governmental 
proceeding in detail. Alongside this process, the legislative branches at regional level 
started to legislate on the matter – the states have competence to legislate for their 
territories in the absence of a national policy – beginning with Rio Grande do Sul in 
1993 (Law 9,921 and Decree 38,356/1998) and Paraná in 1999 (Law 12,493 and 
Decree 6,674/2002, among others) (Jardim and Valverde, 2012: 658).  
Table 12 (below) shows a brief overview of the policy framework and the institutional 
structure of the main bodies responsible for the implementation of the PNRS. The 
Constitution (Article 24) establishes the concurrent competences of the central, state 
and municipal authorities to legislate on environmental protection and pollution 
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control, and the PNRS sets specific competences within the federal government, states 
and municipalities to legislate and enforce the law. The federal legislative branch is 
responsible for setting national policy, the states can add supplementary legislation, 
while the municipalities are only competent to legislate on local matters. 






Federal Constitution of 1988 
National Policy on the 
Environment, 1981 
National Policy on Sanitation, 2007 
National Policy of Solid Waste, 
2010 
Ministry of the Environment 
State State policy 
State Secretary of the 
Environment 
State Environmental Agency 
Municipal Organic law City statute 
Secretary of the Environment 
Municipal Authority on Cleansing 
Source: Author’s illustration 
The PNRS is part of a larger institutional policy framework and is coordinated with 
several other policies and government institutions. The National Environmental 
System (SISNAMA), introduced by the National Environment Policy (6,938/1981), 
establishes the decentralised actions and responsibilities on environmental 
management shared between central government, its departments and its subnational 
agencies. Within this structure, the Environmental Policy also introduced the National 
Council on the Environment (CONAMA), a collegiate body responsible for 
deliberations on national environmental issues. Cristiana Losekann (2012: 190) 
explains that, albeit access to this body is limited to those representatives deemed 
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legitimate, its deliberations are the result of an extensive participatory debate. She 
explains that its plenary is composed of several government representatives (central, 
state, municipal), the public prosecutor, deputy chamber members, representatives 
from the private sector and twenty-two representatives of civil society associations, 
including representatives of indigenous peoples, rural workers, labour unions and 
environmentalists (Losekann, 2012: 190). She claims that, although CONAMA 
demands a high level of institutionalisation of civil society, the deliberations are very 
democratic. 
In the case of the PNRS, however, the central government is still responsible for 
setting national policy and producing a national plan and programmes to assist the 
sector, with the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) as the national government body 
responsible for the planning, coordination and control of implementation. The states 
are responsible for the coordination and formation of consortia and programmes of 
regional interest, and each state has different technical executive bodies responsible 
for managing the implementation and monitoring of environmental compliance. At 
the local level, the structure of implementation varies: major cities and state capitals 
have specific departments for cleansing and solid waste management, and a 
secretariat of the environment, while in medium and small towns, when they have the 
personnel and infrastructure, waste management is delegated to a specific department 
or engineers in charge of public works. The municipalities are responsible for 
organising environmental zoning and the monitoring and provision of public services. 
Also, specific laws, such as the Organic Law, Agenda 21 and the Statute of Cities, 
regulating the procedures at the local level. According to SNIS (2015: 9), the majority 
of Brazilian municipalities (93.5%) provide direct public administration, with specific 
departments or secretaries responsible for MSWN, followed by indirect 
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administration through state-owned companies (3.5%), autarchies (autonomous public 
entities in the municipality) (2.3%) and 1% of mixed-ownership companies (SNIS, 
2015: 9). There has been an increasing delegation of contracts through outsourcing 
MSWM services to the private sector. 
In order to access the federal financial resources allocated to solid waste management, 
the law requires that the authorities at all levels of government (municipalities, 
municipal consortia, micro-regions, metropolises, states, federal districts and federal 
government) submit their Integrated Plans for Solid Waste Management (ISWMP) 
(ICLEI, 2012: 29). These plans help the government to gather information for the 
National System of Information on Sanitation (SNIS) in order to map a picture of 
waste-related activity in the country. The PNRS establishes guidelines, targets and 
instruments, with specific obligations assigned to government, industries and society. 
As a law, it follows the trend of current legislation in industrialised nations, 
incorporating approaches to address climate change, the waste-recovery hierarchy and 
principles such as prevention and precaution: the ‘polluter pays’ and the ‘protector-
receiver’ principles (Article 6). 
The value of solid waste is recognised in the PNRS: the legislation differentiates solid 
waste and refuse – waste has social and economic value, and only refuse, after it has 
exhausted all treatment and recovery possibilities, can be disposed of in landfills 
(PNRS, 3rd, XV). Municipal solid waste management, therefore, is expensive and 
demands scale. However, Sérgio Gonçalves (2012: 42) explains that 90% of the 5,565 
cities in Brazil have less than 100,000 people, making solid waste management 
economically unsustainable. In order to reduce costs and gain economies of scale, the 
legislation has interlinked activities with the Public Consortia Law (11,107/2005), 
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which empowers mayors of neighbouring cities to develop collaborative projects for 
the provision of public services. According to the SNIS (2015: 2), in 2013, there were 
166 municipal consortia established for the provision of waste management services, 
involving 1,846 municipalities across the country, which means that one third of the 
country’s municipalities participate in consortia. Thus, the PNRS defines mechanisms 
for the operational and financial sustainability of the waste management processes. 
The law provides lines of credit, incentives and tax regulations aimed at improving 
the system. Financial institutions have developed special credit lines for the 
elimination of dumps, improvement of waste-management services and promotion of 
the recovery of value from waste. Incentives are also available for research into clean 
technologies, environmental management systems and commercial activities aimed at 
improving productive and recycling processes. The government, therefore, provides 
several financial incentives aimed at attracting interest group investment in waste 
management policy implementation. 
In the case of waste pickers (catadores),36 one of the key features of the PNRS is the 
recognition of solid waste as an economic good of social value, generating income 
and encouraging citizenship. This recognition has entailed prioritising the inclusion of 
catadores’ cooperatives in recycling and reverse-logistics programmes: for example, 
municipal contracting of cooperatives is exempt from competitive bidding processes 
(Article 36). The government seeks to create 600,000 jobs through the social and 
economic inclusion of waste pickers in the waste-management sectors (Freitas and 
Fonseca, 2011: 57). The law also provides lines of credit and tax incentives for 
                                                
36 In Brazil, waste pickers are called catadores of reusable and recyclable materials, according to the Brazilian 
Occupation Classification (CBO) of the Ministry of Labour and Employment. 
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projects that enhance the consolidation of cooperatives, such as the development of 
new technologies, equipment and innovative techniques. 
The effects of these new approaches are currently unfolding in Brazil, with the active 
participation of interest groups and through debates at business fairs and conferences 
and in publications. However, the policy proposes bold reforms that require the 
coordination of several sectoral institutions, and the involvement and efforts of public 
administrations, the private sector, civil society, catadores’ cooperatives and citizens. 
Brazil is a huge country, with many regional and cultural differences that inevitably 
generate difficulties in the implementation of the law. Although the PNRS has been 
well accepted by the majority of local governments and interest groups, the 
government has been severely criticised for its delay in putting the legislation into 
practice. First, the PNRS has been waiting for approval in the MMA for more than 
five years, and secondly, some sectoral agreements on reverse logistics involve 
endless negotiations without clear solutions for agreements between the government 
and some industrial sectors. At the moment, the deputies are analysing the Senate’s 
proposal to amend the PNRS and postpone the deadline to close all the country’s 
dumpsites (Câmara, 2015). Neither the municipalities nor the federal districts were 
able to achieve this second target (September 2014) established by law. Bill 2289/15 
has set new deadlines for local governments to close their dumpsites that vary 
according to the different sizes of the cities, ranging from July 2018 for metropolitan 
regions to July 2021 for municipalities with less than fifty thousand inhabitants. These 
results show a mismatch between the central government’s objectives, the actual 
capacity of local governments and the interests of the business sector, posing 
enormous challenges for the implementation of the PNRS. 
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Section summary  
There has been a one-decade gap between India’s Waste Rules in 2000 and Brazil’s 
waste policy (PNRS), enacted in 2010, and during this time, several international 
standards on pollution and new technologies have evolved. Thus, the new MSW 
Rules 2016 have improved on several aspects of the previous MSW Rules 2000, and 
can be better compared with the later Brazilian PNRS. Both laws apply contemporary 
strategies adopted worldwide in the most advanced countries’ legislatures, such as 
adopting ‘integrated sustainable waste management’ policies, delegating 
responsibility for financial mechanisms to support subnational governments, and 
implementing the necessary measures and mechanisms to promote inter-municipal 
projects. The main difference between the two pieces of legislation is the fact that the 
PNRS is one main policy, which serves as the basis for all types of waste,37 setting 
regulations for sectoral agreements for reverse logistics that address different types of 
waste.38 Brazilian policy also includes the content of Decree 7,404, which regulates 
the law and expands the policy, developing how the executive will put the legislation 
into practice. The Indian legislative framework, on the other hand, divides the 
legislation according to different types of waste. Therefore, in addition to the MSW 
Rules, there are also specific laws for plastic, hazardous, bio-medical and e-waste. In 
this manner, these rules appear to be more concise, particularly in terms of local 
government implementation. However, an extensive Manual on MSWM, published by 
the MoUD, compensates for this brevity: it expands the knowledge on solid waste 
                                                
37 This is with the exception of radioactive refuse.  
38 In distinction to the European Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) model, Brazil has adopted shared 
responsibility for waste generation along the chain of the product’s life cycle, relying on a series of sectoral 
agreements with productive sectors. 
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management, covering most of the topics in detail, even those not addressed in the 
Waste Rules.  
Another key conceptual difference between these policies is the fact that the PNRS 
recognises the economic value of waste, separating waste from refuse. The ultimate 
goal of both policies is similar, based on the segregation of waste at source, and the 
promotion of recycling and waste recovery to minimise landfill; however, the 
recognition of the value of waste leads to different outcomes. The Indian legislation is 
primarily an environmental and managerial policy, with specific responsibilities for 
waste generators and authorities, while the Brazilian waste policy (despite a number 
of criticisms) has married technical and social aspects by providing mechanisms for 
the socioeconomic inclusion of waste pickers in the waste management system. This 
difference has had a strong impact on conditions in the informal sector. In India, by 
contrast, all the evidence points to the fact that the informal sector has been neglected 
since the Waste Rules 2000. The 2016 rules have improved the process; however, 
critics claim that it is still not enough, and there is a lack of clear measures and 
mechanisms to guarantee waste pickers’ inclusion in the process. The PNRS and its 
Decree (7,404), meanwhile, clearly define the role of catadores in the Brazilian waste 
management system, and establish clear mechanisms for their socioeconomic 
inclusion. These differences have strong implications for interest group participation 
in policy decision-making in both countries, an issue that will be scrutinised in depth 
in section 7.5.  
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the complexity of public service provision and its 
institutional arrangements (the policies and government bodies) in Brazil and India. 
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As such, it contributes to the study of how the relationship between public and private 
agents has evolved over the course of the development of public sanitation in these 
countries, and why this relationship takes the forms it does. The chapter, therefore, 
investigated the inheritance of the historical relationship between public and private 
agents in the waste management sectors. To some extent, these earlier practices have 
influenced current interest group activities: in Brazil, private contractors and public 
administrators have a long tradition of collaboration in the management of urban 
problems; in India, the definition and monitoring of such problems have always been 
the exclusive preserve of experts and the bureaucracy at central and state levels.  
As Kennedy Loraine (2009: 72) explains, in India, the privatisation of public services 
at the local level is still not a significant factor, and as a result, there are a variety 
local experiments in progress in the various sectors. For example, budgetary 
constraints and widespread deficiencies in the supply of public services are perceived 
as the failure of the local authorities, and this has led residents (and their associations) 
to shift towards subcontracting low-skilled private bodies to provide these services. 
However, the poorest members of the population lack the resources to pay for these 
outsourced services (Kennedy, 2009: 73). P. U. Asnani (2008: 170) explains that the 
capacity to outsource the delivery of waste management services and to monitor their 
implementation has, for this reason, always been limited. Although the arrangements 
vary greatly in character across the country, the contracts are generally awarded to 
small entrepreneurs and NGOs, which are labour-intensive and fragmented: they 
employ cheap, often unskilled labour and lack the capacity to manage the waste of an 
entire city. The chapter drew attention to the fact that although individuals like 
Almitra Patel and Bindeshwar Pathak have dedicated their lives to demanding better 
public services for the whole population, many politicians in the past have avoided 
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linking their names to sanitation policies – possibly due to cultural beliefs. Research 
by Marielle Snel (1997) and documents from the Rajya Sabha (the lower house of 
parliament) show that sanitation has always been the domain of committees of 
experts; it took a series of environmental crises and energetic judicial activism before 
the government was forced into regulating the sector. Current higher rates of urban 
waste collection, therefore, are the result of the efforts of administrators who have 
tried to tackle India’s historical sanitation problems. 
In Brazil, on the other hand, the links between municipal administrations and public 
health experts have earlier origins. The chapter recounted how the first outsourcing of 
municipal solid waste management, with the provision of door-to-door collections in 
the city of São Paulo, dates from the late nineteenth century, while the first University 
of Sanitation and Public Health was established in the late 1960s (Caodagilo and 
Cytrynowicz, 2012). It also revealed that, over the years, many sanitarians and public 
health experts have assumed public office in Brazil, including mayoral positions in 
the major cities. 
International agreements on the environment 
The chapter also took into account the almost simultaneous impact of international 
agreements and environmental legislation on the national legislative frameworks of 
both countries. These laws and agreements introduced environmental principles that 
transformed public attitudes towards natural resources, engendering an increasing 
social acceptance that solid waste is one of the main sources of environmental 
degradation (Sands, 2003). International environmental legislation thus empowered 
concerned citizens, interest groups and the judiciary to demand state action (discussed 
more fully in section 6.4). It also brought a myriad of new actors into the political 
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process, and the state subsequently became an institutional arena of conflict and 
negotiation over the issue (Sands, 2003). In Chapter 7, section 7.4 discusses in detail 
the results of globalisation, due to which, environmental problems and their proposed 
solutions cross national borders, and in the process, strengthen the hand of foreign 
lobbying organisations in national government decisions. 
Differences between ‘law-making’ and ‘rule-making’ procedures 
The chapter went on to ask how the presidential system in Brazil and the 
parliamentary system in India differentially affect interest group activities and citizen 
participation. Both provide opportunities for participation; however, there are wide 
variations in the policy design and decision-making processes adopted in each 
specific polity. The Brazilian and the Indian decision-making processes take distinct 
forms. The Brazilian PNRS was formulated by the legislative branch of government, 
which meant that the ‘law-making’ was decided on in Congress by elected political 
representatives; the Indian Waste Rules, however, were published by the executive, 
which meant that its ‘rule-making’ was conducted by ministerial decree and decided 
on by unelected bureaucrats (Golden, 1998: 246). Both proceedings are legitimately 
democratic. As Scott Furlong and Cornelius Kerwin (2004: 354) stress, in the rule-
making process, public participation is crucial to ensuring the procedure is 
democratic, since the rules are formulated by politically appointed public servants, 
invited experts and consultants. In the case of the Indian Waste Rules, participation is 
guaranteed by a mandatory period of ‘public notice’, when the bill is uploaded onto 
the web page of the government agency concerned and open to comments from the 
public. These two models provide distinct institutional spaces for interest group 
participation in government decisions. 
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Although, the term ‘public participation’ infers the inclusion of the citizen in the 
political process, it also allows more pluralist interest groups, often with 
disproportionate social and economic power, to participate in the political debate. The 
next chapter discusses how public participation has been established in the legislation 
and how interest groups have participated in the decision-making processes of waste 
reform in both India and Brazil. 
 Chapter 5 Public Participation as a Legal Concept 
5.1 Introduction 
While the last chapter discussed some of the key differences that characterise the 
politics of the management of solid waste in Brazil and India, this chapter extends the 
investigation by exploring the distinct ways in which public participation in these 
countries’ waste reforms has been designed, its impact on their decision-making 
proceedings, and the main players involved. The chapter argues that it has been 
implemented strategically in both contexts, but that each process possesses a distinct 
political purpose. 
In order to analyse the role interest groups play in these political processes, the 
chapter investigates how public participation is conceptualised in law. It looks at the 
decision-making processes involved in these sectoral policies from the perspective of 
public participation, exploring how and why it has been implemented, and who has 
benefited. Although the literature review has shown that interest groups employ 
various formal and informal strategies in their attempts to influence policy decisions, 
their actions need to be contextualised by the particular political and legislative 
frameworks in which they are embedded (Cornwall, 2004: 9). The chapter, therefore, 
discusses the democratic basis for public participation in each country in order to 
reveal who comprises the ‘public’ participating in these processes and the impact of 
their activities on policy outcomes.  
The decision-making proceedings determine how individuals and groups participate 
in policy formulation; the decisions agreed in these processes shape the sectoral 
practices in each country. By analysing the proceedings, this chapter contributes to an 
understanding of how these processes are implemented and why they assume distinct 
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configurations according to their different political contexts. This theme – the 
practices of public participation in the sector and the consequent activities of interest 
groups – is enlarged on in the following chapters.  
The chapter is divided in two main parts. The first section explores how participation 
was conceived of in two specific moments of waste reform in India: the Indian Waste 
Rules 2000 (and its amendment in 2016) and the Clean India Mission (SBA), 
launched in 2014. The second section analyses public participation in the context of 
the decision-making process of the Brazilian National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS). 
5.2 Interest group participation in the decision-making process in the Indian 
MSW Rules and the Clean India Mission 
According to official documents and the testimony of groups involved in the debate 
on solid waste management in India, the decision-making process of the successive 
Indian MSW Rules, from 2000 to 2016, has been for the most part conducted at the 
central level, and is essentially a top-down process. This means that the policy 
decisions have been taken by high-ranking officials and invited experts, with little 
institutional space for public participation. This technocratic approach has influenced 
the contents of the policies and impacted the engagement of interest groups in the 
solution of problems related to waste management. 
Although most of the literature shows that the current Indian solid waste legislation 
began in 2000 with the publication of the MWS Rules by the Ministry of the 
Environment and Forests (MoEF), the archives of the legislative branch in the Lok 
Sabha (the lower house of parliament) and the Rajya Sabha (the upper house) reveal a 
history of extensive debates on sanitation and solid waste issues. Well before the 
publication of the first MWS Rules, parliamentarians were questioning the ministries 
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about different problems caused by deficient waste management services; for 
example, the risk of aircraft colliding with birds as a consequence of waste dumping 
near airports (RS, 1986); the conversion of waste into energy at the incinerator plant 
of Timarpur in Delhi, the first to be installed in India (RS, 1987); and the privatisation 
of urban public services (RS, 1992). However, the major concern of parliamentarians 
was the spread of epidemics and the risk of outbreaks of plague, resulting from poor 
or non-existent waste collections in several cities (RS, 1978). In general, the 
ministries appeared to answer these kinds of questions by stating that, according to 
the Indian Constitution, solid waste and sanitation were state affairs, and the National 
Waste Management Council (NWMC), under the MoEF, was studying the problem. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 (section 4.3), in 1996, after the plague in Surat, Almitra 
Patel, who had been lobbying bureaucrats for several years to outlaw the dumping of 
waste on open ground and adopt eco-friendly waste management practices, filed a 
public interest litigation (PIL) at the Supreme Court against the central government, 
the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), and all the states and municipal 
governments (Patel, 2006), discussed more fully in section 6.4. The court, the 
petitioner and the government agreed to appoint a committee, headed by Asim 
Barman, to draw up a report. The final report was submitted in March 1999, and in 
October 2000, the MoEF published the MSW (Management & Handling) Rules 
(Rajamani, 2007: 297). In this case, it was the judiciary that put the management of 
waste issue firmly on the political agenda by ruling that the government should 
formulate national legislation to address the problem. 
The formulation and decision-making stages of the political process were delegated to 
an expert committee. The Asim Barman Committee, which consisted of seven top-
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ranking technocrats and the petitioner, held four regional workshops to present the 
results of their work. However, as Lavanya Rajamani (2007: 297) explains, because 
the Supreme Court had not set the guidelines, the decision about the participatory 
process was delegated to the members of the Committee. After interviewing some of 
the participants, Rajamani (2007: 297) showed that the formulation of the MSW 
Rules 2000 was basically a technocratic process. The Committee, for example, 
decided to restrict the attendance of NGOs. Ravi Agarwal from the NGO, Toxic Link 
(cited in Rajamani, 2007: 304), explains that local authorities were invited to the 
regional workshops, and in one of these events, international organisations also 
attended, but NGOs were not allowed to participate. Bharati Chaturvedi, director of 
the NGO, Chintan Environmental Action and Research Group (cited in Rajamani, 
2007: 304), had to force her way into one of the events. She claims that the process 
was neither participative nor consultative, and that the recommendations of the 
Committee were ‘driven by the notion that “leaner municipalities and greater 
efficiency” would solve the problem of MSW management’. 
Debolina Kundu and Dibyendu Samanta (2011: 55) argue that, since the 1990s, the 
Indian government’s development reforms were intent on improving the urban 
infrastructure and governance of a few major cities. This process was boosted by the 
launch of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), when 
the central and state authorities turned their focus onto urban infrastructure. Despite 
the implementation of measures to improve infrastructure for the poor, the largest part 
of government investment has been directed at large metropolitan cities and the most 
developed states, which represent about 58% of the urban population (Kundu and 
Samanta, 2011: 55). The main objective of the urban development reforms is to create 
‘global cities’ with the potential to attract both domestic and international investment 
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and public-private partnerships (PPPs), since the government is not in a position to 
invest 100% in any sort of infrastructure (see section 7.3). One official, who requested 
anonymity, explains the rationale behind this policy: 
Any private agency, either domestic or international, would invest in Indian 
cities in a project which is cost-effective. Private players do not want to 
invest in a project which does not give returns. So this is the basic logic by 
which any agency would work. In order to give a boost to this, the 
government is creating the environment for investment in India. 
Urban development plans, therefore, have been directed at the most developed and 
industrialised areas, where real estate interests prevail, rather than addressing the 
poorer areas, thus increasing inequality (Kundu and Samanta, 2011) 
In 2014, activists in Delhi gained access to copies of official documents from internal 
MoEF meetings held between 1998 and 2013, which reveal that the committee 
discussing the MSW Rules was composed of twenty high-ranking officials and 
experts, and did not include any representatives of civil society. In the case of solid 
waste management in India, the lack of public participation in the decision-making 
process is aggravated when informal social groups are ignored by the legislature and 
local authorities, while some of the participants boast personal links with major 
corporate groups (see the discussion about ‘revolving door’ politics in section 6.5). 
Representatives of the most active NGOs in Delhi, Toxic Link and Chintam, confirm 
they were not invited to the discussions. 
In addition to the expert committees in the MoEF, the main agency responsible for 
setting the guidelines and monitoring the implementation of the MSW Rules, there are 
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other committees, task forces and audits investigating the issue and writing reports for 
the government on the financial and technological aspects of waste management. In 
the sixteen years since the publication of the MSW Rules 2000, several government 
departments have produced reports evaluating their outcome. The parliament has also 
set up a permanent Standing Committee on Urban Development, comprising members 
of the Lok and Rajya Sabhas, which is responsible for providing parliamentarians 
with information and overseeing executive actions. Following the recommendations 
of the 186th report of the Rajya Sabha Committee and several other official reports 
(MoUD, 2013, GoI, 2014a, CPCB, 2013), which state that the existing Rules are 
unable to solve the waste crisis, the MoEF Expert Committee began discussing the 
amendment of the MSW Rules 2000. 
One of the outcomes of the Expert Committee’s deliberations, the Draft Amendment 
Rules 2013, was published online for public consultation on the MoEF website for a 
period of sixty days. A written petition (WP (C) 46523), filed in the High Court of 
Karnataka by Leo Saldhana, a member of the Environment Support Group NGO in 
Bangalore, alleged the proposed amendment was opposed to segregation at source 
and, thus, was contrary to the principals of the MSW Rules 2000. The Amendment 
Rules 2013 were criticised because ‘waste collection without segregation at source’ is 
in the interests of some private waste operators. Recycling is a big industry in India: 
the economic value of waste is completely extracted by several informal players along 
the waste stream, leaving only valueless refuse. Waste without segregation halts the 
activities of the informal sector and facilitates the specific technologies of a few 
corporate operators. Given that an institutional space for debate and public 
consultation did not exist, the courts effectively became the only alternative for public 
participation. Fig. 6 (below) replicates the notice published by the MoEF in leading 
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newspapers inviting further ‘public comments and suggestions’, over a period of 
seventeen days, when the draft was re-uploaded at the request of the Court of Justice. 
According to activists who were in contact with Subba Rao, the chairman of the 
Expert Committee, it was intent on passing the bill before a new general election, but 
in addition to the public interest litigation (PIL), the Committee also received more 
than a hundred comments on the draft, and it was unable to revise the process before 
the elections in 2014. 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Public notice’ of the MoEF inviting comments and suggestions on the 
Waste Rules 2013. (Source: The Gazette of India) 
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Agarwal of Toxic Link explains that there is nothing wrong with this decision-making 
process, since the government can invite whoever it wishes to participate.39 In fact, 
sections 3, 6 and 25 of the Environmental (Protections) Act 1986, define the powers 
of the central government to appoint officers to plan and execute nation-wide 
programmes, lay down standards, and produce manuals and guides, notifying, if 
necessary, the official gazette. Proponents also claim that the experts involved in the 
process are the best qualified in the field. However, without the participation of 
interest groups and civil society, solid waste management becomes purely a 
government process, ignoring the fact that local governments have appeared unable to 
solve the problems of waste management over the last decades. The MSW Rules, 
therefore, represent solely the vision and objectives of those allowed to participate in 
the decision-making process. 
Some non-governmental bodies have evaluated the outcomes of the MSW Rules 
2000. The STEPS Centre’s research (Agarwal et al., 2015: 3) argues that Indian waste 
legislation is primarily environmental legislation, which means that their measures are 
essentially based on regulations and standards for waste management processes such 
as collection, transport, treatment and final disposal by specific bodies. This 
managerial approach reflects the views of the officials and experts involved in the 
formulation and implementation of policies – in this case, the MoEFCC and the 
MoUD, and urban development departments at municipal and state level. These 
researchers claim that this partial understanding of waste management ignores the 
health risks and social injustices associated with waste flow by dismissing the 
                                                
39 Interview recorded (42’59”) at the Toxic Link offices in Delhi, 9 April 2014. 
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involvement of different social groups along the informal waste chain, their 
movement of waste across the cities and their links with the formal waste 
management system. In addition, the implementation of certain processes and 
technologies may exacerbate these problems, leading to the displacement and 
marginalisation of social groups and aggravating conflicts between formal and 
informal actors (Agarwal et al., 2015: 5). 
What seems clear after interviewing a number of actors involved in waste 
management is the fact that bureaucrats and their invited experts are remote from the 
on-going debates and the social movements involved in the issue. During fieldwork 
for this research, I attended events organised around the issue, such as the ‘Exploring 
Pathways to Sustainability’ symposium, which fielded a specific panel on solid waste 
management (Fig. 7), and the ‘Khwahishein: Awareness Campaign for Waste-
Pickers’ seminar (Fig. 8), both of which were organised by Jawaharlal Nehru 
University and the STEPS Centre,40 as well as demonstrations called by the ‘Jantar 
Mantar’, the official website for social movements in Delhi (Fig. 9). In all these 
events, I observed a broad understanding of the waste problem in India. Furthermore, 
the experts’ decisions seemed very distant from well-known models of 
implementation such as the Seva Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit (SWaCH) and the Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) schemes, launched in collaboration with 
the municipal corporations of Pune and Ahmedabad, respectively. These, along with 
so many other actors and debates, are absent from the waste management decision-
making process. 
                                                
40 A joint research initiative between the Centre for Studies in Science Policy (CSSP), Jawaharlal Nehru University 
(JNU), and the Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability (STEPS Centre), University 
of Sussex, UK. 




Figure 7: ‘Exploring Pathways to Sustainability’ symposium at the JNU, India, 
10 February 2014 (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Figure 8: ‘Khwahishein: Awareness Campaign for Waste-Pickers’ seminar in 
Delhi, India, 16 March 2013 (Source: Author’s photo) 




Figure 9: A ‘Jantar Mantar’ demonstration, Delhi (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Ranjit Gadgil, programme director at Parisar, a civil society organisation involved in 
lobbying and advocacy for sustainable development, critiques the lack of citizen 
participation in the decision-making process:41 
It is not just the waste. We have been arguing that this is not the way to see 
public consultations in general. This is not a country of a million people; this 
is a billion[-people] country, where everyone has been affected by this 
[planning]. There is a lot of different people belonging to different segments 
of society, so consultations have to be more meaningful. You cannot put 
notes in English on the website and just say: “We invite suggestions and 
objections.” You have to go out and talk to people, meet NGOs, set up 
meetings everywhere across the country […] you have to go to small towns 
and villages and you have to involve all the stakeholders. And there is no 
                                                
41 Interview recorded (51’44”) at the Parisar offices in Pune, 28 March 2013. 
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such process whatsoever. Neither is the government particularly keen on 
implementing this process. So, when you don’t [carry out] such a process, 
what eventually happens is that the groups that have the most direct access 
to government are the ones that become more influential. I am sure they got 
inputs from large companies involved in waste management. I think this is a 
very biased, one-sided and unfair process. 
This non-participatory decision-making process, therefore, has generated a strong 
reaction, igniting protests against the government. For example, Myriam Shankar 
from the Solid Waste Management Round Table (SWMRT),42 an activist group 
devoted to increasing waste segregation at source and improving solid waste 
management in Bangalore, explains: ‘We, as representatives of civil society, 
participate by reacting against the measures imposed by the government; we do not 
have access to the conversations and individuals responsible for these measures inside 
the government.’ 
Probably because of the lack of a broad debate or of any input by interest groups from 
different parts of the country, the MSW Rules do not represent the reality on the 
ground. Therefore, until mid-2014, the whole decision-making process was marked 
by low levels of public participation, and this was reflected in the measures 
established by the government, which, as a result, have been unable to solve the waste 
problem. For example, the UN-Habitat report on MSWM in the world’s cities (2010: 
142) states that, despite the mention of recycling in the Indian Acts and Rules, the 
legislation does not recognise the informal sector’s role in the process. 
                                                
42 I interviewed Myriam Shankar, Neethu Peter, Sandya Narayanan and Rosario Anslem in a meeting of the 
SMWART in Bangalore, 1 April 2014. 
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Rajamani (2007: 306) states that the MWS Rules 2000 are ‘techno-legal’ rather than 
‘social-legal’: they treat the waste problem as a technical and managerial problem, 
promoting privatisation without taking into account the role of waste pickers in the 
recycling process. He claims that the MSW Rules 2000 ignore the poor, and there are 
no measures to improve waste pickers’ conditions and ensure their effective inclusion 
in the waste management system; nor do they provide mechanisms to promote 
recycling and waste minimisation at source. Yet, years later, activists claim that the 
proposed Amendment 2013 still only reflects the economic interests of private players 
by facilitating technologies such as incineration, which threatens other methods of 
treatment such as the segregation of waste and recycling.  
Unlike the approach of the central government, the city of Pune, however, has 
pursued a very different model over recent decades. This is a participatory model, the 
result of a historical process in the region, and is formed around participatory 
budgeting, the input of both industries and academics, and frequent consultation with 
interest groups involved in urban planning projects. However, Lakshmi Narayan, co-
founder of SWaCH, a world-famous Indian waste-pickers’ cooperative, claims that it 
has not been an easy process.43 Every new administration initiates a new set of 
actions, so achieving a successful historical process has required the establishment of 
a permanent channel of negotiation. Even Subba Rao, the director in charge of the 
Rules Amendment 2013, has admitted to never having visited SWaCH and SEWA in 
Pune and Ahmedabad, despite receiving a number of invitations, although he stated 
that he plans to visit in the future.44 This distance between politicians and social 
                                                
43 Interviewed in a park in Pune, 28 March 2014. 
44 Interviewed at the MoEFCC headquarters in Delhi, 9 April 2014. 
Public Participation as a Legal Concept 
203 
 
groups is one of the key differences between the Indian and Brazilian political 
processes. Finally, in early 2015, a parliamentary standing committee visited Pune, 
and its subsequent report suggests that, with the participation of SWaCH, the model 
should be applied to the whole country. 
At the local level, there are different schemes for public participation in urban 
development. The ‘Area Sabha’ was introduced by the Nagar Raj Bill in the 74th AAC 
to ensure citizen participation in governance, in addition to the JnNURM 
(Sivaramakrishna, 2009: 35). However, Agarwal et al. (2015: 6) claim that, 
unfortunately, public consultation for some larger waste management projects at the 
local level are designed to engage ‘minimal rather than maximum participation’. 
These authors state that the public hearing for the construction of the Okhla 
incineration plant in Delhi was held without properly notifying residents. Agarwal 
criticises these attitudes: 
They [the bureaucrats] are trying to create a ‘publicness’. This is 
problematic, because they occupy the public space. But you cannot produce 
that space. They occupy it for their own purposes. I think that, politically, it 
is a problem. (Agarwal et al., 2015: 6) 45 
Agarwal explains that sometimes his organisation, along with other activists and 
NGOs, are called on to participate in meetings promoted by government agencies and 
expert committees, but in fact their inclusion is simply used to legitimise the actions 
of the working groups. Another example that illustrates this idea of ‘creating 
                                                
45 Interviewed at the Toxic Link offices in Delhi, 9 April 2014. 
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publicness’ is the case of the National Consultation Programme promoted by the 
Indian government in 2015 (discussed more fully in Section 6.2). 
The media, however, has been actively involved in demonstrating that the waste issue 
is an important social concern. In 2014, the TV programme, Satyamev Jayate (Don’t 
Waste Your Garbage), hosted by Bollywood actor Aamir Khan, featured a debate 
with several leading figures, including Malati Gadgil and Lakshmi Narayan, founders 
of SWaCH Plus, scientist Dr. S. R. Maley, and Dr. Almitra Patel. The programme’s 
website received more than six million ‘actions taken’ and more than three million 
‘votes for change’ (Khan, 2014). There are also daily articles in the Times of India 
(Figure 10), the Hindustan Times and The Hindu on issues such as PPP schemes, 
protests against incineration plants and the lack of attention paid to the livelihoods of 
waste pickers. This media campaign intensified during the national elections in 2014. 
 
 
Figure 10: A Times of India article on the Okhla incinerator plant in Delhi 
(Source: Nandi (2014) 




As mentioned earlier, there are no measures for public participation or consultation in 
the existing MSW Rules 2000. The 2016 Rules, however, contain specific measures 
for public participation, establishing the duty of the MoEFCC to formulate rules and 
strategies on waste management with public consultation. According to new MoUD 
legislation (MoEFCC, 2016: Sec.6, b), local urban development departments must 
prepare a waste strategy ‘in consultation with stakeholders, including representatives 
of waste pickers’ (MoEFCC, 2016: Sec.11, a), and the urban local bodies (ULBs) 
have a duty to disseminate information through their websites, public workshops and 
public awareness programmes. 
Nevertheless, emerging alternative platforms have begun to engage interest groups in 
the process. The business sector has taken initiatives to bring together different 
players to discuss issues associated with solid waste management. Among these 
initiatives, in February 2014, the Indian Beverage Association (IBA), with the support 
of the Energy Research Institute (TERI) and Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), held a conference with representatives of waste authorities, 
the business sector, the recycling industry and waste pickers to discuss problems 
associated with packaged waste collection and recycling, and to propose a road map 
to implement a ‘shared responsibility model’ in urban centres.46 
In July 2014, the GIZ hosted a two-day workshop to receive feedback from interest 
groups on the draft of The Manual on MSWM.47 The manual was developed by an 
                                                
46 ‘Waste to Resource: Waste Management & Recycling’ conference, New Delhi, 12 February 2014. 
47 ‘National Workshop for Finalisation of the Draft Manual on Municipal Solid Waste Management’, New Delhi, 
24-25 July 2014. 
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expert committee in the MoUD, with the support of the German group, to update the 
existing manual released in 2000. This is one of the most participatory public 
consultations yet held in India, with more than 240 participants and representatives of 
government bodies, private sector companies, academia, international organisations, 
industries and NGOs. The manual describes this ‘stakeholder consultation’ for 
assessing the current situation and the planning, approval and evaluation of the MSW 
Plans (MoUD, 2014b: 113), and highlights the importance of public participation in 
‘information, education and communication’ (IEC), behaviour change and awareness 
campaigns. Shortly after this, in October 2014, the prime minister launched the Clean 
India Mission, which aims to engage the population in a massive campaign to 
transform social behaviour and attitudes to waste management.  
This section has shown that the limited opportunities for public participation in the 
formulation of the Indian Waste Rules has had implications for policy 
implementation. The following section explores the effect of the participatory process 
adopted by the Clean India Mission. 
5.2.1 The Clean India Mission48 
‘Sometimes, one individual makes the difference in India,’ says Anand Singh Bhal, an 
economic advisor at the MoUD. He explains that after an outbreak of plague in Rajkot 
in Gujarat in 1984, the municipal commissioner, Suryadevara Ramachandra Rao, 
acted efficiently by pulling together the entire system of people and finances in an 
effort to solve the problem that threatened to spread out of control.49 Twenty years on, 
                                                
48 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA) in Hindi 
49 Interview recorded (1:02’05”) at the MoUD headquarters in New Delhi, 12 March 2014. 
Public Participation as a Legal Concept 
207 
 
the city is a beacon of success in the history of solid waste management in India. 
Other cities in Gujarat, such as Ahmedabad and Surat, also present better 
performances than the rest of the country. Part of the national electoral success of 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 was due to the image of Gujarat, where he 
was formerly chief minister, as the ‘best state for business’ (Kumar, 2015). In October 
of the same year, a picture of Modi wielding a broom and sweeping a pavement in 
Delhi made headlines around the world. In his speech on the 68th Independence Day 
celebrations, the prime minister put sanitation at the top of the government agenda, 
launching the Mission (SBA). He pledged to commit 100 hours per year (two hours 
per week) in voluntary work so that the 150th anniversary of Gandhi’s birth in 2019 
could be celebrated with a ‘clean India’ (TOI, 2014). This kicked off a massive 
awareness campaign, involving celebrities and politicians, with several events across 
the country and a powerful marketing campaign to engage the population in a nation-
wide movement. After two weeks of much publicity and daily headlines in the Indian 
mass media, a new threat of conflict with Pakistan (Iyengar, 2015) diverted media 
attention, and the campaign receded in visibility. 
Since 2014, however, the SBA has opened up a new dimension of popular 
participation in the solid waste management process in India, with the potential to 
reverse the insanitary living conditions of majority of the population. Section 5.2 has 
explored the Indian Waste Rules as a legislative framework; this section, therefore, 
explores this new aspect of citizen engagement in waste management and its potential 
to solve the sanitation problems of the country. It first explores the historical context 
of India’s struggle to improve sanitation, then looks at a recent survey of the first 
results of the SBA campaign (published by the MoUD), and finally discusses some of 
the challenges India faces in achieving Modi’s goal. 
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Historical infrastructural challenges 
The SBA not only comprises a campaign, but also an action plan. The campaign itself 
is subdivided into two programmes: the MoUD is the ministry in charge of SBA-
Urban (SBA-U) implementation in urban areas, and the Ministry of Drinking Water 
and Sanitation (MoDWS) directs the SBA-Gramin (SBA-G) in rural areas. Parliament 
has also set up a specific Urban Development Committee to supervise the SBA-U and 
a Rural Development Standing Committee for SBA-G. The SBA seeks to put an end 
to public defecation, manual scavenging and serious sanitary constraints in a country 
where, according to the 2011 national census, 7.9 million households do not have 
access to toilet facilities (MoUD, 2014a: 3). The programme is aimed at increasing 
public awareness and motivating the population and local governments to adopt 
improved sanitation practices.  
The central government estimates that comprehensive sanitary solutions for all 4,041 
statutory towns – urban agglomerations with a municipal government, corporation, 
cantonment board or notified town area committee – will cost Rs. 62,009 crores (USD 
9.3 billion). This financial assistance will be divided into three main parts: Rs. 14,623 
crore (USD 2.2 billion) provided by central government, Rs. 4,874 crore (USD 735 
million) by the regional states, and the rest via private sector participation and market 
borrowing (MoUD, 2014: 5). Central government provides financial assistance of Rs. 
240 (USD 3.5) per capita to each city/town, according to population, and Rs. 12 (USD 
0.17) per capita to cover the cost of formulating the Detailed Project Report (DPR).50 
Solid waste management is one of the programme’s six components, alongside the 
                                                
50 Information provided via email by Prashant Pandya and Nishit Pandya (AMC) on 23 February 2016. 
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provision of public, community and household toilets, improvements in the capacity 
of ULBs to deal with the problem of sanitation, and campaigns of public awareness. 
In reality, the scheme is not a novel creation. According to research by the Police 
Research Institute (PRSIndia, 2015), an NGO that provides information about India’s 
legislative process, the government has been trying to solve the country’s sanitation 
crisis through a series of programmes for the last three decades: 
• In 1986, the government launched the first infrastructure-oriented programme 
providing sanitation facilities for rural families living under the poverty line – the 
Central Rural Sanitation Programme (CRSP); 
• In 1999, this programme was reformulated as the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), 
changing its strategy to a community-led and people-centred approach; 
• In April 2012, the programme was again re-launched, this time as the Nirmal Bharat 
Abhiyan (NBA), which aimed to achieve 100% sanitation for all of rural India by 
2022 (Kaliski, 2015: 76); 
• In October 2014, the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA) expanded the scope of the 
programme to cover all of rural and urban India, advancing the previous target from 
2022 to 2019, in order to accommodate its results with the prime minister’s term of 
office. 
Despite the improvements made since the 1980s, these plans and the massive 
investments they have generated have not been sufficient to solve the problems. In 
fact, an online media evaluation by PRSIndia (2015) demonstrates that the SBA’s 
meagre results were considered to be one of the main failures of Modi’s first year in 
office. The government was unable to deliver the economic growth promised during 
the campaign, and India’s declining infrastructure, low volume of exports and 
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disappointing stock-market performance compared badly with other Asian economies 
(Joshia and Ahmeda, 2016, Seetha, 2015). 
Furthermore, during 2015, the government came under attack from opposition parties 
and workers – a wave of strikes hit major cities across the country. Regular waste 
workers struck against lack of payment by the municipal corporations: in February, 
3,000 waste workers participated in violent protests against the Meerut Municipal 
Corporation (MMC); in June, after ten days of strike, 15,000 tonnes of waste were left 
uncollected on the streets in the eastern part of New Delhi; in July, 8,000 tonnes of 
waste were dumped on the roads of residential areas of the Greater Visakhapatam 
Municipal Corporation (GVMC); in September, the same happened in the Shimla 
Municipal Corporation (SMC)’s area (Bhatia, 2015, ET, 2015, Rao, 2015, Thakur, 
2015). The opposition Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the party of low-caste members of 
the population, including Dalits, also mobilised social movements in protest against 
Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Government opponents, such as Rahul 
Gandhi of the National Congress Party (INC), accused the BJP, the Aam Aadmi Party 
(AAP) and the East Delhi Municipal Corporation (EDMC) of causing the waste crisis 
in Delhi. As the SBA campaign had not achieved better results, the solid waste issue 
became the fuse for a conflagration of political battles. 
In October 2015, the headlines of the main Indian newspapers were dominated by the 
unsatisfactory results of the SBA. The Indian Express (Nair, 2015) showed that the 
results of the first year were lagging behind its targets, with only 20-25% of toilets 
installed, and with even worse results for waste management infrastructure. The 
Hindustani Times (Gupta and Kumar, 2015) reported that inadequate budgets, a lack 
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of capacity and ineffectual awareness campaigns, in addition to the private sector’s 
lack of enthusiasm, were the main obstacles hindering implementation on the ground. 
In February 2016, Minister of Urban Development Venkaiah Naidu announced the 
Swachh Bharat Survekshan, a survey ranking seventy-three of the cleanest Indian 
cities, which comprise about 40% of India’s urban population.51 The survey was 
commissioned by the MoUD and was conducted by an independent consultancy, the 
Quality Council of India (QCI, 2016). However, while even some of Modi’s political 
opponents still hope for the success of the SBA, the fact is that municipal solid waste 
management and sanitation have been chronic problems in India for decades and it is 
too early to celebrate any successful outcomes. Municipal solid waste does not simply 
disappear from the urban areas, rivers and dumpsites. The previous CPCB reports and 
academic research carried out over the last sixteen years since the publication of 
MSW Rules 2000 exposes the serious challenges ULBs face. 
#MyCleanIndia 
The SBA campaign was structured so as to engage the population in its 
implementation and to change social behaviour towards sanitation and waste 
management, employing the main media channels to spread the prime minister’s 
message to the whole country and to the rest of the world. Suddenly, waste lost its 
distasteful image, and newspapers and social media were full of news of celebrities 
sweeping the streets, Twitter messages and Facebook posts. By means of the 
                                                
51 Swachh Survekshan website: https://gramener.com/swachhbharat/ 
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ICleanIndia app 52  (Fig. 11), designed by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, 
everyone could participate, uploading before-and-after photos of their clean-up 
endeavours (TOI, 2014).53  #mycleanindia, the social media campaign, was designed 
to spread the message and to advertise the success of the SBA, involving the 




Figure 11: The app ICleanIndia (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
The internet campaign was considered a success. The SBA follows the same electoral 
strategy, based on direct communication with the electorate, that differentiated Modi 
                                                
52 Website: http://www.icleanindia.com 
53 Website: https://swachhbharat.mygov.in/view-activity-map 
54 Social media – Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/mycleanindia/;  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/mycleanindia;  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/hashtag/mycleanindia?lang=en-gb 
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from his political opponents. By July 2015, there were 5,267 users registered to the 
government website and 133,088 pictures had been uploaded. Today, social media 
and campaign’s websites are full of examples of voluntary initiatives of ordinary 
citizens cleaning passages, parks, train stations and other urban areas.55 However, 
Jessica Kaliski (2015: 149) questions the effectiveness of the campaign: her research 
reveals a lack of correlation between the regional location of app users and  improved 
sanitation in the most disadvantage areas. 
Public participation 
A few weeks after the launch of the SBA campaign, Naidu launched a further ‘Action 
Plan’, while in parallel to this, the MoEFCC prepared the Draft Waste Rules 2016. An 
interesting aspect of this campaign is the way public participation has been framed to 
‘catch the imagination of citizens’, to use Naidu’s expression (QCI, 2016: 4). Since 
the beginning, it has claimed that its success is only possible with citizen 
participation. However, in reality, the decision-making process follows the example 
set by the MSW Waste Rules, where experts make the decisions, and ultimately there 
is minimal popular participation in the design of the policies themselves. Some 
interviewees claim that the programme simply follows the pattern of previous top-
down schemes for major centralised infrastructure projects. Sandya Narayanan56 of 
SWMRT explains:  
The launch of the SBA led us to believe that the whole approach would be 
very participative, hands-on, an on-the-ground kind of exercise, and of 
                                                
55 Examples on social media: 
 https://www.facebook.com/ChakaChakBandra/videos/1502082526762598/?fref=nf 
56 Interviewed via email, 24 August 2015. 
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course it was a big hit, and mini Swachh Bharat campaigns instantly started 
up, all from the people, communities, etc. … The idea of a SBA is so welcome 
to the general public, they have adopted it as a concept, with high 
expectations of what it will deliver. 
Narayanan also criticises the experts’ approach to solid waste management: 
The SBA is a centralised funding process with the central government 
holding the financial strings to get the state governments to plan and invest 
in sanitation and SWM. The SWM guidelines are limited and rigid, and have 
no scope for any creativity, [even] going as far as to promote WTE [waste to 
energy], which is completely the antithesis of what citizen groups want. 
The Indian government has come to the realisation that without engaging interest 
groups in the process, the promised goals are unlikely to be achieved. Recently, the 
MoUD, with the support of the Federation of the Indian Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry (FICCI) and the GIZ, has organised debates in order to build a dialogue with 
interest groups – for example, the international workshop on ‘Extended Producer 
Responsibility in India: opportunities, challenges and lessons from international 
experience’ in May 2016, bringing speakers from other countries to discuss the 
implementation of ‘extended producer responsibility’ (EPR) in India. 
Green environmentalism  
The Swachh Bharat Survekshan survey (mentioned above) has been well received by 
the middle classes, many of whom aspire to cleaner urban centres, although without 
paying land taxes or ameliorating the plight of those who collect their waste. Kaveri 
Gill employs the term ‘bourgeois environmentalism’ to describe this phenomenon: 
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The middle and upper classes pursue ‘green’ environmental causes and push 
their own agendas of a visually pleasing and cleaner city, often at the 
expense of the marginalised, and disregard their pressing ‘brown agenda’ 
concerns, such as housing in slum settlements and work in the informal 
sector. (Gill, 2010: 219) 
Bharati Chaturvedi and Vinay Gidwani (2011: 136) also criticise the ‘bourgeois 
environmentalism’ that marginalises slum dwellers while benefiting the enclaves of 
the rich and promoting elite-driven demands and investments. These authors cite as an 
example the 2021 Master Plan for Delhi, which envisages a city free of slums (Puri, 
cited in Chaturvedi and Gigwani, 2011: 136), a project that aims to create a ‘world-
class city’ by excluding 40% of its residents.  
Waste pickers 
Research conducted by Manisha Anantharaman (2015), Ali (2015: 22), Gill (2010: 
239) calls attention to the stark divergence between the aspirations of the upper 
classes (‘green cities’ and business opportunities) and the perpetuation of the 
appalling conditions of the lower classes (the lower castes and waste pickers). 
Subhash Gatade (2015: 29) argues that the government’s simplistic propaganda has 
failed to address the complex, interlinked realities of cultural behaviour and 
sanitation. The editorial of the Economic & Political Weekly (2014), one of the most 
well-known academic journals in the country, argues that the SBA has failed to 
comprehend the reasons for ‘dirt’ in India.  
Several critics (Kumar, 2014, Teltumbde, 2014, Ali, 2015, Gatade, 2015) have raised 
the problem of the scant attention paid by the SBA campaign to crucial themes such 
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as the link between cleanliness and the caste system, and the rights of the 
marginalised social groups that comprise the informal sector. The government – at 
both central and local levels – has failed for decades to include waste workers in the 
MSWM system. Gatade also claims that the Hindu notion of dirt and impurity 
associated with the caste system, as well as the availability of a cheap workforce, has 
maintained the exploitation of the Dalit population. She stresses that without the 
labour of the waste pickers, Indian cities would grind to a halt; nevertheless, the 
government has continued to ignore their existence. Anand Teltumbde (2014: 11) also 
claims that the lack of sanitation in India has been assumed to be a problem of 
poverty, due to the lack of infrastructure. However, he argues instead that it is a 
cultural problem, a result of the caste system: ‘This culture externalises the 
responsibility of maintaining cleanliness to a particular caste. It stigmatises the work 
as unclean and the workers as untouchables.’ Gatade (2015: 29) argues that if social 
attitudes towards sanitation, and the servitude and marginalisation of lower-caste 
waste pickers, are not addressed, the worthy goals of the SBA may never be achieved. 
Teltumbde (2014: 12) agrees that ‘unless this caste culture is eradicated and people 
themselves internalise their responsibility towards cleanliness, no amount of 
campaigns is going to succeed’. 
The caste issue is reviewed again in section 7.5, which explores the inclusion of waste 
pickers in solid waste management. 
Section summary 
The SBA campaign has created a momentum unique in the history of sanitation in 
India, drawing the attention of society and politicians to the problem of sanitation. 
Many interviewees claim that before this campaign, it was common to hear that waste 
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management was not a priority: it did not win votes and no politician would associate 
their political image with waste and dirt, and the ordinary citizen was not worried 
about the amount of waste they generated, because once they dumped it outside their 
homes, they no longer considered it their problem. This perception has certainly 
changed amongst a section of the population; however, it seems that the technocratic 
approach of central government has shown little innovative capacity to take the 
campaign beyond the promotion of top-down, centralised financial schemes and 
propaganda machinery, and produce concrete measures to address the reality of those 
working formally and informally in the waste management sector. India’s history of 
successive series of nation-wide government programmes and large infrastructure 
projects has proved unable to solve its sanitation crisis. The problem demands a 
participative and pluralist debate, involving social actors and interest groups, rather 
than experts, in the solution of the problem. 
5.3 Interest group participation in the decision-making process of the Brazilian 
PNRS 
The history of Brazil’s national policy on solid waste (PNRS) begins in 1989, when 
Bill 354 on the disposal of healthcare waste was submitted to the Senate by deputy 
Rodrigo Rollemberg. José Valverde, who participated in the formulation of waste 
policies at state and central levels as the technical co-ordinator of the committee 
rapporteur, explains that the bill was motivated by the proximity of the UN’s Earth 
Summit (ECO92).57 In 1991, the draft became Bill 203, receiving close to a hundred 
proposals until, in 1998, the Special Committee for the National Policy on Solid 
                                                
57 José Valverde, one of the drafters of the PNRS, was interviewed in a restaurant in São Paulo, 15 November 
2013. (43’52”) 
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Waste was nominated to analyse the theme (Silva, 1991: 14). However, Valverde 
points out that there were several obstacles to the evolution of the debate in 
parliament. In his view, the country, which was grappling with the aftermath of a long 
economic crisis, had other priorities; there was little appetite for environmental issues, 
and the bill was not proposed as national policy. The business sector, however, had 
already started to discuss certain principles, such as the ‘polluter pays’ principle, 
established by European directives, anticipating that these ideas would arrive in Brazil 
in the near future. There was a powerful lobby inside Congress, organised by the 
retreated tyre import industry, determined to block any initiatives. In the midst of this 
process, Emerson Kapaz, the committee rapporteur, caused a scandal when it was 
leaked in the media that he had ordered the deletion of all enquiries received through 
the bill’s participatory process. In the end, the bill was not approved and the policy 
was terminated. As a result, it was clear that citizen participation in the legislative 
process should command more attention: Valverde states that ‘public policy that does 
not discuss and does not consider the principle of participation is doomed to fail’. 
In 2002, the process of formulating a new bill was reinitiated and a second committee 
was established. The retreated tyre lobby was still strong and the industrial sector 
reacted adversely to any proposal that it take responsibility for the rapid growth in 
waste generation. Although Minister of the Environment Marina Silva adopted a firm 
stance against waste importation, this deadlock hindered the debate in Congress until 
the Supreme Court (STF) decision to ban the import of retreated tyres and the 
overturning of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) position on the export of waste 
from industrialised nations to developing countries in the Conference of the Parties 
(COP8) in 2006. However, as Valverde explains, even at this stage, the business 
sector was reluctant to adopt the ‘polluter-pays’ principle or take any responsibility 
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for consumer waste. There was a common reactive discourse prevalent in the sector 
that argued that ‘the industry does not generate waste, it generates production’. 
At the same time, due to the lack of leadership from the federal government, some 
states had independently begun to introduce legislation; the municipalities were 
demanding solutions for the problems of solid waste management and the regulation 
of contracts for the provision of waste services. Valverde mentions the case of the 
state of São Paulo as an example. In 2003, a non-partisan and multi-disciplinary 
working group was formed in the São Paulo Legislative Assembly to formulate the 
state’s policy on solid waste. From the outset, it differed to the parliamentary model, 
with the emphasis on the express participation of civil society in the proceedings. 
According to Arnaldo Jardim and José Valverde (2012: 665), the working group drew 
up a schedule for public hearings, and presented the preliminary draft at a public 
event in February 2004 to receive suggestions and amendments. There were more 
than fifty participants from different sections of society at this event, including 
representatives from business associations and concessionary companies, academics, 
and members of civil society organisations and the catadores’ (waste pickers’) 
movement. In addition, the process involved seminars, technical visits and a link on 
the Legislative Assembly’s website to facilitate contact between society and 
municipal decision-makers. This was followed by a public hearing to discuss the 
deliberations. Praise for this participatory process was unanimous among those 
interviewed for this research, from public managers to businessmen and waste 
pickers. Diógenes Del Bel, director of the Brazilian Association of Solid Waste 
Treatment Companies (ABETRE), highlighted that he had never experienced such a 
vibrant and rewarding democratic environment: 
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Those meetings were a surprising experience to me. I did not know that 
democracy was something that could work in such a way. There was a lot of 
dialogue and everybody was in direct contact, debating waste policies and 
suggestions from different perspectives. We knew the plenary had no legal 
validity, but the promotion of an alignment between all sectors was a great 
triumph. 58 
In 2006, the São Paulo State Policy on Solid Waste (Law 12,300)59 was unanimously 
approved, and its legislative process was also characterised by broad public 
participation. 
At the national level, three major events consolidated the participation of society in 
the decision-making process for environmental policies. In 2003, the I National 
Conference on the Environment (CNMA), held in Brasilia, marked the first time that 
a variety of representatives of society had come together to discuss proposals for a 
national policy on the environment (Silva, 1991). In 2004, the Ministry of the 
Environment held a seminar, ‘Contributions for the National Policy on Solid Waste’ 
(MMA, 2010), gathering feedback from society on the formulation of a new bill. In 
the following year, the issue of solid waste management became one of the key 
themes at the II CNMA (2005), with the widespread participation of interest groups, 
evidencing the need for federal regulation (Silva, 1991: 14).  
According to Silva (1991: 15), a group was created in early 2005 within the Ministry 
of the Environment to evaluate the existing waste bills in Congress and the 
                                                
58 Interviewed the ABETRE offices in São Paulo, 22 August 2013. 
59 Available at: http://www.ambiente.sp.gov.br/cpla/files/2012/09/2006_Lei_12300.pdf 
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contributions of the participatory processes mentioned above, in order to formulate a 
new bill. In September 2007, Bill 1991 was submitted by the executive to the 
legislative branch of government, reinitiating the process in Congress. The new 
project was attached to the existing debate, resuming the discussion and introducing 
the institutional format of the National Policy on Solid Waste. The experiences of the 
policy-making and participatory processes carried out at state level were integrated 
into the federal proceedings, which involved new debates, technical visits and public 
hearings. In November 2007, the ‘International Seminar on the Solid Waste’ was held 
in Brasilia, organised by the Parliamentary Environmental Front and the 
Environmental Committee for Sustainable Development in the Chamber of Deputies, 
with panel debates presented by congressmen, academics, environmentalists and 
representatives of business sectors. In 2008, a non-partisan working group was 
nominated by the Chamber of Deputies to debate the policy (Jardim and Valverde, 
2012: 675). The group established a programme of four public hearings, with 
representatives of government bodies (MMA, FUNASA and the Ministry of Cities),60 
corporate entities (CEMPRE, CNI, FIESP, ABES)61 and academics, as well as a 
series of technical visits to privately run recycling centres, the Wal-Mart and Coca-
Cola recycling plants and the waste pickers’ cooperative, Coopere, in São Paulo. In 
addition, the public hearing entitled, ‘The catadores’ cooperatives and the social 
mobilisation in the PNRS’, was held by the São Paulo Legislative Assembly and the 
Waste and Citizenship Forum. 
                                                
60 The Ministry of the Environment (MMA) and National Health Foundation (FUNASA). 
61 The Brazilian Business Commitment for Recycling (CEMPRE), the National Conference of Industry (CNI), the 
Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) and the Brazilian Association of Sanitary and 
Environmental Engineering (ABES). 
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Valverde states that the participatory process was crucial for the whole process of 
formulating a national waste policy. From the beginning, there were several 
conflicting demands, but the idea was to engage all political and economic interests in 
the debate. Thus, a participatory process was crucial to debate the divergent interests 
of all the actors involved. As a result, the national waste policy emphasises the 
responsibility of all economic agents for waste management; the interests of the 
business sector, established through a number of different sectoral agreements; and 
the economic potential of the recycling sector, with the inclusion of the cooperatives 
of waste pickers (Jardim and Valverde, 2012: 673). This pluralist approach pushed the 
solid waste issue up the government’s political agenda and enabled the development 
of a policy that found wide acceptance amongst all those involved in the process. 
Valverde states that the participatory process was crucial for the approval of the 
PNRS: 
No one particular interest prevailed over others. All sectors that participated 
in the organisation during the process conducted in the Chamber of Deputies 
were heard. It was a thoroughly transparent and participatory process. On 
the whole, even government interests did not prevail. Certainly, not all 
propositions prevailed, but all were heard. And the policy was approved 
unanimously at first instance. It was an achievement that was entirely 
constituted by way of a participatory process. 
Public participation was ensured by several articles in the PNRS. The policy is based 
on the concepts of shared responsibility of all the actors involved in a product’s life 
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cycle (Art 3, XVII), the right of all citizens to access information (Art.6, X) and the 
‘social control’ 62  and participation of interest groups in public hearings and 
consultations on the formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policies 
and plans (Art.14, 15 and 18). The Basic Sanitation Law also guarantees democratic 
consultation on policy-making and the control of service provision, with the 
establishment of collegiate bodies (involving organisations comprising public and 
private representatives of the authorities in charge of public services provision, 
government bodies, service providers, users, technical entities, civil society and 
consumer protection organisations at local, state and central levels) in which the 
decisions are agreed on a collective basis (Law 11,445/2007, Art.47).63 
In August 2010, the PNRS was approved in Congress, and in December of the same 
year, it was enacted as law. Silvano Silverio, the secretary for water resources and 
urban environment at the MMA, who was in charge of the process at the time, 
recognises, however, that the process was extremely delayed.64 He explains that the 
the PNRS is the result of a history of several years of National Congress proceedings, 
from 1989 to 2007, and three additional years of formulation, which indicates the 
difficulty and effort involved in reaching a consensus among the various sectors, each 
with diverse interests, involved in the issue. However, few policies in Brazil are 
promulgated in four months, and the PNRS was only realised because the debate 
displayed a level of political maturity, and because the public, the public prosecutor, 
                                                
62 Both the Basic Sanitation Law (11,445/2007, Art.3rd, IV) and the PNRS (12,305/2010, Art.3rd, VI) define social 
control as “a set of mechanisms and procedures that guarantee information to society and participation in the 
processes of formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policies”. 
63 These collegiate bodies can be councils, committees, working groups and chambers, among other sort of 
organisation. 
64 The current president of the Municipal Authority of Urban Cleaning (Amlurb), interview recorded (40’04”) at 
the AMLURB headquarter in São Paulo, 5 December 2013. 
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the business sector and local governments pressed for the enactment of a regulatory 
framework with national coverage. In addition, two months later, two institutional 
spaces for the implementation of the PNRS were created: the Inter-ministerial 
Committee on Solid Waste and the Guidance Committee for Reverse Logistics. 
Silverio explains that, a few years earlier, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had 
experienced the creation of the Basic Sanitation Law, which took three years to pass, 
a delay that ultimately weakened its implementation, and thus wanted to sign the 
PNRS into law during his term in office. 
President Lula’s legacy 
The PNRS was not solely the achievement of the Worker’s Party (PT), which was in 
power at the time, as several political parties contributed to the debate during the 
history of its evolution; however, all interviewees in this research, whatever their 
political persuasion, agree that President Lula was responsible for the inclusion of 
waste pickers in the PNRS, as well as the involvement of civil society in the decision-
making process. It would, however, be wrong to link the PNRS exclusively to his 
government: the political process of the PNRS was non-partisan, involving a range of 
interest groups, and it is likely that a large segment of the engineers involved in the 
solid waste management sector opposed the government on most other issues. 
President Lula undoubtedly left a significant legacy of environmental and social 
welfare policies; however, Flávio de Miranda Ribeiro, technical advisor to the vice-
president of the state of São Paulo Environmental Agency (CETESB), explains that it 
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is difficult to attribute the inclusion of the waste pickers in the PNRS exclusively to 
Lula or to the Workers Party: 65 
It is certainly a fundamental contribution. Nevertheless, at the same time that 
there is a merit in this cause, there was also a populist use of that good 
intension. There was a personal cult of the former president as the ‘Father of 
Catadores’. Albeit this fact is open to criticism, it is also a legitimate 
strategy. He was not the first to take advantage of this sort of strategy, and 
will not be the last.66 
In fact, it is worth mentioning that during his two terms in office, Lula appointed two 
leading environmentalists to head the Ministry of the Environment: Marina Silva 
(from 2003 to 2008) and Carlos Minc (from 2008 to 2010). Opponents criticise the 
‘featherbedding’67 practices of the Workers’ Party (PT), due to partisan interests and 
personal links between civil society organisations, party activists and environmental 
bodies, mainly within the MMA, but also in the municipalities across the country. 
However, Cristiana Losekann (2012) stresses that the former president played a key 
role in putting social and environmental policies onto the government agenda. In 
addition to the presence of environmentalists in the MMA, she claims that during his 
presidency, new spaces for dialogue between state and society were opened up, and 
the National Conference on the Environment, the National Council on the 
Environment (CONAMA) and the powers of the public prosecutor were strengthened 
(Losenkann, 2012: 179). All of these institutional processes had considerable 
                                                
65 This subject is addressed again in the case study of waste pickers in section 7.5. 
66 Interviewed via telephone on 22 February 2016. 
67 The practice of hiring more employees than necessary to the bureaucracy, mainly due to partisan interests 
(‘cabide de empregos’ in Portuguese). 
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influence on the promotion of pluralist debates and interest group participation in 
government decisions.  
However, since its enactment, the PNRS has faced several challenges (as mentioned 
in section 5.3), and there are a number of critiques against the delays to its approval 
and the negotiations of the sectoral agreements (see section 6.3). Del Bel claims that 
the process was well managed in the past, but now it is waiting for further definition 
by the government. He criticises the lack of synergy on the sectoral agreements for 
reverse logistics: 
Here in Brazil, everyone wants to be friendly and avert conflict, and in the 
end, matters are not properly resolved. I always participate in meetings, and 
many of them get nowhere. Then it takes even more time to assess what has 
in fact been done, and things don’t move. Months pass and no solution is 
reached. Definitions require deadlines. 
Section 6.3 discusses the impact of interest group participation in the Sectoral 
Agreements on Reverse Logistics, probably the most important mechanism for the 
success or failure of the implementation of the PNRS. 
5.4 Chapter summary 
The chapter has analysed the decision-making processes involved in the Indian and 
Brazilian waste reforms from the perspective of public participation, starting with an 
examination of the legal proceedings and the actors involved. It argued that the design 
of the participatory processes in each country has influenced policy outcomes in the 
waste management sector: in Brazil, political and economic elites in the sector took 
advantage of the participatory mechanisms within the legislative process to overcome 
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existing barriers erected by internal lobby groups in Congress; in India, due to the 
constitutional configuration of the decision-making process in this sector, and the 
limited space granted public participation, pressure groups were forced to appeal to 
the judiciary, which afforded them a participatory space for contestation of the rules. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the descriptions above is the fact that the 
political environment of the debates on waste management is dominated mainly by 
business groups and technical and policy experts, with little space for ordinary 
citizens. This chapter has also shown that, in both cases, although policies may 
provide mechanisms that are intended to facilitate citizen participation in government 
decisions, according to participants’ descriptions of the processes and observations 
made during this research, only interest groups participate. As a result, there is a near-
absence of ordinary citizens in the political negotiations, while experts, government 
authorities, associations of industrialists, large NGOs, academics and other influential 
groups tend to dominate the technical debates. However, the lack of citizens’ 
engagement in decision-making on environmental issues is not a problem confined to 
Brazil and India. The chapter’s findings confirm previous research by Marissa Golden 
(1998), Scott Furlong and Cornelius Kerwin (2004), and other scholars, which reveals 
similar characteristics in the passage of environmental legislation in the US, where 
mechanisms designed to engage citizens in the decision-making processes are 
appropriated by powerful interest groups. 
The chapter went on to show that the Brazilian PNRS was the result of a series of 
intensive participatory processes, while the Indian MSW Rules and the SBA were 
technocratic decisions formulated inside the ministry concerned. By comparing both 
cases it became clear that the participatory process in Brazil in fact helped interest 
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groups and decision-makers to overcome the internal lobbies in Congress and thus 
strengthen the evolution of the bill, bringing pluralist perspectives to the political 
debate and pressure to bear on the enactment of the policy. According to one of the 
policy’s authors, who worked with the committee rapporteur, other bills had failed in 
the past and only social pressure and interest group involvement helped further the 
negotiations. At the beginning, there were too many conflicting perspectives, and the 
industrial sector opposed any proposal that would place them in the position of taking 
responsibility for domestic waste generation. However, government bureaucrats used 
the experience of successful participatory decision-making at regional or state level to 
gain the support of interest groups to advance the law at the federal level. Public 
participation became a key strategy in gaining public support, and even the media 
contributed by placing the waste issue on the government’s political agenda and 
putting pressure on the decision-makers. It is important to keep in mind that the 
promotion of these diverse spaces of debate also demands investment from the 
government and the support of interest groups. Therefore, public participation was an 
articulation of the desire of certain politicians and coalitions of powerful interest 
groups involved in the waste management sector to pass the law in the Congress.  
In India, the passage of the waste rules started with a PIL in the Supreme Court. As 
section 5.2 showed, there were frequent debates in which parliamentarians in the 
Rajya Sabha questioned the actions of the government. According to the descriptions 
discussed in this chapter, the nominated expert committee announced a public 
consultation, but with access limited to certain interest groups. In 2013, the proposed 
amendment of the MSW Rules aggravated the discontent, since its content seemed 
slanted towards particular economic interests. On the other hand, the Clean India 
Mission (SBA) is based on a nation-wide campaign, promoted by the government 
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with public awareness campaigns, social media communications and educational 
programmes. Minister of Urban Development Venkaiah Naidu has emphasised the 
importance of the involvement of the entire population for the success of the 
campaign (QCI, 2016: 4). After so many decades of unsuccessful national schemes, 
only the power of a wide social movement could shift government inefficiency. 
However, as the chapter has shown, in the case of the SBA, the ‘public’ is politically 
passive. There is no tradition of public participation in government policy decisions in 
India, and the internet and social media are no substitute for participatory open 
debates; instead, these channels are used to disseminate the government programme, 
encourage the population to participate in cleaning up urban spaces, and gain support 
from government bodies, local authorities and interest groups.  
The chapter went on to compare the outcomes of both these political processes. In 
India, for example, only the small group in charge of promoting the bill possessed the 
power to establish the methods and technologies of waste management, and the actors 
allowed to provide these services. In the case of the amendment of the MSW Rules 
2016, however, the working group in the ministry responsible organised public 
consultation meetings, with the support of industry sector associations, in New Delhi, 
Mumbai and Kolkata. The chapter, therefore, emphasised that when the formulation 
of the law-making process includes participatory debates, in order to gather insights 
and contributions from the wider society, as in Brazil, these institutional spaces are 
able to provide opportunities for interest groups to meet and discuss the proposals, 
making their interests and alliances more evident in the political arena.  
The political participation of waste pickers in decision-making processes is a key 
distinction between the political processes in the two countries. In the Indian process, 
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due to the limited participatory spaces for debates, only a few groups have access to 
decision-making and the policies can end up biased towards specific technical and 
economic interests. By contrast, in the Brazilian participatory process, catadores have 
an institutional forum in which to raise their voices and claim their rights. Using the 
concept proposed by Lavanya Rajamani (2007), the Indian MSW Rules could be 
classified as a techno-legal document, which mainly addresses the managerial aspects 
of solid waste management and the responsibilities of the actors involved in the 
process; the Brazilian PNRS, on the other hand, also addresses the social and legal 
aspects of the problem. In addition, as the chapter has illustrated, the active 
participation of these groups throughout the process of its formulation ensured that 
the law mandated their political inclusion: the PNRS established legal mechanisms 
and government institutions to promote catadores’ social and economic inclusion in 
the waste management system. Chapter 7 has an exclusive section on the situation of 
waste pickers in Brazil and India.  
The chapter concluded that the PNRS combines technical waste management 
measures with progressive socioeconomic aspects, while the Indian MSW Rules have 
the characteristics of environmental legislation oriented towards technical and 
managerial interests. These specific characteristics have supporters and opponents in 
both countries. In Brazil, the private sector complains that the technical aspects of 
waste management should not be mixed with social policies; while in India, activists 
claim that the policies are too managerial and do not represent the reality on the 
ground, excluding the major contribution of the informal sector. 
 
The next chapter explores in more detail the institutional spaces resulting from these 
policy frameworks and how interest groups interact in these political arenas. 
 Chapter 6 The Nature of Institutional Spaces 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed how interest groups have participated in the 
formulation of waste management policies in Brazil and India; this chapter explores 
the nature of institutional spaces for public participation generated by those policies in 
order to understand if and how they inform the practices in the sector. It argues that 
the participatory spaces provided by the state play a crucial role in enabling pressure 
groups to put their interests forward in the political arena; they allow such groups to 
meet and negotiate with government authorities, and to some extent, shape subsequent 
policy decisions. However, these spaces are not impartial, and there are few 
institutional mechanisms in place to regulate their processes. As such, they are highly 
politicised – as evidenced by the political tensions manifest in the MSWM sector.  
The comparative analysis presented in this chapter contributes to an understanding of 
how the political realm differs in the countries under review, and how it influences the 
practices of the interest groups involved in the political processes of these 
participatory spaces. The cases studied illustrate different forms of state-society 
interaction, where the state represents the social space that regulates and organises the 
relations of production and the hierarchy of organisations, individuals and interest 
groups involved. They exemplify how these different forms of public participation 
have shaped government decisions through the actions, alliances and networks of 
individuals and interest groups. 
These cases were chosen, therefore, according to how the waste management sector, 
the state and the main actors involved are organised in each country. Thus, they 
represent key nation-wide participatory processes that are specific to each country, 
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shaping their waste reforms in different ways. The findings enhance our 
understanding of the different actors engaged in these debates and the power relations 
involved, and provide evidence of how democracy operates in different ways in this 
sectoral niche, according to the political context. 
The chapter examines the activity of interest groups, employing the three types of 
participatory space proposed by John Gaventa (2005): ‘invited space’, ‘closed space’ 
and ‘hidden space’. It discusses two examples of ‘invited space’ in Brazil, where 
interest groups are called on to discuss alternative resolutions to the challenge of 
implementing waste management policies; while in India, it describes how pressure 
groups have reacted to the ‘closed space’ of the government’s decision-making 
process by turning to the judiciary to provide a political arena for the contestation of 
government policies (see section 6.4). In both cases, the sector’s manifest 
irregularities are classified as ‘hidden spaces’; they exemplify how weak institutions 
affect public participation in these countries. 
The chapter is organised in four sections. Following Brazil’s first national plan to deal 
with solid waste, the National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS), the government 
established two national participatory processes – the National Conference on the 
Environment (CNMA) and the Sectoral Agreements for Reverse Logistics – in order 
to engage a large number of interest groups in the decision-making process. Sections 
6.2 and 6.3 of the chapter covering this subject also reflect on similar processes under 
development in India. Similarly, in both countries, the judiciary is currently one of the 
most respected of political powers and is itself a key player in the participatory 
processes of the waste management sector. Nevertheless, in India, it appears to have 
taken on the role of ‘defender of the poor’, becoming the main instrument for social 
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change, and has incontestably advanced Indian policymaking on solid waste 
management since the late 1990s. Finally, the last section investigates the 
irregularities that hinder the implementation of waste management policies and 
impact negatively on the relationship between state and society, and on the 
participation of interest groups in government decisions. The chapter raises the 
question of whether regulation of the practices of pressure groups would help mitigate 
the unequal balance of power between the different interests when it comes to policy 
decisions in this sector. 
6.2 The 4th National Conference on the Environment in Brazil 
In 2013, over the four days of the 4th CNMA, 1,981 people from all parts of the 
country met in Brasilia to debate proposals for the improvement of the 
implementation of the PNRS (MMA, 2013a: 15). (Fig. 12, below, shows the opening 
session of the conference.) National public conferences such as this are the largest on-
site democratic institutional spaces in Brazil: during its preliminary stages, the 4th 
CNMA mobilised about 200,000 people across the country, involving 643 municipal 
conferences, 179 regional conferences across 3,009 municipalities, one virtual 
conference accessed by 3,881 users, and 224 free conferences, allowing civil society 
to mobilise and submit proposals to the national commission, with 24,771 participants 
in twenty-six states and the federal district (MMA, 2013c). In total, 3,652 
municipalities were involved, which includes 65,61% of Brazilian cities (MMA, 
2013a: 5). 





Figure 12: Opening session of the 4th CNMA in Brasilia, 24 October 2013 
(Source: Author’s photo) 
The political environment of the national conferences 
As Clóvis de Souza et al. (2013b: 56) explain, the national conferences on public 
policies are one of a number of institutional tools used by the Brazilian government to 
strengthen public participation in the processes of decision-making, implementation 
and monitoring of public policies. These broad institutional spaces, designed to 
support public debate (Luchmann, cited in Alencar and Cruxên, 2015: 8), have 
introduced a new framework aimed at mobilising the majority of actors involved in 
specific areas of interest and sectoral policies to promote a dialogue between the 
government and society.  
According to Souza et al. (2013b: 8), the first National Conference on Education and 
Health was held in 1941. However, these authors explain that, at first, the conferences 
were instruments for planning decentralised measures, and only involved government 
representatives. It was not until after the 8th Conference on Health in 1986 that the 
purpose of the conferences changed and they were opened up to extensive public 
participation. In the 1980s, due to the rise of new democratic institutions during the 
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country’s transition to democracy, the employment of these conferences as an 
interface between government and society gradually expanded to other public policy 
areas (Souza and Pires, 2012: 501). Between 2003 and 2010, eighty-three national 
conferences were held on a variety of themes, including education, health and human 
rights (Souza et al., 2013: 11). The first National Conference on the Environment was 
held in 2003, with the theme, ‘Strengthening the National System on the 
Environment’, and involved 65,000 people across the country. It was followed by two 
others, in 2005 (‘Natural Resources and Sustainable Development’) and in 2008 
(‘Climate Change’). 
The national process 
Joana Alencar and Isadora Cruxên (2015: 6) explain that, in general, the conferences 
are convened by the executive and organised in successive stages. The process begins 
with preparatory stages at the local level (municipal and regional conferences), 
evolving into conferences at state level, and concluding at the national level. Each of 
these stages involves a selection process for representatives and for proposals 
submitted by both the government and civil society that will be taken forward to the 
next stage, thus seeking to mobilise a variety of actors from different social classes 
from all regions of the country. During the 4th CNMA, I had the chance to observe 
and interview some of the participants – for example, Irilene Alcantra,68 a civil 
servant from the state of Maranhão, who stressed that the whole process demands a 
lot of effort. She explained that, at the local level, the municipal conferences enable 
the participation of the ordinary citizen, who is the most directly affected by the 
                                                
68 Interviewed during the 4th CNMA in Brasilia, 24 October 2013. 
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legislation for and delivery of the public service. At the state conferences, these local 
representatives bring their particular perspectives to the regional debate, where they 
have the opportunity to balance their claims against the views of their peers from 
other localities. All proposals are debated and voted on again to determine what will 
be included at the national conference in Brasilia. Alencar and Cruxên (2015: 9) point 
out that all these stages are crucial, given that the public administration at local and 
state levels have the opportunity to take suggestions, monitor the effect of their 
actions and plan programmes to address local issues. The whole process, therefore, 
encourages interaction between government bodies and interest groups. 
 
Figure 13: One of the 20 working groups of the 4th CNMA (Source: Author’s 
photo) 
In the last stage, which took place in Brasilia, the central theme of the conference, 
waste reform, was divided into four thematic axes (or sub-themes): sustainable 
production and consumption; environmental impact minimisation; labour, 
employment and income generation; and environmental education. Each of these axes 
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had about two hundred proposals on a variety of topics.69 The 1,130 delegates could 
join any of the twenty working groups – four working groups of about fifty delegates 
per axis. For example, I attended ‘Axis III – Labour, Employment and Income 
Generation’ (Fig. 13), participating in the discussions as a guest without the 
entitlement to vote. In this session, delegates from different states and a variety of 
backgrounds (for example, a tourism official from the state of Alagoas, a waste picker 
from Rio Grande do Sul, a banker responsible for financing programmes on solid 
waste management in Sergipe, a public servant from Rondonia, and a micro-
entrepreneur from Minas Gerais, among many others) debated forty proposals on 
themes such as economic mechanisms, inter-sectoral partnerships and labour rights.  
On the second day, the proposals debated the previous day were circulated for the 
delegates to vote on. They were mandated to submit fifteen of these to the plenary. 
During the ballot, the participants walked around the room with their lists and notes, 
reading the proposals and putting their stamps on their priorities (Fig. 14). Also 
apparent was the activism displayed by members of social movements: ‘Let’s 
prioritise this policy’; ‘Let’s organise our votes to approve this proposal’; ‘Hey, this 
proposal does not guarantee waste pickers payment for their environmental services’; 
‘The text of that proposal is more complete than this one’; ‘Have you ever voted for 
that one?’ All the participants seemed very aware of the waste management problems 
in their localities and their role in this deliberative process. A civil servant from the 
state of Pernambuco said: ‘Each has their own militant [ideas], but we have to work 
                                                
69 For example, the thematic axis ‘Sustainable Production and Consumption’ addressed the following topics: 
sustainable production; recycling; reverse logistics; certification; family farms and agro-ecology; packaging; 
research; waste segregation; environmental education for sustainable consumption; the environmental agenda in 
public administration; participatory spaces; labelling; normative instruments and environmental consumption. 
The Nature of Institutional Spaces 
238 
 
with objectivity to defend our proposals. They should involve partnerships; we need 
to integrate the actors.’ After this analysis, all the delegates returned to the plenary to 
receive the working groups’ proposals and motions. Each delegate received fifteen 
more adhesive voting labels (Fig. 14) and was asked to approve the final document, 
comprising 160 actions (Fig. 15) – fifteen per thematic axis (MMA, 2013a: 15). 
 
Figure 14: Prioritisation of proposals in the working groups and submission to 




Figure 15: Deliberative process in the 4th CNMA (Source: Author’s photo) 
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Thus, during the event, a large number of interest groups and decision-makers were 
brought together in the same venue, debating the problems and proposals. Leading 
Brazilian experts, politicians, activists and leaders of social movements participated in 
the discussions. For example, in one of the twelve debates held before the working 
group activities, the Minister of the Environment, Izabella Teixeira; the chief justice 
of the court of auditors of the state of Amazonia (TCE); a representative of the 
National Confederation of Industry (CNI); the head of the Brazilian Association of 
Urban Cleansing and Waste (ABRELPE); the president of the Municipal Authority of 
Urban Cleansing in São Paulo (AMLURB); the leader of the National Movement of 
Catadores of Recyclables (MNCR); and the secretary of the environment of the state 
of Pernambuco sat at the same table, debating related legal instruments. Everyone was 
able to chat informally with any expert, businessman or interest group, strengthening 
the sense of dialogue between all of the actors involved in the process. As a result, the 
main authorities involved with the issue were in direct contact with ordinary players. 
The participants 
The national conference brought together people from different backgrounds, social 
classes and ethnic origins. According to a survey by the MMA (2013a: 61), the 
distribution of representatives was fairly homogeneous across the states, varying from 
14% from the south to 32% from the north-western regions. Out of the 1,000 
delegates interviewed, 28% belonged to the business sector, 25% to the government, 
21% to social movements, 9% to NGOs, 7% to waste pickers’ associations, 5% to 
labour unions, 5% were traditional communities and indigenous people, and 4% were 
academics. The majority (68%) had worked in the environmental field or in activities 
related to civil society over the last five years (MMA, 2013a: 69). In terms of gender, 
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it was also relatively balanced, with 57% men and 43% women. Their ages ranged 
from 35 to 54 years. In terms of education, 67% had a graduate degree and 9% had 
not concluded their studies. Alencar and Cruxên (2015: 25) point out that a large 
number of the delegates had never experienced public deliberations of this kind before 
– according to the survey, the 4th CNMA was the first national conference that 73% of 
them had attended. Thus, it was an enormous challenge to enable such a wide variety 
of voices to present their interests and be heard receptively and with respect.  
Each national conference has its own structure, which is decided on collectively by a 
national organising committee, comprising representatives of the government, civil 
society and professional associations, to ensure that all participants have the 
opportunity to engage with the debates. In addition, Alencar and Cruxên (2015: 27) 
highlight that this structure includes a system of information to apprise delegates of 
the conference process and its content, and ensure there is adequate space for the 
debates and access to transport, food and accommodation. Each national conference 
takes around a year and costs the government about USD 3.2 million (R$ 12 million).  
Participatory observation 
During the 4th CNMA, it was interesting to capture different perspectives on the same 
theme from people from different regions of the country. Although each participant 
was concerned with specific regional aspects of the problem, the event was conducted 
in such a way that particularities could be taken into account by the legislative 
process, to ensure that any obstacles to national implementation could be overcome. 
For instance, an entrepreneur, Alexandre Massimo, from the state of Minas Gerais, 
The Nature of Institutional Spaces 
241 
 
was interested in discussing oil recycling and business opportunities;70  the secretary 
for tourism in a city in the northwest came to discuss environmental education in the 
municipality’s schools; and Marilyn Oliveira, from the state of Rondonia, wanted to 
discuss financing schemes for the formulation of an Integrated Regional Plan through 
the National Health Foundation (FUNASA). She commented that without social 
accountability, implementation is always problematic. Meanwhile, Ana Lucia, a 
member of the Association of Catadores of Recyclables from the Island of Vitória 
(AMARIV) in the state of Espirito Santo, claimed:  
Our problem has been the lack of information. There are a lot of public 
managers taking advantage of the catador. It is easy to justify their projects 
with our flag. The catador attracts attention […] We have to be vigilant with 
regard to the laws they approve. The catador is not a fool. The municipal 
councillor no longer takes advantage of [us]; now we have lawyers, public 
prosecutors, managers and social assistants on our side.  
Despite their different regional interests, the delegates, almost unanimously, 
supported the PNRS; their criticisms focused on the economic interests involved in 
service provision. Dauri Correia da Carecica, a representative of the Federation of 
Associations of Residents and Popular Movements of Espirito Santo (FAMOPES), 
claimed that implementation demands a lot of effort and, in the end, the actual 
decisions are made by the mayor. Despite the political engagement of social 
movements, it appears that implementing the PNRS is still a complex operation. 
 
                                                
70 All the participants were interviewed during the 4th CNMA, held between 24 and 26 October 2013. 
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Critiques of the national conferences 
After the experience of the conference, the first question that emerged was: what is 
the effect of the deliberations and recommendations?71 Have these proposals been 
translated into actions, and if so, how? Souza et al. (2013a: 36) explain that the 
Permanent Committee for the Conference Organisation within the MMA monitors the 
results. The proposals are evaluated according to their legal basis, and there is a 
tracking system to follow the current progress of proposals. However, they also 
mention that the committee faces limitations, due to the way it is structured in the 
ministry, as well as difficulties relating to the flow of information from other 
ministries. In addition, the MMA has not yet specified an evaluation index. This 
problem should be resolved in the future with the application of a new methodology 
decided at the 4th CNMA. 
Some government interviewees regard the conferences with a degree of scepticism. A 
number of bureaucrats at central, state and municipal levels claim they have never 
received or read any of the documents created in the conference: ‘These documents 
do not reach us. It may be that they are sent to the MMA or to the parliament?’72 
Some see the conference as simply a pro-forma exercise, undertaken to comply with 
the requirement for public participation in the legislative process, but of limited 
practical use. Diógenes Del Bel, president of the ABETRE, comments: 
                                                
71 According to Souza et al. (2013: 35), the proposals of the conferences are called ‘deliberations’ when 
implementation falls within the scope of the ministry running the conferences and ‘recommendations’ when they 
are the responsibility of another ministry. 
72 Official at the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCDI) 
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I saw a study on the approval of public policies by the governments of 
FHC73 and Lula. In FHC’s, decisions were made by a small group and went 
to trial. In Lula’s, the definitions are already given, but it seems that the 
government must show that the decisions have been validated by the 
majority. The current government makes the decisions and calls [on] society 
to ratify [them]. […] The cards have already been previously marked. 74 
The participants’ view of the 4th CNMA was quite different, however. The majority of 
delegates seemed very engaged and conscious of their commitment to the debates and 
the poll. For example, a civil servant from the state of Maranhão told me that he had 
participated actively in all the National Conferences on the Environment,75 being very 
active in the social movements in his state. However, he claimed that the results of the 
last conference were determined on paper but not implemented – the government 
provided space for public participation but the results were simply archived. 
Nonetheless, he stressed that he had confidence in the minister’s claim had that this 
time it would be different: ‘The proposals discussed throughout this process are quite 
important, and popular participation is crucial; otherwise, the politicians will 
formulate their policies according to their interests.’ Above all, the delegates seemed 
very politicised, extremely aware of the problems in their localities and of their role in 
the political process, each one bringing the interests of their regions to the table, 
seeking to reach agreement on the measures needed for better national 
implementation. 
                                                
73 Former Brazilian presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-
2011) 
74 Interviewed the ABETRE offices in São Paulo, 8 December 2013 
75 The interviewee requested anonymity. 
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For example, Ana Lúcia, the waste picker from the state of Espirito Santo referred to 
above, said that the conference was important in that it brought everyone together in 
the same place to debate their problems.76 She said that the catadores meet frequently 
so as not to lose focus: ‘Our proposal has been discussed for a long time. If we make 
changes to it now, it might get weakened. We should make all efforts to approve it.’ 
In a similar vein, Mana do Abaque, a native from the Kaxinawás ethnicity in the Alto 
Purús National Park in the Amazon,77 described how he lives near a large city in the 
state of Acre, whose waste has been responsible for the spread of disease amongst his 
tribe, the pollution of their rivers and the deaths of animals in their forest. He had 
travelled five hours by canoe, then by airplane, to get to Brasilia to attend the 
conference. He said he came for information, because his tribe needs to learn how to 
discuss their problems with the municipality, but he also stressed that politicians, in 
turn, have to learn to listen to and work in partnership with indigenous communities. 
Despite the absence of indicators with which to monitor and evaluate the results of the 
conference, researchers from the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) 
have provided a broad review of the value of the conference. Souza and Pires (2012) 
explore the national conferences from the perspective of the bureaucrats. According to 
their research, public managers display diverse motivations for holding conferences 
(Souza and Pires, 2012: 510). Firstly, they are used to strengthen federal links 
between the central government and state and municipal governments, improve 
internal links for the execution of programmes that involve different areas and 
departments of government, and establish a dialogue with the interest groups involved 
                                                
76 Interviewed during the 4th CNMA in Brasilia, 24 October 2013. 
77 Interviewed during the 4th CNMA in Brasilia, 24 October 2013. 
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in specific sectoral policy areas. Secondly, the conferences are employed within the 
policy cycle in order to share information and broaden the debate on specific themes 
and to introduce other topics onto the government agenda; to compile a record of 
social demands and mobilise interest groups; to propose guidelines for the 
formulation of public policies; and as a mechanism of evaluation. Alencar and Cruxên 
(2015: 25) point out that the conferences also provide an opportunity for collective 
learning about the benefits of an ‘inclusive political culture’.  
Despite these potentialities, the national conferences are still under-used. The survey 
carried out by Souza and Pires (2012) shows that, out of 399 federal programmes 
evaluated between 2003 and 2010, only 15% employed these conferences as 
instruments to interact with society. Therefore, in the Brazilian system of 
participatory democracy, the national conference is just one form of institutional 
space among other mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting, public hearings and 
public consultations (Souza et al., 2013a: 8). 
Silvano Silverio, president of the Municipal Authority of Urban Cleaning (Amlurb), 
who also participated in the formulation of the PNRS as secretary of Water Resources 
and Urban Environment (SRHU) in the MMA, highlights that the conferences also 
brought important contributions to the municipalities:78 
In the case of the municipal stage of the conference in the city of São Paulo, 
in addition to the conference’s contributions at state level, the participatory 
process is also important for the formulation of the Integrated MSWM Plan. 
We had a basic proposal already formulated, therefore our conference was 
                                                
78 Interviewed at the AMLURB headquarter in São Paulo, 5 December 2013. 
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very focused. The interest groups were separated in working groups (i.e. dry 
waste, organic waste, environmental education, construction and demolition, 
hazardous and industrial waste) to evaluate the proposals, amend and 
include projects and actions. Now, we are elaborating our Integrated Plan 
based on the results of the municipal conference. Therefore, the CNMA also 
has a very strong impact at local level, because we can incorporate in our 
executive plan the contributions of interest groups through their 
representatives. I believe this is the best we can do with this participatory 
process. 
In Valverde’s opinion, there is no need for any deliberation: 
The CNMA has an intangible value. The most important thing is the fact that 
the conference brings all interest groups into the same space to debate. It 
generates news for the mass media and shows that the MSWM is part of the 
political agenda of the government. 
The evidence above demonstrates that the national conferences are important spaces 
of participation, involving the majority of interest groups in a specific sectoral policy 
in a dialogue and the search for collective solutions. As Santos and Avritzer (cited in 
Souza and Pires, 2012: 501) point out, it is a ‘collective exercise of public power’. 
Therefore, what these conferences deliver is the power of popular discussion and the 
dissemination of ideas, on the one hand, and a deliberation on the effectiveness of the 
policy proposals, on the other. The analysis of the results of the national conferences, 
however, requires a broader understanding of all the participants involved and of their 
impact on the political process of waste reform. Nonetheless, they appear to offer a 
unique scenario in which government officials and interest groups from all regions of 
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the country can gather together to debate solid waste management policies and 
strategies. These pluralist spaces provide some potential to influence the decision-
making process.  
These sorts of conferences exemplify the state promotion of an institutional 
participatory space, established to engage interest groups in a debate about public 
policies. In 2015, the Indian government also promoted a national consultation 
programme, which comprised four regional meetings in the cities of Delhi, Mumbai, 
Bengaluru and Kolkata. The draft amendment of the MSW Rules 2015 was published 
on its website as a ‘public notice’ and these events were intended as part of the public 
consultation process. However, this programme illustrates how the discourse of 
people’s participatory spaces can be subverted to promote business interests. The 
‘Stakeholders’ Consultation on Draft Waste Management Rules 2015’ was organised 
by the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC) in 
partnership with the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII). Despite being called a ‘Stakeholders’ Consultation’, according to the 
descriptions of some of the participants, these meetings were not designed to produce 
open public participation. The NGO, the Environment Support Group (ESG, 2015), 
claims there was misconduct in the consultation process; it calls the process illegal 
and undemocratic, restricted to the corporate lobby and the waste management 
industry to the detriment of civil society. Environmental activists claim that there was 
no public advertisement of the event; the institutions organising the meeting invited 
only selected lobby groups from the industry; and the event took place in a five-star 
hotel, where entry was restricted to previously registered invitees (Sharholy et al., 
2008). Sandya Narayanan, a member of the Solid Waste Management Round Table 
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(SWMRT), gives as an example one of these participatory events in Bangalore, 
stating that the debates were very hierarchical and restricted to All India Services 
(AIS) commissioners and high-ranking officers. 79  The meeting was fractious, 
disrupted by various squabbles, and the MoEFCC was forced to cancel it after several 
irregularities in the process came to light (BS, 2015). 
6.3 Sectoral Agreements on Reverse Logistics 
Another significant participatory institutional space that shapes the implementation of 
the Brazilian PNRS is the set of Sectoral Agreements for Reverse Logistics. Unlike 
the Indian process, where the MoEF publishes separate guidelines for specific types 
of solid waste, the Brazilian legislation proposes that the market should provide 
solutions for solid waste management, according to each productive sector. The 
PNRS establishes that all waste generators share responsibility for the product’s 
lifecycle, which means that all players along the waste stream (manufacturers, 
importers, distributors and traders, consumers and conveyors of public services, such 
as urban cleansing and solid waste management) are both individually and 
collectively responsible for minimising the amount of waste generated and reducing 
the impact on human health and the environment (PNRS, Art. 3, XVII). As such, the 
Brazilian concept of ‘shared responsibility’ differs from the globally recognised 
European extended producer responsibility (EPR) model (adopted by the Indian 
Plastic Waste Rules 2011), in which producers and importers are responsible for the 
environmental impact of a product’s lifecycle and its end-of-line costs (Abramovay et 
al., 2013: 30). 
                                                
79 Interviewed via email on 24 August 2015, in order to collect more information about the National Consultation 
Programme in Bangalore in May 2015. 
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In order to activate the return of post-consumer waste to the productive sector, the 
Brazilian policy introduced the concept of ‘reverse logistics’, which consists of a 
series of procedures to collect and recover the solid waste, and reintroduce it into 
either its own lifecycle or the lifecycles of other products, or to dispose of it in an 
environmentally sustainable way (Art. 3rd, XII). The success of the PRNS relies on the 
implementation of these reverse logistics. 
At first, instead of imposing this process by decree, the government’s strategy was to 
bring all the business sectors and entities involved in solid waste management to the 
negotiating table to produce a unified proposal for reverse logistics for each 
productive sector. Some government officials recognised that the government alone 
does not have the expertise and technical capacity to offer solutions for the enormous 
challenge of implementing this across the country. As Ricardo Abramovay et al. 
(2013: 17) suggest, establishing an economic rationale for the treatment of waste 
creates an incentive for multiple players to seek solutions to the enormous difficulties 
of the reverse-logistics process. Therefore, the PNRS created an extensive 
participatory process based on market mechanisms, where the business sector, social 
movements and representatives of local government could debate ways of 
implementing the process nationally. 
According to Paula Silva (2013), the first ‘take-back’ programme was introduced in 
Brazil in 1989. The law established that consumers were responsible for returning the 
empty packaging of pesticides and their components to the retailer, and the 
manufacturers and traders were responsible for its safe disposal. The productive sector 
was also responsible for monitoring these mechanisms, designing educational 
programmes and creating incentives to ensure the system’s success. Additionally, 
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over the last decade, the National Environmental Council (CONAMA) has set specific 
standards requiring the recall of products which could pose a significant risk to public 
health and the environment, such as used or contaminated lubricant oil (1993) and 
tyres and batteries (1999). 
Reverse logistics really came into its own with the enactment of the PNRS, when the 
government called on business sectors to sign up to a sectoral agreement on five 
priority product chains (MMA, 2013b): 
• plastic packaging for lubricating oils; 
• fluorescent bulbs, sodium and mercury vapour bulbs and mixed light bulbs; 
• general packaging; 
• electrical and electronic products and their components; 
• and medicines. 
During the six years since its implementation, one sectoral agreement has been put 
into operation: that concerning plastic packaging for lubricating oils, which was 
concluded in December 2012.  At the time of writing, in late 2015, the sectoral 
agreement on packaging waste had been signed, and two other agreements were still 
in progress: medicine and e-waste. 
Beatriz Carneiro, general manager of Sustainable Development at the Department of 
Industrial Competitiveness in the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade 
(MDIC), explains how the sectoral agreements are structured.80  In 2011, after the 
national waste policy passed into law, the government established the Guidance 
                                                
80 Interview via the internet held on 29 May 2014. 
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Committee for the Implementation of Reverse Logistics Systems (CORI).  This body 
is composed of five government ministries and assisted by the Technical Advisory 
Group (GTA), coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment. The government 
announced the establishment of five Thematic Technical Groups (GTTs), one for each 
of the priority productive chains listed above. Each GTT comprises GTA advisers and 
representatives from industrial bodies, NGOs, catadores’ organisations, financial 
institutions and other players involved in the production chain, who come together to 
study the technical and economic feasibility of reverse logistics, and to formulate 
proposals for their sectoral agreements. 
However, reaching an agreement among the different interest groups has been a 
complicated task. For example, the most difficult aspect was negotiating an agreement 
among the GTTs on packaging, electronic products and medicines, due to the 
enormous variety of products and players in these markets. To illustrate this point, the 
packaging GTT was presented with three conflicting proposals from separate groups 
of associations of producers of packaging for glass and steel and a coalition of 
producers of other materials. It turned into a drawn-out negotiation process, replete 
with disagreements and conflicting interests, lasting over four years. The greatest 
difficulty, however, concerned the disposal of medicines, which was divided between 
three proposals, representing the different perspectives of the manufacturers, 
distributors and retailers. Even in this case, however, the government required a 
unified proposal for reverse logistics. 
Currently, all the GTTs’ remits have been concluded and their proposals are under 
scrutiny at the GTA, which will soon submit its resolutions to the CORI. The 
conclusions of the sectoral agreements must then go through a consultation process to 
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gather responses from the wider society. After a final summing-up by the CORI, the 
whole process should result in sectoral agreements between the Ministry of the 
Environment and the parties concerned, finally being published in the official gazette.  
Clearly, producing sectoral agreements is a challenging process, with a number of 
technical obstacles; however, even more problematic are the conflicting interests of 
those involved. These result in political and administrative disputes, which are 
difficult to overcome, making the decision-making process the major challenge of the 
reverse logistics system. To illustrate some of the difficulties in this process, 
Abramovay et al. (2013: 19) explain that some products, such as tyres and packaging 
for lubricating oil, enable a centralised reverse-logistics process, due to the fact that 
these supply chains involve commercial operations with capacity for waste storage, 
which favours incorporating reverse flows into their productive cycles. Other 
products’ lifecycles, however, depend on a huge number of actors operating in a 
completely decentralised way, as is the case in general packaging, electrical and 
electronic products, lamps and batteries. 
In addition to all these problems, there are geographical barriers to reverse logistics. 
Mirtes Boralli, a consultant on solid waste management, explains that the recycling 
infrastructure is deficient and unequally distributed across the country.81 The majority 
of recycling plants are based in the south-eastern and southern regions of Brazil, close 
to the industrial areas. For this reason, recovery programmes near major urban centres 
and industrial zones are more feasible, whereas recycling in the regions in the 
hinterland is very costly and sometimes impractical, due to a lack of markets for 
                                                
81 Interview via the internet on 29 May 2014. 
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recycled materials in regions with low industrial activity. The cost of transporting 
waste over long distances also makes reverse logistics impracticable in some areas. 
Moreover, some states have less political will and technical capacity to implement the 
necessary measures, and these differences end up hindering the even development of 
reverse logistics across the country. The government, therefore, needs to foster the 
implementation and development of recycling markets in the less economically 
developed regions of the north, north-east and west-central areas of Brazil. 
As Ribeiro from CETESB stresses, a large debate involving all interest groups is 
crucial, since the economic returns of reverse logistics in many cases are not enough 
to maintain the recycling industry.82 The cost of reverse logistics is a critical issue for 
the industrial sector. Business executives consider it a financial burden, an additional 
cost that has to be incorporated into the product’s final price. Paula Bernardes, project 
manager of the Brazilian Technical Association of Automatic Glass Industries 
(ABIVIDRO), claims that the government needs to work in partnership with the 
business sector, as the industry is searching for technical solutions to make reverse 
logistics feasible.83 The government should provide incentives; for example, tariff 
reduction in the recycling chain. There are also taxation issues: in the lamp sector, for 
example, national manufacturers want to retain control over imported products and 
receive equal price guarantees, since some 90% of the lamps used in the country are 
imported. Similarly, in the electrical and electronic products sector, there are 
problems of pirated and illegally imported products without any certification of 
origin, where supply chains cannot be tracked. On the other hand, local governments 
                                                
82 Interview recorded (1:10’55”) at the CETESB headquarters in São Paulo, 6 January 2014. 
83 Interview via the internet on 28 May 2014. 
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claim that it is unfair that municipalities, which are responsible for the collection of 
municipal solid waste, assume this burden alone. They are unable to cope with the 
increasing complexity of the waste. Hence, it is vital that business sectors assume 
financial responsibility for the return of recyclable materials into the chain of 
production (Abramovay et al., 2013: 41). 
One of the key features of the reverse logistics programme is the integration of waste 
pickers of reusable and recyclable materials into operations involving shared 
responsibility over a product’s lifecycle. The government has tax incentives and lines 
of credit for initiatives that enhance the development of projects in partnership with 
cooperatives of catadores. As Abramovay et al. (2013: 41) suggest, the catadores can 
be important allies for the business sector in the recovery of post-consumer products 
and their reintegration into the supply chain, as the legislation strengthens their role in 
reverse-logistics programmes. However, like all the actors in the system, waste 
pickers need to receive remuneration for the environmental services they provide. 
As mentioned earlier, in November 2015, the Sectoral Agreement of Packaging Waste 
was signed between the Minister of the Environment, Izabella Teixeira, twenty-one 
sectoral business entities (producers of aluminium, plastic, food and cosmetics, 
among others) and the National Movement of Catadores (MNCR).84 According to 
this agreement, the sector agreed to reduce 22% of the post-consumer packaging sent 
to landfill by 2018, which means approximately 3,815 tons per day during the 
following two years (SINIR, 2015). This was very modest, according to Jardim and 
                                                
84 The agreement is available in the website of the National Information System for SWM (SINIR), available at: 
http://www.sinir.gov.br/documents/10180/93155/Acordo_embalagens.pdf/58e2cc53-3e38-420a-97fd-
dba2ccae4cd3 
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Valverde (2015).85 The agreement formalises the reverse logistic system among these 
sectors and the cooperatives of catadores. During the negotiations, the MMA received 
three proposals, and eventually chose the Coalizão86 proposal. Between September 
and November of 2015 the agreement was put to public consultation, and was signed 
in November, in the face of strong opposition from the Brazilian National Association 
of Municipal Sanitation Services (ASSEMAE, 2015).  
Opponents claim that this agreement only benefits the industrial sector and the 
catadores’ cooperatives, prioritising the twelve major state capitals acting as hosts for 
the World Cup, 87  which represents a mere 18.5% of the Brazilian population, 
neglecting the other 5,553 municipalities. In addition, the proposal does not establish 
any dialogue between the industrial sector and the municipalities or the inter-
municipal consortiums. Walter Plácido (Pedro, 2015) claims that the agreement will 
only foster ‘green-washing’ campaigns by the large retail and industrial corporations, 
whose advertising budgets are far larger than the budget for reverse logistics. Ribeiro 
from CETESB explains that the agreement may sound reasonable to those states 
where recycling is not yet in operation, but in fact only serves the interests of the 
industry lobby that wants to postpone effective action on the problem: 
The agreement details one phase, while it should detail the process. [It] 
should be broader, and structured in different phases, so that each state 
could adapt it to its own stage of development. For example, [it] does not 
                                                
85 Deputy rapporteur and co-ordinator of the committee responsible for the PNRS bill proposal. 
86 The ‘Coalizão’ (‘Business Coalition’) is led by the Brazilian Business Committee for Recycling (CEMPRE) 
with another twenty business associations, which comprise the major retail and industrial producers of plastic, 
aluminium and cardboard packaging, and vegetable oil, meat, food, beverage and beer packaging, among others. 
Among the members are Coca-Cola, Unilever and Nestlé. 
87 São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Brasilia, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, Manaus, Curitiba, Recife, Porto Alegre, 
Natal and Cuiabá. 
The Nature of Institutional Spaces 
256 
 
meet the state of São Paulo’s needs, where the recycling structure [has] 
already [introduced] the early stage of implementation.88 
Until now, it seems that the only beneficiaries are the chosen cities, the corporate 
members of the Coalizão; the MNCR and the cooperatives of catadores established in 
those cities, and the central government, which has at least achieved some degree of 
success. In the end, the approved proposal was less widespread than expected. The 
Sectoral Agreement has also generated dissent among the catadores. A group of nine 
cooperatives from the western region of the state of São Paulo have joined together to 
form a new association of cooperatives, as they do not feel represented by the MNCR 
leaders who signed the Agreement. 
It is still too early to report favourable results for Brazilian reverse logistics, due to the 
fact that the process is still getting underway. The lessons learned up to now, 
however, prove that it is a long and complex process, involving a multitude of 
negotiations. In Ribeiro’s opinion, the government failed to give the sectoral 
agreements a fully democratic character: 
The Sectoral Agreements on Reverse Logistics sound great, but they do not 
work in practice. How do you suppose these conflicting and at times 
competing interests will reach a consensus spontaneously? Someone has to 
arbitrate. There are a few exceptions, mainly in high monopolised and closed 
markets where few players have the majority of the market share, such as 
lubricating oils; in very fragmented markets, like food packaging and 
electronic waste, it is almost impossible to reach an agreement. 
                                                
88 Interviewed via telephone on 22 March 2016. 
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Nevertheless, proponents suggest that these problems are teething troubles and that 
much can be expected of a country that intends to align radical economic growth with 
social and environmental justice. Brazil’s policy aims to change the way that citizens 
and industries view solid waste, attributing it economic and social value, and 
assigning the burden of cost to those who cause pollution. 
In comparison, in India, as mentioned above, the EPR was introduced in the Plastic 
Waste Rules 2011. However, Lakshmi Narayan, co-founder of SWaCH, the Indian 
waste pickers’ cooperative, claims that this kind of process, which should establish 
arrangements between municipalities and industries, and also include the waste 
pickers in the system, is very far from developed: ‘There is no clear context for how it 
is supposed to work; it’s a completely new area, a grey area, even for the 
municipalities and central government. So, there are no mechanisms in place to figure 
out how to implement it and how to pin responsibility on industry.’89 
In February 2014, the Indian Beverage Association (IBA), together with The Energy 
and Resources Institute (TERI) and GIZ (an international provider of sustainable 
development services), organised a conference with different interest groups to 
discuss waste packaging and the shared responsibility model in Indian urban centres.90 
It aimed to build a common platform for representatives of the beverage industry, 
urban local bodies (ULBs), NGOs and policy decision-makers about the collection 
and recycling of waste, and to discuss the roles and duties of the different actors in the 
recycling process. This is a proactive initiative of the industrial sector, with the 
support of an international organisation, to organise the roll-out of the shared 
                                                
89 Interviewed in a park in Pune, 28 March 2014. 
90 Conference on ‘Waste to Resource: Waste Management & Recycling’, Delhi, 12 February 2014. 
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responsibility system in the country, discussing, among other topics, the role of local 
governments and informal sectors in the process. 
Returning to Brazil, the participatory process and the involvement of a large number 
of interest groups in working groups, conferences and business fairs has helped to 
build greater interaction among the different actors and the government. Ribeiro 
explains that until 2009, the industrial sector was reticent about the introduction of 
reverse logistics into its waste management bill, arguing the unconstitutionality of the 
process; nowadays, however, reverse logistics and shared responsibility have become 
marketing strategies. In addition, this process has extensively shaped the policy 
formulation process, with a high level of participation by business associations and 
other actors. It is expected that these measures will significantly contribute to solving 
the problem of the enormous amount of waste produced in Brazil. Moreover, there is 
an opportunity for competitive gains for those companies or business sectors that 
develop reverse logistics systems in advance. It is hoped that, in future, reverse 
logistics will become the defining factor in achieving competitiveness in the market. 
Thus, as Ribeiro points out, the evolution of the environmental issue is part of a 
process of political improvement that evolves along with public awareness, access to 
information and democratic debate. 
6.4 Participation and the judiciary in India and Brazil 
Introduction 
Due to the limited space for public participation in policy-making, the judiciary has 
assumed a key role shaping solid waste management in India. In recent decades, it has 
been both one of the main channels for citizen participation in central government 
decisions on waste, as well as an active participant in the political process. As 
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discussed throughout this thesis, waste management involves disputes over social 
rights and competition for financial and material resources, market share and contracts 
for service provision. The legislative framework is supposed to control this system so 
that the relevant actors can provide services and the population receive public goods. 
However, as Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2009: 10) point out, it is extremely rare 
that bureaucrats will actually effect changes without pressure from society, lobbying 
organisations or particular incidents that trigger a demand for immediate action; in 
general, policymakers react to demands rather than shape the agenda. Also, the 
written texts of the policies do not cover all details or prevent conflicts of interest – in 
fact, the reality is quite the opposite. The legislative process both in Brazil and India 
comprises a complex overlay of competing institutions and frequently contradictory 
policies, enacted at different times in a variety of political contexts. Consequently, the 
judiciary has become the final arbiter in these disputes. 
The judiciary and environmental legislation 
Ana Paula Barcellos (2014: 36) claims that courts worldwide have protected and 
promoted human rights through public law suits. In Brazil and India, the judiciary has 
played a key role in the defence of social and environmental rights and has enlarged 
the opportunity for citizens and social movements to participate in and question 
government decisions. This section discusses the role of the judiciary as a key player, 
influencing and empowering public participation in environmental governance and 
the provision of waste management services. In Brazil, the federal constitution grants 
the public prosecutor the autonomy to represent the community, including the power 
to oversee public administration, initiate inquiries and propose civil action to protect 
the environment. Additionally, the judiciary has been active in cases of improper 
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waste disposal in dumpsites, non-compliance with policies and problems of contract 
concessions, among other irregularities. In India, where the central government 
provides the public with few participatory spaces, the judiciary has gained 
prominence with its actions in support of environmental protection and has become, 
as Justice Balakrishnnan (2008) shows, a powerful catalyst of social change.  
Environmental legislation has changed the character of the judiciary both in Brazil 
and India, empowering judges to interpret the constitution and defend social rights, 
allowing them to play an innovative role in environmental governance. Geetanjoy 
Sahu (2007: 3) argues that, recently, the Indian judiciary has expanded this role 
beyond the arbitrage of conflicts, ensuring that decision-makers create and 
government bodies implement policies in accordance with the principles established 
by the Indian Constitution. This judicial intervention in environmental governance has 
created a growing jurisprudence that has expanded knowledge and furthered the 
debate on the environment in a process that mutually reinforces itself.  
This section explores the influence of the judiciary on the political process of solid 
waste management. Despite the extensive legal literature examining the judiciary and 
environmental legislation, its role as both a key actor and as an institutional space for 
public participation has not been analysed in depth in the field of social sciences. This 
section first discusses the influence of the Indian judiciary on the political process of 
the MSW Rules, then it debates the role of the public prosecutor in Brazil, and it 
concludes with thoughts about the impact of the judiciary on public participation. 
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India’s Public Interest Litigation (PIL) 
The first question concerns how the Indian judiciary is able to influence public 
participation. The Indian legal system is founded on common law, whereby judges 
base their decisions on a binding jurisprudence. This means that the lower courts must 
follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, creating a jurisprudence that evolves and 
enriches itself over time. Sahu (2008: 9) explains that the environmental jurisprudence 
created by the Indian Supreme Court since the 1980s has expanded the dimensions of 
the fundamental rights of the Constitution. He explains that, unlike the Brazilian case, 
where the Constitution 91  includes an article dedicated to ‘the rights on the 
environment’ and methods that enable citizens to participate in the protection of the 
environment, in the Indian Constitution, the environment92 per se is not addressed. 
For this reason, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted the principle of the ‘right to life’ 
in the Constitution.93 Sahu (2008: 5) explains that in the late 1970s Justices P. N. 
Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer began to implement judicial protection of the 
fundamental rights of individuals and communities in such a way as to give a legal 
voice to the underprivileged so that the courts could assist them by extending the 
legislation beyond such issues as child labour, violence against women and the right 
to education to encompass environmental practices.  
Public interest litigation (PIL), the most significant innovation of Indian 
jurisprudence, simplifies the judicial process, dispensing with technicalities, so that 
                                                
91 The author also mentions the same characteristic in the constitutions of Spain, Portugal and Equator. 
92 Sahu (2007: 140) explains that articles 48A and 51A(g), which specifically interpret the environment as forests, 
lakes, rivers and wildlife, are not enforceable by any court, according to article 37, since they are under the 
Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) and Fundamental Duties (Part IVA); while articles 13, 32 and 226 
empower the Supreme and High Courts to review the legislation on the fundamental rights of citizens (articles 14-
32). 
93 Constitution of India, Part III, Art.21, ‘Protection of life and personal liberty’: ‘No person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.’ 
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the poor can access the courts and petitions can be filed in the name of individuals, 
third parties or groups (Sahu, 2007: 142). Understanding the way PIL has been legally 
interpreted is crucial to an analysis of the role of the Indian judiciary in the waste 
issue. Sahu (2008: 5) explains that, over time, the focus of the judges shifted from the 
plaintiff to the subject of the petition, due to the perception of the environment as a 
bundle of diffuse rights, thus liberating them from the legal concept of locus standi.94 
Previously, the petitioner had to prove they had been directly affected by any claimed 
harm. The environmental legislation changed this perception, since the parties 
affected might be unidentifiable and not have suffered any personal injury, as in the 
case of the effect on a community of pollution caused by improper waste collection. 
Contrary to the Brazilian system, where only associations, public prosecutors and 
public institutions can file public civil actions, in India, the petitioner must generally 
have ‘legitimacy in the cause’, which means they have been directly affected.95 The 
petitioner, however, can approach the court in the name of public and general interest, 
or in the name of a third party, albeit without personal gain. As a result, scholars, 
journalists and interest groups have filed PILs in the name of public interest, with the 
aim of protecting the environment, communities and social groups (Sahu, 2007: 142). 
Indian environmental jurisprudence has also incorporated principles of international 
environmental law, empowering the judges to refer to scientific and technical experts, 
investigate causes, suggest solutions, guide policy amendments, summon authorities 
                                                
94 The legal term, locus standi, means that the petitioner accessing the court must prove they have been directly 
harmed. 
95 The new Brazilian Civil Procedure Code (Law 13,105/2015), which has recently been approved, maintains the 
settings of the previous code (Law 5.869/1973). Article 17 determines that in order to approach the court, the 
petitioner must show the legitimacy of his/her interest. Ordinary legitimacy is one that advocates its self-interest in 
court. According to article 18, no one can claim rights in the name of a third party, unless authorised by law. 
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to produce explanations and enforce implementation, all in the name of public interest 
(Sahu, 2007: 16; Rajamani, 2007: 294; Sharma, 2008: 57).  
PIL, therefore, has encouraged the population to access the judiciary as it means that 
any citizen can use the courts if they are subject to human rights violations. Upendra 
Baxi (2000 cited in Rajamani, 2007: 293) points out that this has had a major impact 
in the country at a time when the reputations of political parties, politicians and 
bureaucrats is steadily declining due to corruption scandals. By contrast, the judiciary 
has gained an image of integrity and impartiality; it is seen as the only institutional 
power that protects citizen’s rights against adverse government decisions. (Baxi, 2000 
cited in Rajamani, 2007: 293) states: ‘The Supreme Court of India has assumed the 
mantle of a “Supreme Court for Indians”.’  
The role of the Indian judiciary in MSWM 
This description of how PIL works is an essential introduction to the role of the 
judiciary in the debate about waste in India. The Indian judiciary has definitely shaped 
waste reforms in India over the last two decades: some of the key Indian legislation 
on solid waste management has been due to intervention by the judicial system, and 
some of the most significant government guidelines are the result of PILs filed in 
India’s Supreme and High Courts. For example, Chaturvedi and Gidwani (2011: 134) 
explain that the Bio-Medical Waste (M&H) Rules published in 1998 were the result 
of a petition filed by Dr. B. L. Wadhera in 1996 against improper dumping of hospital 
waste in public landfills. In the same year, Almitra Patel filed another petition in the 
Supreme Court, which resulted in the MSW (Management and Handling) Rules 2000. 
These authors explain that legal processes such as these have produced significant 
changes in waste management in the country. The former court case marked a critical 
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moment when high-ranking officials were called on to provide explanations for the 
inefficiency of their administrations, revealing the incapacity of local governments to 
deal with waste, and initiating, in turn, the privatisation of solid waste management 
system in Delhi. Meanwhile, the latter has been instrumental in the creation of the 
most important Indian legislation on waste so far.  
Important documents, such as the Manual on Solid Waste Management System 2000 
and the Inter-Ministerial Task Force Report 2005, mentioned in section 5.2, were also 
results of the same process. Once again, in 2013, due to another PIL in the High Court 
of Karnataka, the MoEF was forced to withdraw the Amendment Rules 2013, drafted 
with the objective of replacing the existing MSW Rules 2000. Among these 
prominent legal rulings at the national level, there have been several other cases of 
PILs at state and municipal levels. Ranjith Annepu (2013: 3) mentions examples of 
High Court actions against the illegal dumping of waste by local authorities in 
Bangalore, Mumbai and state of Haryana. Rajamani (2007: 295) states that, 
nowadays, the judiciary is active in almost all areas of environmental governance in 
India. The Indian MSW Rules, therefore, have evolved, to a great extent, because of 
judicial pressure. 
Dr. Maley, one of the leading experts on solid waste managment in India, defends this 
judicial activism.96 However, he points out that the judiciary has also prevented the 
introduction of some important initiatives, because every time there is a proposed 
solution to a problem, even if well intentioned, a new PIL is filed to halt the process. 
According to Dr. Maley, in recent times, there have been numerous legal 
                                                
96 Interview recorded (39’35”) at his office in Mumbai, 3 February 2014. 
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interventions by NGOs and other organisations trying to advance their case in any 
way possible, and as a result, actions on waste management grind to a standstill. 
Nevertheless, the Indian Supreme Court (central level) and the High Court (state 
level) have been very effective in monitoring and correcting the actions of the public 
administration and legislature, reviewing and nullifying unconstitutional laws and 
acts. According to Sahu (2007: 11), two different judicial currents of thought have 
emerged from this process: those of active judges and those of activist judges. Active 
judges strictly follow the law as written in the constitution, and their conservative 
thought affirms the power and sovereignty of the state; more progressive judges, on 
the other hand, tend to interpret environmental rights as comprising one of the 
fundamental rights of the citizen, expanding the horizons of social and environmental 
rights (Sahu, 2007: 12). However, judicial activism has faced constant criticism since 
it first entered the political arena, particularly as it influences public policies, which, it 
is claimed, are solely the responsibility of the elected representatives and government 
bureaucrats in the legislative and executive branches (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 259). 
Rajamani (2007: 318) presents the arguments of Justices Chandrachub and Pathak, 
who maintain that when the judiciary exceeds the limits of its legislative 
competences, straying into territory that should remain under the authority of the 
elected representatives, it undermines the fine balance between the three branches of 
governance that comprise the pillars of democracy.  
Critiques of judicial activism 
Although the activist character of the Indian judiciary has also been criticised by 
public officials who argue that it is usurping the government’s position, Justice 
Balakrishnnan (2008) claims that the judiciary is probably the most respected power 
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in India, and the majority of the population relies on the law to protect their interests. 
Ramesh Ramanathan (2007: 675) states that the lack of participatory spaces in Indian 
policy-making, both at local and central government level, is acute. He claims that 
government officials are aware of the complexity of bureaucratic procedures and the 
way that high-ranking officials, members of the elite and celebrities are able to use 
their economic and social positions to circumvent the inefficient public service 
infrastructure: ‘None of them can individually survive in the city without the coping 
mechanisms that their particular position offers them: their networks, their identities’ 
(Ramanathan, 2007: 675).   
In this urban scenario, where even some of the elite struggles to access basic public 
services, the courts become the only route for the ordinary citizen. Due to a lack of 
institutional participatory spaces and democratic channels (Gill, 2010: 239), the 
judiciary has become a ‘platform for public action’ (Annepu, 2013: 3), and sometimes 
it is the most effective channel of mediation between the state and society. Raghav 
Sharma (2008: 52 and 71) also highlights the importance of judicial activism in 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment in an emerging economy 
oriented towards fast-paced industrial growth. Rajamani (2007: 295) states that the 
courts have strengthened the possibilities of democracy in India, promoting policies to 
improve the environment; however, the practice of using public interest legislation 
has raised doubts about the real extent of public participation. 
For example, the formulation of the MSW (M&H) Rules 2000 shows that, although 
the judiciary has forced the government to acknowledge the importance of public 
interest in its policies, this process does not guarantee the participation of society in 
the actual policymaking. Due to the complexity of environmental cases, the court 
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relies heavily on the interpretations of the scientific community (Sahu, 2007: 154); the 
courts appoint independent expert committees, comprising scientific and technical 
experts, to study the cases and provide the judges with information on which to base 
their conclusions. (Section 2.2 in the literature review discusses the role of experts in 
government decisions, mainly in the case of India.) Sahu (2007: 155) argues the idea 
that this produces unbiased rulings is disingenuous, since it configures the problem in 
a determinant manner that ultimately leads to certain conclusions.  
The law is thus legitimated by scientific knowledge; however, the relationship 
between science, law and political decision-making is complex (Sahu, 2007: 156). In 
general, the courts rely on experts from the most respected government bodies, such 
as the MoEF, CPCB and the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute 
(NEERI). However, particularly in the case of waste management, where the 
decisions are invariably contentious as they involve various political and economic 
interests, some of these experts are not free from political interests themselves – some 
have professional and economic links with or have worked as consultants for well-
established corporate players in the market. Moreover, in addition to the inherent 
fallibility of science (due to the continuous evolution of knowledge about the 
environment), the potential for data inaccuracy and the limitations of test models must 
be taken into account. This is problematic as the law requires a simple resolution to a 
dispute, within a limited timeframe. 
Moreover, Rajamani (2007: 303) argues that the poor and the illiterate are unlikely to 
access the courts. Despite the fact that PIL dispenses with legal technicalities and 
lawyers’ expertise, there are other costs involved in the process. Also, most PILs are 
not the result of social mobilisation but of distinct interests based on particular cases 
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(Rajamani, 2007: 306). Kaveri Gill (2010: 208 and 239) also claims that PIL, which 
was originally introduced to protect the disadvantaged sections of society and give the 
poor a voice, has been appropriated by the middle and upper classes to push their own 
‘bourgeois’ interests in urban governance. Rajamani (2007: 303) claims that judges 
are, in general, intellectuals with their own middle-class viewpoints, values and 
interests, which prevent their final rulings from according with the agenda of the 
urban poor. As Gill (2010: 238) argues, the state and the judiciary share the same 
class interests in pushing ‘the green agenda’ –the environmental quality of urban 
spaces – above ‘the brown agenda’ – that is, the provision of basic public services and 
public health. Therefore, although the Indian judiciary has played a key role in solid 
waste management, influencing both the participatory process and policymaking, the 
evidence shows that the upper classes have benefited from, rather than been 
disadvantaged by, this process. 
The role of the Brazilian judiciary in MSWM 
Research carried out by Barcellos (2014: 39) shows a similar trend in Brazil, where 
lawsuits tend to be concentrated in the wealthier cities rather than in the poorer ones. 
In her survey on the impact of public civil action (ACP) on sanitation, Barcellos 
shows that, over a period of ten years, the 258 lawsuits in place were concentrated in 
only 177 municipalities. She claims that even if all of these cities were part of the 
2,495 Brazilian municipalities without sanitation (sewerage and treatment), this would 
mean that only 7% of these cases addressed the most disenfranchised (Barcellos, 
2014: 38). 
Based on Brazil’s extensive legislative framework for environmental protection, the 
judiciary and the public prosecutor have played a crucial role in the solid waste 
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management issue. 97  The judiciary has been used to solve irregularities in the 
environmental licensing and bidding process, and also in the conflicts over the 
competence of the official environmental body. The 1988 Constitution gave the public 
prosecutor the power to promote public investigations and public civil actions to 
protect public and social property, the environment, and other collective interests.98 
The public prosecutor has played a significant role in forcing the municipalities and 
the operators of municipal solid waste management and larger waste generators to 
improve waste management, and putting pressure on environmental bodies to monitor 
their activities.  
Among other mechanisms for environmental protection, the public prosecutor has two 
instruments of direct action: public civil action (ACP) and the Conduct Adjustment 
Terms (TAC). As Cristiana Losenkann (2012: 194) explains, the public prosecutor 
acts through the ACP on behalf of the state in defence of society – even in actions 
against the government – rectifying policy decisions that are contrary to public 
interests. Through the TAC, an extra-judicial agreement between the public body and 
the violator for the regularisation of activities and restoration of environmental 
damage, the public prosecutor has put pressure on the municipalities, contractors and 
other actors to apply best practice and technological improvements to their waste 
management systems (PPIAF, 2011: 16). 
However, opponents such as the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF Report 2011: 17), a donor group associated with the World Bank, claim that, 
                                                
97 In Brazil, the key policies for environmental protection are the National Policy on Environment (Law 6.838/81), 
the law establishing civil public action (Law 7,347/85), article 225 of the Federal Constitution of 1988, and 
environmental crime law (Law 9,605/98). 
98 Brazilian Federal Constitution, Article 129, III. 
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in many cases, due to excessive conservatism, judges have assumed a repressive role, 
which harms enterprises. The PPIAF report highlights the key role played by 
‘Specialised Chambers on the Environment’,99 comprising magistrates with wide 
expertise on environmental legislation, on the solutions of conflicts involving 
environmental issues. 
Losenkann (2012: 195) claims that, despite the wide potential for the promotion of 
justice and public participation, the ACP has been little used in practice. The ACP 
demands legal and technical expertise, and therefore, although it contains the potential 
for participation, it is not open to all of society; on the contrary, it restricts access to 
justice to the more institutionalised groups and those with knowledge of the 
legislation. Barcellos’ survey (2014: 42) shows the potential possessed by the ACP to 
improve sanitation, particularly as the courts have favoured the plaintiffs in 76% of 
cases; however, these cases still represent minimal coverage for the poor. She claims 
that the judiciary need to do more to defend public rights and assure the provision of 
collective goods in order to address the problems of those most in need. 
Unlike the Indian process, where the judiciary has acted almost as a channel for 
communication between state and society, and where public interest litigation has 
been simplified to facilitate the ordinary citizen’s access to state protection, in Brazil, 
where there are other spaces for public participation, the judiciary and the public 
prosecutor concentrate on the solution of conflicts and the effective improvement of 
waste management service provision. 
                                                
99 These are known as the Câmaras Especializadas em Meio Ambiente in Portuguese. 
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Comparing both countries, it is clear, however, that there is a similarly unequal access 
to justice and participation in both systems. Boaventura Santos (2003: 21) emphasises 
the class divisions inherent in access to the state, claiming that it signifies the end of 
the democratic ‘social contract’ and the rise of ‘social fascism’. In his view, this is a 
contemporary phenomenon, mainly seen in the peripheral countries, where the 
democratic regime is characterised by unequal social relationships and the potentially 
irreversible exclusion of certain individuals and groups in society. Santos argues that 
the state is complicit in this ‘pluralist fascism’ generated by the societies of emerging 
economies. Among the different forms in which social fascism manifests itself, he 
describes social stratification in the state-society relationship and the division of urban 
spaces into two zones: civilised and savage spaces (Santos, 2003: 21). In the civilised, 
wealthy zones – for example, enclaves of the rich in India and private condominiums 
in Brazil – the state protects the private space and democratic rights of the more 
privileged citizens; in the savage zones, however, in the slums and urban peripheries, 
the ‘Hobbesian state’ is the ‘predator’, incapable of assisting individuals and assuring 
their civil rights (Santos, 2003: 21). He differentiates civil society by three categories 
of access to the state: intimate, estranged and uncivil (Santos, 2003: 24). ‘Intimate 
civil society’, differentiated by ‘hyper-inclusion’, comprise those individuals or 
groups with full access to public goods, who enjoy complete socio-political, economic 
and cultural rights and full public participation; those who comprise ‘uncivil civil 
society’, characterised by ‘hyper-exclusion’, where social fascism occurs in totality, 
are invisible to the state and do not belong to society; while the intermediate layer, the 
‘estranged civil society’, comprise the middle and lower-middle classes with scarce 
access to the provision of the state.  
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6.5 Irregularities in the MSWM sector 
The history of municipal solid waste management in São Paulo city in Brazil, from 
the late-1980s to mid-2000s, has been marked by several corruption scandals. After 
recurrent emergency contracts and allegations of irregularities in the bidding process 
under the tenure of mayors from different political parties, in 2002, the Legislative 
Assembly established a parliamentary commission of enquiry100 to investigate the 
infamous case of the ‘Cartel of Contractors’, 101  where a group of nine large 
companies, which had dominated the contracts for cleaning services in the city for 
decades, were accused of irregularities and buying favours in exchange for election 
campaign donations (TI, 2010). Some of these contractors had previously been under 
investigation in 1999 as part of the scandal of the ‘Mafia of the City Hall Tax 
Inspectors’,102  a corrupt network of public officials taking bribes and falsifying costs, 
which was uncovered by the state prosecutor (Mug, 2002).  
In response these scandals, in 2002, Mayor Marta Suplicy introduced the Domestic 
Solid Waste Tax (TRSD),103 which separated out the fraction of public tax supporting 
municipal solid waste management from the existing Urban Building and Land Tax 
(IPTU), in order to render the provision of public services more transparent and to 
increase public awareness in the battle to reduce waste and increase recycling in the 
city (Ferreira, 2003). However, the tax generated protests from the social movements, 
led by opposition parties, with allegations of municipal corruption and fraud. In the 
                                                
100 Well-known in São Paulo as the ‘CPI do Lixo’. 
101 In Portuguese: Cartel das Empreiteiras. 
102 In Portuguese: Máfia dos Fiscais da Prefeitura.  
103 Known as the ‘garbage tax’ (Taxa do Lixo), the tax was self-declared, and varied between R$ 6,14 (USD 1,45) 
to R$ 61,36 (USD 15,36) per month, according to the volume of waste generated by the property type. According 
to São Paulo Agora (2003), while in place, the tax helped to increase recycling rates, as it forced the population to 
reduce waste generation and use recycling options in order to reduce tax payments. 
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end, after a noisy political battle in the municipal council and the mass media, the 
Chief Justice revoked the tax in 2005 (Soares, 2005). In 2004, he also cancelled the 
previous contracts due to irregularities in the public bidding process (São Paulo 
Agora, 2004). Although, the cases mentioned above are specific to the city of São 
Paulo, Brazil’s major industrial and financial hub, such irregularities are common in 
other municipalities across the country. 
Corruption in municipal solid waste management 
The first question we need to answer is why there is such irregularity and corruption 
surrounding solid waste management. André Trigueiro (2012) argues that problems 
such as weak monitoring, lack of transparency and biased bidding procedures, 
common in municipal solid waste management, attract corrupt practices. He explains 
that, in general, solid waste is charged according to weight – the cost per ton of 
transport – and this varies according to specific types of solid waste (household, 
C&D, hazardous and others types of waste).104 Due to weak monitoring processes, 
there are weighing irregularities, clandestine escape routes, enabling lorries to evade 
inspection, and dumping in illegal landfills. Trigueiro explains that the mayor is in 
charge of setting up the solid waste management system in their city; however, due to 
a misconception that waste is not an issue that attracts votes, many of mayors fear to 
increase public costs and are thus unable to solve the corruption and deficiencies they 
inherit from their predecessors. In addition, in Brazil, as mentioned above, the larger 
contractors in the sector, such as the transport sector and banking institutions, are 
major contributors to the election campaigns of local officials (Novaes, 2013). 
                                                
104 Triguerio explains that in 2012, a ton of household waste cost around R$ 40 (USD 10), while a ton of hazardous 
waste cost around R$ 1,000 (USD 250). 
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Trigueiro (2012) calls attention to the fact that, due to misinformation, incompetence 
and, in some cases, malicious practices, some mayors oppose any environmentally 
sound solid waste management policy (recycling, composting and other treatment 
systems), preferring to take advantage of illegal practices committed by their 
unscrupulous corporate allies. In fact, the search for a political solution to these 
irregularities was one of the main reasons for the enactment of the National Policy on 
Solid Waste (PNRS).  
Curiously, despite all the differences between Brazil and India, in one variable at least 
they are similar: in 2015, both countries occupied the 76th position in a ranking of 168 
countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, scoring 38 
points each.105 
Empirical research 
This section explores some of the irregularities, discovered through the fieldwork, that 
are prevalent in the solid waste management sector in both countries. These 
irregularities were raised as a constant complaint throughout the interviews. Some of 
these cases are well known by practitioners, bureaucrats and the media, while others 
are not apparent to the ordinary citizen as they are not reported in official documents 
and very few reach the pages of the newspapers or judicial proceedings. These hidden 
abuses have become part of the political milieu in this sector, and are known 
popularly as ‘business as usual’. In fact, the majority of irregularities are ‘legal’, due 
to the lack of legislation preventing infringement or the weak monitoring 
mechanisms, so that corrupt agents are able find legal loopholes.  
                                                
105 Available at: https://www.transparency.org/country/ 
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During the course of the fieldwork, it became evident that this subject demands a 
thorough investigation; however, this research was not designed to explore the extent 
of corruption in waste management. Nevertheless, an understanding of these practices 
is crucial for the debate about public or interest group participation. On the one hand, 
particularism hinders political participation, while on the other, proponents claim that 
public participation aims to improve transparency and accountability in governance. 
However, there is no data to measure the impact the irregularities have on public 
service delivery and public participation. The cases discussed in this section are based 
on the narratives of practitioners in the sector, collected during the fieldwork, and 
show examples of corruption at all levels of governance. The names and organisations 
are anonymised due to the lack of legal action in these cases; therefore, the section 
focuses on the practices and the political milieu, rather than the perpetrators, in order 
to analyse how these structural deviations impact the political process. Despite the 
limitations of the data and the research design, this debate is crucial, as some of these 
practices directly impact the public participation process, hindering the provision of 
services and imposing the burden of additional costs on the general population. 
Despite the fact that the literature claims that citizen pressure and social control play a 
crucial role in holding the government and its institutions to account, ensuring they 
follow through on their commitment to improve the quality of public service 
provision, the evidence shows that public participation does not guarantee that these 
political vices are eliminated.  
Recurrent crises vs. systemic irregularities 
As with any other public sector, municipal solid waste management faces some 
recurrent crises. During the fieldwork, two specific cases emerged in India and Brazil 
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that illustrated the outcome of irregularities at the local level. Since 2000, the 
municipal corporation of Thiruvananthapuram, state capital of Kerala in India, was 
disposing the city’s solid waste in a dumpsite in the neighbouring city of Vilappil, 
15km away from the capital. In August 2012, in protest against the environmental 
degradation and the deterioration in the health of Vilappil’s population, due to 
leachate contamination of its rivers and groundwater, the residents decided to close 
the dumpsite (EPW, 2016). Ranjith Annepu (2013) explains that the municipal 
corporation abdicated responsibility for collecting Thiruvananthapuram’s waste 
without letting its residents know, so they started to throw their garbage in bushes, 
rivers and community areas across the city. According to EPW (2016), the case was 
still under judicial review at the National Green Tribunal in 2016. 
When I visited the city of Sorocaba, in Brazil, approximately 100km away from the 
state capital of São Paulo, in December in 2013, piles of waste had remained on the 
streets for more than a week without collection, and the municipal authorities of 
Sorocaba had been forced to sign an emergency contract to resolve the crisis. The 
newspaper Cruzeiro do Sul (2013) explains that the crisis was the result of a poorly 
drafted tendering process held in 2010: the contract delegated all the services to the 
same contractor, leaving the municipal authority with no control over the 
subcontracting of other services by the company. After months of lack of payment, 
the subcontracted company, Proactiva Ambiental, took the contractor that held the 
concession, Gomes Lourenço, to court, closing the commercial landfill, Iperó, and 
creating a chaotic situation for the city’s inhabitants.106  
                                                
106 A video on Youtube shows waste workers of the concessionary company dumping waste clandestinely on the 
streets during the night: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDIZ9EF1qV 
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Citizens’ access to public services 
Pranab Bardhan (1997: 1321) defines corruption as the ‘use of public office for 
private gains’. In general, it refers to politicians and bureaucrats who take advantage 
of their official position to enrich themselves or finance their campaigns; businessmen 
who seek to gain contracts, influence policies, accelerate or block administrative 
processes, and control the bidding for and granting of licences through illicit 
practices; and citizens who try to avoid taxes or penalties. However, it is important to 
emphasise that it is easy to blame the bureaucracy for every ill, generalising the 
incompetence of some civil servants and the usury of big companies. After meeting a 
variety of businessmen and visiting government bodies at different levels in various 
states in both countries, I perceived that some professionals are frustrated with the 
obstacles these irregularities pose; these are engaged and skilled professionals trying 
their best to overcome these barriers and carry out their duties. There seemed little 
difference between the civil servants in their offices in the municipality of Maceió in 
Brazil and those in Pune’s municipal corporation in India. They demonstrated hard 
work and a commitment to overcoming constraints (for example, a lack of adequate 
equipment and an unceasing plethora of paperwork) to provide public services. 
As Akhil Gupta (2012: 23) explains, the problem is the fact that good intentions are 
subverted by bureaucratic procedures. He calls attention to the structural violence of 
the state, calling it a ‘crime without a criminal’ (Gupta, 2012: 21), where issues such 
as corruption and exclusion cannot be attributed to a particular, identifiable agent, but 
are the consequence of the structural system of power, where violence is constant 
rather than intentionally perpetrated. Girish Kumar et al. (2009: 105) state that 
corruption is not only found in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy, but civil servants, 
local elected representatives and middlemen all establish systems of patronage and 
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brokerage, bargaining with the population over access to public goods. When people 
pays bribes or commissions, they do so because it is the only way they can access 
essential services that should be free. Gupta (2012: 33) argues that systemic violence 
structures the daily practices of the bureaucracy, and the poor are those who suffer the 
most: they are denied access to services and programmes that were specifically 
designed for them; they are forced to deal with corruption in their daily life and made 
to pay for public goods that should be free (Gupta, 2012: 76).  
Kumar et al. (2009: 105) argue that India’s system of tax collection displays 
incompetence and inefficiency at all levels of government – the payment of fees for 
public services is regularly replaced by illegal payments, which leads to a low level of 
revenue collection, impacting in turn the quality of public services. When public 
resources are diverted for other purposes, investments in infrastructure are clearly 
affected and society loses out (Singh, 2007: 16); corruption makes public 
infrastructure and service provision more expensive and inefficient (Bardhan, 1997: 
1328). Therefore, as Nirvikar Singh (2007: 48) stresses, poor accountability leads to 
corruption. In order to improve accountability, it is necessary to introduce monitoring, 
transparency and disclosure of public information, but this can only occur with legal 
support through the institutional framework. 
Structural violence 
The examples above show some of the outcomes of misguided contractual processes, 
but there are other structural deviations that are part of the political context. For 
example, one reason for the lack of capacity at the local level, already debated above, 
is the political milieu. In Brazil, a frequent complaint among government staff, which 
is most likely echoed across the country, is the constant discontinuation of public 
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programmes after elections. Civil servants interviewed complained that when new 
governments come to power, they always expect to face a shortage of resources. It is 
common practice that former civil servants destroy all information relating to the 
previous administration before handing the mandate to their successors. In this way, a 
great part of the progress and investments of the previous government is lost after 
each new election; instead of a gradual and straightforward evolution, solid waste 
management, as well as other programmes, become continuous cycles, maintained by 
the electoral processes. The new government and its staff generally need to start new 
programmes from scratch, following their new political agenda. 
In general, municipalities have poor inventories and thus never have total control of 
their municipal assets, including their equipment and furniture. At the end of one term 
of office, former employees often take with them what they can carry, from 
computers to telephones and chairs. These types of practices were confirmed by 
respondents at different levels of governance and in different cities during the 
fieldwork. Moreover, there are also conflicting interests, with opposition parties vying 
for power within the different levels of government. Civil servants complain that 
members of opposition parties often play a damaging role, discrediting and 
obstructing the work carried out by the parties in power; it is usually difficult to 
implement programmes at a local level when the party of the municipality has 
divergent political interests to those of the party in power at state level. For example, 
when I visited the superintendent of Urban Cleaning (SLUM) in the city of Maceió, in 
the state of Alagoas in Brazil, in 2013, the director was dealing with a particularly 
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flagrant case of sabotage.107 While the SLUM was establishing a neighbourhood 
clean-up task force108 in a community, members of the opposition party were spotted 
by the local news outlet dumping garbage into the areas already cleared, in order to 
damage the image of the local government. 
The Secretary of State for the Environment and Water Resources (SEMARH)109 of 
the state of Alagoas confirms that municipalities are completely unprepared for the 
implementation of the PNRS, as they lack technical staff and equipment. In many 
cases, the political will of the local mayors is the key problem. For example, their 
bargaining power lies in the fact that they can deliver the vote in their constituencies, 
and parliament provides funding in exchange for votes. Therefore, in addition to 
exempting the population from paying taxes, these mayors also place trusted allies in 
public positions in exchange for political favours, regardless of their qualifications for 
the job, thus weakening the capacity of the municipality. Valmir Penedo, a local 
authority engineer for the Department of Public Works, explains that the department 
needs a technician, but there is no budget to hire a gazetted officer, because the 
position is occupied by unskilled employees, hired according to political interests, 
who in many cases do not even go to work.110 I also found this sort of cronyism in 
India at all levels of governance, where the responsibility for licencing, compliance or 
monitoring processes is passed between members of public and private organisations 
with kinship ties or personal links to each other. 
 
                                                
107 Interviewed at the SLUM headquarters in Maceió, 18 December 2013 
108 In Portuguese: mutirão. 
109 Interviewed at the SEMARH headquarters in Maceió, 19 December 2013. 
110 Interviewed at the Penedo City Hall, Brazil, 23 December 2013. 
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The ‘revolving door’ in the Indian bureaucracy 
Probably one of the most egregious aspects that deserves more extensive investigation 
is the close relationship of government officials with the private sector in India. When 
searching for potential interviewees, conducting interviews or participating in policy 
formulation, it was interesting to note that the technocrats working in governmental 
bodies frequently had links with private companies. Some informants confirmed a 
common practice in the bureaucracy, in which, after retiring from public office, high-
ranking officials and civil servants move directly into key positions in private 
companies operating in the same sector. Amiya Sahu, Director of the National Solid 
Waste Association of India (NSWAI), explains that, from time to time, public 
officials ease into pre-retirement by joining private companies and, after a few years, 
return to their government posts.111 Also, in many instances, company executives 
occupy advisory positions in government policymaking, acting as consultants or 
members of research institutes while working in the corporate sector. In the literature, 
this phenomenon is commonly called the ‘revolving door’. Transparency International 
(2010: 2) defines this practice as the movement of public officials between public 
office and private organisations, exploiting their public positions to advance their 
private interests.  
Supporters of this practice claim that it strengthens the political system, benefiting 
both public and private sectors by fostering innovation and expertise; however, it also 
raises concerns about conflicts of interest and favouritism undermining the legitimacy 
of policy decisions. Conflicts of interest arise when public officials take advantage of 
                                                
111 Interviewed at the NSWAI offices in Mumbai, 27 February 2014. 
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their current, previous or future public office (their contacts and insider information) 
to influence decision-making for personal gain. Transparency International (2010: 2) 
calls attention to the risk of policies which clearly advance the interests of private 
clients to the detriment of the public. In such a situation, without a more open and 
participative policymaking process, it is those individuals and groups with direct 
access to the government who ultimately influence policy-making.  
The presence of private interests in government is the probable explanation for the 
gap between the proposals of government-financed schemes put before public debates 
on municipal solid waste management and the very different reality on the ground. 
This was confirmed in interviews conducted for this research with practitioners in the 
sector, such as Ravi Agarwal (Toxic Link) in Delhi, Ranjit Gadgil (Parisar) in Pune, 
Amiya Sahu (NSWAI) in Mumbai and Myriam Shankar (Solid Waste Management 
Roundtable or SWMRT) in Bangalore, among others, who suggest that the main 
question Indian citizens should ask themselves is: who writes the policies and what 
are the conflicts of interest involved in the policymaking process? 
In Brazil, according to Transparency International (2010: 7), the government 
established legislation112 and a code of conduct, following a series of scandals, to 
prevent this sort of conflict of interest. The Brazilian legislative framework curbs 
these practices with strict rules and heavy penalties. M.K. Venu (2015) stresses that 
India urgently needs such a legislative framework to enforce a similar code of 
conduct. The Janaagraha report (2012: 31) confirms that the Indian legal system does 
not have the legislative mechanisms in place that could set boundaries, prevent 
                                                
112 Decree 4,187/2002 regulates the opportunities for officials to exercise activities or provide services after 
dismissal from public office, and Law 12,813/2013 imposes a quarantine period. 
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potential abuses and impose ethical behaviour on private companies. This sort of 
regulation is crucial at a time of increasing interaction between the government and 
the corporate sector in processes such as the procurement of public contracts and 
concessions, the creation of PPPs and the implementation of privatisations, this issue 
will be scrutinised in depth in section 7.3. 
The Janaagraha report (2012: 32) also reveals that the private sector lobby constantly 
seeks to find loopholes in the legislation, areas of ambiguity and weak regulation that 
it can exploit. Although this underhand and unethical behaviour cannot be generalised 
to all firms and interest groups, it reduces competition and skews the market in favour 
of those who undertake these predatory practices. Ethical conduct is essential to 
ensure fair competition in the private sector and to improve the performance of public 
administration, ensuring transparency and accountability (Janaagraha, 2012: 32). This 
begs the question of whether particularism is solely a problem of the Global South? 
International players 
In partial answer to this question, it is clear that some of the corruption described 
above is also driven by international donors and multinational corporations, who take 
advantage of the loopholes, fluidity and lack of knowledge apparent in an emerging 
market still in formation. For example, Eduardo Soriano, general coordinator of 
Energy and Mineral Resources at the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (MCTI), claims that he frequently receives several unrealistic projects: 
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‘There are companies selling the same project to several cities, and mayors frequently 
come to visit me with their ‘magical solutions’, which are simply not viable.’113 
Soriano’s criticisms are aligned with research produced by the Great Western Mining 
Corporation (GWMO) (UNEP and ISWA, 2015: 133), which shows that, in Brazil, 
local mayors are regularly invited to visit state-of-the-art facilities in highly 
industrialised countries, whose expensive technologies are devised for northern 
environmental conditions, with the waste composition, and operational and 
maintenance capacities, of high-income societies. The public officials then attempt to 
implement these technologies in their tropical municipalities, which are still 
struggling to provide basic services for their populations. For example, the mayor of 
Penedo, a town of some 63,000 inhabitants in the northeast of Brazil says: ‘We are 
already looking for a power plant to convert waste into energy. This is very common 
in Europe, the US and Japan, and naturally, here in Penedo, I will follow the same 
pathway.’114 Soriano criticises this attitude: ‘Unfortunately, a lot of money will be 
thrown away: facilities will be halted or inadequately built, and the cost will be passed 
on to the next administration. Because this is our political culture.’ 
Section summary 
This section mentions only those irregularities reported by the interviewees in this 
research, and is far from covering all the modalities of corruption that exist in solid 
waste management sectors in India and Brazil. The bidding process for the outsourced 
concessions and contracts is probably the main source of corruption. However, the 
                                                
113 Interviewed at the MCTI headquarters in Brasilia, 23 October 2013. 
114 Interview recorded (20’30”) at the Penedo City Hall, 13 December 2013, State of Alagoas. 
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problem is systemic and well-known to practitioners in the sector. Nevertheless, the 
subject would merit a further exploration, using specific research tools to explore 
these cases in more depth. 
Corruption and collusion has a negative impact on public participation. Sofia Olsson 
(2014: 2) explains that citizens become disengaged when they feel they have little 
influence on politics. In Brazil, Ribeiro of CETESB claims that well-designed 
processes which include social control are certainly able to increase transparency and 
hold governments and companies to account for their actions to a greater degree; 
however, public participation does not guarantee less corrupt political processes, and 
in some cases, can even aggravate the problem. In India, Joël Ruet and Stéphanie 
Lama-Rewal (2009: 5) claim that fighting against corruption is a crucial feature of 
‘good governance’, but even new actors have taken advantage of the deficiencies of 
public service provision, subverting the participatory process through patronage. 
Therefore, to some extent, corruption is also part of the democratic system. The 
literature review (Chapter 2) discussed the idea that democracy is not synonymous 
with development. Indeed, as Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Karl (1991: 85) claim, 
there is a false notion that democratic participation will resolve all irregularities; in 
fact, they suggest that democracy does not necessarily produce good governance and 
more efficient administrative systems. Neither does the electoral process change such 
conduct; rather, it has often led to the continued election of corrupt politicians. 
However, despite this, these authors claim that democratic control still promises the 
public a better chance of achieving the goal of transparency and accountability than 
do autocratic regimes (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 87). 
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6.6 Chapter summary 
Public participation, in theory, provides alternative institutional arenas in which 
citizens and interest groups can debate policies, exchange information and provide 
inputs to the solution of national and local problems. It also has the potential to 
improve the transparency and accountability of political processes. The Brazilian and 
Indian models attest to the differences that can be seen in processes that incorporate 
open participatory forums and those that rely on more closed decision-making 
proceedings. However, this chapter has illustrated that in the apparently more pluralist 
processes in Brazil, powerful interest groups have been able to take advantage of 
these participatory processes and their lack of regulation, capitalising on the fragility 
of government institutions and the venality or political ambition of government 
officials to advance policies that privilege their economic interests. 
Thus, the investigation of public participatory forums presented in this chapter has 
revealed that these public spaces, instead of representing forums in which citizens can 
participate in government decisions, have for the most part provided opportunities for 
neo-pluralist interests (as defined in Chapter 2) to dominate the proceedings. Taking 
the example of the CNMA and the Sectoral Agreements in Brazil, the chapter has 
shown that not all participants’ claims prevail in these debates; rather, as these forums 
for discussion have evolved, associations of those with partisan interests in specific 
issues have emerged. Some more organised groups are able to raise and sustain their 
claims, mobilising other supporters to join their cause. Consequently, access to 
information and expertise play a crucial role in determining which voices are heard. 
The ability to engage in several rounds of debates requires information exchange, 
control of the means of persuasion and sufficient resources, which only the most 
organised groups can afford – a facet of collective action discussed by Olson (1971). 
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The point this chapter has emphasised is that, although these participatory spaces (as 
defined by Gaventa) have, in principle, been established to enable the ordinary citizen 
to debate policies that affect their lives, they are in reality exploited by interest groups 
and policy experts. In addition, interest group lobbies are not only able to exert 
pressure in these participatory forums, but along the entire course of the decision-
making process. 
This chapter examined case studies of four influential political spaces of state-interest 
group interaction. The cases discussed in sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 illustrated the level 
of participation in the political debates on waste management in both India and Brazil. 
In the example of Brazil, the government has invested in institutional spaces which 
bring interests groups together to debate alternatives for the implementation of waste 
management policies. Meanwhile, the process in India over the last two decades, from 
when the first PIL introduced the MSW Rules 2000 up to the introduction of the SBA, 
has been driven by legal interventions promoted by interest groups. This has clearly 
been the result of the limited space for public contestation in the country. 
According to the categorisation of interest groups by Grant Jordan et al. (2004), the 
groups and individuals participating in the 4th CNMA were ‘policy participants’. 
Although the forum provided opportunities for groups to debate, put forward 
proposals and vote on the issue, the chapter section on the conference has shown that 
it is not clear whether the final documents that emerged guaranteed any effective 
policy outcome. Even some of the government employees interviewed for this 
research confirmed that they have not had access to any of these documents. 
Nonetheless, many interviewees also stressed the importance of the forum for the 
articulation of demands and exchange of information among interest groups and 
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government institutions at the three levels of governance involved in solid waste 
management. In this sense, it was undoubtedly an exercise in democratic education. 
By contrast, as this chapter illustrated, the interest groups in the Sectoral Agreements 
could be classified as ‘pressure participants’, since they discussed the proposal for a 
national recycling system, and the final report that emerged from the negotiations 
received government endorsement. As such, it represents a legally valid agreement 
between the state and the parties involved. In this case, powerful corporate groups 
actively participated, influencing the policy outcomes, as the profitability of their 
operations relied on these agreements. 
This chapter also argued that the gap between the proposals of the Indian Waste 
Rules, drawn up centrally, and the reality of their implementation in the cities is the 
result of the lack of participatory discussions; the central government policymakers 
failed to anticipate the diversity of interests involved or recognise the potential for 
alternative strategies for waste management represented by other groups across the 
country. As some interviewees emphasised, solid waste management was not a 
priority for the government at this stage. Recently, the SBA and the new MSW Rules 
2016 have gained momentum and signalled some changes to this process, creating 
new opportunities for more pluralist debates around the issue. However, as the chapter 
warned, it is not clear yet how much participatory space the political and economic 
coalitions of elite forces will allow.  
Moreover, in addition to irregularities in participatory processes such as the Indian 
National Consultation Programme, this research found potential conflicts of interest 
among the experts and consultants invited to participate in India’s waste management 
policymaking process. Pranab Bardhan (1998) stresses that tight coalitions of 
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corporate interests and bureaucrats have dominated policy areas, ensuring that 
decisions remain under their control. Further research is needed to investigate whether 
public servants at different levels of governance have economic interests in corporate 
groups, compromising their impartiality. The ‘revolving door’ – the exchange of 
officials between government and business – which is forbidden in many countries 
(see section 6.5), is common practice in the Indian bureaucracy. These matters have 
been criticised by Indian scholars for decades: Atul Kohli (1993), for example, calls 
attention to the technocratic rule-making process, which is conducted behind closed 
doors, with limited public scrutiny. It is no surprise that in this technocratic 
environment, where conflicts of interest are ignored, there is little space for the 
informal sector. 
However, the chapter also pointed out that the decision-making processes and legal 
systems in Brazil and India show something more striking. In both cases, the wealthy 
groups in society are the main beneficiaries of these participatory processes. In 
Brazil’s Sectoral Agreements on Packaging (probably the most important piece of 
policy for the successful implementation of the PNRS), the most powerful group of 
industrialists won the political battle, and their proposal, which covers only a small 
part of the national problem, was accepted, disproportionately benefiting their 
members’ operations. Although many interviewees highlighted the educational 
importance of these sectoral debates, and the potential they offer for sharing 
information amongst all levels of society, in the end, they clearly have become a 
channel for neo-pluralist interests. Meanwhile, within the judiciary, scholars in both 
countries (Rajamani, 2007; Barcellos, 2014; Ramanathan, 2007) have concluded that 
the upper and middle classes have taken advantage of legal tools designed to protect 
the poor. 
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In addition to the high levels of inequality in terms of access to public resources, the 
political systems in both countries display a range of irregularities, as section 6.5 
revealed. Although this research was not designed to specifically investigate 
irregularities and systemic corruption, the findings of this chapter have shown that 
these practices have a strong negative influence on decisions concerning the 
governance of solid waste management. They affect the quality of the services 
provided to the public, the economic development of certain regions or cities and even 
the health of democracy in these countries, since they allow the misappropriation of 
public goods by certain groups (Santos, 2003); it appears that only a privileged 
minority has full access to democracy (Santos, 2003; O’Donnell, 1996). The chapter 
argued that some of these malpractices are part of the culture of the bureaucracy and 
its relationship with the private sector, while others are informally institutionalised in 
the political systems. These sorts of permanent and pervasive irregularities are what 
Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) claims separate newer, ‘uneven’ democracies from older 
ones (see Chapter 2, section 2.2, for a full description of this term). The key 
difference is the fact that in long-established democracies ‘rules are truly followed 
and public-oriented government prevails’, with little space between the formal rules 
and official behaviour (O’Donnell, 1996). Conversely, particularism and informal 
rules are real obstacles to democracy and development in countries such as India and 
Brazil, since they legitimise the abuse of the relationship between government 
officials and interest groups. 
The question this chapter has raised is whether the legal regulation of interest group 
participation would, to some degree, curb the power of corporate pressure groups to 
sway policy decisions. In distinction to the US, the UK or France, where lobbying is 
regulated by law, neither Brazil nor India have specific legislation regulating the 
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participation of interest groups in decision-making or their relationship with public 
officials. However, both countries have introduced bills115 seeking to regulate the 
activity of interest groups in federal public administration in an attempt to enhance 
transparency and accountability. The following extract from ‘The Disclosure of 
Lobbying Activities Bill’ (208/2015), proposed in the lower house of parliament (Lok 
Sabha) in 2015, shows that Indian parliamentarians are not unaware of the influence 
of pressure group lobbying on government decisions: 
There is a growing fear among the public that lobbyists, especially corporate 
lobbyists, are gaining undue powers to influence public policy and that 
decisions arising from such lobbying activities are detrimental to the 
interests of the exchequer and the public at large.  
By institutionalising and regulating lobbying practices, the law aims to ensure the 
equal treatment of pressure groups and equal access to decision-makers in the 
administrative or legislative process. Future research will be needed to analyse the 
impact of these policies on the disproportionate power such interest groups wield over 
government decision-making. 
The next chapter discusses the key actors operating in the waste management sector, 
and analyses their strategies, and their capacity, for influencing the decision-making 
process. 
                                                
115 In Brazil, Bill 1,202/2007 regulates the lobbying activities of pressure groups, while in India, ‘The Disclosure 
of Lobbying Activities’ (Bill 208/2015) was introduced in 2015. 
 Chapter 7 Influential MSWM Interest Groups in Brazil and 
India  
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the historical political processes and the 
institutional participatory spaces created around the management of solid waste in 
Brazil and India have given rise to different forms of political participation, which in 
turn have shaped the waste reforms in these countries in distinct ways. This chapter 
explores the organisation of key interest groups involved in waste management in 
these countries and their capacity to influence government decisions. 
The chapter shows that the MSWM sector is extremely politicised, and participants 
need to invest substantial resources and forge coalitions that will enhance their power 
to compete successfully. The democratic process is, therefore, characterised by the 
competition for power, and the state is the arena where the conflicting interests 
compete. The government possesses the ability to mediate, monitor and enforce 
measures to produce some balance in this dispute and thus ensure the equitable 
provision of public services such as waste management. However, this chapter reveals 
that key pressure groups in the sector take advantage of the opportunities that public 
participation provides to influence government policies. 
The chapter is organised in four sections which analyse the interaction of the key 
interest groups shaping the political processes in four main cases. It explores: 
•  representative associations in the MSWM sector in Brazil; 
•  the provision of waste management services in India; 
•  the participation of international elites in the domestic debate in both countries; 
•  and the situation of informal waste pickers in India and Brazil. 
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This subject division reflects the key characteristics of solid waste management in 
each country. Using this structure, the chapter aims to explore the identity and nature 
of the interest groups involved in waste management, their actions and strategies, and 
their capacity to influence government decisions. 
The presence of participatory spaces in Brazil has helped promote the aggregation of 
the demands, and therefore the political power, of influential interest groups in the 
waste management sector, while the characteristics of the Indian political context (the 
asymmetric structure of the legislative process, the technocratic nature of decision-
making, which limits pluralist debate, and the historical evolution of these debates) 
has led to a fragmentation of demands, hindering any substantive changes to central 
government decisions. These characteristics are illustrated in section 7.2, which 
discusses the three main interest groups’ involvement in the debates around the 
introduction of the National Policy on Solid Waste (PNRS) in Brazil, and section 7.3, 
which explains the informal nature of waste management in India, and its challenges. 
However, concentrating solely on these internal characteristics runs the risk of failing 
to recognise that solid waste management is also greatly influenced by external 
forces. An analysis of the role of international organisations in the domestic political 
debate is crucial to an understanding of interest group participation in these countries. 
In the solid waste management sector, there is a myriad of foreign organisations 
affecting the operation of domestic interest groups and government agencies, from the 
national to the local level. In fact, these external influences help to flatten out the 
differences between the Brazilian and Indian political systems, as they promote a 
uniform system of information, practices and technologies to solve the often very 
different problems in these two distinct cultures. 
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A further, essential element in this picture is the presence of informal waste pickers. 
They are at the centre of the debates about the challenges of waste management in 
developing countries; however, they have achieved quite different political results in 
the waste reforms in Brazil and India. Section 7.5 investigates the causes of these 
differences and the impact of the political participation of waste pickers on 
government decisions. 
7.2 Representative business associations in Brazil 
One key differential when considering Brazilian and Indian waste reforms is the 
definition of responsibility for the generation of solid waste. The Indian Waste Rules 
are based on a set of hierarchical responsibilities: sections 4 to 18 of the MSW Rules 
2016 outline a series of duties that are to be shared between the waste generators and 
the waste authorities, among them the relevant ministries, the urban development 
departments of the local states and the UTs, ULBs, CPCB, SPCB116 and other official 
bodies (MoEFCC, 2016). In contrast (as discussed earlier in section 6.3), the Brazilian 
PNRS demands that all waste generators share responsibility for the product’s entire 
lifecycle and find solutions to the problem of solid waste, either individually or as part 
of a network (PNRS, 2010: Art.3, XVII). For this reason, before enforcing this duty, 
the law calls on specific productive sectors to offer their solutions via the Sectoral 
Agreements on Reverse Logistics. The PNRS, therefore, has initiated a widespread 
debate, involving all the interest groups in the sector, in a complex process of 
negotiation to search for nation-wide solutions. 
                                                
116 Union Territories (UT); Urban Local Bodies (ULB); Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB); and State 
Pollution Control Board (SPCB), respectively. 
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The specific conceptual basis of the Brazilian legislation, and the institutional spaces 
created by the state apparatus, have allowed a variety of interest groups and collective 
bodies to exert control over the political process, the most powerful of these being: 
• the SWM sector; 
• the industrial sector; 
• and local government entities. 
This section will explore the role and impact of these key interest groups in the 
Brazilian waste policy context. Alongside these coalitions, the leaders of the National 
Movement of Catadores of Recyclables (MNCR) have also actively participated in 
the debates. This specific interest group will be analysed separately in section 7.5, in 
order to provide a comparison with the situation of waste pickers in India. 
Due to specific historical circumstances, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the Brazilian 
government has established institutional channels of participation (the National 
Conference on the Environment (CNMA) and the Sectoral Agreements), where 
decisions over waste management are debated by those with an interest in the policy 
outcomes. These measures have provided opportunities for coalitions, alliances and 
agreements between interest groups – Lee Alston et al. (2016) employ the term 
‘dominant networks’ (see Chapter 2) to describe the coalitions between elite interest 
groups and the state that operate in the political realm in order to influence or change 
waste policy. As discussed in section 5.3, the PNRS emerged from one such extensive 
participatory process, where different coalitions were formed to promote certain 
interests, including the powerful industrial lobby, which mobilised to prevent the 
introduction of extended producer responsibility (EPR) in Brazil. This is the crucial 
difference between Brazil and India in the waste reform area: in Brazil, the 
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government debates potential solutions with market players and civil society in public 
forums that encourage the formation of dominant networks; in India, decisions are 
made inside government by appointed experts, and such coalitions are less evident, as 
there are few spaces for interest group participation. 
India also has several prominent interest groups in the sector, formed among 
economic associations. However, the lack of participatory spaces in which to debate 
central government decision-making was evident in the interviews conducted for this 
research; interviewees repeatedly emphasised that waste policies are formulated in the 
ministry, and only a few high-ranking officials, experts and invited guests participate 
in the internal debates and have access to the negotiations. Expert groups such as the 
Centre for Public Health, the Environmental Engineering Organisation (CPHEEO) 
and the Energy Research Institute (TERI) – NGOs with business interests – play a 
significant role in decision-making, both directly by participating in the expert 
committees and indirectly by advising the government and providing studies and 
reports. Over the last sixteen years, these experts have acted as advisors to the 
government – for example, over the proposals of amendments to the MSW Rules. 
Recently, due to the amount of public interest raised by the government’s Clean India 
Mission (or SBA), organisations such as the FICCI, CII, IBA and the German 
organisation, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), have organised 
workshops and debates aimed at organising the demands of a variety of interest 
groups. 
In Brazil, coalitions of interest groups have articulated and lobbied for their demands 
across several institutional spaces, both during the formulation of the PNRS (section 
5.3) and also in the debates of the CNMA and the Sectoral Agreements (sections 6.2 
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and 6.3). These debates have generated a long round of discussions across the 
country, an event without parallel in India, where, in the recent past, the separate 
policy debates of academics, public administrators or businessmen have appeared 
disconnected from one another. Thus, these participatory spaces, and their potential 
for interaction between the government and interest groups, represent a crucial 
difference between the Brazilian and Indian political processes of waste management 
reform. The following subsections investigate the main interest groups involved in the 
Brazilian participatory process, their claims and strategies. The positions taken by the 
three main groups listed above provide a glimpse of the challenges the 
implementation of a nation-wide waste management policy faces, including the 
disproportionate influence these groups wield over government decisions. 
The MSWM sector 
Until very recently, the Panorama of Solid Waste in Brazil, updated annually since 
2003 by the Brazilian Association of Urban Cleansing and Waste (ABRELPE), was 
probably the most reliable national survey of solid waste management in the country. 
Before the enactment of the PNRS, the last official data about sanitary conditions 
across the country was the National Survey of Basic Sanitation, published by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in 2008. Nowadays, the 
Brazilian National Information System on Sanitation (SNIS), published by the 
Ministry of Cities, provides official data on the current conditions of solid waste 
infrastructure across the country, including the 2015 report, A Diagnosis of Municipal 
Solid Waste Management (SNIS, 2015). Thus, it is the private sector that has been the 
main conduit for information about the situation of waste management in the country. 
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In Brazil, the SWM sector has forced the waste issue onto the government’s and 
society’s agenda, in a historical process dating from the early twentieth century and 
involving those concerned with sanitation in such major metropolises as São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro. This movement gained strength from the 1960s on, as it was able 
to take advantage of the expertise emanating from the new university courses 
dedicated to sanitation (see section 4.3). Nowadays, in addition to the ABRELPE 
(mentioned above), other business sector associations have aggregated their interests 
in specific niches of the solid waste management market. The most influential are the 
Brazilian Association of Sanitary and Environmental Engineering (ABES), the 
Brazilian Association of Solid Waste and Public Cleaning (ABLP) and the Brazilian 
Association of Solid Waste Treatment Companies (ABETRE). Despite their particular 
interests, they act as a cohesive pressure group, which aims to keep the waste 
management issue in the public eye and on the government agenda. As mentioned 
earlier, solid waste management commands a large part of the municipalities’ 
budgets, and some of the members of these associations are major contractors of 
public service provision.  
However, as Carlos Silva, president of ABRELPE, puts it: ‘In most municipalities, 
this [SWM] is not a vote-winning issue. It is not perceived as a matter of priority. It is 
better to launch a school or a new emergency care unit,117 or even pave the street, than 
deal with the waste issue.’118 Valmir,119 a municipal engineer in Penedo, explains that, 
in Brazil, sanitary infrastructures are pejoratively called ‘buried infrastructure’ (or 
                                                
117 The Unidades de Pronto-Atendimento (UPA) is the official designation for stationary pre-hospital care facilities, 
according to the SUS (Brazilian Unified Health System). 
118 Interviewed at the AMLURB headquarter in São Paulo, 5 December 2013. 
119 Interviewed at the Penedo City Hall, Brazil, 23 December 2013. 
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obras enterradas) in civil engineering jargon – the term is used to describe crucial but 
less visible urban public works demanding high capital investment, such as sewerage, 
drainage and landfills, that compete with more visible and popular public 
infrastructure such as hospitals and schools. As Silva states, in general, mayors prefer 
to prioritise the more visible public goods than these invisible, buried facilities. 
Silva also complains: 
If the local waste authorities do not have the appropriate technical 
background and knowledge to develop a SMW system in accordance to his 
or her specific local situation, that city is doomed to failure. The process can 
only be developed to a rudimentary stage, because the knowledge of the 
contractor is limited to the basics, which is basically to take the dustbin 
lorry, collect the waste and dispose of it in any site. SWM is highly technical. 
Unfortunately, in Brazil, it is a political issue. Firstly, because the 
municipalities do not have the technicians and specialists available, and also 
because, in most municipalities, it does not help bring in votes. SWM is not a 
priority. Where it is not treated technically, but enters the political sphere, 
the solutions will certainly not be properly put in place like they should be.120 
Thus, representatives of these sectoral associations are active in using both official 
and business events across the country and the media to publicise the sector’s 
demands. These institutions provide information and consultation, and also lobby the 
authorities at central, state and local level, in order to influence policy decision-
                                                
120 Interviewed at the ABRELPE offices in São Paulo, 5 December 2013. 
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making. They are one of the main entities responsible for the advancement of the 
subject on Brazil’s political agenda. 
The industrial sector 
As mentioned above, the PNRS invites the industrial sector to offer solutions to the 
problem of post-consumer solid waste. Beatriz Carneiro, general manager of 
sustainable development at the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
(MDIC), explains that the government does not have the expertise to establish reverse 
logistics (see section 6.3) for all production chains: ‘It is not the government’s 
proposal to impose by decree, mainly because only the industrial sector knows the 
details of its own production chain. The goal is not to impose, but to reach an 
agreement which guarantees its implementation.’121 
However, this process poses enormous challenges. The industry across the country is 
keen on extracting and transforming natural resources into products, and then 
delivering these products to the consumer; however, in regard to the post-consumer 
waste generated by this process, the government is requesting that it rethink these 
logistics in reverse, reintroducing the waste into their productive stream. This a 
challenging exercise for any sector. The industrial sector claims that these reverse 
logistics gives rise to new costs that must be added to the final price of the product. 
Ricardo Young, former president of the Institute of Business and Social 
Responsibility (ETHOS), an influential NGO that, since 1998, has helped the 
industrial sector introduce ‘social responsibility’ business models, summarises the 
sector’s complaints: 
                                                
121 Interview via the Internet, 29 May 2014. 
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The industry is keen to produce, but not to recycle. Reverse logistics is a 
business process of reverse management. The business is responsible for 
recovering the product, disassembling and re-packing the parts, and finally 
reselling them on the secondary market. The industrial sector does not have 
this expertise, and it entails an additional cost to the product, and the 
recycled resale on the secondary market does not yet cover that cost. We do 
not have a compensation system to cover this additional cost. Reverse 
logistics internalises the costs, which are now pervasive in society and have 
to be privatised. Which is fine from the point of view of sustainability, but not 
from the perspective of market competitiveness – and this issue must to be 
considered. As a result, business will be burdened; the costs will have to be 
transferred to the consumer, thus creating an inflationary [cycle]. Instead, 
the government should provide tax incentives for medium and long-term 
commercial strategies. The law should be associated with fiscal 
compensation.122 
Despite these technical and financial problems, there are also numerous competitive 
economic interests and rivalry within the industry. For example, Paula Bernardes, 
manager of ABIVIDRO, explains that during the UN’s Rio Earth Summit (Eco92), 
transnational corporations, such as Nestlé, Unilever, Coca-Cola and Procter & 
Gamble, formed the organisation, Business Commitment for Recycling 
(CEMPRE), 123  with the purpose of organising the Brazilian recycling system. 
However, she claims that this powerful economic group, representing major market 
                                                
122 Interviewed at the São Paulo’s Legislative Assembly, 4 December 2013 
123 Interview via the Internet, 28 May 2014. 
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forces, put pressure on the decision-making process in order to guarantee that the EPR 
model would not be implemented in Brazil. Bernardes argues that this sums up the 
dilemma of the Brazilian waste strategy: ‘We have a fragile government unable to 
face up to the power of capital, which is significantly different to the structure of 
European governments. This is what lies behind the [problem].’ 
Trade and business associations, such as the National Conference of Industry (CNI) 
and the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), have also 
organised events, published documents and actively participated in the debates for the 
formulation and implementation of waste policies that directly affect the industrial 
sector. In India, business associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have 
carried out an extensive survey and produced a subsequent report entitled, The Status 
of Municipal Solid Waste Management in Indian Cities and the Potential of Landfill 
Gas to Energy Projects in India, as well as organising debates, such as the 
‘Conference on Waste Resources’, promoted by IBA in Delhi in 2014, and the 
‘National Consultation Program’, conducted in partnership with the MoEFCC in 
2015. However, the policy formulation process and the Indian MSW Rules do not 
directly involve these actors in the debates in the same way as the Brazilian PNRS, 
and the debates about the implementation of EPR in India have evolved more 
recently, and have yet to reach a clear resolution. 
Ricardo Young, current member of the Environmental Parliamentary Front in São 
Paulo’s legislative assembly, explains that reverse logistics demands a new level of 
interaction between the government, local authorities and the interest groups involved 
in the process It is an enormous challenge that requires negotiations between all the 
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actors involved in the search for solutions, such as fiscal policies compatible with the 
additional costs imposed on the industry by reverse logistics. The organisation of an 
economically sustainable recycling chain demands an industrial approach, and needs 
to include the catadores. In Young’s view, increasing waste generation is very much a 
contemporary problem, and local governments in emerging economies are struggling 
to adapt to this new reality. 
Local government 
Under the Brazilian Constitution, the local authorities are responsible for public 
service provision. In order to pressure the municipalities into implementing the 
national waste policies – as their success is contingent on the actions of the 
municipalities – the federal government has established tight targets for compliance. 
The PNRS and the Administrative Improbity Law have empowered the public 
prosecutor to bring pressure to bear on local authorities, particularly the mayors, to 
meet the legislation’s targets. However, local governments face several obstacles to 
implementing these measures: a lack of specialised staff, essential equipment and 
financial resources, among other administrative and political constraints. When new, 
incoming mayors assume office, they automatically inherit the arrears and liabilities 
accumulated by their predecessors. Therefore, representative associations of local 
governments claim that the central government targets are unrealistic, and raise these 
concerns in deliberative events, as well in the courts and in Congress. 
As discussed above (section 5.3), the majority of local governments are not prepared 
for the PNRS. Young, for example, states that ‘the modernisation of the 
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municipalities to deal with the SWM is the key problem, because very few local 
authorities can understand what sustainability means’.124 In addition, as Ricardo 
Abramovay et al. (2013) argue, it is unrealistic to expect that local governments bear 
the burden of all the costs of solid waste management. Silvano Silvério, president of 
the Municipal Authority of Urban Cleaning of the city of São Paulo (Amlurb), 
explains: 
We cannot structure a reverse logistics system of packaging, for instance, 
which comprises about 70% of the dry sections of household waste, and also 
[waste] from the industrial and private sectors, traders and importers, 
without including the local governments in the debate. The representatives of 
local government entities are in dialogue with the MMA to create a feasible 
and realistic proposal that takes into account the perspective of the 
municipal governments.125 
For example, as sanitary landfills are expensive – their equipment demands an 
economy of scale – they are only viable for cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. 
However, 89% of Brazilian municipalities have less than 50,000 inhabitants and 
94.5% have less than 100,000. In order to solve this problem, the PNRS established 
‘municipal consortiums’ (Article 8), in which two or more local authorities join forces 
to share the costs and increase the economy of scale (Article 11) when implementing 
the legislation. In 2013, there were 166 inter-municipal consortiums with SWM 
projects, comprising a total of 1,864 municipalities, which amounts to one third of the 
country (SNIS, 2015: 2). 
                                                
124 Interviewed in São Paulo’s legislative assembly, 4 December 2013. 
125 Interviewed in São Paulo, 5 December 2013. 
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The tight deadlines have triggered the main entities involved to lobby for their 
interests during the implementation. For instance, some associations in this area are 
providing expertise and working with the government to provide viable solutions by 
forming municipal consortiums. The five largest, most active and non-partisan NGOs 
defending the interests and claims of the local authorities are the National 
Confederation of Municipalities (CNM); the National Front of Mayors (FNP); the 
National Municipal Association for the Environment (ANAMMA); the Brazilian 
National Association of Municipal Sanitation Services (ASSEMAE); and the 
Brazilian Association of Municipalities (ABM). All possess different interests and a 
varying structural capacity to influence the debate. For example, the FNP comprises 
the mayors of large municipalities and is technically oriented, while the CNM defends 
the interests of the middling and small municipalities, and is more politically oriented. 
While some municipalities are well-structured and prosperous, others are deeply in 
debt and compromised by clientelism and corruption, and still others have mayors 
who are almost illiterate and lack any capacity to manage the city. Therefore, these 
organisations, which are run by experts who lobby for the municipalities’ interests at 
central and state levels, are responsible for enhancing the managerial capacities of 
local authorities, and have played an important role in aggregating the claims and 
demands of their associates, sharing information and training, and exerting influence 
on national policy-making. Acting as pressure groups, they have unified and 
amplified the voice of local authorities at central government level, managing, for 
example, to postpone the targets to close all dumpsites. 
In addition to their own meetings, all these interest groups have participated in other 
forums for debate. For example, during the RWM Brasil 2013 trade show, the Local 
Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI/Brazil) organised a roundtable, at the UK 
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Trade & Investment (UKTI) stall, for local government representatives to share their 
experiences and discuss the challenges they face in implementing the PNRS, 
presenting their case before international experts. 
 
Figure 16: Seminar in the RWM business fair in São Paulo, Brazil, 5 November 
2013 (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
 
Figure 17: RWM business fair in São Paulo, Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 
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In 2014, during the International Solid Waste Association Conference (ISWA), the 
Municipal Authority of Urban Cleansing in the city of São Paulo (AMLURB) and 
ABRELPE held a debate with local government representatives to discuss the 
implementation of reverse logistics, and other issues. One of the challenges raised in 
these debates is the relationship between the municipal authorities and the 
organisations of the catadores. For example, local governments claim that there are a 
great number of conflicts between their role in solid waste management, the industrial 
sector’s proposals for reverse logistics and the prioritisation of catadores’ 
cooperatives. They argue that they are paying for something that should essentially be 
the responsibility of the industrial sector, and that the proposals of the industrial 
sector benefit only the industry. Also, the PNRS mixes social policy, environmental 
issues and waste management engineering processes. A representative of the 
municipality of Manaus, in the state of Amazonia, for example, explains that 
catadores demand that the local authorities pay them fixed salaries: 
How is it possible? The government can hardly even pay all the charges and 
now we have a new [organisation] knocking on our door... The municipality 
is unable to pay the co-operatives. Now, they want to receive a fixed monthly 
salary, social security, labour benefits and an area shed for storage and 
equipment. The cooperative is not discussing quantities of recyclables, but 
fixed wages. This means a contract with a new agent, and the Federal Audit 
Court (TCU) is demanding the municipalities [take] action.126 
                                                
126 A debate between local government representatives, organised by the Municipal Authority of Urban Cleaning 
(AMLURB) and ABRELPE at the ISWA 2014 World Congress, São Paulo, held on 8-11 September 2014. 
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Municipalities’ representatives claim that packaging is a benefit to the industry and 
the consumers. If society wants this benefit, the householder must pay for the service 
of recycling their packaging. According to the law, the municipality is obliged to 
provide recycling services, but the sale of recyclables on the market does not cover 
the costs. The local authorities argue that the policy must also be linked to the 
purchase of recyclables by the industry, and if the municipality provides recycling 
services, the costs must be met by industry. 
As can be seen from the discussions above, the implementation of the PNRS requires 
extensive debates among all the interest groups involved, as they have particular and 
often divergent demands. The participatory process has provided the opportunity for 
interest groups to meet and debate the challenges of these policies, in the attempt to 
negotiate solutions. During the fieldwork for this research, the representatives of these 
entities were observed presenting their positions at several business fairs, forums and 
meetings, such as the RWM Brasil, ISWA 2014 World Conference, Recycle 
CEMPRE and FIMAI,127 and in institutional forums such as the 4th CNMA and the 
Thematic Technical Groups (GTTs) of the sectoral agreements on reverse logistics. 
Despite their political and technical divergences, the representative associations of all 
these groups, in general, have been unanimous in their criticism of the government’s 
delay in approving important measures. Diógenes Del Bel, director of ABETRE, 
complains: ‘How do you ask a businessman to wait weeks, sometimes months, for 
feedback? The slowness of the public sector is unacceptable in the business sector.’ 
                                                
127 IX Seminar on Waste, Recycle CEMPRE and Resource Efficiency and Waste Management Solutions (RWM 
Brazil), held between 1-2 October 2013 and 2014 and 8-9 September 2014, respectively; XV International 
Industrial Environment and Sustainability Fair (FIMAI), São Paulo, held on 5-7 November 2013. 
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These coalitions have been important in aggregating the demands of the main groups 
responsible for the implementation of the PNRS. The participatory process reveals 
that the top-down policies of central government need engagement and discussion 
among interest groups at the bottom of the government hierarchy to better understand 
how they can be implemented. The participatory process provides some sort of 
transparency on some government proceedings, since the participants can access 
public authorities directly. It provides opportunities for the interest groups involved to 
seek out and negotiate with other parties (government officials, catadores and 
representatives of civil society). Certainly, the involvement of so many interest groups 
makes the decision-making slower and more complex, but it has shaped solid waste 
management reform in Brazil, expanding the knowledge about the implications of 
waste management and public service provision within government and business 
sectors, society and the informal sector. In general, the majority of interviewees in 
this research stressed that, despite the complexities and delays, this dialogue between 
central government, local governments and non-state actors is a fundamental learning 
process that is essential to the evolution of the whole political system. 
7.3 The provision of public MSWM services in India 
Introduction 
Anand Bhal, economic advisor at the MoUD, points out that ‘SWM seems like such a 
technocratic function, but in India there are many social dimensions’.128 He claims 
that although the waste management system is still not in place across the country, the 
government continues to enact laws that do not represent the reality on the ground. 
                                                
128 Interviewed at the MoUD headquarters in New Delhi, 12 March 2014. 
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For this reason, although this research focuses mainly on the waste policies proposed 
by central government, the following section explores the impact of these decisions at 
the local level. Recently, the government’s SBA campaign has enlarged the concept 
of public participation in municipal solid waste management, inviting the ordinary 
citizen to engage with its ‘mission’ (section 5.2); this section, therefore, explores the 
role of the different actors (ULBs, community organisations, the private sector, 
middle classes and the informal sector) involved in waste management in India. 
Urban infrastructure 
In both Brazil and India, local governments face severe constraints on the provision of 
public services to the whole population under their jurisdiction. There are problems of 
low tax returns, and lack of equipment and trained staff. In many cases, the ULBs do 
not have even the basic infrastructure in place to formulate a minimum ‘municipal 
plan’ that would enable them to access the federal grants available for policy 
implementation. One remarkable difference between Brazil and India, however, is the 
variety of actors involved in municipal solid waste management on the ground. As 
discussed in section 4.2, in Brazil, the majority of municipalities provide solid waste 
management services using their own employees and equipment, or delegate the 
services to private companies through outsourcing or concessions. The overall index 
of regular collection covers about 98.4% of the urban population.129  
The literature and official documents, discussed in section 4.2, show a different reality 
in India, both in terms of the variety of groups involved in municipal solid waste 
                                                
129 According to SNIS (2015), this coverage varies from 96.7% in the southwest region to 83.7% in the north of 
the country. 
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management and also in the variation of models across the country. Travelling in 
India, it was interesting to observe the impact of the asymmetric features of the MSW 
Rules in practice: each city’s municipal waste management process has its own 
characteristics, in terms of the type of departments in charge, the systems of collection 
and the actors involved. For example: 
•  In Delhi, the door-to-door collections are largely carried out by the informal sector, 
while in several of the slums and unauthorised settlements, waste is left on the 
streets and in empty lots. Delhi has a distinctive characteristic that distinguishes it 
from all other Indian cities: it comprises all three levels of government – the central 
government, the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD) and the Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi (MCD). Urban territory administration is also divided between 
two local bodies: the Delhi Cantonment Board (responsible for the area of the 
central secretariat and diplomatic enclaves) and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD). The MCD is further divided into three zones: the SDMC, NDMC and 
EDMC.130 Each of these municipal corporations has its own mayor, commissioner 
and assembly. This administrative structure generates a complex overlay of 
functions, with a multiplicity of agencies and actors involved in waste collection. 
• Pune is possibly the most progressive example of urban waste management in India. 
The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) has an agreement with Solid Waste 
Collection and Handling (SWaCH), a labour union of waste pickers, for the 
provision of DTDC (dry and wet) waste in fifteen wards in the city, covering some 
four million households (SWaCH, 2013). Since 2007, the PMC has implemented a 
                                                
130 According to the Swachh Survekshan, the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) is the 4th cleanest city in 
India; South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC) is the 39th; the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) 
the 43rd and the East Delhi Municipal Corporation (EDMC) the 52nd. Pune is ranked 11th and Ahmedabad 14th. 
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participatory budget and established channels of dialogue between municipal 
officials and interest groups such as the Pune Housing Group (PHG) and the Pune 
Citizens Environment Forum (PCEF).131 Avinash Madhale, programme coordinator 
of the Centre for Environment Education (CEE) (an educational organisation, 
supported by the MoEFCC, that is committed to promoting environmental 
awareness and sustainable development), explains that the PCEF represents the 
interface between civil society and the local authorities, enabling the exchange of 
information, and the planning and monitoring of public affairs, and this has been 
crucial to advancing key social and environmental issues.132  
•  In Ahmedabad, meanwhile, collection is largely privatised across the city’s wards. 
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) has probably one of the most well-
structured municipal solid waste management departments in the country, equipped 
with machinery and expertise. The AMC works with six larger transfer stations, 
where the vehicles are monitored through information communication technology 
(ICT), and has dedicated collection points and recycling treatment centres for the 
construction industry. According to Prashant Pandya, deputy director of SWM, the 
city is investing in the objective of ‘zero waste’ by 2031, and was involved in public 
consultations at the time of this research. Recently, the AMC introduced the 
‘Swachhta Jan Model’, a pilot initiative, involving waste pickers, to collect 
segregated waste in four wards in the city. 
P.U. Asnani (2006: 170) provides an overview of the many different models of solid 
waste management implemented in different cities across India, including some where 
                                                
131 Website: http:/ /pcef.blogspot.com/2008/01/rce-pune.html 
132 Interviewed at the CEE offices in Pune, 27 March 2014. 
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different parts of the process are provided by municipal corporations with their own 
personnel and equipment, and others where contracts are agreed with private sector 
companies or awarded to NGOs, residents’ welfare associations and organisations of 
waste pickers. However, these examples are taken from the larger cities; Chapter 4 
has shown that the majority of ULBs are unable to provide their populations with 
public waste collection and disposal services. As a result, the issues of uncollected 
waste and the disposal of waste in dumpsites is acute across India. The following 
subsections provide a brief overview of the different actors involved in waste 
management in Indian cities. 
Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) 
Size of population is certainly a factor in the capacity of Indian urban local bodies 
(ULBs) to provide comprehensive municipal solid waste management services. 
However, Ramesh Ramanathan (2007) argues that the process of federal 
decentralisation initiated by the Constitutional Amendments Act 74th (CAA) has not 
delivered the participation the ULBs demand. As mentioned earlier, the third tier of 
urban governance in India was introduced in 1994 with two CAAs; the 73rd CAA 
established the basis for self-governance in rural areas (the ‘panshayati raj’); and the 
74th, self-governance for urban local bodies. However, Ramanathan (2007: 274) 
explains that these parallel processes have achieved different results. He gives the 
example of the different proportion of representatives per citizen in two local 
governments: one elected representative in an urban government represents ten times 
more citizens than the does same position in rural areas. According to his survey, in 
Bangalore in 2007, for example, while one elected representative in the rural area 
represents 380 citizens, in the urban areas this ratio increases to 3,800 citizens. 
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Therefore, he argues, an average urban citizen is a hundred times more distant from 
their representative than the rural citizen, an issue that tends to be increasingly 
aggravated by the rapid growth of the urban population (Ramanathan, 2007: 274).  
Furthermore, in the meetings of the gram sabha, the local village self-government 
organisations, every citizen has the right to vote on decisions concerning proposed 
projects in the region; while in the ward committee, a similar meeting held in the 
urban areas under the aegis of the municipal corporation, this participatory process is 
hindered by limited citizen involvement, questionable appointment processes and the 
ambiguous mandate of their representatives. Ramanathan (2007: 274) argues that 
these differences arise partly from the historical processes that resulted in the 
formulation of these amendments. He explains that the 73rd AAC was the culmination 
of the ideologies of three generations of Gandhians and decades of debates on 
national committees, while the 74th AAC lacked the same attention and had to be 
formulated in a few months during Rajiv Gandhi’s term of office to compensate for 
the lacuna of the third tier of urban governance in the Indian federal structure. 
Therefore, the urban amendment lacks the spirit and rich debate of the rural 
amendment formulation. Ramanathan (2007: 675) claims that the proximity of 
citizens to their local governments is crucial both to improved urban governance and 
strengthened federalism, but the ULBs currently lack leadership, weakening the 
bottom-up structure of the federal system. In addition, Loraine Kennedy (2009: 60) 
states that neither the size nor the specific functions of the ward committees were 
established in the 74th AAC, and each state has made its own rules, resulting in a large 
diversity of models. 
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Ebony Bertorelli of the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy in 
Bangalore further explains that there is an overlap of intergovernmental institutions 
involved in urban affairs. 133  For example, there are a variety of parastatal 
organisations (governmental and quasi-governmental bodies) running municipal 
affairs while answering directly to the state government. The majority of these bodies 
do not communicate with each other or with the municipal corporations – for 
example, the electricity board and the water board have little contact. Bertolli argues: 
‘There is always a huge amount of overlapping, fragmentation and messy 
communication, which often means things get sliced and diced without [even] a 
minimal cohesive structure.’ 
The private sector 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the participation of private companies in 
municipal solid waste management. The Indian government has encouraged public-
private partnership (PPP) projects for public service delivery across the country. PPPs 
or public-civic groups are agreements between the government and the private sector 
to mobilise resources for the development of projects, with popular participation. For 
example, the Janaagraha report (2012: 4) shows several cases of successful PPP 
projects in cities such as Hyderabad and Guwahati (the entire SWM system); 
Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Nagpur (door-to-door collections); and Delhi, 
Coimbatore, Kolkata and Chennai (waste treatment and disposal). 
However, large corporations, such as Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services 
Limited (IL&FS) and Veolia, two of the major contractors in India, complain of 
                                                
133 Interview recorded (38’) at the Janaagraha offices in Bangalore, 1 April 2014. 
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predatory competition in the market. Patrick Rousseau, president of Veolia Water 
India, believes that the tendering processes are unrealistic:134 competitors put in bids 
with impractical prices, win the contracts and after one or two years abandon the 
projects, claiming lack of economic sustainability; ultimately, both the government 
and society lose out. Rousseau claims that this problem is repeated across the country. 
The French multinational has, for example, recently stopped competing in the solid 
waste management sector in India, restricting their operations to water and sanitation. 
Rousseau complains that it is impossible to compete with local private players: 
After seven years of providing services in Chennai, we lost the tender in 
2007, abandoning the sector in India. We cannot compete with a local 
contractor that offers a proposal with 50% of our price. We have strong 
corporate policies, with payroll taxes, standards to manage the landfills and 
the health and safe working conditions of our employees. There are no rules 
for serious private companies in this market in this country. 
Avinash Madhave, CEE/Pune, explains that some tendering processes are 
manipulated and that not all organisations receive the same opportunities to 
participate in the bidding process.135 Even with central government’s efforts to 
encourage PPPs, several projects are not economically viable, and substantial 
investments are subsequently lost. A report by the Department of Economic Affairs 
(DEA) (2009: 2), published by the Ministry of Finance in a bid to attract investment 
into the sector and assist PPP initiatives, acknowledges that  ‘the urban sector is 
regarded as a high-risk sector, due to institutional complexity deriving from the 
                                                
134 Interviewed at the Veolia offices in New Delhi, 18 March 2014. 
135 Iinterviewed at the CEE in Pune, 27 March 2013. 
Influential MSWM Interest Groups in Brazil and India 
317 
 
multiplicity of agents involved in service delivery’. In recent years, new operators in 
the market, such as waste-to-energy (WtE) organisations, have been lobbying to 
change the policies so that the waste can be collected unsegregated, contrary to the 
wishes of the majority of players on the ground. 
In general, privatisation, which means the delegation of services to private companies 
(Kennedy, 2009: 56), had a negative connotation among interviewees in India, mainly 
because, in seeking to modernise their waste management processes, local authorities 
tend to displace existing players and grassroots systems, delivering the responsibilities 
of waste management to private players. 
Civil society 
The deficiency of services provided by the state and the private sector, especially in 
underprivileged areas, has led to the emergence of new forms of public participation 
in the management of public affairs. According to research carried out by Joël Ruet 
and Stéphanie Lama-Rewal (2009), the failure of the Indian ULBs in the provision of 
public service provision legitimises the presence of community-based organisations 
(CBOs), such as NGOs and residents’ welfare associations (RWAs), in public affairs. 
CBOs have a greater capacity for action than the government because they have 
emerged from the initiative of residents who know their own local problems and have 
the capacity to improve the conditions of their localities, empowering communities 
through slum improvement awareness programmes and poverty alleviation through 
targeted service delivery. Some CSOs assume an institutionalised form, while others 
are more informal. However, Madhave argues that the problem with this situation is 
that in some cities, where civil society is not strong, an NGO that decides to fill the 
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gap left by the ULB becomes a private contractor and starts to assume public 
responsibilities, but without accountability or ULB control. 
The middle classes 
The Indian middle classes have been one of the key driving forces in the improvement 
of the quality of life in the cities. As discussed in section 6.4, in general, the middle 
classes enjoy higher levels of education, access to professional occupations and better 
urban infrastructure than the poor. Therefore, they are more willing and able to 
articulate their demands in relation to urban governance. Section 6.4 has mentioned 
the term ‘bourgeois environmentalism’ (Baviskar, 2002 cited in Gill, 2010: 190), 
where the new middle classes have aggressively promoted their ‘green agenda’ to 
improve their urban spaces. Other scholars have employed terms such as the ‘middle-
classisation’ of public demands (Mooji and Lama-Rewal, 2009: 81) to describe the 
phenomenon of the upper and middle classes advancing their environmental discourse 
and shaping the urban landscape according to their aspirations for aesthetic 
beautification and entertainment opportunities, and the cleanliness and safety of their 
urban environments (Gill, 2010: 191).  
In recent years, the urban areas of Indian metropolises have been redesigned to 
accommodate real-estate projects, with shopping malls, tower blocks, multiplex 
cinemas and restaurants (Mooji and Lama-Rewal, 2009: 81; Gill, 2010: 191), while 
the poor and the working classes are displaced towards the urban peripheries, where 
they strive to access even basic services. The high-consuming upper classes become 
richer and their areas become markedly ‘differentiated’ (Deshpande, cited in Mooji 
and Lama-Rewal, 2009: 83) from the those inhabited by the poorer part of the 
population. For example, Manisha Anantharaman (2015) has studied the impact of 
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this process in Bangalore, a city that in two decades has changed from a tranquil town 
to a megalopolis synonymous with investment and business, home to the headquarters 
of the major information and technology firms. Her study explores the new trends 
adopted by the emerging upper classes, based on Western eco-friendly lifestyles, 
including habits of such as recycling. This phenomenon is quite similar to the trends 
in wealthier regions of Brazilian cities, where recycling practices are symbols of 
improved urban spaces and are associated with European lifestyles. 
The most active middle-class CBOs shaping Indian urban governance are residents’ 
welfare associations (RWAs). Loraine Kennedy (2009: 67) explains that RWAs are 
voluntary neighbourhood organisations, formed by householders and usually managed 
by retired professionals, who leverage their contacts with the bureaucracy to improve 
services inside the walls of their gated enclaves. Debolina Kundu (2011: 23) claims 
that the much of the ULBs’ service provision has been delegated to RWAs, and this in 
turn has accentuated inequalities across the cities. She gives the example of the 
Bhagidari scheme (a citizen-government partnership) in Delhi, where the RWA is 
responsible for distributing bills, collecting taxes, advocating for residents’ interests, 
coordinating services with different governmental bodies and maintaining public 
services, such as waste collection and the cleansing of road and community areas, 
inside the gated enclaves (Kundu, 2011: 24).  
Poorer communities do not have the same capacity to raise their demands in urban 
governance, and the ward committees (WDCs) have been ineffectual at representing 
their needs. In general, slums and low-income settlements do not have the same 
capacity or access to resources needed to organise themselves in pursuit of their aims. 
In addition, as Girish Kumar et al. (2009: 105) explain, citizens know that accessing 
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public services routinely means paying bribes as part of a system of client patronage, 
where MPs, bureaucrats and local elected representatives act as gatekeepers of the 
provision of goods and services. Most citizens are aware that the rich enclaves receive 
public services through the RWAs, which have direct channels of communication 
with the local bureaucracy and are thus able to expedite their provision to their 
wealthy constituencies. Therefore, Kundu (2011: 25) and Ruet et al. (2009) claim that 
RWAs and wealthy enclaves have created a geography of discrimination and 
institutionalised disparities inside the city, particularly in terms of access to public 
services. The RWAs exert a strong influence on the organisation of waste collection, 
and in general, each RWA has an agreement with a group of waste pickers in the area, 
who collect the waste from the doorsteps on a daily basis. Mikkey, a restaurant owner 
in Delhi, claims: 
Inside the gates of the enclaves, in general, the RWA has its own agreements 
with waste-pickers’ organisations. Those outside the gates have to negotiate 
directly with waste-pickers’ leaders. If we do not want to pay the waste 
pickers, we have to deliver our waste to the waste dealer’s shop or find some 
place to throw [it away].  
He claims also that although very few householders pay property tax to the municipal 
corporation, some residents still call this scheme, ‘the mafia of waste.’ 136 
The informal sector 
Unlike Brazil, the majority of primary waste collection in India is carried out by the 
informal sector: the cities contain a high number of people working informally, 
                                                
136 Interviewed on the street in New Delhi, 20 February 2014. 
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collecting, segregating and moving waste from the streets to dumpsites. This section 
gives only a brief introduction to the issue of the informal sector in India, as the 
subject is thoroughly discussed in section 7.5, where it is compared to the informal 
process in Brazil. 
The Manual on Municipal Solid Waste Management (MoUD, 2014: 171) separates 
the informal sector into two categories: the kadabi system and ‘ragpickers’ (waste 
pickers). According to the manual, about 70% of recyclable materials are handled by 
the kadabi system, which comprises itinerant dealers in waste and junk, who buy only 
the valuable recycling materials (plastic, cardboard, glass and metal) from 
householders, while the waste pickers carry out the primary collection, transporting 
the waste from the doorstep to the collection points, and sorting the dry from the wet 
waste discarded by householders and shops. The waste pickers charge householders a 
fee, and complement their income by selling the products to middlemen.  
Vaishali Nandan of GIZ explains that there are several other players who extract 
valuable resources along the waste stream, all with minimal coordination by the 
ULBs.137 She describes the competing processes for waste resources, giving the 
example of the kabadiwallas:  
These informal entrepreneurs are not ragpickers. They come to buy the 
valuable recyclable materials from householders before the ragpickers. So, 
even before it enters the waste stream, if you look at the characteristics of the 
waste, you will not find newspapers, cardboard, metals or plastic of good 
quality. It will never enter into the waste stream, because the householder 
                                                
137 Interviewed at the GIZ offices in New Delhi, 9 April 2014. 
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has already sold it for a certain price. We have a system where every day 
somebody is walking around in the colony, collecting and selling these 
materials. Everything goes, even a bottle, because the PET138 bottle has a 
price. Even if it is a little PET of 15 paissa (Rs 0.15). The householder is 
ready to store it up and give it away, at a price. 
The major criticism in the literature is the fact that these informal players are, in most 
cases, excluded from official municipal solid waste management, and neither the 
legislation, in the main, nor the local authorities recognise their role as part of the 
system. 
The Manual on Municipal Solid Waste Management (MoUD, 2014: 171) sets out 
advice for local authorities to ensure the integration of informal workers in the formal 
solid waste management system by identifying the numbers of informal workers in 
the city, organising their inclusion with support of NGOs, ensuring their labour rights 
(social security, welfare benefits and healthcare), and providing facilities (toilets and 
storage space) and personal protective equipment (PPE). It is interesting to note that 
the manual (MoUD, 2014: 171) states clearly that these measures should be supported 
by local bye-laws, but leaves the responsibility of integrating waste pickers in 
municipal solid waste management to the RWAs, CBOs, NGOs and the private sector 
(MoUD, 2014: 170). However, these measures need to be ensured at the national 
level, since, as this research argues, municipal solid waste management is a 
competitive market dominated by influential economic interests; otherwise, any 
                                                
138 Abbreviation of polyethylene terephthalate, a common plastic used in beverage bottles. 
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improvement in the somewhat conflictual relationship between ULBs and waste 
pickers will have to rely on the political will and efforts of the local authorities.  
Section summary 
For decades, the MSW Rules have failed to deliver the promised benefits due to a 
lack of understanding of the potentialities of all the interest groups involved in the 
waste management process, and the fact that the policymakers continue to establish 
financial schemes for waste management that suit their own interests and those of 
their clients. As long as the government fails to involve all the players in the sector, 
formal and informal, in the political process, the dissonance between government 
proposals and the reality on the ground will persist.  
Solid waste management in India, therefore, differs from the Western models, and if 
the Clean India Campaign (or SBA) is to succeed it demands an innovative mindset 
that takes these differences into account. The campaign has gained the support of 
ordinary citizens and raised the expectations of all the groups involved in waste 
management, particularly the informal workers, many of whom have gone 
unrecognised for decades. In addition, government organisations and NGOs are 
organising debates and establishing participatory spaces, in order to involve interest 
groups in the search for answers to the myriad problems faced by local authorities 
seeking to deliver waste management services across the country. In Brazil, as 
discussed earlier, these sorts of participatory forums have been crucial to the 
integration of interest groups into the process of finding solutions, as well as to the 
creation of public support for the improvement of the legislation. 
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7.4 The participation of international organisations in the domestic debate 
As can be seen in Fig. 5 (section 4.3), which compares the historical evolution of the 
waste management policy frameworks in Brazil and India, despite all their 
socioeconomic and cultural differences, the introduction of government measures in 
these countries has followed a very similar timeline. Of course, this almost 
simultaneous evolution is not a coincidence: the evolution of solid waste management 
policies in both countries has been strongly influenced by the participation of 
international interest groups in their domestic debates. Despite the evidence of this, 
however, the literature on public participation generally concentrates on the domestic 
social movements and interest groups; it pays little attention to the activities of 
external forces and their effect on internal politics. This section, however, explores 
the influence of some of the key international players in the domestic debates on 
waste management in Brazil and India, and the channels of interaction between 
international and domestic interest groups in the sector. 
Solid waste management has become a global industry. Never before in history have 
human beings produced such enormous amounts of waste on a daily basis. The Global 
Waste Management Outlook (GWMO, 2015: 52) estimates that roughly two billion 
tonnes of urban solid waste are generated every year,139 and between 2013 and 2014, 
the municipal solid waste management sector received investments of USD 85 billion, 
largely for waste-to-energy (WtE) projects (GWMO, 2015: 79). The emerging 
economies represent a booming market for the global SWM sector, where India alone 
                                                
139 This number is only a rough estimation, as that large parts of the world do not have reliable control of their 
waste streams. Also, the estimated figures are as high as seven to ten billion tonnes per year, as urban waste 
landfill comprises not just municipal solid waste (MSW), but also commercial and industrial waste (C&I) and 
construction and demolition waste (C&D), especially in lower- and middle-income countries. 
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represents 5% of the abovementioned investments (GWMO, 2015: 79). A key feature 
of these countries is the rise of an aspirational middle class, with increased purchasing 
power and levels of consumption (GWMO, 2015: 59), and which demands public 
services of greater quality, improved urban spaces and environmental protection. 
However, local governments in emerging economies face serious constraints in 
coping with this consumption frenzy and the vertiginous production of waste: 
according to ABRELPE (2013: 108), Brazil needs to find waste disposal solutions for 
at least 3,300 cities. 
Despite the socioeconomic and cultural differences, and the various challenges of 
implementation, waste management in both Brazil and India are undergoing similar 
changes in terms of legislation, technical and human processes, and the technologies 
for waste treatment. Nowadays, environmental protection, best practice and models 
for sanitation and waste management are established by a variety of state and non-
state international organisations. International bodies, business concerns, experts and 
academics, by disseminating information and proposed solutions on a global scale, 
contribute to the spread of a uniform terminology throughout the world. Sands (2003: 
71) argues that the history of the international environmental law has evolved with 
active participation of state and non-state actors. Since the early international treaties 
on the environment, such as Stockholm and UNCED, mentioned in section 4.3, 
subsequent international agreements and documents focused on environmental issues 
have been ratified, legitimating the participation of state and non-state interest groups 
at international, national, regional and local levels. 
At a global level, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the UN’s 
main body for the promotion of the international coordination of activities, providing 
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technical and legislative guidance and sharing scientific knowledge and information 
on the condition of the global environment (Sands, 2003: 83). At this level, specific 
sectors have institutionalised associations to defend their interests in the global arena. 
At present, the International Solid Waste Management (ISWA) is the leading NGO 
promoting the solid waste management sector worldwide. In 2014, this organisation 
had representatives in ninety-six countries and links with government authorities, 
intergovernmental organisations, the industrial sector, the scientific community and 
interest groups around the world. According to the ISWA report, in that year, the 
institution promoted sixty-two international events, including conferences, training 
programmes and study tours; nine working groups and scientific and technical 
committees; the publication of the academic journal, Waste Management & Research; 
and funded and developed projects in cooperation with UN agencies such as the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2015, ISWA 
initiated the publication of an annual report, Global Waste Management Outlook 
(GWMO), in partnership with UNEP and several leading global experts, scientists and 
academics. This document aims to provide a credible overview, as well as in-depth 
analysis and recommendations for policymakers and practitioners, on the current state 
of solid waste management worldwide (ISWA Report, 2014: 22). The studies were 
conducted by a community of international researchers, sharing the expertise of 
practitioners based in different countries. A second phase of this research has been 
organised by the United Nations Environmental Assembly (UNEA) to explore 
regional cases of waste management practices. In summary, the figures above indicate 
the influence of these international associations; in many cases, they have helped to 
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advance decision-making and professionalise solid waste management practices 
worldwide. 
These global organisations establish partnerships with organisations operating at the 
national level. ISWA has affiliate members in Brazil, the Brazilian Association of 
Urban Cleansing and Waste (ABRELPE), and in India, the National Solid Waste 
Association of India (NSWAI). In 2014, ABRELPE organised the ISWA World 
Congress (ISWA 2014) in São Paulo, a five-day event with fifty-five sessions and 
around 220 speeches, which ran in parallel with a trade fair and an international forum 
(ISWA, 2014: 14). Fig. 18 shows the closing ceremony of the event. Later, in 2015, 
ISWA and ABRELPE worked together with the municipality of São Paulo to develop 
its City Assessment and Action Plan.140 
 
Figure 18: ISWA2014 World Conference, São Paulo, Brazil, 8 September 2014 
(Source: Author’s photo) 
 
                                                
140 ISWA’s newsletter: Global News, Issue 39, February 2016. 
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Business fairs and international forums contribute to the spread of information and the 
fostering of relationships between international and domestic interest groups. During 
the three-day event, around a thousand participants (public officials, business and 
experts) from 64 countries met to share experiences on solid waste management. In 
India, NSWAI promoted the conference, ‘Safe Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste’, in 
the SNDT Women’s University, Mumbai, attended by academics and representatives 
of ULBs (Figure 19). The CEOs of these institutions are respected in this sector and 
are actively engaged with policymaking and implementation – for example, Carlos 
Silva, director of ABRELPE, participates closely with government bodies and 
business entities to promote solid waste management practices, while Amiya Sahu,141 
founder of the National Solid Waste Association of India (NSWAI), helped formulate 
the MSW Rules 2000, and continues to be very active in waste management politics. 
 
 
Figure 19: NSWAI conference, ‘Safe Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste’, held at 
the SNDT Women’s University, Mumbai, on 26 February 2014 (Source: 
Author’s photo) 
 
                                                
141 Interviewed at the NSWAI offices in Mumbai on 27 February 2014. 
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However, conferences and workshops are not participatory spaces, they are not 
decision-making forums open to ordinary citizens discuss policy alternatives. In fact 
they are performative spaces designed and controlled to promote and reinforce 
powerful interests (Turnhout et al., 2010).  
In addition to the sectoral associations mentioned above, there are also important 
intergovernmental organisations with branches and operations in both countries, along 
with specific projects dedicated to SWM, such as German international development 
agency GIZ, the UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) and the International Council for 
Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). These institutions are involved in the 
political process at all levels of governance, and take part in gathering information, 
publishing reports and providing assistance with the political and managerial 
processes in these countries. Vaishali Nandan,142 a senior technical expert at GIZ, 
explains that the agency provides technical support to the Indian government; creates 
development programmes for areas such as sanitation, climate change and fiscal 
reforms; and establishes links and promotes cooperation between domestic and 
international institutions, including public bodies, industries, research centres and 
NGOs. In India, the majority of events and actions on waste management have 
received support from GIZ – for instance, it helped prepare the recent Manual on 
Municipal Solid Waste Management 2014, in partnership with the MoUD (MoUD, 
2014b). However, at the same time as these organisations provide assistance, they 
also facilitate the efforts of companies in their home countries to sell their products in 
                                                
142 Interviewed at the GIZ offices in New Delhi on 9 April 2014. 
Influential MSWM Interest Groups in Brazil and India 
330 
 
these still under-served markets. It is no coincidence that Germany is selling 
incinerators to both Brazil and India. 
In Brazil, the Guidance Manual for Preparation of Solid Waste Management Plans of 
the MMA was developed in partnership with the International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives/Brazil (ICLEI) and the British Embassy (ICLEI, 2012). The 
ICLEI is an international organisation, with some 1,200 associated local governments 
around the world, focused on sustainable development (ICLEI, 2012: 12), and 
branches in both Brazil and India. During the RWM Brazil, the ICLEI organised a 
meeting at the UKTI stand, with representatives from several Brazilian municipalities 
and a representative of the British Waste & Resources Action Programme (WRAP) to 
debate the challenges of implementing the PNRS.  
In addition, there is also the increasing participation of international consultants such 
as Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), who provide assistance and help compile market 
reports on urban sector infrastructure – for example, the reports on the waste 
management sector in Brazil, published by the Union of the Urban Cleaning 
Companies of the State of São Paulo and the Brazilian Association of Solid Waste 
and Public Cleaning (Selur/ABLP, 2011), and on investment opportunities in Indian 
‘smart cities’. 143  These documents assist in opening up new markets to donor 
agencies, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
which provide the funding for international corporations to make large-scale business 
investments to foster modernisation in these countries. 
                                                
143  PwC website: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/government-public-services/public-sector-research-
centre/publications.html 
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In addition, the grassroots social movements, Women in Informal Employment: 
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and the Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance 
(GAIA), are among some of the NGOs that have expanded their international 
networks, advocating sustainable ideologies, connecting interest groups, and 
exchanging information and practices between countries (GWMO, 2015: 170). 
These figures show that the solid waste management sector has become a global 
institutional force; international interest groups in the sector wield significant 
influence, participating actively in the decision-making processes in India and Brazil, 
influencing the formulation of public policy and introducing global models of waste 
management practice to these countries.  
Conferences and business fairs 
Nowadays, the most advanced technologies on waste management and sustainable 
development are the property of international corporations based in the EU, US, 
Singapore and other industrialised countries. The development of this technology 
began in some of these countries in the 1970s. At present, Brazil and India represent a 
huge market for these international interest groups and investors. Business fairs and 
conferences are the main institutional spaces in which partnerships between domestic 
and international interest groups are forged, commercial technology sold and 
management processes introduced.  
Business seminars have become fashionable in recent years, although they are 
increasingly expensive, resembling closed clubs of businessmen. In these business 
fairs, industries and consultants establish contacts in order to sell equipment and 
services. While some giant global corporations, such as Veolia, have clients in Brazil 
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and India, other companies prefer to establish partnerships with domestic players, as 
the waste management sector is an extremely politicised environment. Opinions of 
international businessmen about the waste management market in Brazil and India 
vary. From the point of view of some of the representatives of international 
companies gathered at these business fairs, 144  the Brazilian industry is 
underdeveloped and represents huge market opportunities. The PNRS assigns 
economic value to waste, creating opportunities for financial returns in a way that is 
very familiar to international investor mindset. Others, such as those interviewed in 
Brazil for this research, claim that the Indian market poses a greater risk: the Indian 
waste management industrial sector competes in the market with impracticable prices, 
and its low gross domestic product (GDP) and the lack of revenue from ULBs 
undermines the economic sustainability of its SWM projects. 
The latest state-of-the-art technologies always attract attention in these international 
exhibitions: traders, experts and even academics present the successful examples of 
the most industrialised countries as an option for less developed countries. For 
example, in the conference, ‘Safe Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste’,145 organised 
by NSWAI, speakers presented high-tech solutions implemented in Finland as a 
solution for Mumbai. Of course, such technology may be serviceable in India, but not 
without significant modifications, taking into account the social, economic, cultural, 
climactic and geographical differences. One evident example of the transfer of 
technology from the North to the South is the case of waste-to-energy (WtE). 
Nowadays, there is strong pressure for the implementation of WtE projects in both 
                                                
144 Interviews with representatives of international companies conducted during the RWM business fair in São 
Paulo, 1-2 October 2013. 
145 SNDT Women’s University, Juhu, Mumbai, 26 February 2014. 
Influential MSWM Interest Groups in Brazil and India 
333 
 
India and Brazil; incineration has become the focus for major enterprises and 
represents the major part of investment in the solid waste management sector in 
emerging countries (GWMO, 2015: 79).  
The WtE process is interesting as a case study of public participation, since few 
communities will accept an incinerator in their backyard and there are always strong 
protests against the installation of such plants; however, industry lobbies counteract 
this local opposition at the national policy level, pushing for the implementation of 
these projects. In India, the purchase of large Chinese incinerators has been presented 
as an economic solution for the country’s metropolises: despite all the problems 
related to low calorific power due to the large percentage of organic material in Indian 
waste, local authorities have been opting for incineration plants. Tarun Rokadiya,146 
general manager of Abellon Clean Energy Limited, explains that because municipal 
solid waste management cannot produce projects that are economically sustainable, as 
the tax revenues are very small, the sector has lobbied for a change in policy so that 
entrepreneurs can sell the energy generated by the mass burning of urban solid waste 
to the government to compensate for the costs of incineration.147 
The PIL against the MSW Rules 2013 is evidence of the lack of citizen participation 
in decision-making in India. The activists were forced to use the courts to halt the bill. 
If approved, the new legislation would had changed the waste collection process in 
                                                
146 Interviewed at the Abellon offices in Ahmedabad, 6 March 2014. 
147 According to some interviewees in the business fairs, it is cheaper to build an incinerator plant in India than in 
Brazil. In India, the system of environmental protection is simpler; the Indian legislation is out-of-date, as it was 
launched before the European directives, thus allowing higher emission levels. The lobby for WtE has reclassified 
the energy generated from the burning of waste as a renewable energy. Without an institutional space for dialogue, 
it is more difficult for ordinary citizens to access, for example, lobbies in parallel sectors, such the energy sector, 
in the case of WtE. Therefore, only those with access to the decision-makers enjoy the advantage, without any 
participatory debate. 
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the country, allowing some private players to collect the dry and wet waste together in 
a mixed state. This is a procedure that is only suitable for incineration – a technology 
that favours only a small number of players who have access to the decision-makers, 
to the detriment of the rest of the formal and informal players in the sector, whose 
subsistence is, in most cases, entirely based on the income extracted from recycling. 
Among this enormous exchange of business opportunities and technology between 
the most industrialised Northern countries and the Southern transition economies, 
there is little South-to-South exchange of experiences. The only solid waste 
management business interaction between these two countries encountered during the 
fieldwork was the joint venture, ‘Antony Lara Enviro Solutions’, undertaken by two 
major industrial groups from India and Brazil, who are building the sanitary landfill, 
Kanjur, in Mumbai.148 
Thus, the debate on MSWM in both countries must take into account the participation 
of international pressure groups, which have exerted significant influence on the 
decision-making processes in both countries in terms of transfer of knowledge and 
technologies, and lobbying power. For example, as discussed in section 5.3, the strong 
lobby for retreated tyres inside the Brazilian Congress presented an obstacle to the 
formulation of a national waste policy until 2006, when the Brazilian proposal to ban 
the importation this sort of waste from developed countries was voted on at a global 
level in the Conference of the Parties (COP8) at the WTO. As Valverde states, the 
retreated tyres lobby managed to halt the formulation of a Brazilian waste policy for 
                                                
148 I was welcomed in Mumbai by Jose Jacob, owner of the Kanjur landfill and the Indian partner of the joint 
venture, on 28 January 2014; I tried to contact his Brazilian counterpart, the owner of Lara Central de Tratamentos 
de Resíduos, but without success. 
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many years. Nowadays, however, the market has changed, society is more engaged 
and new legislation has empowered the judiciary and government agencies to enforce 
the law. In addition, some business groups are beginning to recognise the waste 
hierarchy and the potential of ‘take-back’ programmes as a market strategy, creating 
opportunities for innovation and the entry of new players into the system. 
The influence of international interest groups in the domestic debate divides opinions. 
On the one hand, proponents of a more open market advocate the participation of 
international interest groups in the domestic market, claiming that this will prevent the 
monopolies of a few economic elites dominating the provision of public services. On 
the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 2, post-developmental theory, which emerged 
in the 1990s, mainly through the works of Arturo Escobar (1995), strongly criticises 
the large-scale Western programmes propagated by politicians and international donor 
agencies. The Colombian scholar shows how the discourse of economic 
modernisation, based on the transfer of large investments and technology from the 
North, creates dependency and eventually leads to neo-colonialism. In fact, the 
economic model based on Western living standards, characterised by increasing levels 
of production, consumption and urbanisation, has, in many cases, led to poverty and 
pollution in the South (Escobar, 1995: 14). As he points out, ‘the dominance of this 
knowledge system has dictated the marginalisation and disqualification of non-
Western knowledge systems’ (Escobar, 1995: 13), and ‘science and expert discourses 
such as development produce powerful truths, ways of creating and intervening in the 
world’ (Escobar, 1995: 20).  
However, in the eyes of businessmen, entrepreneurs and governments, these 
investments, business opportunities and international partnerships are crucial for the 
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development of solid waste management processes in these countries. Also, many 
grassroots movements and NGOs currently operate by employing similar strategies, 
partnering with international pressure groups, thus blurring the boundaries between 
public/private and formal/informal activities.  
7.5 A case study of waste pickers in Brazil and India 
If solid waste management is treated purely as a ‘techo-legal process’, to use 
Rajamani’s expression (2007: 306), however, it fails to take into account the presence 
of the waste pickers. The issue of waste management in developing countries 
demonstrates that, in addition to the problem of handling and finding appropriate 
destinations for the increasing amount of waste generated, there is also the sensitive 
issue of the sector’s army of informal workers (Un-Habitat, 2010). This is a topic that 
divides opinions due to its complex social and economic dimensions. In general, 
scholars, activists and NGOs advocate for the inclusion of waste pickers into the 
formal waste management system, while the corporate concerns in the sector and the 
authorities often have difficulty integrating them. In addition, these workers are 
frequently marginalised, due to their unhygienic and risky working conditions, and to 
racial and caste discrimination. 
Anyone who visits a major city in Brazil or India will notice the presence of informal 
waste pickers. They are responsible for collecting, transporting, sorting and separating 
recyclable material from the majority of the waste generated in the urban areas. In 
Brazil, the Bolsa Família, a Brazilian conditional cash-transfer programme for low-
income families, registered some 800,000 waste pickers across the country in 2012 
(Gonçalves, 2012: 41). In India, Annepu (2012: 76) estimates that 2.86 million people 
work in informal waste collection and recycling, which represents 0.75% of India’s 
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urban population. Waste picking is the only alternative for a population excluded 
from the labour market – migrants, low-skilled workers, the elderly, disabled and 
children, most of them residents of the slums, viaducts and streets of the metropolis, 
some of them illiterate and without identification documents. The majority of this 
population, therefore, works informally, dragging sacks of waste or transporting 
recyclables in pushcarts through the streets, or scraping a living by scavenging on 
dumpsites. 
This section explores the participation of this particular social group in the solid waste 
management sectors in Brazil and India, and their ability as individuals, social 
movements and interest groups to influence the decision-making process in these two 
political contexts. The section is divided into four parts: a review of the struggle of 
waste pickers for inclusion in the waste management system; the differences between 
waste pickers in Brazil and in India; their forms of organisation for political and 
economic participation, such as labour unions, cooperatives and NGOs; and the 
difference in achievements of waste pickers in these two countries. 
The struggle for recognition 
As the previous sections have shown, waste management is an extremely politicised 
issue. In Brazil, the PNRS, and the institutional participatory spaces it has created, 
have allowed the more institutionalised interest groups to influence the political 
process. In India, the sector has an array of formal and informal actors providing 
services at the local level, but (as this research has revealed) few institutional spaces 
in which non-state actors may gain access to the decision-making process at the 
central level. In both countries, as elsewhere, the contract for public service provision 
of solid waste management is especially competitive, since it can represent up to 15% 
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of the municipal budget (UN-Habitat, 2010; 21). In addition, the profitability of the 
market and the competition for waste resources has been growing worldwide as a 
result of increasing levels of waste generation. This is especially the case in emerging 
countries, due to the rise of a new middle class, with new consumption patterns, 
coupled with the scarcity of urban space to dedicate to landfill. The competition for 
contracts, and the rapid evolution of technologies and managerial processes, have put 
pressure on the market – and consequently on the conditions of the waste pickers. In 
this competitive, dynamic and increasingly high-tech environment, waste pickers 
struggle to survive. The only way to make their voices heard and to justify their 
inclusion in the waste management system is through collective organisation and 
institutionalisation, in accordance with the rules of the political system and the 
market. However, before entering into a discussion on the participation of waste 
pickers, it is necessary to first determine the reason why waste pickers should be 
integrated into the waste management system. 
In Brazil, the waste pickers’ cause helped bring the issue of waste to the attention of 
society. To the ordinary citizen, solid waste is almost invisible – most people want all 
types of waste kept out of sight. Therefore, the image of human beings earning a 
living by picking through mountains of waste in deplorable conditions has been 
enough to put the waste issue on the public agenda. However, when the issue enters 
the political arena, it is a struggle to maintain that waste pickers or catadores should 
have special rights or any type of priority in terms of waste resources and service 
provision, in the face of such strong competition. Some critics regard the 
appropriation of the image of waste pickers, mentioned above, as a political ploy: they 
claim that the catadores have been exploited for political purposes, and that only their 
leaders and other highly articulate individuals have ever benefitted from this process.  
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In general, the business sector is opposed to the logic that underpins the public 
policies that attempt to address informal working and underemployment. João Gianesi 
Neto, vice president of the Brazilian Association of Solid Waste and Public Cleaning 
(ABLP), claims that social issues should not be mixed with technical and managerial 
processes in the PNRS.149 He claims that the social element of the legislation is poorly 
defined, asserting that ‘the catador must be in considered in the legislation, but not 
prioritised’, and that it is naive to assume that catadores can solve the problems of the 
enormous amount of waste generated today. Ricardo Young, a councillor in the 
legislative assembly of São Paulo and former president of the ETHOS Institute, 
elaborates the view of the industry: 
The work of the catadores should be regarded as a transitional or immediate 
survival job. But you cannot think of this sort of work as a structuring 
element of the recycling chain, because it is very fragile, not only socially, 
but also from the point of view of consistency. A recycling chain demands 
constant re-feeding of secure and reliable volumes [of waste], because the 
whole production relies on it. Recycling cooperatives have proved fragile. 
From the social perspective, there is no doubt that they present a solution: 
cooperatives have gotten a lot of people out of poverty, also creating the 
conditions for individuals to leave the waste chain. But, then, their 
inconsistency prevents a more industrialised approach, which this [sector] 
eventually demands.150 
                                                
149 Interviewed at the ABLP offices in São Paulo, 10 October 2013. 
150 Interviewed in São Paulo, 4 December 2013. 
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Flávio Ribeiro of CETESB also claims that the PNRS is still only partially successful 
as a social policy, as it does not generate real autonomy for the catadores: 
It is necessary to seek new forms of social and economic inclusion. The ideal 
scenario is to take the individual out of poverty, to empower him and create 
conditions so that the catador can free himself from a condition of 
dependency. Once this trajectory is completed, the individual has to leave 
that condition and compete in the market. The government cannot bear the 
weight of maintaining special conditions for this individual to the detriment 
of other agents.151 
In Ribeiro’s view, ideally, cooperatives should become enterprises and compete in the 
market; however, he believes there is political exploitation involved. He claims that 
the final target of the PNRS is not social inclusion, but the establishment of the 
cooperatives themselves. Therefore, the problem lies in the fact that the PNRS 
encourages the proliferation of underemployment and reliance on assistance from the 
state, which gives rise to exploitation for political purposes. 
On the other hand, supporters claim that, due to their socio-economic conditions, 
waste pickers and their families are one of the most vulnerable groups in the 
population: they are exposed to the risks caused by solid waste, such as disease and 
pollution, because they work with hazardous materials, live in precarious dwellings 
and have little power to demand healthcare and other resources (Chintan, 2011: 37). 
Some waste pickers have never had access to education, and some do not even 
possess identity documents. In addition, alcoholism, drug addiction and mental illness 
                                                
151 Interview recorded (1:10’55”) at the CETESB headquarters in São Paulo, 6 January 2014. 
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are frequent problems, making their social integration, including holding down 
regular jobs, more difficult.  
The informal sector of waste collection and recycling, therefore, provides a livelihood 
for a large percentage of the poor in urban centres who would otherwise have no 
access to the labour market. Also, leading researchers in the field (Scheinberg et al., 
2006, Wilson et al., 2006, Dias, 2010a) argue that the inclusion of waste pickers 
contributes to the sustainability of municipal solid waste management in low-income 
and transitional countries. The survey of UN-Habitat (2010: XXIII) on SWM in 
developing countries shows that the informal sector complements local governments’ 
capacity to deliver public services, saving almost 15% of the municipal solid waste 
management budget, by collecting, recycling and composting part of the waste that 
otherwise would fall to the responsibility of the municipality (UN-Habitat, 2010: 21 
and XXVI), with all the added costs, and health and environmental impacts.  
However, as Bharati Chaturvedi (2008 cited in Scheinberg et al., 2011: 195) explains, 
without their political participation, the pressure of stronger political and economic 
forces may lead to the criminalisation of waste pickers’ activities and their further 
marginalisation. Therefore, ignoring or removing the informal sector may create 
competition for waste resources between the existing informal sector, contractors and 
waste authorities, and to an increase in municipal waste management-related costs to 
taxpayers (UN-Habitat, 2010: 132). Moreover, Anne Schienberg et al. (2011: 197) 
claim that in emerging economies, for the most part, the informal sector is linked into 
the formal sector and the recycling chain, filling specific niches in the waste stream. 
Even some formally employed waste workers sometimes work informally to 
complement their income. 
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Thus, the proposal to include waste pickers within the formal waste management 
system provokes a complex debate. The integration of all interest groups in waste 
management and planning is also recognised as a key feature of the Integrated Solid 
Waste Management (ISWM) approach, which is now generally accepted worldwide. 
This approach entails not only introducing the most up-to-date technology, but also 
taking into account all the particular local strengths, when planning a solid waste 
management system for a specific city or region (UN-Habitat, 2010: 214). All interest 
groups must be included in the processes of planning, implementing and monitoring, 
where the best option is the recognition and integration of formal and informal sectors 
in the process (UN-Habitat, 2010: XXIII). Sonia Dias (2009: 101) defines 
‘integration’ as any formal arrangement (agreement, contract or commitment) 
between waste pickers’ organisations and the municipality that guarantees their 
inclusion in the legalisation for the provision of services related to waste 
management. The legislation is a key starting point in the recognition and 
establishment of the role of waste pickers as economic actors in the sector (Dias, 
2009: 102). 
Nevertheless, legislation alone is not enough to guarantee the waste pickers’ 
integration into the waste management system. The following section compares the 
different modes of participation for waste pickers in Brazilian and Indian waste 
management scenarios, exploring the engagement of individuals with interest groups, 
and the capacity of such interest groups to shape waste policies that will affect their 
lives. The section aims to understand how waste pickers’ participation in the political 
debate has been shaped in each country, and how this participation has influenced the 
outcomes, in particular their inclusion in the waste management system. 




The differences between waste pickers in Brazil and India 
Despite certain common features mentioned earlier, the Brazilian and the Indian 
waste pickers’ situations are quite distinct. According to Lakshmi Narayan, co-
founder of Solid Waste Collection and Handling (SWaCH), the famous Indian waste-
pickers’ labour union, the main difference between Latin American and South Asian 
waste pickers is the fact that the former are fighting to maintain their labour rights and 
their access to recyclables, while the latter are regarded primarily as waste collectors, 
in addition to their role in recycling per se.152 In Brazil, urban waste collection has, 
over the decades, been a public service provided by the municipalities, while in 
several Indian cities, waste pickers fill the gaps in local authority service provision, 
collecting dry and wet household waste directly from citizens’ doorsteps and 
sweeping the streets. Figs 8 and 9 in section 4.2 shows the primary collection by 
waste pickers and a collection point in New Delhi, where the waste is deposited to 
await secondary collection by the local authority. 
The role of religion  
Another crucial difference is the attitude towards poverty and waste of the two main 
religions in these countries, which permeate societies in which 88.9% of Brazilians 
are Christians (IBGE, 2010) and 79.8% of Indians are Hindus (Census of India, 
2011). In Brazil, there are no religious cleavages, and the problem is almost 
exclusively linked to racial and class divisions. According to research carried out by 
                                                
152 Interviewed in a park in Pune, 28/3/2014. 
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IPEA (2013: 44), based on the 2010 census,153 two-thirds of catadores are black 
(66.1%) and one third are women (33.1%), and the rate of illiteracy is quite high 
(20.5%), in comparison to the general illiteracy rate in Brazil of 9.4%. In fact, 
historically, the support of the left-wing branch of the Catholic church was crucial to 
strengthening social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Márcia Hirata (2011) 
explains that the Catholic international organisation, Caritas, was established in São 
Paulo to help organise homeless people living in the city centre, providing land for 
shelters and mediating between the government and social movements to form the 
first cooperative of catadores.154 
The caste system 
In India, the Hindu caste system is by far the major barrier for Indian waste pickers. 
This is a millenary hierarchical system, where individuals in society are divided 
according to their race and the occupation of their ancestors.155 The large majority of 
waste workers are members of minority communities, such as Dalits or other so-
called ‘backward castes’.156 Kaveri Gill (2010: 7) explains that the occupational 
rigidity of caste status prevents these minorities from accessing formal work 
opportunities, and the lower social ranks – the scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled 
tribes (STs), Muslim minorities and ‘untouchables’ – are considered ‘a permanently 
                                                
153 According to the IPEA (2013: 42), the labour activity categorised as ‘collector of waste and recyclable 
materials, sorter of waste and sweepers’ was first included in the census data in 2010, classifying a total of 387,910 
individuals across the country. Researchers state that this figure is set too low, once the facts that the census is self-
declaratory and some respondents also have other work are taken into account. 
154 Recently, theologian Leonardo Boff (interviewed in Brasilia during the Waste and Citizenship Festival on 29 
October 2013), a famous promoter of liberation theology in the 1970s and advocate for the poor, an ecologist and a 
Marxist, was one of the guest speakers in the ‘Waste & Citizenship Festival’, held in Brasilia in 2013. 
155 The term ‘caste’ comes from the Portuguese, casta. The social stratification of the caste system was established 
during the British Raj, dividing society hierarchically, according to race and origin: Brahmins, Kshatriyas, 
Vaishyas, and Shudras and excluded castes, the Dalits, in addition to scheduled castes (Dalits) and scheduled tribes 
(Adivasi). Article 15 of the Indian Constitution establishes that discrimination against Dalits is illegal, and there 
are now specific policies and quotas implemented in schools and public employment. 
156  Dalits are the ‘untouchables’, classified officially as ‘schedule castes’ (SC). 
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polluted people’ due to ‘the hereditary pollution work assigned to their castes’ in the 
past (Gill, 2010: 91). Gill (2010) identifies several academic studies (for example, 
Searle-Chatterjee, 1979; Huysman, 1994; Deliège, 1994, 1997; Strefland, 1979) that 
show how the caste system has historically ascribed lower caste status to waste 
workers. In her survey of the informal urban economy, Gill (2010: 94) shows that 
even among informal waste workers there are hierarchical differentiations between 
those handling dry waste and trading in recyclable materials and those working with 
degraded materials such as night soil, animal carcasses and sweepings. Barbara 
Hariss-White’s (2016) research, in a city in the state of Tamil Nadu, shows that 40% 
of waste workers are Dalits, 30% are scheduled tribes and the rest are members of 
backward castes; the private sector of recyclables is dominated by Nadars157 and the 
second-hand market by Muslims. 
In addition to the different cultures and beliefs, there are also the questions of 
regionalism and gender. Most waste pickers in Indian metropolises are migrants from 
rural areas or other neighbouring countries. In her research on waste pickers in Brazil 
and India, Dias (2009: 107) shows that Bangladeshi migrants and Dalit women are 
even subjugated by other waste pickers on the streets of Delhi. Therefore, the caste 
system both prevents individuals struggling against their social conditions and 
impedes collective struggle. Gill (2010: 91) states that the caste system separates 
‘untouchables from the rest of Indian society’. As discussed in section 5.2, some 
critics show that the Clean Indian Mission (SBA) cannot achieve success while this 
cultural discrimination still exists. 
                                                
157 A specific and prominent ‘untouchable’ caste in the state of Tamil Nadu. 
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Jean Drèze (2012) argues that the caste system is an instrument of power used by the 
upper castes that dominate the main positions in public, private and social institutions. 
He gives as an example a case study in the city of Allahabad, in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, which explores caste hierarchy in terms of positions of power and influence 
(POPIs). The sample shows that POPIs in the city are dominated by two upper castes 
(Brahmins and Kshatriyas): they occupy 1,000 positions in twenty-five public 
institutions, which means that 75% of the main positions are in the hands of two 
upper castes in a state where they represent only 20% of the population. Even worse, 
the upper castes dominate 80% of POPIs in NGOs and trade union leadership 
positions, 90% of the executive committees of legal associations, and comprise 100% 
of office-holders in the press club, while there are no Dalits in those institutions, 
except for the university because of the mandatory quota system. 
The first conclusion of this comparison between the waste pickers’ conditions in Latin 
America and South Asia is the fact that, despite decades of campaigns and social 
movements, waste pickers in India continue to be stigmatised and marginalised, and 
excluded from the political processes of solid waste management. An Indian high-
ranking commissioner or director of a corporate contractor would not debate policies 
with a waste picker in the same forum: in general, they come from different castes, 
and cultural and religious tradition does not allow for this sort of proximity. In Brazil, 
by contrast, the implementation of the national waste policy is currently debated in 
several conferences and business fairs across the country. In many of these events, the 
leaders of the National Movement of Catadores (MNCR) sits at the same table with 
representatives of government authorities, industries and other players to discuss the 
feasibility of proposed strategies. The engagement of catadores in these events is 
critical to ensuring the improvement of their socioeconomic conditions. Comparing 
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the political participation of waste pickers in India and Brazil, the negative effects of 
the caste system is extremely clear. This begs the question of how Indian waste 
pickers can participate in the democratic process if they cannot dialogue with the 
decision-makers. 
Recognition and waste management policies 
One example of the differences evident in Brazil and India is the way waste pickers 
are regarded in the waste legislation in these countries. A key feature of the Brazilian 
waste policy is the recognition of solid waste as an economic good of social value that 
generates income and citizenship (PNRS, Art.6th, VIII). Recognising this means 
prioritising the inclusion of waste pickers in the municipal collection of recyclable 
waste and reverse logistics programmes (PNRS, Art.36th, VI, §1st). The PNRS 
establishes that, in order to access federal resources, municipal governments should 
deploy segregated waste collection, with the participation of catadores, organised in 
cooperatives or other forms of association. Moreover, the legislation allows financial 
incentives for projects developed in partnership with cooperatives that enhance the 
consolidation of shared responsibility for the product’s lifecycle and the operation of 
reverse logistics. The government provides lines of credit for infrastructure and 
equipment (treadmills, presses and trucks) for cooperatives via institutions such as the 
Federal Savings Bank (CEF), the Ministry of Cities and the National Health 
Foundation (FUNASA) in the Ministry of Health. Along with the enactment of the 
PNRS, the government has established the Pro-Catador Programme (Decree 7,405/10) 
and the Inter-ministerial Committee for Social and Economic Inclusion of Catadores 
(CIISC), in order to integrate federal government actions that improve the working 
conditions of catadores, such as the expansion of socioeconomic opportunities and 
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structures for productive organisations and recycling trading chains. Despite criticism 
of the mix of technical managerial processes and social issues in the PNRS, this 
legislation provides mechanisms to ensure the integration of this interest group in the 
waste management system. 
Meanwhile, in India, the MSW (M&H) Rules 2000 do not recognise the informal 
recycling sector. Chaturvedi and Gidwani (2011: 134) stress that ‘the Solid Waste 
Rules emphasises the need for recycling. However, they do not acknowledge the right 
to livelihood of [the] informal sector recycling workers anywhere in their mandate.’ 
The waste pickers were only legally recognised in the National Environmental Policy 
in 2006; however, it seems that this national legislation is the exception that proves 
the rule, as the MSW Rules 2000 remain the guiding principles for the sector and the 
local authorities. These authors claim that the absence of recognition of the informal 
sector in the court’s judgement on the PIL 888, and consequently in the waste rules, 
has had a detrimental effect on policy decisions.  
The new MSW Rules 2016 finally mentioned waste pickers. The guidelines for SBA 
(MoUD, 2014a: 15) mentions in Article 2.5.5 that ULBs should prioritise upgrading 
the conditions of the informal sector (waste pickers), enumerate them and integrate 
them into the formal system of municipal waste management. However, although they 
are mentioned, there are no clear measures on to how to integrate waste pickers. The 
waste pickers of different regions of the country have been left to rely on the political 
will of their own state legislators and the administrations of the ULBs. Narayan of 
SWaCH claims that their mention in the policy has been purely tokenistic: ‘It is 
wrong to mention them [waste pickers] and define them without providing very clear 
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guidelines on how they should be included. The words “waste pickers” are written in 
the Rules, but they are not integrated in the process at all.’158 
Although waste pickers have been recognised in the national legislation, in many 
cases, they are not officially recognised by local authorities. Not only academics have 
criticised the negligence of the MoEF, even government reports published over the 
last decade have shown that the role of the informal sector in SWM has not been 
addressed appropriately by government officials. CAG (2007: 33) states that, even 
though India is a signatory of Agenda 21, which recommends that the government 
support the inclusion of the informal sector in waste management, the MoEF does not 
recognise waste pickers as agents in the recycling and reduction of waste, and up to 
2007, only four pieces of state legislation have recognised these groups’ contribution 
to the recycling process. M. Ramachandran, a former minister in the Indian 
government, in a letter to the Chief Secretary in 2010, stressed that waste pickers “are 
often ignored in urban project planning, although their activities are vital to the life of 
the city” (MoUD, 2013: Appendix).159 
This striking difference in outcomes is also the result of the historical process of 
political organisation in the different countries. In Brazil, India and elsewhere, waste 
pickers as individuals are extremely vulnerable and can only be politically heard 
when organised collectively as a pressure group. However, their social and political 
organisation relies on their capacity to subsist economically. Among the different 
forms of formal and informal associations, trade unions, cooperatives and NGOs are 
their three main institutional forms of organisation. Basically, the first refers to 
                                                
158 Interviewed in a park in Pune, 28 March 2014. 
159 Interviewed in a restaurant in Delhi, 19 March 2014. 
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representation, the second to the organisation of production, and the third assumes a 
variety of formats and purposes. 
Labour unions, cooperatives and other forms of organisation 
In India, the trade unions work as membership-based associations, organising 
workforce demands collectively, representing and protecting the waste pickers’ 
interests politically. The first union for women waste pickers, the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA), was established in 1972 in the city of Ahmedabad, 
with the support of union leader and social activist Baba Adhav.160 It grew out of the 
Textile Labour Association (TLA), a union of textile workers dating from 1920. In 
Pune, the trade union, Kagad Kach Patra Kaghtakari Panchayat (KKPKP), was 
founded in 1993 and currently has some 9,000 members, 80% of them women from 
‘backward castes’. Meanwhile, the trade union, Solid Waste Collection and Handling 
(SWaCH), founded in 2006, has 1,500 members and provides services for the Pune 
Municipal Corporation (PMC). (Figs 20 and 21 show one of the two KKPKP 
cooperatives in Pune.) These organisations are regarded, worldwide, as an illustration 
of a successful social movement. However, as Ravi Agarwala (2013: 2) states, despite 
the fact that 93% of the Indian labour force comprises informal workers, the work of 
the trade unions and caste movements, such as that of the All India Backward and 
Minority Communities Employees Federation (Bamcef) in the 1970s, has never 
achieved a unified voice and has been unable to improve labour regulations. 
Moreover, after the economic reforms that began in 1991, state regulations on capital, 
labour and social welfare have been superseded by the logic of neoliberalism. 
                                                
160 Interviewed in his office in Pune, 28 March 2014. 





Figure 20: KKPKP cooperative in Pune, India (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Figure 21: KKPKP co-operative in Pune, India (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
In Brazil, waste pickers’ trade unions play a crucial role in helping regulate the waste 
market. They gained strength during the 1980s during the period of democratisation 
(Barbosa et al., 2014: 62); in 1988. the Brazilian federal constitution established the 
foundations for citizen participation and free initiatives, and incentives for the 
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development of cooperativism. Dias161 states that the waste pickers quickly learned to 
take advantage of the changed political scene, and the activism and organisation of 
social movements and labour unions, to fight for progressive policies. Arguably, 
among all the BRIC countries, the Brazilian structure of tripartism has demonstrated 
the most progressive in terms of policies involving workers in the country’s 
development (Balestro, 2015). This ideology has provided a critical framework for the 
debate on waste policies in Brazil. According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (cited in Abramo et al., 2013: 213), tripartism establishes a social 
dialogue between the three key actors involved in the promotion of decent working 
conditions: labour, employment and government. This dialogue comprises 
negotiation, consultation and the sharing of information between these actors for all 
public policies and subjects of common interest. Therefore, Ishikawa (cited in 
Abramo et al. 2013: 216) states that the government has a key role in establishing the 
juridical and political framework and the institutional space for dialogue between the 
parties and in ensuring that the agreements reached result in real policies. 
The Brazilian legislation on sanitation and solid waste management has prioritised the 
inclusion of catadores, organised in cooperatives and other forms of associations. 
According to the legislation, which determines their functions (Art. 2, Law 
12,690/2012), labour cooperatives are non-profit companies for the provision of 
services, where all the participants work for the common good and engage in the self-
management of the organisation, in order to gain better qualifications, income, 
socioeconomic status and general working conditions. The Brazilian cooperative 
                                                
161 Interviewed over the phone, 24 March 2014. 
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model offers catadores better healthcare and safer working conditions, as well more 
productive ways of collecting, sorting and selling their products, and greater 
opportunities for political engagement in the formulation of public policies on 
recycling. Flávio Ribeiro162 of CETESB suggests that the economic example of 
cooperatives is possibly the only current alternative to the capitalist productive model: 
If there is an alternative in the market to existing private enterprise, which is 
exclusively for profit, it goes through the co-operatives, whether they are of 
catadores, small producers, farmers, or any other groups. However, what is 
happening today is disastrous, with accusations of money laundering and the 
cover-up of organised crime. The proposal sounds great, but personal 
interests have distorted the ideal. 
Historically, cooperatives of waste pickers in Brazil have their origins in the social 
movements of the mid-1980s (Hirata, 2011: 9, Magni and Günther, 2014: 103), when 
a group of homeless people, living under the Glicério viaduct in the centre of São 
Paulo, realised that cooperativism would give them more strength and help them 
attain greater gains from the sale of collected material (Hirata, 2011: 13). Out of these 
early experiences the first legally recognised cooperative was formed in 1989 – the 
Cooperative of Autonomous Collectors of Paper, Scrap and Recyclable Materials 
(COOPAMARE) – working in partnership with the municipal government. Other 
cooperatives then proliferated across the country, such as the Association of 
Collectors of Paper, Cardboard and Recyclable Material (ASMARE), which was 
formed in the city of Belo Horizonte in 1990.  
                                                
162 Interviewed via telephone, 22 March 2016. 
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Recognition of the catadores’ cooperatives as productive agents in the recycling 
chain, therefore, began in 1990 at a local level in the cities of Belo Horizonte and 
Porto Alegre, and later reached state level, beginning with the state of Minas Gerais 
and spreading to the Federal District in 2004 (Dias, 2011: 2). In the following 
decades, other key policies were enacted, granting the cooperatives greater 
legitimacy. In 2002, the informal recycling of waste materials was classified as a 
profession in the Brazilian Occupation Classification (CBO) produced by the Ministry 
of Labour and Employment. In 2006, Decree No. 5940 determined that the federal 
public administration should collect and send recyclable materials to cooperatives of 
catadores, and in 2007, the Policy on Basic Sanitation exempted them from bidding 
for public service contracts for recyclable waste collection. Therefore, the evolution 
of the catadores’ social movements into the political pressure groups of today has a 
historical context. 
The support of the legislation is an emblematic difference between the waste pickers’ 
labour conditions in India and Brazil. For example, in India, Yamin Parikh, vice-
president of SEWA, and Varsha Mehta, a member of SEWA, explain that, between 
2004 and 2009, it ran a pilot project with the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
(AMC), providing door-to-door-collection (DTDC) of household waste in six wards 
in the city.163 However, in 2009, the AMC put out the waste collection services to 
tender. Participation in the bid was subject to payment of an initial deposit. SEWA, 
the majority of whose affiliates are illiterate, lower-caste women, did not have the 
                                                
163 Interviewed at the SEWA offices in Ahmedabad, 7 March 2014. 
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cash and were unable to participate in the bid. Consequently, the organisation lost the 
concession. 
Some of the political achievements in Brazil are the result of the engagement and 
mobilisation of the MNCR, which, since 2002, has been the main representative 
group of the catadores. As discussed earlier, the formulation of the PNRS was 
extensively debated in several public hearings and conferences, which representatives 
of the MNCR attended. Representatives of catadores have also participated in 
conferences and business fairs: for example, during the 4th CNMA, which I attended 
in the course of the fieldwork for this research, the catadores seemed to be the most 
organised and active group. In the prelude to the event, the MNCR announced their 
entrance with a demonstration, chanting their slogans and waving their flags, 
commanding the attention of the whole auditorium. Figure 22 shows a meeting of the 
MNCR to discuss proposals during one of the working group sessions, and its strategy 
for the ballot in the plenary: ‘Comrades, let’s organise. We need the support of all 
during the poll.’ The group is politically articulate and influential in the decision-
making process at a central level and in some major cities across the country. Behind 
the scenes, both opponents and proponents interviewed said that the PNRS was only 
approved by President Lula on condition that the gains of the catadores were 
translated into law. Indeed, the former president, Lula, and the recent president, Dilma 
Rousseff, received the catadores’ representatives in their offices and participated in 
their meetings.  
Alongside this political participation, the MNCR has recently promoted major events 
to bring the catadores together. The week following the 4th CNMA, its members met 
again in the 12th Waste & Citizenship Festival in Brasilia, which received some 2,000 
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leaders and representatives of catadores from across the country. The MNCR also 
promoted the Expo Catador, a business fair exhibiting equipment and facilitating the 
exchange of experiences, which received more than 8,000 visitors in 2013, including 
representatives from fourteen countries. Dias (2009) argues that such events have 
been responsible for engaging and catalysing the demands of different groups 
throughout the country. In this way, catadores have taken advantage of the 
participatory process in Brazil to raise their demands. Currently, the MNCR is 
seeking to institute special insurance cover for those working as catadores as part of 
the general social security system. 
 
Figure 22: Meeting of the MNCR during the 4th CNMA to organise their 
demands (Source: Author’s photo) 
 





Figure 23: Waste and Citizenship Festival, Brasilia, 25 October 2013 (Source: 
Author’s photo) 
 
However, even with progressive policies and the support of organisations, academics 
and civil society, the condition of the catadores can be fragile when faced with 
powerful economic and political interests. In addition to their own organisations, 
waste pickers rely on the support of NGOs and activists. During the fieldwork, it was 
possible to observe a rich variety of NGOs and CBOs, who support and advocate for 
the waste pickers’ cause in both India and Brazil, and in the international arena. To 
mention just two local NGOs engaged in the organisation and support of specific local 
groups of waste pickers, there is the Centre of Studies and Support of Development, 
Employment and Citizenship (CEADEC),164 which supports the Sorocaba Recycling 
Cooperative (Coreso), and the Centre of Education São Bartolomeu (CEASB),165 
supporting the Cooperative of Catadores of Vila Emater II (Coopvila). Rita de Cássia 
Viana, president of CEADEC, explains that in some cases, cooperatives that are 
                                                
164 Interviewed at CORESO in Sorocaba, 6 December 2013. 
165Centro de Educação Ambiental São Bartolomeu 
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supported by NGOs have achieved better results and have improved their 
infrastructure in comparison to those associated with the municipalities. 166  For 
example, the cooperative CORESO has machinery to recycle plastic and used cooking 
oil, while COOPVILA has better building installations and the catadores have better 
wages than those in cooperatives working in partnership with the local authorities. 
Figs 24 and 25 show a cooperative working with the NGO (COOPVILA) and one 
working with the municipality (COOPLUN). In addition, organisations such as the 
Brazilian Dê uma Mão para o Futuro,167 set up by the Brazilian Association of 
Personal Cosmetics, Toiletry and Fragrance (ABIHPEC), represent initiatives by the 
industrial sector to develop a network of businesses and catadores’ cooperatives, in 
order to find solutions to the problem of post-consumer packaging waste. 
 
Figure 24: Catadora Ivanilda Gomes at the entrance of the COOPVILA, Maceió, 
Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
                                                
166 Centro de studos e apoio ao desenvolvimento, emprego e cidadania 
167 ‘Lend the Future a Hand’ 




Figure 25: COOPLUN, Maceió, Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
There are also larger organisations providing information and lobbying at government 
level. In India, NGOs like Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group and 
Toxic Links have been actively advocating for waste pickers at central, state and local 
government levels for more than a decade. At a global level, international NGOs such 
as Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO)168 and the 
Global Alliance of Waste Pickers provide a network for the exchange of information 
and experiences between social movements worldwide, and also act on international 
agreements at the global level. 
Currently, the major threat to waste pickers in Brazil, India and elsewhere is what is 
known colloquially as ‘the lobby for incineration’. Waste-to-energy (WtE) is a 
capital-intensive approach that burns and destroys recyclable materials, and is intent 
on replacing the more labour-intensive approach of the waste pickers, negatively 
                                                
168 WIEGO website: http://wiego.org 
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impacting their livelihoods. Currently, the flagship issue facing Brazilian catadores 
and Indian waste pickers is the fight against the granting of concessions by public 
services and the WtE industry. The Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance (GAIA)169 is a 
global network, comprising more than 800 associations in around ninety countries, 
against incineration. Without organisation, waste pickers are incapable of facing 
down these powerful economic interests.  
Comparing outcomes in Brazil and India 
Kazuo Nakano,170 director of the Department of Urban Development of the Municipal 
Secretariat for Urban Development of São Paulo (SMDU), explains that the MNCR 
exerted strong pressure to insert the prioritisation of catadores and reverse logistics in 
the law on waste management. He stresses that the fact that catadores are 
contemplated at all in the legislation is highly significant; nevertheless, as he says, 
discourse is one thing, putting good intentions into operation is something else 
altogether. Five years after the implementation of the Brazilian waste policy, some 
municipalities hired cooperatives and closed their dumpsites, promoting the 
socioeconomic inclusion of their catadores. According to the Brazilian National 
Survey on Basic Sanitation (IBGE) in 2008, 26.8% of waste authorities had 
recognised the existence of waste pickers. The Ciclosoft survey (CEMPRE, 2014) 
shows that 927 municipalities in Brazil (17% of the country) have implemented some 
sort of recycling programme, of which 76% involve cooperatives of catadores in their 
processes.  Ronei Alves, one of the leaders of the MNCR, highlights that these 
achievements are the result of the engagement with local groups of catadores and the 
                                                
169 GAIA website: http://www.no-burn.org/index.php 
170 Interviewed at the SMDU headquarters in São Paulo, 4 October 2013. 
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political will of the municipal authorities, but the inclusion of catadores in the 
legislation does not guarantee their inclusion as such in the formal market.171 In 
addition to the lack of knowledge and organisation among certain groups of 
catadores, access to waste resources and contracts for the provision of public services 
are now the target of major industrial corporations and politicians. 
Hence, the fact that the MNCR lacks both the structure and the financial resources 
necessary to achieve representation for all catadores in every municipality in Brazil is 
problematic. Further complicating the issue, catadores are part of an informal 
collection of unskilled workers, and not all of them share the same aims. The labour 
market of the catador is unstable, and in periods of economic improvement, workers 
often migrate to other jobs that offer better wages and working conditions, such as 
construction. Moreover, the economic conditions of the catadores working in small 
towns and regions far from recycling centres differ from those working in larger 
industrialised cities, where the prevalence of recyclable waste and the market for the 
sale of recycled material compensates their efforts. The fieldwork observation of the 
cooperatives of COOPERE in the city of São Paulo (Figs 26 and 27) and COOPLUN 
in Maceió (Figs 25 and 28), conducted for this research, shows a large difference in 
terms of equipment and infrastructure. Despite the fact that the latter has a certain 
level of infrastructure, including a shed to work in and other facilities, the waste 
pickers still work on the floor, with unsafe equipment. Access to materials and a 
market is a key factor in the economic sustainability of such cooperatives. There are 
some cases in less developed cities, where the cooperatives have been given trucks by 
                                                
171 Interview via telephone on 2 May 2014. 
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the local authorities to collect recyclables, but they do not make enough profit to pay 
for either a driver or fuel. Figure 28 shows the case of COOPLUN in Maceió, where 
the vehicle is not in use due to lack of diesel. 
 
 
Figure 25: COOPERE, São Paulo, Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Figure 26: COOPERE, São Paulo, Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 





Figure 27: COOPLUN, Maceió, Brazil (Source: Author’s photo) 
 
Despite the progressive policy framework and the efforts of the MNCR, the large 
majority of Brazilian catadores remain unorganised and still work in precarious and 
dangerous conditions in the streets and on dumpsites. Notwithstanding all the efforts 
of the Indian and Brazilian organisations championing the waste pickers’ cause, a 
large number of the unorganised waste pickers gathering street and dumpsite waste 
are unaware of these organisations – some catadores interviewed on the streets in 
Brazil stated that they had never heard of the MNCR. Similarly, in India, small 
enterprises and family associations of waste collectors, who offer their services 
directly to householders and RWAs, have never heard of Chintam, KKPKP or SEWA.  
In addition, many waste pickers working in the streets prefer to work independently, 
for a number of reasons. Many are not affiliated to any of these organisations by 
choice, arguing that they can earn more money by selling the collected material 
directly to the junkshops. In São Paulo, an individual unorganised catador told me 
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that he earns approximately R$1,600 (USD 420) per month, while the wage of a 
cooperate catador may vary between R$1,200 (USD 315) per month in São Paulo and 
R$250 (USD 66) per month in a mid-sized city. The unorganised catador claims that 
he receives payment according to the amount of the material collected, in contrast to 
the monthly payments received by the catadors in cooperatives. Furthermore, the he 
does not have to follow a set work schedule, having the freedom and flexibility to 
take other temporary informal jobs to complement his income. Carlos Alexandre and 
Rodrigo Alves, two catadores in São Paulo, explain that they have sometimes worked 
in co-operatives, but they do not like this type of job: ‘Here, in the street with my 
handcart, I do not work with dirty waste, like in the co-operatives; I just work with 
clean and valuable materials. This is work for men; cooperative work is for women 
and elderly people.’ Francisco Inácio, a member of COOPIRES,172 claims this kind of 
disinformation is problematic, because most of these catadors are not conscious of the 
advantages and importance of political participation and the value of work in the 
community.173 He claims that the majority of catadores are exploited and have, as a 
result, become wary of any sort of organisation. However, these unorganised workers 
do not have access to the benefit of the law, as the PNRS only covers those catadores 
working in cooperatives or other forms of associations. 
In Delhi, a waste picker receives around 70 (£0.71) to 100 rupees (£1.01) every month 
per residence to collect the household waste, and around 500 (£5.07) from small 
shops and restaurants, according to Shashi Pandit, leader of the NGO, All India 
Kabadi Mazdoor Mahasangh (AIKMM). In India, every migrant is a small 
                                                
172  COOPIRES, or Coop Material Reciclável de Ribeirão Pires, is a recycling co-operative in the district of 
Ribeirão Pires in the state of São Paulo. 
173 Interviewed in the 4th CNMA in Brasilia, 24 October 2013. 
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entrepreneur, including the garbage man: he or she collects the waste from a number 
of houses and delivers it to the collection point, which is generally run as a family 
business. More often than not, men collect the waste, which the women and children 
then sort. Some waste-picker families earn around 1,000 rupees (£10.15) per month. 
sorting the waste for middlemen (waste-buyers). The rest of the waste, which is not 
recycled, is burned. Waste picker Suman Lankeshwar, a member of SWaCH for more 
than a decade, explains that she now individually collects the waste of some 200 huts 
in the Indira Vasahat Aundh slum area.174 She earns between 20 (£0.20) and Rs 50 
(£0.51) per hut each month, and also sells the recyclable material, making around Rs 
50 per day (£0.51). Some more organised entrepreneurs have a better structure. 
Somnath Thiral, another member of SWaCH, uses his truck to collect and deliver the 
waste material of 160 flats of fifteen wealthier condominiums to his relatives to be 
segregated every day.175 He receives around Rs 50 to 100 per flat per month. This 
enterprise generates an income of around Rs 50 to 60,000 (£507.50 to £609). He 
claims: ‘Nobody segregates the waste in these flats. It does not matter if society 
segregates it or not, I just want to work.’ 
The involvement of waste pickers in the waste industry varies across India from state 
to state and city to city. Travelling to different cities in India and talking to different 
organisations and practitioners in the field, it is clear that there are several 
perspectives but no one voice coordinating the different demands in a single model. 
One of the best examples illustrating this variation is the case of the KKPKP in Pune.  
Lakshmi Narayan of SWaCh explains, for instance, that the KKPKP is involved in 
                                                
174 Interviewed on the street in Pune, 27 March 2014, with the support of SWaCH. 
175 Interviewed in Balewudi area, Pune, 27 March 2014, with the support of SWaCH. 
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two different models in two neighbouring cities. In Pune, waste pickers run two scrap 
shops (Figs 20 and 21), providing door-to-door collections for householders through 
the SWaCH cooperative, in agreement with the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), 
while in the neighbouring city, the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation 
(PCMC) contracted a private company to provide waste management services. In the 
case of Pune, which has a distinguished record of progressive policies, SWaCH fights 
for waste pickers’ rights as formal workers: they must be prioritised in hiring and 
receive the benefits of formal employment, such as access to the minimum wage and 
statutory benefits. According to Avinash Madhale, programme coordinator of the 
Centre for Environment Education (CEE) of the Nehru Foundation for Development, 
this characteristic of the city is the result of the evolution of the industrial sector there, 
as well the intellectual currents and particular social characteristics of Pune.176 In 
early 2015, a parliamentary standing commission visited Pune to learn about the 
SWaCH model (Khape, 2014). The commission was impressed by the service 
provided by the cooperative and, in its report, it recommended that the model be 
included in the SBA as an example to be replicated across the country (LS, 2014). 
However, Narayan claims that although SWaCH has good channels – and a successful 
history – of negotiation with the authorities, the relationship with the municipal 
corporation is never an easy process. With every incoming administration, they have 
to reaffirm their proposals. 
According to Prashant Pandya, deputy director of SWM of the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation (AMC), in November 2014, the AMC engaged waste pickers for door-to-
                                                
176 Interviewed at the CEE offices in Pune, 27 March 2014. 
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door collections in two zones of the city.177 According to the AMC’s report (2016: 
11), due to this programme’s positive results, the ‘Swachhata Jan Model’ (SJM) was 
implemented in three wards of the city in October 2015, and in another four in 
February 2016, with the aim of providing a collection service to 35,000 residences. 
The income generated by the dry waste sorted and sold in the centre will be shared 
among waste pickers. In fact, activist groups of waste collectors have campaigned in 
residential areas to try and change social behaviours. 
The recognition of the catador as a key player in recycling in the Brazilian waste 
management system has generated innovative examples of partnerships between 
cooperatives, business sectors and the authorities. One example, is the contract agreed 
between the city of São Paulo and a private contractor in 2014, with the involvement 
of a waste pickers’ cooperative, which stipulated that the recycling centre would be 
managed by fifty-four catadores. Another is the Green Stock Exchange Rio de 
Janeiro (BVRio, 2014), which has created reverse logistics credits (RLC), in 
partnership with the MNCR, to trade on the stock market.  
SWaCh’s Narayan admires the Latin American waste pickers’ achievements; 
however, she has a few concerns about the results. At first glance, with a more 
progressive policy and successful outcomes, the Brazilian SWM political process 
appears more inclusive and participatory than the Indian one, but a thorough analysis 
shows a more complex reality. Narayan explains that Indian waste pickers are not 
well organised across the country as in Brazil. In her view, the Indian process is 
different, and though a number of organisations of waste pickers have fought hard 
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over the last decades to reach some sort of consensus, attaining a unified voice is 
almost impossible in the short term. She highlights that the Indian process has to be 
slower and more gradual, as we cannot keep pace with Brazil’. She adds: 
You need waste pickers organised in other cities... Language can be a 
problem in India, but there has been very little effort to bring waste pickers 
together across the country into a common forum. Debating issues 
collectively poses different challenges. Where will the money for this come 
from? Organisations of waste pickers barely have the money to organise the 
waste pickers in their own cities. Even if you are talking about organising a 
meeting in another nearby city, the cost is not the kind of money that is 
available, and all the more so for holding national-level meetings. Even the 
cost of travel would be very difficult for these waste pickers. 
By contrast, as mentioned previously, there are several financial institutions and 
programmes in Brazil that provide cooperatives with financial incentives and 
infrastructure. 
Narayan claims that, possibly, the Indian process has not been as successful because 
the focus has been on apprising waste pickers of their collective rights, rather than 
how to organise and change their conditions: ‘[Only] those who are more organised 
and articulate, and have the ability to control the entire movement, can ensure that the 
benefits of cooperative movements reach everyone.’ 
The problem with the Latin American cooperative model, Narayan claims, is the fact 
that it covers a small number of waste pickers. According to the Brazilian PNRS, in 
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order to access the benefits of the law, catadores must be organised in cooperatives or 
other forms of associations. She points out: 
The total percentage of waste pickers working in cooperatives [which are 
covered by the law], compared with those [who are] unorganised and 
outside of the cooperatives [working informally in the streets and on 
dumpsites], is very small. If you look at the number of waste pickers whose 
lives have actually changed, who are organised, they are only a small 
proportion of the whole. This makes a huge difference. 
She claims that in most places in India, the transition has been far more gradual, but 
many are glad of this. 
Nowadays, the waste pickers are slightly better off than they previously were, 
but it is not as though their conditions have changed dramatically. Hence, I 
also think that the struggle to get larger numbers into the process means that 
you will never have that rapid pace of growth, since you are building a much 
larger base. To attain that pace of change is very difficult. 
However, waste pickers are not legally recognised in the legislation or by the 
authorities in large parts of the country in India, and several official documents on 
waste management do not even mention their existence. It is not for lack of activism 
or of the engagement of scholars, advocacy groups and activists that waste pickers are 
distanced from Indian legislators. For decades, academics have demanded the 
inclusion of waste pickers in the waste system in India. This is a constant complaint 
voiced in the majority of the research and debates involving academics. 
Narayan claims: 
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Even though people know about the SWaCH of KKPKP model, it makes a 
significant difference whether the bureaucrats and politicians of the state 
government and central government are physically overseeing it out there, in 
the street. It is not the same [as sitting] somewhere and hearing about the 
model. This makes a huge difference. 
In India, the caste system definitely halts the access of waste pickers to the democratic 
process, and as a consequence, a large amount of people are kept out of the formal 
labour market and denied the resources essential to improving their lives. The origins 
of this obstacle do not lie with the government alone, they are also social. The middle 
classes demand greener and cleaner urban spaces, but the thorny question is whether 
they are willing to promote the social inclusion of Dalits, and how much social 
mobility the upper castes will be willing to accept. 
In Brazil, the socioeconomic inclusion of catadores is openly declared as a policy 
objective; the social and economic relevance of this labour category is officially 
recognised in the policy framework. Although only 10% of catadores are currently 
organised in cooperatives in Brazil, the number of cooperatives is increasing across 
the country, and groups such as the MNCR participate in policymaking, proposing 
solutions for the impasse of the informal sector. Although it is not easy to generalise 
about the situation of the catadores, given that the majority of them are still living 
very precariously, the example of Ana Lúcia, a catadora from the state of Espírito 
Santo, illustrates the significance of social inclusion: 
Our struggle has carried on for more than fifty years. My father was a 
catador. In the past, we were unable to reach this level. We were alone on 
the dumpsites and in the streets, and everyone had to fend for themselves. 
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Today, we are in the cooperative recycling warehouse. We are ‘actors.’ The 
focus is on us. Today, we are on top. The public prosecutors are on our side 
and we have lawyers. 
[…] 
I used to work pushing a cart on the streets and selling my work to the 
middleman. Now, I have been working for five years in the cooperative. 
Today my son is about to graduate and he will then study law, and my 
daughter is also studying. During this time, I have saved money so they could 
have the opportunity to study. I have my own house. Everything I have, I 
attained with through waste picking.178 
The waste pickers’ cooperatives, therefore, have lifted people out of extreme poverty, 
and some have attained a far better economic level. In addition, the inclusion of 
catadores in the waste management process (including reverse logistics) in 
mechanised centres in the city of São Paulo and in BVRio has generated innovative 
business opportunities. Such experiences have resulted in significant contributions to 
the Brazilian economy. 
7.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has shown that, in order to ensure their voices are heard and to advance 
their interests in these competitive and highly politicised environments, interest 
groups need to establish alliances – lobbying, supporting and negotiating with other 
groups and decision-makers. Participatory institutional processes are democratic 
                                                
178 Interviewed during the 4th CNMA, 26 October 2013. 
Influential MSWM Interest Groups in Brazil and India 
372 
 
spaces that allow non-state actors to intervene in the political debate; however, if they 
are dominated by interest groups, these democratic processes become based solely on 
lobbying and competition between the most powerful pressure groups, determining 
how democracy itself operates in these sectoral areas.  
The case studies in this chapter have offered specific examples of the impact of 
interest group participation on the solid waste management sector in Brazil and India. 
Despite the pluralist character of the Brazilian case, it has revealed that policy 
decision-making in this sector is dominated by powerful political and economic elites. 
The extensive debates during the formulation of the PNRS, and the subsequent 
forums of the CNMA, the Sectoral Agreements and the discussions on the goal of the 
complete closure of all dumpsites in the country, created opportunities for 
representative entities of local governments, businesses and other associations to 
interact with each other, discuss their conflicts and form coalitions to influence 
government decisions. All of these debates, however, have been extremely technical, 
examining the environmental legislative framework, the specific technologies of 
implementation and the cost-benefit analyses, and for this reason, have been led by 
technical experts, lawyers and the public authorities in charge of the system. Many of 
these negotiations have ended up mediated by the judiciary. 
In the context of participatory spaces such as these, the concept of dominant networks 
(Alston et al., 2016; Wallis, 2015; Bardhan, 2008) contradicts the idea of the 
independent pluralism of ideas (Dahl, 1989), since the political competition between 
different groups demands the aggregation of forces around certain topics in order to 
advance specific interests. Only the most powerful groups have the expertise, access 
to information and financial resources to influence the policy agenda. There are no 
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balanced and fair outcomes – all of the decisions are political and economic, 
benefiting just a few groups. Even the social and economic inclusion of the catadores 
is the result of political disputes amongst the more powerful players; some politicians 
and interest groups have taken advantage of the condition of the waste pickers to 
foster their own political and economic ambitions. Meanwhile, in the case of the 
Indian MSW Rules, dominant coalitions have used the policy process to protect their 
entrenched political and economic privileges. 
This chapter has also confirmed Mancur Olson’s (1971) theory of the unequal, 
competing pressures and capacities of what he terms ‘latent’ and ‘privileged’ groups. 
By applying Marissa Golden’s (1998) findings (on the rule-making processes in the 
US) to both the Brazilian and Indian debates on waste reform, the chapter revealed 
that there is a near-absence of groups advocating for the interests of the users of the 
system – that is, the ordinary citizens. In the case of waste management, the citizen is 
defined as either a consumer or a householder. The individual, as a householder, is 
affected by the quality of the public service and pays directly or indirectly for its costs 
in the form of fees or taxes, while the consumer pays for the costs of recycling in the 
final price of the product. During the fieldwork for this research, I did not observe 
groups of citizens raising these subjects in those decision-making processes I had the 
chance to participate in. The few cases that did arise were related either to ‘not-in-my-
backyard’ (nimby) concerns, where groups of local citizens affected by the 
installation of facilities near their communities mobilised to pressure the government 
to solve their immediate problem, or to the introduction of new taxes or a rise in waste 
management fees. 
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Foreign lobbies and environmentalism 
Due to globalisation and the current debates on the environmental crisis and climate 
change, solid waste management has become a global concern. The sector is the 
beneficiary of increasing investments by international organisations and the support 
of the international scientific community, which promotes equivalent practices and 
technologies throughout the world, including in developing countries. Brazil and 
India have a long tradition of external entities influencing government decisions, from 
international humanitarian and sanitation aid in India to global financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, intervening during the economic crises in the 
1980s in Brazil (Gozetto and Thomas, 2014: 16). The current governments in these 
countries have passed measures to attract foreign investment in a bid to foster 
economic development. As this chapter has shown, in both India and Brazil, several 
international interest groups have gathered and exchanged information, created 
partnerships with domestic players and directly lobbied the national governments, 
consequently influencing their decisions.  
The impact of foreign lobby groups on domestic decision-making in these countries 
cannot be ignored, particularly in the waste management sector. Some proponents 
claim that this influence is a key driver behind the improvement of the current critical 
situation of waste management. John Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy (2009) explain 
that, although environmental theory does not offer an explanation of how the 
democratic system operates and how decisions are taken that could counterbalance 
traditional theories of democracy, it provides an understanding of the logic behind the 
forces influencing state decisions. In fact, in many cases in the domestic system, 
government bodies and interest groups rely heavily on international organisations for 
knowledge, investment and technology (that is, the supply of experts, money and 
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equipment). The discussions in the domestic waste management sector are also 
strongly influenced by these international debates. The majority of ideas discussed in 
business forums and the specialist media by policy experts are quite often based on 
technologies and methods implemented in the industrialised countries, which are then 
presented as solutions for these developing economies. In addition, the financial 
mechanisms proposed by the legislation are a staple of international players, since the 
policies have been designed by global experts. In sum, this chapter has shown that 
international interest groups have exerted significant influence on government 
decisions, shaping the political and economic practices in these countries. 
Social inclusion 
The inclusion of waste pickers in solid waste management in the developing world 
has been extensively debated in the social sciences (Wilson et al., 2006, Scheinberg et 
al., 2006, Dias, 2010b). As this chapter has argued, their political participation is a 
key example of the importance of public participation in government decisions. 
Institutional spaces have provided an opportunity for the leaders of these groups to 
defend their rights, interact with other interest groups and present proposals for the 
solution of waste management problems. However, the cases of the Brazilian 
catadores and the Indian waste pickers differ in several aspects, and they show quite 
distinct political outcomes. In Brazil, the catadores have the chance to debate their 
interests actively with other interest groups in numerous political forums; in India, 
although recent legislation has recognised the role of the informal sector in the 
management of solid waste, it is still unclear whether these legal mechanisms will 
ensure the inclusion of waste pickers in the formal sector. 
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As Sonia Dias (2009) emphasises, social movements in Brazil took the opportunity of 
new democratic legislation and the emergence of trade union movements in the late 
1980s to learn how to mobilise resources and gain the support of politicians and 
interest groups. Consequently, the catadores became, over the decades, a significant 
interest group in its own right in the waste management sector. Although there are a 
variety of catadores’ organisations, one central group has assumed leadership and 
now has the political cohesion to claim a voice in government decisions. However, 
although they have gained in strength, catadores still rely on other influential 
organisations and the authorities’ political will to enable them to participate in the 
political debate. As discussed in section 7.4, catadores have always had the support of 
the Workers’ Party, from its origins at the municipal level in the 1980s to its 
assumption of power at central government level. However, political participation 
does not mean social inclusion, and these political spaces are not impartial and 
consensual. As some interviewees in this chapter have claimed, catadores are not 
easily accepted into the formal waste management sector and, to some extent, their 
inclusion in the final text of the waste reform bill was a political condition imposed by 
the former president, Lula da Silva. Opponents have labelled this policy ‘populist’, 
and syndicalism is indeed the basis of the Workers’ Party; nonetheless, catadores 
have definitely shaped the PNRS, and both proponents and opponents of the policy 
agree that it addresses both social and technical issues within the same framework. 
By contrast, as this chapter has shown, Indian waste pickers still face constraints 
when it comes to collective action: the prejudices of the caste system and years of 
marginalisation by local authorities have seriously affected their capacity to organise 
in pursuit of their claims. Closed participatory spaces, such as the National 
Consultation meeting in Bangalore, hinder a more pluralist debate. Although waste 
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pickers are mentioned in the MSW Rules 2016, these policies are not the result of an 
extensive debate involving the views of the waste pickers. Indian waste pickers need 
to take advantage of the current favourable moment ushered in by the SBA, where the 
issue of solid waste has been raised as a government priority; they need to use the 
new forums that have been established to encourage pluralist discussions around the 
struggle for their social and economic rights. The participatory institutional spaces 
that have emerged around the issue of waste management are the political arenas 
where tensions can be negotiated and interests advanced, and the nature of these 
political processes means that waste pickers have to organise among themselves in 
order to compete with other, far more powerful pressure groups if they wish to further 
their demands. 
 Chapter 8 Conclusion 
The purpose of the current study has been to determine how interest group 
participation shapes government decisions on the provision of solid waste 
management services in two emerging economies: India and Brazil. It has explored 
their influence from two perspectives (the specific sectoral context and the wider 
political ramifications), and argues, firstly, that the channels for public participation, 
which should empower citizens to determine the terms of delivery of this public good, 
have been appropriated by pressure groups that are often associated with the large 
corporate concerns in the sector. This means that some unaccountable and 
unrepresentative powerful economic elites (or ‘dominant coalitions’), who possess 
financial power but lack the electoral endorsement needed to formally exercise 
political power, have nevertheless been able to use the channels of public 
participation to capture and shape the agenda of the democratic state. Secondly, it 
concludes that corporate interests tend to define the distribution of public goods in 
these two countries in ways that are specific to each country. The investigation, 
therefore, has looked more deeply at the issue to reveal how the predominance of 
private involvement in decision-making impacts democracy, equality and 
development in these countries.  
The research investigated public participation in Brazil since the National Policy on 
Solid Waste (PNRS) was announced as an inclusive national policy, emerging out of 
an extensive participatory process. In India, by contrast, from the enactment of the 
Waste Rules 2000 onwards, waste management policy has appeared far more 
technocratic, with limited public consultation. However, these two different political 




quite distinct formal policymaking proceedings, key pressure groups dominate the 
decision-making process and take advantage of participatory mechanisms to advance 
their private interests in both contexts. Analysing how powerful interest groups take 
advantage of democratic channels to influence government decisions helps us 
understand how democracy works in these emerging economies. 
Comparative analysis 
In light of the research question, this study has shown that interest groups have been 
able to dominate the decision-making process of waste management reforms in both 
Brazil and India. However, as Chapters 5 and 6 showed, the decision-making 
proceedings and the activities of these groups can vary from one democratic system to 
another. A key issue in this comparative analysis is the difference between the amount 
of public consultation: there is a distinct lack of public involvement in the Indian 
ministerial decrees on waste management in comparison to the participatory debates 
promoted by the Brazilian policy-making procedure carried out by the legislative 
branch of the government. The structure of the decision-making processes determines 
how interest groups participate in the policies and how their activity influences the 
outcomes. In Brazil, where the legislature played a central role in drafting the waste 
management bills, the law has included more opportunities for pressure groups to 
participate in the decision-making process, exchanging information and putting 
forward different perspectives. However, in the Indian system, the decision-making 
was concentrated in the executive branch, which provided very few opportunities for 
an open public discussion of the bill or the inclusion of any interested parties other 




In Brazil, pressure group participation has been used as a political strategy to push the 
solid waste management issue up the government agenda and advance the PNRS in 
Congress. The evidence in section 5.2 has shown that the discourse of public 
participation has been used to overcome existing barriers inside the political system. 
According to the technical co-ordinator of the committee rapporteur, other bills on the 
subject have sunk in the past, and only a pluralist debate could reconcile antagonistic 
lobbies enough to enable negotiations to proceed. As a result, the PNRS was 
formulated after several rounds of participatory debates, and even subsequent 
measures, such as the recycling system (the Reverse Logistics Agreements – see 
section 6.3), were deliberated and decided on primarily as a result of the pressure of 
the participatory process.  
The practice of conducting participatory debates in forums established by the 
government, as well as other parallel channels of discussion, emerged with the 
promotion of the PNRS; the government encouraged diverse groups to interact with 
each other and negotiate their specific interests as part of the political process. 
Certainly, these spaces are not impartial, as not all interest groups have the power to 
influence policy outcomes, but they do provide a political arena for face-to-face 
interaction and confrontation. In fact, it is through these participatory processes that 
the Brazilian waste pickers or catadores, with the support of politicians, civil society 
and other groups, have been included in government decisions on the sector. The 
National Conference on the Environment (CNMA) (section 6.2) is another example of 
a nation-wide participatory forum involving interest groups from across the country in 
political discussions. The empirical analysis of these cases shows that pressure group 
participation has played a crucial role in the evolution of political debates around the 




It is important to bear in mind, however, that this participatory effort is not a common 
practice in all policy issues: unpopular legislation, like the recent labour reforms, anti-
corruption legislation and the austerity package, have been voted on in Congress 
without any public participation – sometimes in the middle of the night. Hence, there 
is a tension between the political processes determining how pressure groups 
participate and the different ways in which these groups, even marginalised groups, 
are able to influence policy. The debates over municipal waste management policy 
have provided a forum in which this tension is recognised and contested. 
In India, on the other hand, there are two parallel processes in the country’s waste 
reforms: the series of Waste (MSW) Rules, from 2000 up to the proposed 
amendments in 2016, and the government campaign, the Clean India Mission (SBA). 
They mark two distinct moments in the story of Indian waste reforms, where public 
participation plays a particular role in advancing the implementation of these policies 
and the inclusion of interest groups in the political process. The MSW Rules represent 
an essentially technocratic process: they were decided on behind closed doors, with 
limited public scrutiny; the campaign, however, was promoted publicly in order to 
engage the support of a wide swathe of the population.  
In the first procedure, therefore, according to empirical evidence gathered from 
interviewees, official documents and the description provided by Lavanya Rajamani 
(2007), there was little space for the public or interest groups to participate in the 
government’s decisions, and the rule-making process was restricted to high-ranking 
public officials and hand-picked experts (section 5.2). Excluded from access to any 
other alternatives, some interest groups appealed to the judiciary as a channel through 




judicial activity by both government (MoUD, 2013) and academic sources (Agarwal 
et al., 2015, Chaturvedi and Gidwani, 2011, Kaushal et al., 2012) is evidence of the 
mismatch between the solutions to the management of solid waste proposed by the 
technocrats at the central level and the range of problems the implementation of these 
solutions encountered on the ground across the country. The 2013 bill proposing an 
amendment to the MSW Rules 2000, which was barred by the High Court, and the 
National Consultation Programme in Bangalore, discussed in sections 5.2 and 6.2, 
respectively, are clear examples of the abuse of economic power by some lobby 
groups and biased participatory processes, the result of the limited space for 
contestation. 
The SBA, on the other hand, marks a turning point in this policy sector, bringing a 
popular audience to the discussions around the waste management issue. From that 
point forward, sanitation became one of the priorities of the government, particularly 
as the re-election of Prime Minister Modi to some extent relies on the success of the 
programme that he has so publicly championed (Gatade, 2015, 35). Due to the 
popularity of the campaign and the pressure of election deadlines, new participatory 
forums, and a series of business meetings promoted by associations of industrialists, 
were established to engage interest groups in discussions of the waste problem 
(section 5.2). Although recent government evidence of the successful evolution of the 
campaign lacks credibility, as it is by no means an independent evaluation, the 
campaign does appear to have the potential to achieve some significant results. 
However, as discussed in section 5.2, the support of the population has been used, in 
effect, to legitimise the actions of the government, and the citizens themselves have 
had no opportunity for political participation in the actual policy proceedings. The 




friendly and open to investment. Future research will be needed to analyse the 
government’s strategy in its handling of the tension between its need to garner 
popular support and its acquiescence to the traditional pressures of nepotism and the 
demands of the powerful coalitions that dominate certain policy areas. 
One singular group that this research has shown deserves special attention when 
discussing public participation in these countries is that of the waste pickers. The 
inclusion of the catadores in the Brazilian PNRS is a key differential between these 
countries’ decision-making processes. The structures of the decision-making process 
and the participatory spaces in Brazil have contributed to the political participation of 
the catadores. However, this does not mean the Brazilian political system is more 
socially fair than that of India. It is also important to keep in mind that catadores have 
gained in strength over the last decades in Brazil. Waste pickers’ unionism originated 
in the midst of trade union movements in the 1980s. The Workers’ Party (PT), in 
power from 2003 to 2016, emerged from that scenario; trade unionism, public 
participation and progressive policies are the basis of the party’s political agenda. 
Howlett et al. (2009: 71) claim that, although less strong than business groups, labour 
unions are also crucial pressure groups that are able to engage in the shaping of public 
policies. The activism of the catadores has definitely shaped Brazil’s solid waste 
policies, since one of the key features of the PNRS, highlighted by the literature, is its 
social and economic inclusiveness – the government created mechanisms (in the form 
of lines of credit and government bodies) to promote the effective inclusion of the 





In the case of the Indian Waste Rules 2000, however, the technocratic treatment of the 
waste issue has clearly excluded the informal sector from the political decisions over 
the last decades. Although waste pickers received legal recognition in 2006, this has 
had little impact on waste management policy, and it is only very recently that their 
role in waste management has received official mention in the new, amended MSW 
Rules 2016. However, the case of the Indian waste pickers is more complex than that 
of the Brazilian catadores: in addition to the barriers to effective collective action due 
to their diversity of cultures, languages and castes, it is difficult to conceptualise their 
fragile and fragmented political engagement in the extremely competitive neoliberal 
environment endorsed by the government. Despite many existing critiques (Gatade, 
2015; Kumar, 2014), further research is needed to fully understand the role of the 
informal sector in a government campaign such as the SBA, which claims as its 
purpose improved sanitation for all, but whose ideology is focused primarily on 
implementing pro-business measures. 
Who are the participants in these political processes? 
The major finding in this research is the limited political capacity of citizen 
participation: in addition to a corporate bias, interest group activity poses significant 
challenges for citizens’ democratic right to participate in government decisions. This 
is problematic as public participation should provide citizens with an alternative route 
into politics, enabling them to oversee the decision-makers’ activities and scrutinise 
the political processes and content of the policies. The evidence discussed in Chapter 
5, which evaluated the decision-making processes in Brazil and India, and the case 
studies of institutional spaces presented in Chapter 6, show that these political 




observed of the events that I attended during the course of the fieldwork for this 
research, the debates are extremely technical and the participants and main speakers 
are politically engaged, supporting certain specific interests, both in the case of the 4th 
CNMA and the Sectoral Agreements in Brazil and the conferences in Mumbai and 
New Delhi. In these participatory processes, leading groups dominate the debates and 
there is little space for the ordinary citizen or public interest groups to participate. In 
fact, they are usually only involved in environmental policies in the case of localised 
issues such as not-in-my-backyard (nimby) protests (Riydin and Pennington, 2000) or 
when new taxes are introduced to finance waste management services. 
The analysis of citizen participation from the perspective of interest group theory 
revealed how political and economic elites take advantage of the discourse of popular 
sovereignty to advance their interests. Although Chapter 2 discussed the distinction 
between the literatures of citizen participation and collective action, this research has 
revealed significant interrelationships between these theories. The research findings 
add substantially to our understanding of these two distinct lines of thought. The 
problem is the fact that participatory spaces, as John Gaventa (2005) discusses, which 
appear to hold the potential for civil society to gain some form of institutional channel 
for political action, have ended up reinforcing the influence of powerful interest 
groups. As Robert Dahl (1989) emphasises, ‘effective participation’ relies on ‘equal 
and adequate opportunities’ for participants to put forward their claims and support or 
oppose policy proposals in the political arena. This research has shown, however, that 
there is a very unequal balance of power between the participants involved.  
With regard to the identity of the participants in these political processes, Chapter 7 




and how their activity and organisation shapes waste reforms. In the case of interest 
groups, not all groups are potentially powerful enough to influence government 
decisions (Jordan et al., 2004). Among the groups involved in the political process, 
only some powerful, well-articulated and long-established groups in the policy sector 
have the necessary capacity to influence and control the decision-making process and 
the decision-makers. The concept of dominant coalitions or networks proposed by 
Pranab Bardhan (1998), and more recently by John Wallis (2015), contribute to the 
explanation by describing the interaction between different elite interest groups, 
government officials and the major forces influencing government decisions. In this 
sector, the major contracting companies, associations of industrialists, financial 
institutions, politicians and public administrators are the political and economic 
driving forces shaping its policies. Their members are involved at all stages of the 
political process, exchanging information and lobbying for their interests.  
As Lee Alston et al. (2016: 19) explain, in the attempt to press for policy alternatives 
that favour their members, dominant networks seek to shape the opinions and beliefs 
of interest groups; they are the main beneficiaries of the measures agreed and the 
public resources invested. The institutional participatory spaces in Brazil, mentioned 
earlier, have provided the opportunity for such interest groups to establish their 
coalitions, negotiate their conditions and receive the endorsement of the government. 
Therefore, to some extent, the participatory process legitimises government actions 
and their agreements with dominant coalitions. Andréa Gozetto and Clive Thomas 
(2014: 3) claim that the Brazilian political realm has always been characterised by the 
distribution of power between political and economic elites. Alston et al. (2016) claim 
that dominant networks play a significant role at critical moments of political 




values and institutions of the political sphere to ensure it will continue to promote 
their interests. In the period of political crisis that Brazil faces at the moment, the 
government is fragile; its lack of popular support means that is forced to rely on 
agreements with powerful groups to advance and approve its reforms. In the Indian 
political context, Pranab Bardhan (1998) employs the term ‘dominant coalitions’ to 
describe the alliances forged between corporate groups and the bureaucrats 
controlling key infrastructural policies. In his view, these are barriers that have 
constrained India’s private investment and economic growth over the last decades. In 
the end, the solid waste management policies in these countries regulate how power is 
distributed among the interest groups that claim a stake in the sector.  
This research does not suggest that public participation is a sham, or that it should not 
be supported. On the contrary, public participation enables pressure from below. 
Important social victories have often been the result of the existence of such channels 
of public participation and representation, many of them won through social 
mobilisation and activism. Authors like James Holston (2009) have shown that the 
participation of the poor is possible if the mobilisation is big enough to matter to 
policymakers. Without public participation, the most disenfranchised groups rely only 
on the will of political leaders, which risks encouraging clientelism. Moreover, many 
authors (Gaventa, 2004, Brodie et al., 2009) have stressed the potential role social 
control plays in ensuring transparency and accountability in the relationship between 
public and private forces.  
The main problem this research has revealed, however, is that informal rules provide 
disproportionate advantages to certain economic and political elites, creating 




costs to society as a whole. The analysis of the decision-making involved in waste 
management policies supports the argument of this research that the power 
relationships in these political processes affect the functioning of democracy and the 
progress of development in emerging countries. 
Interest groups and democracy 
As discussed in Chapter 2, interest group activity is inherent to liberalism and crucial 
to economic development; Grant Jordan and William Maloney (2007: 2) even suggest 
that, in many cases, it has become more representative of citizen concerns than 
political parties. Certainly, without the involvement of pressure groups, many policies 
would not have had the strength to evolve, far less be implemented (Maloney et al., 
1994). Interest groups provide information for policy formulation and reduce the 
number of conflicts and antagonist reactions that often block the decision-making 
process (Howlett at al., 2009). In addition, interest group participation is crucial to 
solving the problems of waste management. Municipal solid waste management poses 
significant challenges to countries such as Brazil and India, since the majority of local 
administrations in these countries lack the financial and technical capacity and the 
personnel to implement national policies; the private sector can therefore play an 
essential role in the provision of this public service. One of the major obstacles 
discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.3), is the fact that, in both Brazil and India, there is 
neither a consensus on nor a methodology available to implement the systems of 
reverse logistics (Brazil) and extended producer responsibility (EPR) (India), which 
have been created to structure a national recycling industry. Certainly, any debate on 
solutions to the enormous challenges of national implementation could not evolve 




are strongly affected by these policies. Therefore, only an extensive and participatory 
debate, driven by the needs of national policy implementation, could hope to bring the 
plurality of perspectives (including those of interest groups, government authorities 
and civil society) to bear on finding solutions to these challenges. 
However, interest group activity in itself represents a challenge to the democratic 
systems in these countries. Two major issues arise from the disproportionate power of 
interest groups in government decisions: the question of who participates in the 
participatory debates on government decisions (and for what reasons) and the problem 
of informal rules. Interest groups do not seek to negate democratic procedures; on the 
contrary, their competition is crucial for development and for advancing solutions. 
The danger is, however, that the government and civil society often lack the capacity 
to intervene and mediate between powerful interests, and possess limited mechanisms 
with which to eradicate, or at least inhibit, economic and political abuses in both the 
policy decision-making process and in governance. 
However, in all the cases of participatory spaces presented in Chapter 6, wealthy and 
powerful groups in both countries have been able to take advantage of these 
democratic openings to advance their own interests. Corporate interests have 
prevailed in all the policy decisions in this sector, and the interests of the ordinary 
citizen have become secondary concerns. The results of the Sectoral Agreements in 
Brazil (section 6.3) illustrate the example of neo-pluralism (defined in Chapter 2), 
where a contract is agreed between the state and a coalition of powerful industries and 
corporate retail groups to their benefit, and contrary to the interests of the large 
majority of other groups and the local governments involved. In this case, the final 




This problem becomes evident in developing countries with high levels of 
socioeconomic inequality, such as India and Brazil, where certain sectoral niches are 
dominated by coalitions of elites that are able to influence policies in order to 
maintain their privileges and protect their interests (Jayal, 2001; Bardhan, 2011). As 
discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) claims 
that the main problem in these ‘uneven democracies’ is the distance between formal 
institutions and behaviours on the ground. In order to reflect more precisely on these 
definitions, Chapter 4 has shown that both Brazil and India in fact have well-
established government institutions with which to implement solid waste management 
reforms. Indeed, this research provides evidence that both countries have far more 
comprehensive policy frameworks for waste management and environmental 
protection than even some of the more advanced industrialised nations, and their 
federal structures have established a hierarchy of government bodies responsible for 
implementing policies across the country. Moreover, the literature (Barcellos, 2004; 
Sahu, 2007) shows that the judiciary and the public prosecutors, empowered by 
environmental legislation, have played a significant role in supervising central 
government and correcting irregularities in this sector. The main problem, however, 
lies in the quality of the government institutions that hold the ultimate power to 
restrain irregularities and particularism.  
Section 6.5 has shown that the systemic deficiencies (associated with nepotism and 
clientelism) of the bureaucratic systems and political cultures in these countries are 
probably worse than the individual cases of corruption that capture the headlines 
would indicate. In both countries, in the waste management sector, the passage of 
biased public tenders using legal proceedings, and the financing of electoral 




common practices. These informal rules give the offenders disproportionate 
advantages, allowing them to benefit from their misconduct at enormous cost to 
society and the rest of the market. These issues became obvious during the fieldwork, 
when stories of nepotism kept emerging in the different cities I visited. In India, there 
are many cases of conflicts of interest involving family ties and the ‘revolving door’ 
between officials in the bureaucracy and the personnel of corporate groups. In both 
countries, some large companies operating in the solid waste management sector 
today originated from such corporate-political collusions. In addition, these groups 
are able to hire the best professional experts and lawyers in the market to defend and 
lobby for their interests. The only official mechanisms that appear able to restraint 
these irregularities are those possessed by the judiciary and public prosecutors. 
However, lobbyists and decision-makers work ceaselessly to create legal loopholes to 
allow the private sector to take advantage of ambiguities in the rules (Janaagraha, 
2012). 
The unofficial activities of institutions is a frequent complaint even among 
businessmen and public officials in the sector, particularly as it negatively affects fair 
competition in the market, the integrity of the political system and the quality of 
public services. In sum, with all the advantages that powerful institutions accrue due 
to their informal relationships with government decision-makers, in addition to their 
substantial financial resources, skilled personnel and control of information, it is 
difficult to see how public participation, which is currently hampered by the lack of 
organisation and political engagement in society at large, will overcome the power of 
these elite groups and compensate for the lack of government institutions able to 




The central claim in this thesis could only have been brought to the fore by a 
comparative analysis of the characteristics of the political processes in this sector in 
these two countries. As mentioned before, the decision-making procedures and the 
public-private relationships in these countries appear natural to the political contexts 
in which they are embedded, and it is only when the same political phenomena are 
contrasted that we can highlight the key characteristics of both political contexts and 
consider alternatives to the problems this research has revealed. Some of these 
problems include the influence of ‘revolving door’ practices on public-private 
relationships in the sector; the relatively homogeneous influence of international 
pressure groups on the sector in both countries; and the actions of the judiciary, which 
appear to provide an alternative route to compensate for social inequalities, but have 
also been misappropriated by the wealthiest groups in society. The two case studies, 
therefore, provide a rich analysis of one specific field in these two emerging 
economies. The conclusions, however, cannot be directly generalised to other 
countries, including other emerging economies, because they refer to the complex 
interplay between the actors involved and the specific historical background and 
political structures in Brazil and India. Notwithstanding these limitations, the 
approach used in this research could be extended to interest group analysis in other 
contexts, where the focus is on the effectiveness of these groups in public policies. 
Further research is needed to deepen our understanding of how the participation of 
pressure groups in government decisions affects the quality of democracy and 
development. This investigation could also be expanded to other developing countries 
with democratic polities in order to discover how corporate interests influence public 
institutions in these contexts. It is also crucial to analyse whether long-established 




accountability and the responsiveness of the government to all citizens, promote more 
balanced, publicly oriented government behaviour. In Brazil and India themselves, 
additional work is needed to understand how private interests influence other policy 
areas, investigating which are more prone to control by corporate interests. Finally, 
once the bills regulating lobbying activities (mentioned in section 6.5), which are still 
at the debate stage in these countries’ legislatures, are enacted as laws, this research 
can serve as a starting point from which to measure the impact of this legislation 
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Figure 1: Map of India with cities visited during the fieldwork 
Source: author illustration 
 
Figure 2: Map of Brazil with cities visited during the fieldwork 
Source: author illustration 
9.2 Legislative framework for special waste in India and Brazil 
Translation of the Brazilian National Policy on Solid Waste to the English language by the author: 
http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/resources/files/Pereira-Brazilian-Waste-Policy.pdf 





Solid Waste Management Rules 2016 available online at the MoEFCC website: 
http://www.moef.gov.in/sites/default/files/SWM%202016.pdf 
9.3 Interviewees 
Table 1: Interviewees in India 
Interviwee Organisation Sector 
Abhay Khobragade Bharuch Enviro Infrastructure Ltd - Unit Ahmedabad Private Sector 
Akshay Yadav SWM Roundtable Civil society 
Amit Kr. Singh A2Z Onfrastructure Ltd Private Sector 
Dr. Amiya Kumar Sahu  National Solid Waste Association of India Private Sector 
Anand Singh Bhal  Ministry of Urban and Development Government 
Anjor Bhaskar Activist Waste pickers’ organisations 
Anselm Rosario SWM Roundtable Civil society 
Arvind Bhai RWA - Charitable Trust Civil society 
Avinash Madhale Centre for Science and the Environment Civil society 
Baba Adhav Labour Union Civil society 
Bubbaljeet Kaur Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group Waste pickers’ organisations 
C. R. Kharsan Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Government 
Chikhale Dr. Antony Lara Enviro Solutions Pvt Ltd Private Sector 
Dr. Debolina Kundu  National Institute of Urban Affairs Government 
Dharmesh Shah  Activist, GAIA Waste pickers’ organisations 
Ebony Bertorelli Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy Civil society 
Imran Khan Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group Waste pickers’ organisations 
Jose Jacob Antony Lara Enviro Solutions Pvt Ltd Private Sector 
K.C. Yatish Kumar The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Government 
Dr. Kaveri Gill  IDRC Think Tank Initiative Research 
Dr. Ketaki Ghatge Pune Municipal Corporation Government 
Ketki Gadre Centre of Environment Education Civil society 
Lakshmi Narayanan SWaCH Seva Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Pune Waste pickers’ organisations 
Lokesh Chandra Joint Secretary of Ministry of Steel Government 
Dr. M. Ramachandran MoUD Government 
M. Subba Rao  Ministry of Environment and Forest Government 
Madhavi Joshi Centre of Environment Education Civil society 
Dr. Mona Iyer CEPT University Research 
Myriam Shankar SWM Roundtable Civil society 
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Dr. Nakawana  Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, South Zone Government 
Neethu Peter SWM Roundtable Civil society 
Patrick Rousseau Veolia Environment Private Sector 
Pradeep Khandelwal  Municipal Corporation of Delhi Government 
Pramod Mishra Global Waste Management Cell Pvt Ltd Private Sector 
Prashant A. Pandya Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Government 
Pratibha Sharma SWaCH Seva Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Pune Waste pickers’ organisations 
Dr. Pritpal Randhawa  Centre of Studies in Social Policy Research 
Ranjit Gadgil Parisar Civil society 
Ravi Agarwal Toxic Link Civil society 
Dr. S. R. Maley  Eco Save Systems Pvt Ltd Private Sector 
Sandya Narayanan SWM Roundtable Civil society 
Sanjay Singh IL&FS Environmental Infrastructure & Services Limited Private Sector 
Shashi B. Pandit All India Kabadi Mazdoor Mahasangh Waste pickers’ organisations 
Shashi Shekhar  Ministry of Environment and Forest Government 
Suresh Jagtap Pune Municipal Corporation Government 
Tarun Rokadiya Abellon Clean Energy Private Sector 
Tejas Shah Dr. Health Department - New Waste Zone Government 
Dr. V. Rajagopalan  Ministry of Environment and Forest Government 
Dr. V.K. Chaurasia  MoUD Government 
Vaishali Nandan Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Civil society 
Yamini Parikh Self Employed Women's Association Waste pickers’ organisations 
 
Table 2: Interviewees in Brazil 
Interviwee Organisation Sector 
Eng. Afonso Celso Teixeira 
de Moraes  Consultant, Groupe Vauchê  Private sector 
Aírton José Ruschel Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) Government 
Alessandro Massimo Biorenove Private sector 
Alex MNCR Waste pickers’ organisations 
Dr. Alexandre Barbosa  Cebrap Research 
Ana Lúcia Oliveira dos 
Santos 
Associação dos Catadores de Materiais 
Recicláveis da Ilha de Vitória 
Waste pickers’ 
organisations 
Ana Paula Bernardes ABIVIDRO Private sector 
Dr. Anne Scheinberg  WASTE, Netherlands Research 
Anonimous Catador with pushcart on the street Waste pickers’ organisations 
Antonello Moscatelli SPARK Energy Private sector 
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Arno Rui Schaly Bruno Industrial, Brazil Private sector 
City Councilor Aurélio 
Nomura City Council, São Paulo Government 
Beatriz Martins Carneiro Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior Government 
Benito Juncal Univerisadade da Bahia Research 
Carlos Alexandre Catador with pushcart on the street Waste pickers’ organisations 
Carlos Minoru Nomura Consultor técnico da Câmara Vereadores SP Government 
Carlos R. V. Silva Filho ABRELPE Private sector 
Christian Weinguny Kommunalfahrzeuge Fordertechnik Umwelttechnik (MUT), Austria Private sector 
Diógenes Del Bel ABETRE Private sector 
Dr. Eduardo Caldas  FEA/USP Research 
Eduardo Soriano Lousada MCTI Government 
Elaine Patrícia Gomes de 
Melo SEMA, Alagoas Government 
Eliene da Silva President of the COOPVILA Waste pickers’ organisations 
Ernani Ciríaco De Miranda Ministry of Cities Government 
Fábio Henrique Castro de 
Lima Piranhas, Alagoas Government 
Flávio de Miranda Ribeiro Cetesb Government 
Francisco Inácio (Xorró) COOPIRES, São Paulo Waste pickers’ organisations 
Gislaine Vilas Boas Simões Technical Advisory, City Hall of Sorocaba Government 
Gustavo Lima Novaes SLUM Government 
Helcias Pereira CEASB Waste pickers’ organisations 
Herman Huisman Msc. Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment the Netherlands Government 
Irilene Silva Alcantara Civil servant, state of Maranhão Government 
Ivanilda Gomes COOPVILA Waste pickers’ organisations 
Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) Research 
João César Filho Fernando Banco do Brasil Private sector 
João Gianesi ABLP Private sector 
José Valverde Machado 
Filho 
Technical co-ordinator of the Committee 
Rapporteur Research 
Kazuo Nakano City Hall of São Paulo Government 
Leonardo Boff Theologian Research 
Leonardo Fontes National Front of Mayors (FNP) Civil society 
Lizaldo Vieira dos Santos Movimento Popular Ecológico de Sergipe Civil society 




Marcela Belic Cherubine Observatory of Public Consortia and Federalism (OCPF) Civil society 
Marcelo Chaves Moreira Ministry of the Envirtonment (MMA) Government 
Marcius Beltrão Siqueira City Hall of Penedo Government 
Maria Alice City Council, São Paulo Government 
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Maria Amália Abreu Department of Urban Cleaning of Maceió (SLUM) Government 
Marilyn da Silva Oliveira National Health Foundation (Funasa) Government 
Maurizio Ruggi WT Energy, Italy Private sector 
Mayors of several cities Event carried out by the ICLEI in the RWM Government 
Montse Garcia IDOM, Engineering, Consulting & Architecture Private sector 
City Councilor Nabil 
Bonduki  City Council, São Paulo Government 
Nadja Department of Urban Cleaning of Maceió (SLUM) Government 
Patrícia CORESO Waste pickers’ organisations 
Pedro Paes Lira IDOM, Engineering, Consulting & Architecture Private sector 
Pierre-Yves Vauché Expert, Group Vauchê (França) Private sector 
Raimundo Nonato 
Kaxinawás Native from the Kaxinawás ethnicity, Acre Civil society 
City Councilor Ricardo 
Young City Council, São Paulo Government 
Rita de Cássia Gonsálves 
Viana CEADEC Civil society 
Roberto Laureano Rocha MNCR Waste pickers’ organisations 
Rodrigo Alves da Silva Catador with pushcart on the street Civil society 
Roland P. Greil Hitachi Zosen Inova AG, Switzland Private sector 
Ronei Alves da Silva CENTCOOP Waste pickers’ organisations 
Sara Regina SEMA, Sorocaba Government 
Silva Vieira de Brito ADERES, Espírito Santo Civil society 
Silvano Silvério AMLURB Government 
Sílvio Valdevino de Oliveira Catador, Mato Grasso Waste pickers’ organisations 
Stefan Kipp Keppel Seghers, Germany Private sector 
Tadeu Pinheiro Dias Pais Central Mecanizada de Triagem Carolina de Jesus, Amlurb 
Waste pickers’ 
organisations 
Takashi Shimakawa Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Japan Private sector 
Tayara Calina Pere São Paulo City Hall, International and Federative Affairs Government 
Telines Basilio COOPERCAPS Waste pickers’ organisations 
Thiago Xavier SEPLAN/SPE/DPT Government 
Valmir Lessa City Hall of Penedo Government 
Vicente Carlos Y Plá Trevas Sao Paulo City Hall, International and Federative Affairs Government 
Yoli Wirth Activist, Rio Grande do Sul Civil society 
 
 
 
 
